# Diwakar Nath Tripathi Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 1459
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-02-01
- **Case number:** Crl. Revision Defective No. 576 of 2023
- **Bench:** Jyotsna Sharma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/diwakar-nath-tripathi-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51277
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Limitation Act, 1963 -
Section 5 - Condonation of delay -
Revision, presented on 12.04.2023, was
reported
time-barred
by
318
days
(limitation up to 29.05.2022) - A delay
condonation application dated 11.04.2023
with supporting affidavit was filed - Upon
filing before J.R. (J) on 21.04.2023, delay
was noted as 327 days - Held, revisionist,
claims himself as social worker and RTI
activist in his application u/s 156(3)
Cr.P.C. and he cannot be treated as casual,
non-vigilant - Neither delay condonation
application nor its supporting affidavit
discloses
any
concrete
ground
or
substantiated reason for delay; averments
are vague - Revisionist failed to show
sufficient cause for condonation of delay -
Delay
condonation
application
must
disclose
proper
and
substantiated
grounds, which are absent here - Dispute
being filing of application challenging
impugned
order,
withdrawal
of
his
application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for seeking
remedy, delayed filing of present revision
without disclosing date of applying for
certified
copy
and
unsubstantiated
1460 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reasons indicate lack of seriousness in
pursuing matter - Hence, no ground exists
to condone delay. (Para 3, 22)

Revision dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,858 of 48,642. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39858 for what follows._

2 All. Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1459
nuisance to the public. The removal of the
building is so urgently required as it is
likely to fall and cause injury to
persons living or carrying on business
in the neighbourhood or passers-by.
The nuisance is the concomitant act
resulting in danger to the life or
property due to likely collapse etc. The
dangerous condition of the building is
in praesenti but not in future. The
section is limited to injuries likely to be
caused to the passers-by or persons
living or carrying on business in the
neighbourhood. Each case has to be
considered in the light of the facts and
circumstances obtained in each case."

11. The proceedings under Section
133 Cr.P.C. are summary in nature and
primarily meant to ensure removal of
nuisance and to order demolition of a
building causing nuisance in cases of
imminent danger to the public. In the
present
case
various
civil
litigation
regarding the building in question were
already pending between the parties when
the application under Section 133 Cr.P.C.
was filed. From the conduct of the
revisionist in filing the revision in the year
2001 and thereafter repetitively seeking
adjournments of the revision and not trying
to get the revision decided even after 23
years, indicates that there is no imminent
danger of the building collapsing. It
appears that the revisionist had taken
recourse to the proceedings under Section
133 Cr.P.C. to bypass adjudication of rights
in the pending civil proceedings.

12. In these circumstances, there
appears to be no illegality in the impugned
order
dated
06.06.2001
declining
to
continue the proceedings under Section 133
Cr.P.C. The revision lacks merit and the
same is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1459
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.02.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE JYOTSNA SHARMA, J.

Crl. Revision Defective No. 576 of 2023

Diwakar Nath Tripathi ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Ramesh Chandra Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, Sr. Advocate/AAG, Sri A.K.
Sand, GA, Sri Ajay Singh, AGA-I, Sri Neeraj Kant
Verma AGA, Sri Rajeev Lochan Shukla

Criminal Law - Limitation Act, 1963 -
Section 5 - Condonation of delay -
Revision, presented on 12.04.2023, was
reported
time-barred
by
318
days
(limitation up to 29.05.2022) - A delay
condonation application dated 11.04.2023
with supporting affidavit was filed - Upon
filing before J.R. (J) on 21.04.2023, delay
was noted as 327 days - Held, revisionist,
claims himself as social worker and RTI
activist in his application u/s 156(3)
Cr.P.C. and he cannot be treated as casual,
non-vigilant - Neither delay condonation
application nor its supporting affidavit
discloses
any
concrete
ground
or
substantiated reason for delay; averments
are vague - Revisionist failed to show
sufficient cause for condonation of delay -
Delay
condonation
application
must
disclose
proper
and
substantiated
grounds, which are absent here - Dispute
being filing of application challenging
impugned
order,
withdrawal
of
his
application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for seeking
remedy, delayed filing of present revision
without disclosing date of applying for
certified
copy
and
unsubstantiated
1460 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reasons indicate lack of seriousness in
pursuing matter - Hence, no ground exists
to condone delay. (Para 3, 22)

Revision dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy : (1998)
7 SCC 123, (Paras 9 to 13)

2. Lanka Venkateswarlu Vs St. of A.P. : (2011) 4
SCC 363, (Paras 20, 23, 28, 29)

3. Maniben Devraj Shah Vs Municipal Corpn. of
Brihan Mumbai : (2012) 5 SCC 157, (Paras 19,
23, 24)

4. Basawaraj Vs Land Acquisition Officer :
(2013) 14 SCC 81, (Paras 9 to 12, 15)

5. Majji Sannemma Vs Reddy Sridevi : (2021) 18
SCC 384, (Paras 6.2, 7, 8

6. Sheo Raj Singh Vs U.O.I. : (2023) 10 SCC
531, (Para 31, 32)

7. Aleque Padamsee Vs U.O.I.: 2007 (6) SCC
171, (Para 7)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Jyotsna
Sharma, J.)

Order
on
Crl.
Misc.
Delay
Condonation Application No. 1 of 2023

1. List revised.

2. The present revision U/s 397/401
Cr.P.C. has been filed before this Court by
the revisionist Diwakar Nath Tripathi with
the following prayers:-

"It is, therefore, most respectfully
prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
graciously be pleased to summon the lower
Courts record, allow the present Revision
and be pleased to set aside the Judgment
and Order dated 04.09.2021, passed by the
Learned
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate, Court No. 17, Allahabad,
C.N.R. No. 2750/2021, Misc Case No. - 102
/ X II / 2021, Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs.
Keshav
Prasad
Maurya,
P.S.
Cantt,
District-
Prayagraj
by
which
the
application filed by the revisionist U/S
156(3) Cr.P.C. was rejected otherwise the
Revisionist shall suffer irreparable loss and
injury."

3. The revision was presented before
the
Section
Officer,
Stamp
Reporter
(Criminal) High Court, Allahabad on
12.04.2023 and was reported to be in
limitation upto 29.05.2022 and thus beyond
time by 318 days. A delay condonation
application dated 11.04.2023 supported by
an affidavit dated 10.04.2023 of the
revisionist
has
been
filed
with
it.
Subsequently the revision after being
presented for reporting was then presented
before J.R. (J) (Computer), High Court
Allahabad on 21.04.2023 for its filing after
which it was marked to be beyond time by
327 days.

4. Previously the applicant had filed a
Crl. Misc. Application U/s 482 No. 27198
of 2021 (Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State
of U.P. and another) which after some
arguments was prayed to be dismissed as
withdrawn by learned counsel appearing
therein as he intended to explore the
remedy available to him under law and as
such the same was dismissed as withdrawn
by this Court. The said order dated
24.11.2022 reads as under:-

"List revised.

Heard Sri Kamal Krishna Roy, learned
counsel for the applicant, Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi,
learned
Senior
Advocate/Additional
Advocate
General
assisted by Sri A.K. Sand, learned AGA for
2 All. Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1461
the State. The present applicant under
Section 482 Cr.P.C has been filed by the
applicant with the following prayer:-
"It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed
that
this
Hon'ble
Court
may
most
graciously be pleased to allow this
application
to
quash/set
aside
the
impugned order dated 04.09.2021 passed
by
Addl.
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Allahabad in CNR No.2750 of 2021 Misc.
Case
No.102/XII/2021
Diwakar
Nath
Tripathi Police Station Cantt. District
Prayagraj and also stay the operation of
order dated 04.09.2021 and further direct
to the learned Magistrate to exercise their
power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and
direct to lodge the first information report,
during the pendency of present application
Under Section 482 Cr.P. before this Hon'ble
Court, otherwise the applicants shall suffer
grave irreparable loss and injury."

The applicant is the complainant of
the case.

After some arguments, learned counsel
for the applicant prays that the present
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. be
dismissed as withdrawn as he intends to
explore the remedy available to him under
law.

The prayer is allowed.

The present application under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed as withdrawn."

The order is annexed as annexure 1 to
the affidavit in support of the criminal
revision.

5. Vide order dated 21.11.2023 passed
by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, notice
was issued to the respondent no.2 on the
delay condonation application. The said
order reads as under:-

"Heard learned counsel for the
revisionist and Sri P.K. Giri, learned
Additional Advocate General along with
learned A.G.A. for the State.

This criminal revision has been
filed with delay of 327 days.

Issue notice to the respondent
no.2 returnable at an early date for hearing
on delay condonation application filed
under Section 5 Limitation Act.

The opposite parties may file
counter affidavit within four weeks.

Put up on 21.12.2023 as fresh."

6. Heard Sri Ramesh Chandra
Dwivedi,
learned
counsel
for
the
revisionist, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, Senior
Advocate / learned Additional Advocate
General,
Sri
A.K.
Sand,
learned
Government
Advocate,
Sri
Ajay
Singh, learned Additional Government
Advocate-I
and
Sri
Neeraj
Kant
Verma,
learned
Additional
Government Advocate for the State of
U.P. and Sri Rajeev Lochan Shukla,
learned counsel for the opposite party
no.2/ Keshav Prasad Maurya and
perused the records.

7. Learned counsel for the revisionist
argued that the delay in filing of the present
revision is not wilful. It is argued that due
to the illness of the revisionist he could not
file the revision in time and as such
the same was reported to be delayed.
It is argued that the reasons for
delayed filing of the revision have
been pleaded in paras 3 to 7 of the
affidavit in support of the application
for condonation of delay. It is argued
that the reasons as pleaded in the said
paragraphs go to show that their has
been no deliberate delay in filing of
the present revision and as such the
delay condonation may be allowed and
the revision be treated to have been
filed in time.
1462 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. Per contra, learned counsels
appearing for the Respondent No. 1/ State
of U.P and learned counsel for the
Respondent No. 2/ Keshav Prasad Maurya
vehemently opposed the delay condonation
application and submitted that the filing of
the revision is with malafides. It is argued
that the delay in filing of it is without any
justifiable reason. It is argued that the
reasons as pleaded in the affidavit in
support
of
the
delay
condonation
application are totally vague, without any
justifiable reason and go to show the
casualness of the revisionist in filing of the
present revision. It is argued that the
present revision is barred by limitation and
there is also no cause in it serving a fruitful
purpose which could be considered for
condoning the unexplained delay and
latches. It is argued that the delay
condonation application be dismissed.

9. A delay condonation application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
dated 11.04.2023 has been filed by the
revisionist with the following prayers:

"It
is,
therefore,
Most
Respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may kindly be pleased to condone the delay, if any,
occurred in filing the present Criminal Revision and
further kindly hear the matter on merit, otherwise the
Revisionist shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.

And/or to pass such other and further order
which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in
the circumstances of the case."

10. In the affidavit dated 10.04.2023 in support of
the delay condonation application, paras 3 to 7 have
been averred as the reasons for the delay in filing of the
present revision. The said paragraphs read as under:-

"3. That in Criminal Misc. Application No.
27198 of 2021, the Hon'ble Court passed an Order on
24.11.2022 mentioning therein that the present
Application be dismissed as withdrawn as the Applicant
intends to explore the remedy available to him.

4. That thereafter the Applicant decided to
challenge the Impugned Order dated 04.09.2021 by
filing Criminal Revision and applied for the certified
copy of the Order which could be available 02.02.2023.

5. That thereafter the Applicant fell ill
suffering from dengue which lasted for two months from
the first week of February to the first week of April in
which he was taking treatment and advised bed rest.

6. That a valuable time has passed in
recovery of the Petitioner/Applicant from the prolonged
illness.

7. That the reason for filing the Criminal
Revision in delay is genuine and bona-fide and not
intentional."

11. The order impugned in the present revision is
an order dated 04.09.2021 passed by the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 17, Allahabad in
Criminal Case No. 102/XII/2021 (Diwakar Nath
Tripathi Vs. Keshav Prasad Maurya), Police Station
Cantt, District Prayagraj by which an application moved
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. of the revisionist has been
rejected.

12. The perusal of the grounds as
averred in the affidavit in support of the
delay condonation application goes to show
that
the
revisionist
states
that
his
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was
dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated
24.11.2022 since he intended to explore the
remedy available to him after which he
decided to challenge the impugned order
dated 04.09.2021 by filing a criminal
revision and applied for the certified copy
of the same which could be available to
him on 02.02.2023. Thereafter he fell ill
suffering from dengue since last two
months from 1st week of February to 1st
week of April and was taking treatment and
advised bed rest. His valuable time passed
in the recovery from the prolonged illness,
the reason for filing the criminal revision
2 All. Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1463
with delay is genuine and bonafide and not
intentional.

13. The perusal of the said paragraphs
go to show that except for the bald
statement of the deponent of the affidavit in
support
of
the
delay
condonation
application who is the revisionist himself,
there is no material concrete in any nature
to substantiate his averments. Moreso para
4 of the affidavit although mentions the
date on which the order impugned could be
made available to him which is mentioned
therein as 02.02.2023 but there is no
disclosure whatsoever as to on which date
the certified copy of it was applied for, the
date when it was ready for being issued and
the date on which it was notified to be
ready for being issued. The said events and
facts have conveniently been avoided. The
order impugned is from page 15 to 19 of
the paper book which is along with the
memo of the revision. A perusal of the
same would go to show that the certified
copy of the same was applied for by an
Advocate on 02.02.2023, the same was
ready on the same day i.e. 02.02.2023 and
even the same was issued on the same day i.e.
02.02.2023. In between the other formalities for it
were also done on the same day. The calculation
of the period of limitation was thus counted by the
Stamp Reporter of this Court who give his report
that the revision is beyond time by 318 days upto
12.04.2023 which was the date of the said report.
Even otherwise the 482 Cr.P.C. petition filed by
the revisionist was got dismissed as withdrawn on
24.11.2022 after which the certified copy and the
order impugned was applied for as late as on
02.02.2023. The law with regards to the
consideration of an application for condonation of
delay is trite.

14. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
empowers a Court to condone delay in filing a
motion before it. It reads as under:

"5. Extension of prescribed period in
certain cases.- Any appeal or any application,
other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.

Explanation.-The
fact
that
the
appellant or the applicant was misled by any
order, practice or judgment of the High Court in
ascertaining or computing the prescribed period
may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this
section."

15. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy : (1998) 7 SCC 123 the Apex
Court has held that exercise of discretion in
condoning delay should be on satisfactory
grounds, acceptable explanation and a party
should not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their
remedy promptly. It is held as follows:

"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of
delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section
5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such
discretion can be exercised only if the delay is
within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range
may be uncondonable due to a want of
acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases, delay of a very long range can
be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the court accepts the
explanation as sufficient, it is the result of
positive exercise of discretion and normally
the superior court should not disturb such
finding,
much
less
in
revisional
jurisdiction,
unless
the
exercise
of
discretion
was
on
wholly
untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
different matter when the first court refuses
to condone the delay. In such cases, the
1464 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
superior court would be free to consider the
cause shown for the delay afresh and it is
open to such superior court to come to its
own finding even untrammelled by the
conclusion of the lower court.

10. The reason for such a
different stance is thus:

The primary function of a court is
to adjudicate the dispute between the
parties and to advance substantial justice.
The time-limit fixed for approaching the
court in different situations is not because
on the expiry of such time a bad cause
would transform into a good cause.

11. Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of parties. They
are meant to see that parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The law of limitation
fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for
the redress of the legal injury so suffered.
Time is precious and wasted time would
never revisit. During the efflux of time,
newer causes would sprout up necessitating
newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a lifespan must
be fixed for each remedy. Unending period
for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential
anarchy. The law of limitation is thus
founded on public policy. It is enshrined in
the maxim interest republican up sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a
period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties. They are meant to see
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics
but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is
that every legal remedy must be kept alive
for a legislatively fixed period of time.

12. A court knows that refusal to
condone delay would result in foreclosing a
suitor from putting forth his cause. There is
no presumption that delay in approaching
the court is always deliberate. This Court
has held that the words "sufficient cause"
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
should receive a liberal construction so as
to
advance
substantial
justice
vide
Shakuntala Devi Jainv. Kuntal Kumari
[AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006]
and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah
Municipality [(1972) 1 SCC 366 : AIR
1972 SC 749].

13. It must be remembered that in
every case of delay, there can be some
lapse on the part of the litigant concerned.
That alone is not enough to turn down his
plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides
or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory
strategy, the court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor. But when there
is reasonable ground to think that the delay
was occasioned by the party deliberately to
gain time, then the court should lean
against acceptance of the explanation.
While condoning the delay, the court
should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind that he
is a loser and he too would have incurred
quite large litigation expenses. It would be
a salutary guideline that when courts
condone the delay due to laches on the part
of the applicant, the court shall compensate
the opposite party for his loss."

16.

In
the
case
of
Lanka
Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. : (2011) 4
SCC 363 the Apex Court reiterated the
view as take in the case of N. Balakrishnan
(supra) and further held that once a
valuable right has accrued in favour of one
party as a result of the failure of the other
party to explain the delay by showing
sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will
be unreasonable to take away that right on
the
mere
asking
of
the
applicant,
2 All. Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1465
particularly when the delay is directly a
result of negligence, default or inaction of
that party and further that Justice must be
done to both parties equally. It was held as
follows:

"20. In N. Balakrishnan [(1998)
7 SCC 123] this Court again reiterated the
principle that: (SCC p. 127, para 11)

"11. Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of parties. They
are meant to see that [the] parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their
remedy promptly."

*****************************

23. The concepts of liberal
approach and reasonableness in exercise of
the discretion by the courts in condoning
delay, have been again stated by this Court
in Balwant Singh [(2010) 8 SCC 685 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537] , as follows: (SCC
p. 696, paras 25-26)

"25. We may state that even if the
term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal
construction, it must squarely fall within
the concept of reasonable time and proper
conduct of the party concerned. The
purpose of introducing liberal construction
normally is to introduce the concept of
'reasonableness' as it is understood in its
general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a
substantive
law
and
has
definite
consequences on the right and obligation of
a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles
should
be
adhered
to
and
applied
appropriately depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Once a
valuable right has accrued in favour of one
party as a result of the failure of the other
party to explain the delay by showing
sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will
be unreasonable to take away that right on
the
mere
asking
of
the
applicant,
particularly when the delay is directly a
result of negligence, default or inaction of
that party. Justice must be done to both
parties equally. Then alone the ends of
justice can be achieved. If a party has been
thoroughly negligent in implementing its
rights and remedies, it will be equally
unfair to deprive the other party of a
valuable right that has accrued to it in law
as a result of his acting vigilantly."

*****************************

28. We are at a loss to fathom any
logic or rationale, which could have
impelled the High Court to condone the
delay after holding the same to be
unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal
approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" cannot be employed
to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially, in cases where the court
concludes that there is no justification for
the delay. In our opinion, the approach
adopted by the High Court tends to show
the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to
maintain
whilst
adjudicating
any lis
between the parties. We are rather pained
to notice that in this case, not being
satisfied with the use of mere intemperate
language, the High Court resorted to
blatant sarcasms.

29. The use of unduly strong
intemperate or extravagant language in a
judgment has been repeatedly disapproved
by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst
considering applications for condonation
of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and
unbridled
discretionary
powers.
All
discretionary powers, especially judicial
powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a
systematic manner informed by reason.
Whims
or
fancies;
prejudices
or
1466 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
predilections cannot and should not form
the basis of exercising discretionary
powers."

17. In Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai :
(2012) 5 SCC 157 the Apex Court held that
if the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay. It was held as
follows:

"19. In P.K. Ramachandran v.
State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556], this
Court while reversing the order passed by
the High Court which had condoned 565
days' delay in filing an appeal by the State
against the decree of the Sub-Court in an
arbitration application, observed that:
(SCC p. 558, para 6)

"6. Law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes and the courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds."

*****************************

23. What needs to be emphasised
is that even though a liberal and justiceoriented approach is required to be
adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
similar statutes, the courts can neither
become oblivious of the fact that the
successful litigant has acquired certain
rights on the basis of the judgment under
challenge and a lot of time is consumed at
various stages of litigation apart from the
cost.

24. What colour the expression
"sufficient cause" would get in the factual
matrix of a given case would largely
depend on bona fide nature of the
explanation. If the court finds that there has
been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the
delay does not lack bona fides, then it may
condone the delay. If, on the other hand,
the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it
would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
not to condone the delay."

18.

In
Basawaraj
v.
Land
Acquisition Officer : (2013) 14 SCC 81
the Apex Court held that "sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted
in a negligent manner or there was a want
of bonafide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has "not acted
diligently" or "remained inactive". It was
further held that the applicant must satisfy
the court that he was prevented by any
"sufficient cause" from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation
is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay, the
court has to examine whether the mistake is
bonafide or was merely a device to cover
an ulterior purpose. It was held as under:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause
for which the defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word
"sufficient"
is
"adequate"
or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary
to answer the purpose intended. Therefore,
the word "sufficient" embraces no more
than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish
the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined
from
the
viewpoint
of
a
reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, "sufficient cause" means that
the party should not have acted in a
2 All. Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1467
negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has "not acted
diligently"
or
"remained
inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the
court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation
is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The
court has to examine whether the mistake is
bona fide or was merely a device to cover
an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land
and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v.
A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR
1970 SC 1953], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3
SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011
SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai
[(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24
: AIR 2012 SC 1629].)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra
Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a "good
cause" and a "sufficient cause" and
observed that every "sufficient cause" is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with
on a lesser degree of proof than that of
"sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient
cause"
should
be
given
a
liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial
justice is done, but onlyso long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula
is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal
[(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and
Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3
SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201].)

12.
It
is
a
settled
legal
proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court
has no power to ignore that provision to
relieve what it considers a distress resulting
from its operation." The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice
but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means "the law is hard but it is the
law", stands attracted in such a situation.
It
has
consistently
been
held
that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.
*****************************
15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party
is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay
by
imposing
any
condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
1468 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."

19. Further in Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi : (2021) 18 SCC 384 the
Apex Court while referring to its various
judgments has held that that in the absence
of
reasonable,
satisfactory
or
even
appropriate
explanation
for
seeking
condonation of delay, the same is not to be
condoned lightly. It has been held as follows:

"6.2. We have gone through the
averments in the application for the condonation
of delay. There is no sufficient explanation for the
period from 15-3-2017 till the second appeal was
preferred in the year 2021. In the application
seeking condonation of delay it was stated that she
is aged 45 years and was looking after the entire
litigation and that she was suffering from health
issues and she had fallen sick from 1-1-2017 to
15-3-2017 and she was advised to take bed rest
for the said period. However, there is no
explanation for the period after 15-3-2017. Thus,
the period of delay from 15-3-2017 till the second
appeal was filed in the year 2021 has not at all
been explained. Therefore, the High Court has not
exercised the discretion judiciously.

7. At this stage, a few decisions of this
Court on delay in filing the appeal are referred to
and considered as under:

7.1. In Ramlal [Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39 : (1962)
2 SCR 762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] , it is observed
and held as under : (AIR pp. 363-64, para 7)

"7. In construing Section 5 it is
relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of the period of limitation prescribed
for making an appeal gives rise to a right in
favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as
binding between the parties. In other words, when
the period of limitation prescribed has expired the
decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the
law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond
challenge, and this legal right which has accrued
to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be
light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration
which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause
for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to
the court to condone delay and admit the appeal.
This discretion has been deliberately conferred on
the court in order that judicial power and
discretion in that behalf should be exercised to
advance substantial justice. As has been observed
by the Madras High Court in Krishna v.
Chathappan [Krishna v. Chathappan, 1889
SCC OnLine Mad 1] : (SCC OnLine Mad
para 2)

'2. ... Section 5 gives the Court a
discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is
to be exercised in the way in which judicial
power and discretion ought to be exercised
upon principles which are well understood;
the words "sufficient cause" receiving a
liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice when no negligence nor
inaction nor want of bona fides is
imputable to the appellant.' "

7.2. In P.K. Ramachandran [P.K.
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556], while refusing to condone the
delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the
absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even
appropriate
explanation
for
seeking
condonation of delay, the same is not to be
condoned lightly. It is further observed that
the law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. It is further observed that while
2 All. Diwakar Nath Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1469
exercising discretion for condoning the
delay, the court has to exercise discretion
judiciously.

7.3. In Pundlik Jalam Patil
[Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC
(Civ) 907], it is observed as under : (SCC
p. 450)

"... the laws of limitation are
founded on public policy. Statutes of
limitation are sometimes described as
"statutes of peace". An unlimited and
perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of
limitation is essential for public order. The
principle is based on the maxim "interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the
interest of the State requires that there
should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to
ensure private justice suppressing fraud
and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing
time-limit for litigation is based on public
policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for
the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics but avail their legal
remedies
promptly.
Salmond
in
his
Jurisprudence states that the laws come to
the assistance of the vigilant and not of the
sleepy."

7.4. In Basawaraj [Basawaraj v.
LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81], it is observed
and held by this Court that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously
based
on
facts
and
circumstances of each case. It is further
observed that the expression "sufficient
cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party. It is further
observed that even though limitation may
harshly affect rights of a party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. It is further observed
that in case a party has acted with
negligence, lack of bona fides or there is
inaction then there cannot be any justified
ground for condoning the delay even by
imposing conditions. It is observed that
each application for condonation of delay
has to be decided within the framework laid
down by this Court. It is further observed
that if courts start condoning delay where
no sufficient cause is made out by imposing
conditions then that would amount to
violation
of
statutory principles
and
showing utter disregard to legislature.

7.5. In Pundlik Jalam Patil
[Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC
(Civ) 907], it is observed by this Court that
the court cannot enquire into belated and
stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay
defeats equity. The courts help those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights".

8. Applying the law laid down by
this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the
facts of the case on hand and considering
the averments in the application for
condonation of delay, we are of the opinion
that as such no explanation much less a
sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had
been offered by Respondents 1 and 2
herein-appellants before the High Court
for condonation of huge delay of 1011 days
in preferring the second appeal. The High
Court is not at all justified in exercising its
discretion to condone such a huge delay.
The High Court has not exercised the
discretion judiciously. The reasoning given
by the High Court while condoning huge
delay of 1011 days is not germane.
Therefore, the High Court has erred in
condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in
preferring the appeal by Respondents 1 and
2 herein-original defendants. Impugned
1470 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order [Reddy Sridevi v. Majji Sannemma,
2021 SCC OnLine AP 3977] passed by the
High Court is unsustainable both, on law
as well as on facts."

20. Then in the case of Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India : (2023) 10 SCC
531 the Apex Court has held that there is a
distinction between "explanation" and
"excuse" and held that care must be taken
to distinguish them and each case for
condonation of delay based on existence or
absence of sufficient cause has to be
decided on its own facts. It was held as
under:

"31. Sometimes, due to want of
sufficient cause being shown or an
acceptable explanation being proffered,
delay of the shortest range may not be
condoned whereas, in certain other cases,
delay of long periods can be condoned if
the
explanation
is
satisfactory
and
acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an "explanation" and
an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed
to give someone all of the facts and lay out
the cause for something. It helps clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and
allows the person to point out that
something that has happened is not his
fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must,
however, be taken to distinguish an
"explanation" from an "excuse".