# Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr. Opp. Party

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 600
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-04-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 650 of 2014
- **Bench:** Brij Raj Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-ansar-ahmad-khan-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-opp-party-48276
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - The Court did not find any
reason for interference in the judgment of the
lower court as the St.ment of the prosecutrix
against the revisionist is clear. The Court upheld
the law that in heinous crime like rape, a single
testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient for
conviction. (Para 18)
4 All. Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
601
Revision Dismissed. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

600 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
she does not remarry. Relevant paragraphs
29 and 30 of the judgment are extracted
below:-

 " 29. Cumulative reading of the
relevant portions of judgments of this Court
in Danial Latifi (supra) and Iqbal Bano
(supra) would make it crystal clear that
even a divorced Muslim woman would be
entitled to claim maintenance from her
divorced husband, as long as she does not
remarry. This being a beneficial piece of
legislation, the benefit thereof must accrue
to the divorced Muslim women.

30. In the light of the aforesaid
discussion, the impugned orders are hereby
set aside and quashed. It is held that even if
a Muslim woman has been divorced, she
would be entitled to claim maintenance
from her husband under Section 125 of the
Cr.P.C. after the expiry of period of iddat
also, as long as she does not remarry."

12. In view of the aforesaid
judgement of Sabana Bano (Supra), I
have no hesitation in holding that the view
taken by the revisional Court is contrary to
the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme
Court. The revisionist no.1 being a
divorced Muslim women was entitled to
claim maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C. There is no illegality in the order
passed by the trial Court.

13. Accordingly, the impugned order
passed by the learned revisional Court is
set-aside in view of law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Sabana
Bano (supra).

14. While passing the judgment, this
Court has noticed that the maintenance has
been awarded to the revisionist under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. from the date of the
order, which according to recent judgment
of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh vs.
Neha and another reported in (2021) 2 SCC
324, should be paid from the date of
application filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
and therefore, judgment being retrospective
in nature is applicable in present case.

15. Hence, the order passed by the
learned trial court dated 23.1.2007 is also
modified to the extent that the revisionist
shall be paid maintenance by respondent
no.2 from the date of filing of the
application under Section 125 Cr.PC. Any
amount already paid during the pendency
of the proceedings under Section 125
Cr.P.C. by respondent no.2 shall be
adjusted.

16.

The
present
revision
is,
accordingly, allowed.
----------
(2022)04ILR A600
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Criminal Revision No. 650 of 2014

Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Arun Sinha, Siddharth Sinha

Counsel for the Opp. Party:
Govt. Advocate

A. Criminal Law - The Court did not find any
reason for interference in the judgment of the
lower court as the St.ment of the prosecutrix
against the revisionist is clear. The Court upheld
the law that in heinous crime like rape, a single
testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient for
conviction. (Para 18)
4 All. Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
601
Revision Dismissed. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Anjan Kumar Sarma Vs St. of Assam (2017)
14 SCC 359

2. Brijendra Singh & ors Vs St. of Raj. (2017) 7
SCC 706

3. Arjun Marik & ors. Vs St. of Bihar 1994 Supp.
(2) SCC 372

4. Hardeep Singh Vs St. of Punj. (2014) 3 SCC
92

5. Ravindra Nath Mishra Vs St. of U.P.
Application under Section 482 bearing No. 6936
of 2019

6. St. of Mah. Vs Chandraprakash Kewal chand
Jain AIR 1990 SC 658

7. St. of U.P. Vs Pappu @ Yunus & anr. AIR 2005
SC 1248

8. St. of Pun. Vs Gurmit Singh & ors. AIR 1996
SC 1393

9. St. of Orissa Vs Thakara Besra & anr. AIR
2002 SC 1963

10. St. of H.P. Vs Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC
622

11. Wahid Khan Vs St. of M.P. (2010) 2 SCC 9

12. Rameshwar Vs St. of Raj. AIR 1952 SC 54

13. Phool Singh Vs The St. of M.P. Criminal
Appeal No. 1520 of 2021
(Delivered by Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Arun Sinha, learned
counsel for the revisionist and Sri Ravish
Chandra Mishra, learned AG.A. for the
State and perused the record.

2. This Criminal Revision has been
filed for setting aside the summoning order
dated 03.07.2013 passed by Additional
District
&
Sessions
Judge,
TECP-3,
Lucknow in S.T. No.552/2012, State versus
Deepak Verma arising out of Case Crime
No.14/2012
of
Police
Station-Para,
Lucknow summoning the revisionist as
accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to face
trial under Section 366/323/343/506 I.P.C.

3. The A.P.O. had moved application
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. with averment
that P.W. 1 - Jahanvi Yadav, P.W.2-Smt.
Pammi Yadav and P.W.3-Km. Aarti have
been examined by the court and their cross
examination have also been recorded. The
application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is
made to the effect that after looking into
the statement of P.W.2- Arti recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the court,
the complicity of Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan
in furtherance of the offence is found.
Therefore, a prayer was made to summon
the revisionist for trial. It has been further
submitted that in the case of rape, no other
evidence is required and the statement of
the
prosecutrix
is
sufficient.
The
prosecutrix had stated that the accused
Deepak Verma had brought her to the clinic
of Dr. A.A. Khan, the revisionist on the
pretext that he will provide job to her with
good emolument. She reached to the clinic
of the revisionist at 6:00 p.m., where they
asked her to go to the operation theater,
which was situated in the basement. When
she reached to the operation theater,
nobody was present there. When she
protested and asked them to allow her to
go, she was beaten by the revisionist and
Deepak Verma. As per statement of the
prosecutrix, she was caught hold by the
doctor i.e. the revisionist. She further stated
that she heard the arguments between the
revisionist-Dr. A.A. Khan and Deepak
Verma and they were having dispute on the
question that who will firstly commit
602 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sexual intercourse with her. On the
application of the public prosecutor, the
court had summoned the revisionist by
order dated 03.07.2013.

4. Learned counsel for the revisionist
has submitted that I.O. investigated the
matter and collected the evidence and
submitted his report. However, he did not
find any evidence against the revisionist
and the chargesheet was only filed against
the co-accused Deepak Verma. He has
submitted that on the date of occurrence,
the revisionist had gone to Delhi alongwith
his patient. He has produced the train
ticket, chart of the railway, the statement of
the patient, who had accompanied along
with Dr. A.A.Khan at Delhi. Statement of
the patient was recorded and the I.O. found
that on the date of occurrence, the
revisionist was not present at the place of
occurrence and he was falsely implicated,
hence, charge-sheet was filed only against
Deepak Verma, the co-accused. He further
submitted
that
while
issuing
the
summoning order, the court below has
overlooked the material of the charge-sheet
collected by the I.O.

5. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the revisionist has
placed reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Anjan Kumar Sarma versus State of
Assam; (2017) 14 SCC 359, Brijendra
Singh and others versus State of
Rajasthan; (2017) 7 SCC 706, Arjun
Marik and others versus State of
Bihar;
1994
Supp.(2)
SCC
372,
Hardeep
Singh
versus
State
of
Punjab;(2014) 3 SCC 92 and one
judgment passed by this Court in
Application under Section 482 bearing
No.6936
of
2019(Ravindra
Nath
Mishra versus State of U.P. ).

6. In the case of Brijendra Singh
(supra), which is a matter pertaining to
Section 319 Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has laid parameter in Para 14 and 15
of the decision. The Supreme Court has
observed that the evidence recorded during
the trial should be credible for commission
of offence. Once the I.O. had collected the
plethora of evidence and there is no act of
commission of offence found against the
person the trial court was at least duty
bound to look into the same while forming
opinion to summon. The relevant paragraph
14 and 15 are quoted below:

"14. When we translate the aforesaid
principles with their application to the facts
of this case, we gather an impression that
the trial court acted in a casual and cavalier
manner in passing the summoning order
against the appellants. The appellants were
named in the FIR. Investigation was carried
out by the police. On the basis of material
collected during investigation, which has
been referred to by us above, the IO found
that these appellants were in Jaipur city
when the incident took place in Kanaur, at
a distance of 175 km. The complainant and
others who supported the version in the FIR
regarding alleged presence of the appellants
at the place of incident had also made
statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to the
same effect. Notwithstanding the same, the
police investigation revealed that the
statements of these persons regarding the
presence of the appellants at the place of
occurrence was doubtful and did not inspire
confidence, in view of the documentary and
other
evidence
collected
during
the
investigation, which depicted another story
and clinchingly showed that appellants plea
of alibi was correct.

15. This record was before the trial
court. Notwithstanding the same, the trial
court went by the deposition of complainant
4 All. Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
603
and some other persons in their examinationin-chief, with no other material to support
their so- called verbal/ocular version. Thus,
the "evidence" recorded during trial was
nothing more than the statements which were
already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
recorded at the time of investigation of the
case. No doubt, the trial court would be
competent to exercise its power even on the
basis of such statements recorded before it in
examination-in-chief. However, in a case like
the present where plethora of evidence was
collected by the IO during investigation
which suggested otherwise, the trial court
was at least duty bound to look into the same
while forming prima facie opinion and to see
as to whether much stronger evidence than
mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants)
complicity has come on record. There is no
satisfaction of this nature. Even if we
presume that the trial court was not apprised
of the same at the time when it passed the
order (as the appellants were not on the scene
at that time), what is more troubling is that
even when this material on record was
specifically brought to the notice of the High
Court in the Revision Petition filed by the
appellants, the High Court too blissfully
ignored the said material. Except reproducing
the discussion contained in the order of the
trial court and expressing the agreement
therewith, nothing more has been done. Such
orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny."

7. Similarly, it has been argued by the
counsel for the revisionist that the ratio in
case of Arjun Marik (supra) is also
applicable to the case in hand and he has
relied upon the relevant portion of the said
judgment which is quoted below:

"Thus the evidence that the appellant
had gone to Sitaram in the evening of 19-71985 and had stayed in the night at the
house of deceased Sitaram is very shaky
and inconclusive. Even if it is accepted that
they were there it would at best amount to
be the evidence of the appellants having
been seen last together with the deceased.
But it is settled law that the only
circumstance of last seen will not complete
the chain of circumstances to record the
finding that it is consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and,
therefore, no conviction on that basis alone
can be founded."

8. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has
submitted that in case of rape, single
testimony of prosecutrix is sufficient for
conviction. The prosecutrix has specifically
mentioned the name of the revisionist, who
injected her due to which she became
unconscious. She has further stated that she
was beaten by Dr. A.A.Khan. Thus, since
the evidence is made out against the
revisionist and there is direct evidence of
the Act of the commission of offence,
therefore, revision is liable to be dismissed.

9. The prosecutrix was brought before
the court and her statement was recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 27.02.2012.
She stated before the Court that co-accused
Deepak made promise to get her employed
in the Clinic of Dr.A.A. Khan(revisionist),
who will provide her sufficient salary. She
has stated that she reached at the clinic of
Dr.Khan at 6:00 p.m. on 23.01.2012, where
Dr.Khan and co-accused Deepak Verma
had beaten her and threatened to kill her.
She further mentioned that Deepak Verma
committed rape with her in the clinic of Dr.
A.A. Khan. She has further stated that
when
she
shouted
Dr.Khan
injected
anesthesia and she was kept in confinement
for seven days. The said statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. clearly indicates the
direct evidence against the revisionist. The
prosecutrix Km.Aarti was examined before
604 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Court and her statement is quoted
below:

"uke & dq0 vkjrh mez & 18 o"kZ iq=h Jh
eqUuk] fuoklh & e0uz0&31@4 dk'khjke dkyksuh] ikjk
Fkkuk ikjk] ftyk&y[kuÅ us l'kiFk c;ku fn;k fd
&

?kVuk fnukad 23-1-2012 le; 6-00 cts 'kke dh
gS] ml fnu eSa Dyhfud ij tkWc djus dbZ FkhA MkW0
'kqHke Dyhfud ij eSa dke djrh Fkh] ogk¡ ij MkW0
,0,0 [kku o nhid oekZ ogka vkrs FksA nhid oekZ us
eq>ls dgk fd rqEgs fdruh ru[okg feyrh gSA eSaus
crk;k fd 2000@& :0 ;gka feyrk gSA og dgus
yxk fd vxj rqEgs dke djuk gS rks esjs ;gka dj yks
ogka nksxquk iSlk feysxkA ml gkfLiVy dk uke ohul
uflZax gkse gSA 23 rkjh[k dks ?kVukokys fnu eSa ohul
uflZax gksx tkWc ds fy;s xbZ FkhA ogka ij ohul
uflZax gkse dk cM+k lk cksMZ yxk Fkk eSa vUnj pyh
xbZ tc eSa ogka ij xbZ rks ogka ij MkW0 ,0,0 [kku o
nhid oekZ ekStwn FksA mUgskus dgk fd rqEgs ;gka ij
ipkZ cukuk iM+sxk vkSj 4000@& :0 nsaxs vxj dke
djuk gS rks vHkh nhid oekZ ds lkFk tgka vkWijs'ku
gksrk gS rks og txg ns[k yks rks eSa nhid oekZ ds
lkFk tkdj pyh xbZA tc eSa ogka igqaph rks ogka ij
dksbZ ejht ugha Fkk ,dne rg[kkus tSlk FkkA ;g
ns[kdj eSaus dgk fd eSa ;gka dke ugha dj ikm¡xh ge
tk jgs gSaA mlds ckn nhid oekZ us eq>s ,d rekpk
ekjk vkSj dgus yxk fd rqEgs dgha tkus dh t:jr
ugha gS rqe ;gha jgksxhA eSaus fpYykus dh dksf'k'k dh
rks MkW0 [kku Hkh ogka vk x;sA mlds ckn MkW0 [kku o
nhid oekZ us eq>s cgqr ekjk&ihVk MkW0 [kku us
fjokYoj fudkydj /kedh nh fd vxj ;gka ls Hkkxus
dh dksf'k'k djksxh rks rqEgs tku ls ekj nsxsaA mlds
ckn nhid oekZ o MkW0 [kku us eq>s cka/k fn;k esjk eq¡g
nck;k vkSj dgus yxs fd pqi&pki jgs ;gka ls tkus
ugha nsxsA fQj MkW0 [kku ogka ls pys x;s vkSj vkil
eas ckgj yM+kbZ djus yxs fd igys eSa xyr dke
d:axk nksuks vius&vius dks igys xyr dke djus ds
fy;s yM+kbZ djus yxsA fQj FkksM+h nsj esa vk;s vkSj
MkW0 [kku us eq>s fdlh pht dh lqbZ yxk nh vkSj oks
ogka ls pys x;sA nhid oekZ us esjs lkFk xyr dke
fd;kA vius is'kkc dh txg esjh is'kkc dh txg esa
MkyhA mlds ckn eq>s tc gks'k vk;k rks eSa ,d xkao
esa FkhA ml xkao dk uke ugha irkA ogka ij nhid
oekZ gh FkkA nhid oekZ us uflZax gkse esa 7 fnu xyr
dke fd;k Fkk vkSj xkao esa Hkh 6&7 fnu xyr dke
fd;k FkkA mlus gekjh oh0Mh0vks0 Hkh eksckby ls xkao
esa cukbZ FkhA iqfyl us eq>s cq)s'oj pkSjkgs ls fnukad 9
rkjh[k nwljk eghuk lu~ 2012 dks cjken fd;k FkkA
ml le; esjs lkFk nhid Hkh Fkk ftls fxj¶rkj fd;k
x;k FkkA esjh MkDVjh cjkenxh ds fnu gh gqbZ FkhA
MkDVjh djkus esjs lkFk eEeh vkSj efgyk iqfyl xbZ
FkhA MkW0 us ogka esjk fu'kkuh vaxwBk yxok;k FkkA
mlds ckn nwljs fnu Fkkus ls eq>s esjh eEeh ds lkFk
Hkst fn;k FkkA eSa bl le; ch0ch0,0 dj jgh gw¡A
?kVuk ds oDr eSa b.Vj QLVZ b;j esa eksrh yky usg:
eseksfj;y xYlZ b.Vj dkWyst esa i<+rh FkhA esjh
tUefrfFk 22-09-94 gSA eSaus gkbZLdwy Hkh blh Ldwy ls
fd;k FkkA eftLVasV lkgc ds lkeus esjk c;ku gqvk
FkkA vfHk;qDr nhid oekZ us esjs lkFk tks xyr dke
fd;k Fkk og esjh bPNk dsa fo:) fd;k FkkA og
/kedh nsrk Fkk fd fojks/k djksxh rks rqEgkjs ?kj okyksa
dks ekj Mkywxka vkSj fofM;ks fn[kkus dh Hkh /kedh nsrk
FkkA xokg dks 164 n0iz0la0 dk c;ku i<+dj lquk;k
x;k rks xokg us dgk fd ;g c;ku eftLVasV lkgc
dks fn;k Fkk ftl ij esjs gLrk{kj gSA njksxk th us
eq>ls iwaN&rkN fd;k FkkA ;gh ckrsa eSaus njksxk th dks
crkbZ FkhA"

10. On perusal of the statement made
by prosecutrix before court, it is amply
clear that there is complicity of the offence
found against the accused-revisionist. He
had injected anesthesia on the body of
prosecutrix and he also gagged her mouth
and threatened her. It is thus clear that the
statement of the prosecutrix is very clear,
which is direct evidence against the
revisionist and there is no iota of doubt
regarding the offence committed by the
revisionist.

11. In State of Maharashtra Vs.
Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain AIR
1990 SC 658, this Court held that a woman,
who is the victim of sexual assault, is not
an accomplice to the crime but is a victim
of another person's lust and, therefore, her
evidence need not be tested with the same
amount of suspicion as that of an
accomplice. The Court observed as under :-

"A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot
be put on par with an accomplice. She is in
fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence
Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot
4 All. Dr. Ansar Ahmad Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
605
be accepted unless it is corroborated in
material particulars. She is undoubtedly a
competent witness under Section 118 and
her evidence must receive the same weight
as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. The same degree of care
and caution must attach in the evaluation of
her evidence as in the case of an injured
complainant or witness and no more. What
is necessary is that the Court must be alive
to and conscious of the fact that it is
dealing with the evidence of a person who
is interested in the outcome of the charge
levelled by her. If the court keeps this in
mind and feels satisfied that it can act on
the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no
rule of law or practice incorporated in the
Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to
Section 114 which requires it to look for
corroboration. If for some reason the court
is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her
testimony short of corroboration required in
the case of an accomplice. The nature of
evidence required to lend assurance to the
testimony
of
the
prosecutrix
must
necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. But if a
prosecutrix is an adult and of full
understanding the court is entitled to base a
conviction on her evidence unless the same
is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy.
If the totality of the circumstances
appearing on the record of the case disclose
that the prosecutrix does not have a strong
motive to falsely involve the person
charged, the court should ordinarily have
no hesitation in accepting her evidence."

12. In State of U.P. Vs. Pappu
@Yunus & Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248, this
Court held that even in a case where it is
shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or
a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it
may not be a ground to absolve the accused
from the charge of rape. It has to be
established that there was consent by her
for that particular occasion. Absence of
injury on the prosecutrix may not be a
factor that leads the court to absolve the
accused. This Court further held that there
can be conviction on the sole testimony of
the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not
satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix,
it can seek other evidence, direct or
circumstantial, by which it may get
assurance of her testimony. The Court held
as under :-

"It is well settled that a prosecutrix
complaining of having been a victim of the
offence of rape is not an accomplice after
the crime. There is no rule of law that her
testimony
cannot
be
acted
without
corroboration in material particulars. She
stands at a higher pedestal than an injured
witness. In the latter case, there is injury on
the physical form, while in the former it is
both physical as well as psychological and
emotional. However, if the court of facts
finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search
for evidence, direct or circumstantial,
which would lend assurance to her
testimony.
Assurance,
short
of
corroboration as understood in the context
of an accomplice, would do."

13. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit
Singh & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1393, this
Court held that in cases involving sexual
harassment, molestation etc. the court is
duty bound to deal with such cases with
utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or
insignificant discrepancies in the statement
of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for
throwing
out
an
otherwise
reliable
prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of
sexual assault is enough for conviction and
606 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
it does not require any corroboration unless
there are compelling reasons for seeking
corroboration. The court may look for some
assurances of her statement to satisfy
judicial conscience. The statement of the
prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an
injured witness as she is not an accomplice.
The Court further held that the delay in
filing FIR for sexual offence may not be
even properly explained, but if found
natural, the accused cannot be given any
benefit thereof. The Court observed as
under :-

"The court overlooked the situation in
which a poor helpless minor girl had found
herself in the company of three desperate
young men who were threatening her and
preventing her from raising any alarm.
Again, if the investigating officer did not
conduct the investigation properly or was
negligent in not being able to trace out the
driver or the car, how can that become a
ground to discredit the testimony of the
prosecutrix?

The prosecutrix had no control over
the investigating agency and the negligence
of an investigating officer could not affect
the credibility of the statement of the
prosecutrix...............The courts must, while
evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact
that in a case of rape, no self-respecting
woman would come forward in a court just
to make a humiliating statement against her
honour such as is involved in the
commission of rape on her. In cases
involving sexual molestation, supposed
considerations which have no material
effect on the veracity of the prosecution
case or even discrepancies in the statement
of the prosecutrix should not, unless the
discrepancies are such which are of fatal
nature, be allowed to throw out an
otherwise
reliable
prosecution
case.............Seeking corroboration of her
statement before replying upon the same as
a rule, in such cases, amounts to adding
insult to injury............Corroboration as a
condition for judicial reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix is not a
requirement of law but a guidance of
prudence under given circumstances.

** ** ** **

The courts should examine the
broader probabilities of a case and not get
swayed
by
minor
contradictions
or
insignificant
discrepancies
in
the
statement of the prosecutrix, which are
not of a fatal nature, to throw out an
otherwise reliable prosecution case. If
evidence of the prosecutrix inspires
confidence, it must be relied upon
without seeking corroboration of her
statement in material particulars. If for
some reason the court finds it difficult to
place implicit reliance on her testimony,
it may look for evidence which may lend
assurance to her testimony, short of
corroboration required in the case of an
accomplice.
The
testimony
of
the
prosecutrix must be appreciated in the
background of the entire case and the trial
court must be alive to its responsibility
and be sensitive while dealing with cases
involving sexual molestations."

14. In State of Orissa Vs. Thakara
Besra & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1963, this
Court held that rape is not mere a physical
assault, rather it often distracts the whole
personality of the victim. The rapist
degrades the very soul of the helpless
female and, therefore, the testimony of the
prosecutrix must be appreciated in the
background of the entire case and in such
cases, non-examination even of other
witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in
the prosecution case, particularly where the
witnesses had not seen the commission of
the
offence.
4 All. Amarjeet Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
607

15. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs.
Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC 622, this Court
held that there is no legal compulsion to look for
any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of
the prosecutrix before recording an order of
conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not
counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence
inspires confidence and there is absence of
circumstances which militate against her veracity.

16. A similar view has been reiterated by
this Court in Wahid Khan Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9, placing reliance on
earlier judgment in Rameshwar Vs. State of
Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54.

17. In another case the Supreme Court in
Phool Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh
[Criminal Appeal No. 1520 of 2021, decided on
01.12.2021], has taken the similar view in respect
of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, which
follows as under:

"5.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted
that in the present case, the prosecutrix has fully
supported the case of the prosecution. She has
been consistent right from the very beginning.
Nothing has been specifically pointed out why the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be
believed. Even after thorough cross-examination,
she has stood by what she has stated and has fully
supported the case of the prosecution. We see no
reason
to
doubt
the
credibility
and/or
trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. The submission
on behalf of the accused that no other independent
witnesses have been examined and/or supported
the case of the prosecution and the conviction on
the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix
cannot be sustained is concerned, the aforesaid has
no substance."

18. So far the other arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the revisionist that the material
of the charge-sheet should be taken into
consideration, does not conspire confidence. In
my opinion, the statement of prosecutrix against
the accused-revisionist is clear and there is no iota
of doubt. The order passed by the Court below
needs no interference and there is no need to
discuss the other material filed by the I.O. while
filing the report before the court below. The plea
of alibi will be subject to further evidence and at
this moment, I cannot infer that the revisionist was
absent and he had gone to Delhi because the
evidences to that effect are subject to further
examination before the trial court. It is also a
settled law that in case of heinous crime like rape,
a single testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient
for conviction.

19. In such circumstances, the impugned
order dated 03.07.2013 does not suffer from any
illegality or infirmity and is based upon relevant
considerations
and
supported
by
cogent
reasons,hence requires no interference by this
Court. The revision is accordingly dismissed.
However, it is made clear that the court below will
not be influenced with any observations made by
this Court.

20. Office is directed to communicate this
order to the court below for necessary compliance,
forthwith.
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(2022)04ILR A607
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.04.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Criminal Revision No. 758 of 2021

Amarjeet ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Vivekanand Misra, Ravindra Kumar Dwivedi