# Dr. Gyanvati Dixit v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 11 ILRA 619
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-27
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 11061 of 2024
- **Bench:** Abdul Moin
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-gyanvati-dixit-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51138
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-
Suspension
-
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921
-
Section
16G(5)
-
The
court/tribunal
620 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
should not mechanically set aside the
order of punishment on the ground that
the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present.

The courts and tribunals should cause the copy
of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved
employee if he has not already secured it before
coming to the court/tribunal and give the
employee an opportunity to show how his or her
case was prejudiced because of the non-supply
of the report. If after hearing the parties, the
court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the
non- supply of the report would have made no
difference to the ultimate findings and the
punishment given, the court/tribunal should not
interfere with the order of punishment. (Para
20)

Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded on the
aspect of 'prejudice' that may be caused to an
employee where he/she alleges some violation.
In the instant case, the violation, as alleged, is
non issuance of the formal order of reinSt.ment.
Petitioner neither in his arguments nor in the
petition has indicated anywhere as to the
prejudice that may have been caused to him on
account of non issuance of the formal order of
reinSt.ment after his suspension order was
quashed. In the absence thereto, merely
because no formal order was issued prior
to
placing
the
petitioner
under
suspension, the same, in the opinion of
the Court, will not vitiate the impugned
suspension order as no prejudice has been
caused to him. (Para 21)

B. Non passing of a formal order of
reinSt.ment can also be seen in context of
'Useless Formality Theory'. (Para 22)

Once the petitioner had only been placed under
suspension vide order dated 04.10.2024, which
had been quashed by the writ court vide
judgment
and
order
dated
05.11.2024.
Consequently, the petitioner can be deemed to
have been reinSt.d in service. Thus merely
because a formal order of his reinSt.ment was
not passed prior to he again being placed under
suspension by means of the order impugned the
same would clearly fall within the ambit of
Useless Formality Theory. (Para 23)

C. Unless there is a failure of justice, the
Court
may
refuse
to
exercise
the
extraordinary jurisdiction with which it is
vested. Merely because a formal order of
reinSt.ment was not passed prior to the
petitioner being placed under suspension, there
has been no failure of justice and as such, this
court refuses to exercise the extraordinary
jurisdiction. (Para 24)

D. Perusal of the suspension order would
indicate that the same had been passed
both under the provisions of Section
16G(5)(a) and (b). Suspension could not have
been ordered without an enquiry been initiated
as provided u/s 16G(5)(b) of the Act, 1921 yet a
perusal of the suspension order would indicate
that the same has also been passed under the
provisions of Section 16G(5)(a) of the Act, 1921
also and thus once the charges are serious as
such the suspension order would squarely be
covered by the provisions of Section 16G(5)(a)
of the Act, 1921 and thus the petitioner has
correctly been placed under suspension in terms
of the aforesaid provisions. (Para 30)

No opinion with regard to provisions of Section
16G(5)(b) of the Act, 1921 has been expressed
that without issuance of a charge-sheet the
suspension order cannot be passed and the said
question is left open to be considered in an
appropriate case.

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

11 All. Dr. Gyanvati Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
619
loss of her husband, she also loses her
source of livelihood unless of course in the
facts of a given case it is found that she is
herself employed or has other means of
sustenance which are adequate to sustain
her in which case she may not have been
dependent upon her father, but, unless this
is proved, it would be reasonable to draw
an inference that she was dependent upon
her father unless of course there is evidence
to the contrary.

(34) Even after marriage as also after
her widowhood, she continues to be his
daughter and her status as such continues
even at the time of death of her father. Her
widowhood occurred prior to the death of
her father, therefore, she was for all legal
and practical purposes daughter of late Om
Prakash Bhakta although a widowed
daughter, on the date of his death.

(35) Consequently, this Court holds
that a 'widowed daughter' would be covered
in the definition of 'daughter' contained in
Note-I of the Guidelines dated 09.10.1998
if she was dependent upon her deceased
father or mother on the date of his/her
death. The question of dependency is one
of fact which is to be determined by the
authorities. If such widowed daughter was
not dependent upon her father then she
would not be entitled to compassionate
appointment under the guidelines.

(36) For all the above said reasons, the
respondent-BSNL could not have declined
to consider the application of the petitioner
for compassionate appointment merely
because the petitioner was a widowed
daughter on the date of death of her father.

(37) We have also gone through the
judgment
of
Central
Administrative
Tribunal
dated
13.01.2023
which
is
impugned herein and in view of the
discussion already made, we find ourselves
unable to agree with the decision given by
it. In view of the reasons already given, the
said judgment is not sustainable. It is,
accordingly, quashed.

(38) The original application as also
this petition is allowed. The competent
authority is directed to consider the claim
of
the
petitioner
for
compassionate
appointment in accordance with weightage
point system prevalent and in doing so she
shall be assigned points accordingly and
her claim shall not be rejected on the
ground that she was married or widowed
daughter.
The
observations
made
hereinabove shall be adhered while taking a
decision in this regard. A decision in this
regard shall be taken within two months
from the date of communication of a copy
of this order.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 619
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

Writ A No. 11061 of 2024

Dr. Gyanvati Dixit ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sudeep Kuma, Avdhesh Kumar Pandey,
Shreshth Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ashutosh Singh, Vijay Vikram

A.
Service
Law
-
Suspension
-
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921
-
Section
16G(5)
-
The
court/tribunal
620 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
should not mechanically set aside the
order of punishment on the ground that
the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present.

The courts and tribunals should cause the copy
of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved
employee if he has not already secured it before
coming to the court/tribunal and give the
employee an opportunity to show how his or her
case was prejudiced because of the non-supply
of the report. If after hearing the parties, the
court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the
non- supply of the report would have made no
difference to the ultimate findings and the
punishment given, the court/tribunal should not
interfere with the order of punishment. (Para
20)

Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded on the
aspect of 'prejudice' that may be caused to an
employee where he/she alleges some violation.
In the instant case, the violation, as alleged, is
non issuance of the formal order of reinSt.ment.
Petitioner neither in his arguments nor in the
petition has indicated anywhere as to the
prejudice that may have been caused to him on
account of non issuance of the formal order of
reinSt.ment after his suspension order was
quashed. In the absence thereto, merely
because no formal order was issued prior
to
placing
the
petitioner
under
suspension, the same, in the opinion of
the Court, will not vitiate the impugned
suspension order as no prejudice has been
caused to him. (Para 21)

B. Non passing of a formal order of
reinSt.ment can also be seen in context of
'Useless Formality Theory'. (Para 22)

Once the petitioner had only been placed under
suspension vide order dated 04.10.2024, which
had been quashed by the writ court vide
judgment
and
order
dated
05.11.2024.
Consequently, the petitioner can be deemed to
have been reinSt.d in service. Thus merely
because a formal order of his reinSt.ment was
not passed prior to he again being placed under
suspension by means of the order impugned the
same would clearly fall within the ambit of
Useless Formality Theory. (Para 23)

C. Unless there is a failure of justice, the
Court
may
refuse
to
exercise
the
extraordinary jurisdiction with which it is
vested. Merely because a formal order of
reinSt.ment was not passed prior to the
petitioner being placed under suspension, there
has been no failure of justice and as such, this
court refuses to exercise the extraordinary
jurisdiction. (Para 24)

D. Perusal of the suspension order would
indicate that the same had been passed
both under the provisions of Section
16G(5)(a) and (b). Suspension could not have
been ordered without an enquiry been initiated
as provided u/s 16G(5)(b) of the Act, 1921 yet a
perusal of the suspension order would indicate
that the same has also been passed under the
provisions of Section 16G(5)(a) of the Act, 1921
also and thus once the charges are serious as
such the suspension order would squarely be
covered by the provisions of Section 16G(5)(a)
of the Act, 1921 and thus the petitioner has
correctly been placed under suspension in terms
of the aforesaid provisions. (Para 30)

No opinion with regard to provisions of Section
16G(5)(b) of the Act, 1921 has been expressed
that without issuance of a charge-sheet the
suspension order cannot be passed and the said
question is left open to be considered in an
appropriate case.

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. The Regional Director, Employees' St.
Insurance
Corporation
Vs
M/s
Popular
Automobiles Etc., AIR 1997 SC 3956 (Para 17)

2. Public Services Tribunal Bar Association Vs St.
of U.P. & anr., 2003 (4) SCC 104 (Para 17)

3. Khem Chand Vs U.O.I., 1963 AIR 687 SC
(Para 17)

4. Canara Bank & ors. Vs Debasis Das & ors.,
2003 (4) SCC 557 (Para 20)

5. M.C. Mehta Vs U.O.I. & ors., 1997 (2) SCC
353 (Para 22)
11 All. Dr. Gyanvati Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
621
6. Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs Government of
Andhra Pradesh & ors., 1996 AIR 828 SC (Para
24)

Precedent distinguished:

1. In Re Lal Bahadur Singh Vs U.P. St. Roadways
Transport Corporation & ors., Special Appeal No.
305 of 2007 (Para 7)

2. Anand Narain Shukla Vs St. of M.P., (1980) 1
SCC 252 (Para 7)

3. Salma Bi Vs Collector, Buladana & ors., 2022
SCC OnLine Bom 273 (Para 7)

4. Managing Director of ECIL Vs B. Karunakar,
1993 (4) SCC 727 (Para 7)

Present
petition
assails
order
dated
09.11.2024, by which the petitioner has
been placed under suspension.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Abdul Moin, J.)

1. Affidavit of compliance filed by Shri
Ashutosh Singh, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent No.5 is taken on
record.

2. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the
State-respondents and Shri Ashutosh Singh,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent No.5.

3. Under challenge is the order dated
09.11.2024, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to
the petition, by which the petitioner has been
placed under suspension.

4. Raising a challenge to the said order,
the contention is that earlier the petitioner had
been suspended vide order dated 04.10.2024, a
copy of which is Annexure-9 to the petition.

5. A challenge had been raised to the
said suspension order by filing Writ A
No.9746 of 2024 In Re Dr Gyanvati Dixit
vs State of U.P. & Ors. This Court vide
judgment and order dated 05.11.2024, a
copy of which is Annexure-2 to the
petition, quashed the said suspension order.
It was further directed that consequences
would follow. Further, it was left open for
the competent authority to pass a fresh
order, if required, in accordance with law.

6. Contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioner is that without reinstating
the petitioner in pursuance of the order of
this Court dated 05.11.2024, the petitioner
again has been placed under suspension
which could not have been done by the
respondents
inasmuch
as
once
the
petitioner
had
been
placed
under
suspension vide the earlier order dated
04.11.2024,
employer-employee
relationship stood suspended and without
the said relationship being restored by
passing of a consequential order in terms of
the order of this Court dated 05.11.2024,
the petitioner could not again have been
placed under suspension.

7. In this regard, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Managing Director of ECIL vs B.
Karunakar : 1993 (4) SCC 727 (Para 31), a
Division Bench judgment of this Court
passed in Special Appeal No.305 of 2007 In
Re Lal Bahadur Singh vs U.P. State
Roadways Transport Corporation & Ors,
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case Anand Narain Shukla vs State of
Madhya Pradesh : (1980) 1 SCC 252 as well
as a judgment of Bombay High Court in the
case of Salma Bi vs Collector, Buldana &
Ors : 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 273.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
further argues that perusal of the impugned
622 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
suspension order would indicate that the
petitioner has been placed under suspension
in view of the provisions of Section
16G(5)(b)
of
the
U.P.
Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred
to as 'Act, 1921'). However, the aforesaid
provision will only be attracted and
applicable in case his continuance in office
is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct
of disciplinary proceedings against him, but
no enquiry was initiated at the time of
passing the suspension order and thus, the
suspension
order
reflects
patent
non
application of mind.

9. No other ground has been urged.

10. Responding to the first submission
of the learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.5 argues that once this Court vide
judgment and order dated 05.11.2024 had
quashed
the
suspension
order
dated
04.10.2024 as such the reinstatement
followed automatically and there was no
requirement to pass a separate order for the
same. This would be apparent from the fact
that while passing the impugned suspension
order dated 09.11.2024, the petitioner has
been addressed as the Principal of the
Institution as specifically finds place in the
order.

11.
Responding
to
the
second
argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner, argument of learned counsel for
respondent No.5 is that a perusal of the
impugned suspension order would indicate
that same has been passed under the
provisions of Sections 16G(5)(a) and
16G(5)(b) and even if the argument raised
by the petitioner with regard to Section
16G(5)(b) is upheld yet the suspension
order can still be sustained considering that
the charges levelled against the petitioner
are serious enough to merit her dismissal.

12. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

13. From the argument as raised by
the learned counsel for the petitioner and
from perusal of the record, it emerges that
earlier the petitioner has been suspended
vide order dated 04.10.2024. Upon a
challenge
being
raised
to
the
said
suspension order this Court vide judgment
and order dated 05.11.2024 had quashed
the suspension order and provided that
consequences would follow. However, it
was left open for the competent authority to
pass a fresh order, if required, in
accordance with law.

14. Again the petitioner has been
placed under suspension vide order dated
09.11.2024. The order has been passed
under the provisions of Section 16G(5) of
the Act, 1921.

15. The grounds urged by the learned
counsel for the petitioner in order to
challenge the said order are (a) that the said
suspension order has been passed without
reinstating the petitioner after the earlier
suspension order had been quashed by this
Court and this Court had specifically
provided that consequences are to be
follow; and (b) that the suspension order
has been passed under the provisions of
Section 16G5(b) of the Act, 1921, which
order could only be passed in case
disciplinary
proceedings
are
being
conducted
but
as
no
disciplinary
proceeding have been initiated against the
petitioner, the same thus reflects patently
non application of mind and consequently,
suspension order merits to be quashed.
11 All. Dr. Gyanvati Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
623

16. As regards the first ground i.e. the
suspension order having been passed
without reinstating the petitioner, suffice to
state that during the period of suspension
employer-employee relationship does not
come to an end. The employee is only
prohibited from actually offering his
services and discharging his duties and
further during the suspension pending
enquiry the remuneration is payable to the
employee concerned.

17. In this regard, it would be suffice
to refer to the judgments of the Supreme
Court in the case of

18. Once the employer-employee
relationship continues thus in terms of
Section 16G(5) of the Act, 1921, which
pertains to the suspension of the head of
institution or teacher and the provision
under which the petitioner has been
suspended, the same categorically provides
that it is the head of the institution or teacher
who can be suspended by the management on
the grounds as contemplated under the said
section. As the earlier suspension order of the
petitioner had already been quashed by this
Court vide judgment and order dated
05.11.2024 and even if no formal order has
been passed by the respondents reinstating
the petitioner, the same would not take away
the fact or the suspension order itself having
been quashed and consequently the petitioner
cannot be said to be a suspended employee
on the date of passing of the fresh suspension
order, in this case as on 09.11.2024 and thus
in case no formal order was passed for the
reinstatement of the petitioner the same
would not vitiate the suspension order on the
ground as urged by the petitioner.

19. Even otherwise if no formal order
was passed in the case of the petitioner
reinstating him, the same would have to be
seen in the context of the prejudice that
may have been caused to the petitioner.

20. This aspect of the matter has been
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Canara Bank And Ors vs
Debasis Das And Ors : 2003 (4) SCC 557
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-

"24. Additionally, there was no
material placed by the employee to show
as to how he has been prejudiced. Though
in all cases the post-decisional hearing
cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional
hearing, in the case at hand the position is
different. The position was illuminatingly
stated by this Court in Managing Director,
ECIL v. B. Karunakar [Managing Director,
ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 :
1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC
704] (SCC at p. 758, para 31) which reads
as follows:

"31. Hence, in all cases where
the enquiry officer's report is not furnished
to
the
delinquent
employee
in
the
disciplinary proceedings, the courts and
tribunals should cause the copy of the
report to be furnished to the aggrieved
employee if he has not already secured it
before coming to the court/tribunal and
give the employee an opportunity to show
how his or her case was prejudiced
because of the non-supply of the report. If
after
hearing
the
parties,
the
court/tribunal comes to the conclusion
that the non-supply of the report would
have made no difference to the ultimate
findings and the punishment given, the
court/tribunal should not interfere with
the
order
of
punishment.
The
court/tribunal should not mechanically set
aside the order of punishment on the
ground that the report was not furnished
as is regrettably being done at present. The
624 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
courts should avoid resorting to short cuts.
Since it is the courts/tribunals which will
apply their judicial mind to the question
and give their reasons for setting aside or
not setting aside the order of punishment,
(and not
any
internal
appellate
or
revisional authority), there would be
neither a breach of the principles of natural
justice nor a denial of the reasonable
opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal
finds that the furnishing of the report would
have made a difference to the result in the
case that it should set aside the order of
punishment. Where after following the
above procedure, the court/tribunal sets
aside the order of punishment, the proper
relief that should be granted is to direct
reinstatement of the employee with liberty
to the authority/management to proceed
with the inquiry, by placing the employee
under suspension and continuing the
inquiry from the state of furnishing him
with the report. The question whether the
employee would be entitled to the back
wages and other benefits from the date of
his
dismissal
to
the
date
of
his
reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should
invariably be left to be decided by the
authority concerned according to law, after
the culmination of the proceedings and
depending on the final outcome. If the
employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry
and is directed to be reinstated, the
authority should be at liberty to decide
according to law how it will treat the
period from the date of dismissal till the
reinstatement and to what benefits, if any
and the extent of the benefits, he will be
entitled. The reinstatement made as a
result of the setting aside of the inquiry
for failure to furnish the report, should be
treated as a reinstatement for the purpose
of holding the fresh inquiry from the
stage of furnishing the report and no
more, where such fresh inquiry is held.
That will also be the correct position in
law."
(Emphasis supplied)

21. On perusal of the judgment in
the case of Debasis Das (supra), it
emerges that the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has
propounded
on
the
aspect
of
'prejudice' that may be caused to an
employee where he/she alleges some
violation.
In
the
instant
case,
the
violation, as alleged, is non issuance of
the formal order of reinstatement. The
learned counsel for the petitioner neither
in his arguments nor in the petition has
indicated anywhere as to the prejudice
that may have been caused to him on
account of non issuance of the formal
order
of
reinstatement
after
his
suspension order was quashed. In the
absence thereto, merely because no
formal order was issued prior to placing
the petitioner under suspension, the same,
in the opinion of the Court, will not
vitiate the impugned suspension order as
no prejudice has been caused to him.

22. Non passing of a formal order of
reinstatement can also be seen in context
of
'Useless
Formality
Theory'
as
enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of M.C. Mehta vs Union Of
India & Ors : 1997 (2) SCC 353.

23. The reason as to why the said
principle may be attracted in the facts of
the instant case is that once the petitioner
had only been placed under suspension
vide
order
dated
04.10.2024
which
suspension order had been quashed by the
writ court vide judgment and order dated
05.11.2024 consequently the petitioner can
be deemed to have been reinstated in
service. Thus merely because a formal
order of his reinstatement was not passed
11 All. Dr. Gyanvati Dixit Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
625
prior to he again being placed under
suspension
by
means
of
the
order
impugned the same would clearly fall
within the ambit of Useless Formality
Theory as per the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta
(supra).

24. Even otherwise considering the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Gadde Venkateswara
Rao vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh
And Others : 1966 AIR 828 SC wherein
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
unless there is a failure of justice, the Court
may refuse to exercise the extraordinary
jurisdiction with which it is vested, as such,
this Court is of the view that merely
because a formal order of reinstatement
was not passed prior to the petitioner being
placed under suspension, there has been no
failure of justice and as such, this court
refuses to exercise the extraordinary
jurisdiction.

25. As already indicated above, once
the
earlier
suspension
order
of
the
petitioner had been quashed consequently
even if the respondents failed to pass a
formal order of reinstatement, the same will
not and cannot take away the power of the
respondents to again place the petitioner
under suspension as has clearly been done
in the instant case. Thus, the aforesaid
ground does not appeal to the Court and is
accordingly rejected.

26. So far as judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Anand
Narain Shukla (supra) is concerned, the
same has no applicability of the facts of the
instant case inasmuch the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has considered the reversion of the
employee
concerned
to
be
one
of
reinstatement while in the instant case the
petitioner
had
been
placed
under
suspension.

27. So far as judgment of this Court
in the case of Lal Bahadur Singh (supra)
is concerned, the said judgment was a case
of dismissal order having been quashed
leaving it open to the respondents to
conduct
a
fresh
enquiry.
In
those
circumstances, this Court had held that a
fresh enquiry could only be conducted after
the employee concerned was reinstated in
the services and without reinstatement the
enquiry could not have been conducted. In
the instant case again it is not a case of the
petitioner
having
been
dismissed
or
removed from the service rather he had
only been placed under suspension and thus
the
said
judgment
would
have
no
applicability to the facts of the instant case.

28. So far as the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Salma
Bi (supra) is concerned, the same would
have no applicability to the facts of the
instant case inasmuch as the same is a case
pertaining to an election dispute while the
instant case pertains to a service matter.

29. So far as the judgment of the
Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of
B.
Karunakar (supra) is concerned, para 31
pertains to a reinstatement of an employee,
which again would have no applicability to
the facts of the instant case.

30. As regards ground (b), suffice to
state that perusal of the suspension order
would indicate that the same had been
passed both under the provisions of Section
16G(5)(a) and (b). Even if for the sake of
the argument, the aforesaid ground as urged
by the petitioner is considered to be valid
that suspension could not have been
ordered without an enquiry been initiated
626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
as provided under Section 16G(5)(b) of the
Act, 1921 yet a perusal of the suspension
order would indicate that the same has also
been passed under the provisions of Section
16G(5)(a) of the Act, 1921 also and thus
once the charges are serious as such the
suspension
order
would
squarely
be
covered by the provisions of Section
16G(5)(a) of the Act, 1921 and thus the
petitioner has correctly been placed under
suspension in terms of the aforesaid
provisions.

31. The Court would like to add that it
has not expressed any opinion with regard
to provisions of Section 16G(5)(b) of the
Act, 1921 that without issuance of a
charge-sheet the suspension order cannot
be passed and the said question is left open
to be considered in an appropriate case.

32. Keeping in view the aforesaid
discussion, no case for interference is made
out. Accordingly, the writ petition stands
dismissed.
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