# Dr. Parasu Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors

- **Citation:** (2013) 2 ILRA 839
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2010-08-11
- **Case number:** FIR dated 11.8.2010 in Case Crime No. 144 of 2010
- **Bench:** A.P. Sahi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-parasu-ram-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-ors-42621
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Constitution of India-Art. 226- suspension
of Principal of intermediate collegewhether
during
existence
of
first
suspension
order-can
be
second
suspension even on fresh allegation?-
held/a suspended employee can not be
suspended-D.I.O.S
to
consider
this
840 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
aspect
after
giving
opportunity
of
hearing to petitioner.

Held: Para-19
The aforesaid issue as to whether the
previous suspension order survives or
not would have to be gauged upon the
status
of
the
resolution
passed
subsequently suspending the petitioner
again. If the previous suspension was
surviving
then
the
subsequent
suspension
would
be
a
redundant
exercise. An employee cannot be put
under
suspension
if
he
is
already
suspended. However, if the previous
suspension was non existent, then the
District Inspector of Schools would have
to take notice of the second suspension
as well in view of the ratio of the division
bench. The District Inspector of Schools
was equally bound to consider the
previous suspension matter in the light
of the judgment dated 1.8.2012 and his
powers as explained in the full bench
judgment of Chandra Bhushan Mishra Vs.
District Inspector of Schools reported in
1995(1) ESC 552.

Case Law discussed:
1986 U.P. L.B.E.C. 144; 1995(1) ESC 552

## Text

2 All] Mahesh Kumar Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
839
view of the Food Safety and Standard
Act, 2006, no proceedings can be initiated
under proceedings 272 and 273 of the
I.P.C. The power of police has been
excluded by the Act to initiate any
investigation in the matter. His plea was
rejected by the trial court. Under these
circumstances, he has approached this
Court.

5. The applicant has placed reliance
on a Division Bench Judgment of this
Court in Writ Petition No. 8255 (MB) of
2010, M/s Pepsico India Holdings (Pvt)
Limited and another.

6. I have perused the material on
record as well as the aforesaid Judgment.
Following directions have been passed by
the Division Bench:-

"In view of the aforesaid discussions,
the writ petitions are allowed. The
impugned G.O. dated 11.5.2010 issued by
the
State
Government
contained
in
Annexure-1 to the writ petition is hereby
quashed. Consequently, the FIR dated
11.8.2010 registered as case crime no. 392
of 2010 under sections 272/273 IPC, PS
Cantt.
District
Varanasi,
FIR
dated
11.8.2010 in Case Crime No. 144 of 2010
registered at PS Rohaniya, District Varanasi
and the FIR registered as case crime no. 244
of 2010, PS Khuldabad, District Allahabad
are also hereby quashed. The concerned
Magistrates
shall
immediately
pass
necessary orders for forthwith release of all
the petitioners, who are in jail."

7. Learned counsel for the applicant
has also placed reliance on a judgment of this
Court in the case of Bankey Bihari Agarwal
& another vs. State of U.P. & others reported
in 2013 (5) ADJ 201 in which the
proceedings on this ground were quashed.

8. In view of the directions given by
this Court, the proceedings before the
Sessions Court are liable to be quashed as
the applicants case is squarely covered by
the aforesaid Judgment.

9. Accordingly, the application is
allowed. The impugned orders dated
16.3.2013 and 23.3.2013 as well as all
consequential proceedings are hereby
quashed.

10. However, it will be open for the
authorities concerned to proceed against
the applicant under the Food Safety and
Standard Act, 2006 in accordance with
law.

11. Learned counsel for the
applicant is permitted to make necessary
correction in the present application.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE A.P. SAHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 24457 of 2013

Dr. Parasu Ram Singh
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashok Khare, Sri Siddharth Khare

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Shashi Nandan
Sri Udayan Nandan

Constitution of India-Art. 226- suspension
of Principal of intermediate collegewhether
during
existence
of
first
suspension
order-can
be
second
suspension even on fresh allegation?-
held/a suspended employee can not be
suspended-D.I.O.S
to
consider
this
840 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
aspect
after
giving
opportunity
of
hearing to petitioner.

Held: Para-19
The aforesaid issue as to whether the
previous suspension order survives or
not would have to be gauged upon the
status
of
the
resolution
passed
subsequently suspending the petitioner
again. If the previous suspension was
surviving
then
the
subsequent
suspension
would
be
a
redundant
exercise. An employee cannot be put
under
suspension
if
he
is
already
suspended. However, if the previous
suspension was non existent, then the
District Inspector of Schools would have
to take notice of the second suspension
as well in view of the ratio of the division
bench. The District Inspector of Schools
was equally bound to consider the
previous suspension matter in the light
of the judgment dated 1.8.2012 and his
powers as explained in the full bench
judgment of Chandra Bhushan Mishra Vs.
District Inspector of Schools reported in
1995(1) ESC 552.

Case Law discussed:
1986 U.P. L.B.E.C. 144; 1995(1) ESC 552

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi, J)

1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel
for the respondent no. 4 - Committee of
Management, and the learned Standing
Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and
3.

2. is writ petition questions the
validity of the order passed by the District
Inspector of Schools, Allahabad dated
31.3.2013 approving the proposal of
suspension of the petitioner on the
strength of the allegations as indicated in
the impugned order coupled with the facts
stated in the resolution dated 18.12.2011
passed by the Committee of Management
for suspending the petitioner. The District
Inspector of Schools has also recorded
that the resolution has been passed with
the approval of 12 out of 14 members of
the Committee of Management and since
the allegations made against the petitioner
are prima facie serious, therefore, the
suspension order is being approved.

3. The background of the case is that
the petitioner was selected by the U.P.
Secondary Education Services Selection
Board and was appointed as Principal
with his placement in the respondent no.4
- Institution on 20th July, 2011. The
petitioner thereafter resumed charge and
started functioning. After about three
months, the Committee of Management
proceeded to level certain charges against
the
petitioner
including
charges
of
financial irregularities, and accordingly,
resolved to suspend him on 18th of
December, 2011. The said resolution was
disapproved by the District Inspector of
Schools on 23rd June, 2012 against which
the
respondent
-
Committee
of
Management filed writ petition no. 34443
of 2012. The same was allowed and the
matter was remitted back vide judgment
dated 1.8.2012 calling upon the District
Inspector of Schools to pass a fresh order
keeping in view the fact that the petitioner
has raised an objection with regard to the
validity of the meeting in which the
resolution was passed, and further to
examine the affidavits that were filed by
three persons referred to in the said
judgment. The petitioner was allowed to
function and receive his salary as
Principal and it was further provided that
his continuance would be dependent on
the decision to be so taken by the District
Inspector of Schools.
2 All] Dr. Parasu Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
841

4. The District Inspector of Schools
does not appear to have immediately
proceeded to decide the matter and in
between the Committee of Management
appears to have passed a fresh resolution
on 3rd of February, 2013 proposing to
suspend the petitioner. This resolution
was communicated in the shape of an
order of the Manager of Institution dated
4.2.2013 copy whereof is Annexure 12 to
the writ petition. A charge-sheet copy
whereof is Annexure 13 was also served
on
the
petitioner,
which
indicates
additional charges having been levelled
against the petitioner, apart from those
which were subject matter of the earlier
suspension order.

5. The District Inspector of Schools
while passing the impugned order on 31st
of March, 2013 has proceeded to notice
this objection having been taken by the
petitioner in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of
his objections.

6. The District Inspector of Schools,
however, while proceeding to record his
findings has relied on the allegations of
certain charges against the petitioner of
having exempted the payment of fee of
certain students. This act of unauthorised
remittance has also been made the basis
of the passing of the impugned order.

7. The District Inspector of Schools
then proceeds to extract the resolution
dated 18th of December, 2011 and has
mentioned thereafter that 12 out of 14
members
of
the
Committee
of
Management have supported the said
resolution. In such circumstances, he has
concluded that the petitioner is prima
facie guilty of serious charges and as such
the suspension deserves to be approved. It
is to be noted that the approval is founded
only on the basis of the earlier resolution
dated 18.12.2011 recording a finding that
12 out of 14 members have been
approved and the same and secondly
having noticed the charges with regard to
the exemption of fees of certain students.

8. Sri Khare, learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner contends that firstly, the
fact or the charge of exemption of
payment of fees, and its condonation in
relation to some students, was neither the
subject matter of the earlier charge-sheet
nor is it subject matter of the subsequent
charge-sheet served on the petitioner in
March, 2013. He therefore submits that
certain material which was not even
known to the petitioner or was not even
part of the allegations of the Committee
of Management has been made the basis
of passing the impugned order. He further
submits that such material which was
foreign to the knowledge of the petitioner
and alien to the resolution of the
Committee of Management could not
have been made the basis for passing the
impugned order which stands vitiated on
account of consideration of extraneous
material.

9. Sri Khare next contends that there
is no basis for ascertaining as to how and
on what documents, is the finding of 12
members having supported the resolution,
based. He submits that no material has
been disclosed or even considered by the
District Inspector of Schools inspite of the
fact that the judgment dated 1.8.2012
clearly indicates the filing of affidavits
and the statement of certain persons
which could have been made the basis for
such a finding. He contends that even this
material which was noticed by the Court
and the other material which was
contained in the objection of the petitioner
has been completely omitted to be
842 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
considered as such the said conclusion is
also based on no material.

10. Thirdly, Sri Khare contends that
the
passing
of
the
resolution
for
suspending the petitioner again on 3rd of
March, 2013 was also an erroneous
exercise and even if it was based
allegedly on new charges, the said factum
having been raised, ought to have been
taken care of by the District Inspector of
Schools for the reason that after the
passing of the resolution of second
suspension, the previous suspension order
and its resolution vanished. He relies on
paragraph 4 of the Division Bench
decision in the case of Committee of
Management,
Jan
Sahyogi
Intermediate College, Modhi, Post
Kunwara, Pargana Bharthana, District
Etawah
Vs.
District
Inspector
of
Schools, Etawah and another reported
in 1986 U.P. L.B.E.C. 144.

11.

Replying
to
the
said
submissions, Sri Shashi Nandan contends
that the charges which have been levelled
in relation to the second suspension order,
are fresh charges, and are not the same
charges as involved in the previous
suspension matter contained in the earlier
resolution. He further submits that the
second suspension resolution was not
subject matter of consideration before the
District Inspector of Schools. Even
otherwise, the direction of the High Court
dated 1.8.2012 was to be complied with
and it is pursuant to the said directions
that the District Inspector of Schools had
to consider the case in accordance with
the said directions and the second
suspension resolution will have no impact
on the same. He therefore submits that the
charges are serious enough indicating
financial
irregularities
as
well
and
therefore, the satisfaction recorded by the
District Inspector of Schools is based on
the material on record and cannot be said
to be perverse so as to warrant any
interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. He further contends
that the second suspension brings about
certain additional charges subsequent to
the resolution dated 1.8.2012 and in those
circumstances, it cannot be said that the
second suspension proceedings are either
mala-fide or have been framed with a
view to give colour to the action taken by
the Committee of Management. The
District Inspector of Schools therefore
according to him rightly confined himself
to the previous resolution, and has
recorded a finding with regard to the
validity of the meeting as well. He
submits that the conclusion being not
been based on the material with regard to
the second suspension matter, does not
vitiate the order at all.

12. Learned Standing Counsel has
also adopted the same arguments as Sri
Shashi Nandan, and he submits that the
facts which have been brought on record
can be assessed and the matter can be
disposed of finally at this stage itself.

13. Learned counsel for the
respondents including the counsel for the
respondent no. 4, therefore do not propose
to file any counter affidavit at this stage.
Accordingly, the matter is being disposed
of finally with the consent of the parties
under the rules of the court.

14. Having heard learned counsel
for the parties, the provisions of the U.P.
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921
contained in Section 16-G (5) to 16-G (7)
spell out the procedure according to
which the approval or otherwise of a
2 All] Dr. Parasu Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Anr.
843
suspension order can be proceeded with
by the District Inspector of Schools. In the
instant
case,
there
was
a
judicial
intervention and the judgment dated
1.8.2012 had clarified the position in
accordance with which the District
Inspector of Schools had to proceed and
decide the matter.

15. The District Inspector of Schools
appears to have taken notice of the
allegations in relation to the exemption of
fees having been granted to some students
and has made the same a basis for passing
the impugned order. In the opinion of the
Court, these allegations, if do not form
part of the charge-sheet, the same should
not have been treated to be a relevant
material for the purpose of approving or
disapproving the suspension order. This
material was not even made known to the
petitioner at any stage.

16. Secondly, the resolution dated
18th December, 2011 has been taken into
consideration
for
the
purpose
of
approving the suspension order. The said
resolution indicates allegations of the
petitioner having realized a sum of Rs.
1,50,000/- as fees and funds relating to
Parent Teachers Association. The District
Inspector of Schools has simply extracted
the resolution without even prima facie
indicating as to how the said charge
levelled against the petitioner appears to
be a charge requiring an enquiry to be
held, and which may result in a major
penalty against the petitioner. Simply
having extracted the resolution will not
amount to indicating any reason for
approving the said resolution on the basis
of such a charge.

17. Thirdly, the District Inspector of
Schools has indicated that 12 out of 14
members had approved the resolution said
to have been passed against the petitioner.
The District Inspector of Schools has
nowhere discussed any evidence that was
indicated either in the judgment or in the
objections raised by the petitioner or the
Committee of Management in relation
thereto. It is a one line conclusion with no
material to support the said conclusion.
Thus on all these scores, the order of
approving
the
suspension
resolution
cannot be sustained.

18. Apart from this, the judgment of
the division bench in the case of
Committee of Management, Jan Sahyogi
Intermediate College (supra) also cannot
be ignored. Paragraph 4 of the said
decision, clearly indicates, that the earlier
suspension order would vanish if a
subsequent suspension order has been
passed. Sri Shashi Nandan has urged that
the subsequent suspension order is
founded on fresh charges and therefore
the same cannot be the basis to apply the
ratio of the said division bench judgment.
He further submits that, in the case which
was there before the division bench, there
was no previous judicial intervention as
presently involved. In the instant case
according to him, it was a decision of this
court which had directed the District
inspector of Schools to take a decision.
He therefore submits that the ratio of the
division
bench
judgment
being
distinguishable on facts the same would
not apply to the present controversy.

19. The aforesaid issue as to whether
the previous suspension order survives or
not would have to be gauged upon the
status
of
the
resolution
passed
subsequently suspending the petitioner
again. If the previous suspension was
surviving then the subsequent suspension
844 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
would be a redundant exercise. An
employee cannot be put under suspension
if he is already suspended. However, if
the previous suspension was non existent,
then the District Inspector of Schools
would have to take notice of the second
suspension as well in view of the ratio of
the division bench. The District Inspector
of Schools was equally bound to consider
the previous suspension matter in the light
of the judgment dated 1.8.2012 and his
powers as explained in the full bench
judgment of Chandra Bhushan Mishra
Vs.
District
Inspector
of
Schools
reported in 1995(1) ESC 552.

20. In this context, it would have
been more appropriate for the District
Inspector of Schools to have considered
the impact of the second resolution passed
by the Committee of Management for
having suspended the petitioner even if it
was on the basis of fresh charges. The
petitioner should have been given the
opportunity to contest the said position as
well as he had already raised this
objection. The District Inspector of
Schools was therefore well aware of these
proceedings having been undertaken and
it cannot be accepted that the District
Inspector of Schools was not aware of the
proceedings of the second suspension
resolution.

21. In the aforesaid circumstances,
for all the aforesaid reasons, the order
impugned dated 31.3.2013 cannot be
sustained. It is hereby set aside. The
matter is remitted back to the District
Inspector of Schools to pass a fresh order
in the light of the observations made
hereinabove after giving an opportunity of
hearing to all the parties concerned
preferably within a period of two months
from today. The status of the functioning
of the petitioner shall continue to be the
same as directed under the decision of this
Court dated 1st of August, 2012 till fresh
orders are passed.

22. The writ petition is allowed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.05.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SIBGHAT ULLAH KHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 24748 of 2013

Jagjeet Kaur

 ...Petitioner
Versus
Charan Singh and Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajesh Tripathi, Sri Varinder Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri K. Ajit.

Constitution of India, Art. 226- Jurisdictionsuit for cancellation of will deed filed before
civil court-according to plaint allegation-the
petitioner
are
continuing
in
peaceful
possession and their name recorded for last
18 yrs-unless declaration about title not
claimed before revenue court-civil court has
no
jurisdiction-petition
allowed-plaintiff
either to file suit under 229-B before trail
court
pray
for
return
of
palint
for
presentation before Revenue court.

Held: Para-7
If the plaintiffs had been recorded tenure
holders or the recording of the name of the
defendant petitioner had been promptly
objected to by the plaintiffs only then they
could maintain the suit before the civil court.
The relief claimed is purely of declaration.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sibghat Ullah Khan, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for both
the parties.