# Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 11 ILRA 51
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-14
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 31358 of 2021
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-prabhanshu-srivastava-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51087
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

C.S.C.,
Ashok
Shukla,
Raj
Kumar
Upadhyaya (R.K. Upadhyaya)

A.
Service
Law
-Constitution
of
India,1950-Article
226-Temporary
Government
Servants(Termination
of
Service Rules),1975-The petitioner was
appointed as Dental Surgeon and he was
terminated
under
Rules
1975
citing
unauthorized absence-The court held that
the
petitioner's
appointment
was
substantive and on a permanent post
making the Rules 1975 inapplicable-The
termination order was stigmatic since it
accused the petitioner of absconding
which requires proper inquiry and an
opportunity to respond-The court cited
several Supreme court judgments that
stigmatic orders must follow due processFailure
to
provide
such
procedural
safeguards
renders
the
termination
arbitrary, illegal, and violative of article 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India-thus,
the termination order was quashed-The
petitioner was directed to be reinstated
with all consequential benefits from the
date of his appointment.(Para 1 to 26)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

11 All. Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
51

Divorcee:
someone
who
is
divorced and who has not married again.

Divorced: married in the past but
not now married."

12. The Black's Law Dictionary, 9th
Edition defines "divorce" as follows:

"The legal dissolution of a
marriage by a court."

12.
From
perusal
of
aforesaid
definitions
as
given
in
Cambridge
Advanced Learner's Dictionary as well as
Black's Law Dictionary it clearly emerges
that divorce is marriage ended by official or
legal process or a legal dissolution of
marriage, divorcee is a person who is
divorced and has not married again and
divorced is married in the past but not now
married. Thus once a person has not
married again he would obviously fall
within the ambit of being unmarried though
he may be a divorcee.

13. Accordingly, when the grounds as
taken in the counter affidavit filed by the
respondents are seen vis a vis the
definitions as indicated above it clearly
emerges that the contention on the part of
the respondents that as the deceased brother
of
the
petitioner
was
a
divorcee
consequently he would fall within the
ambit
of
being
married
is
patently
misconceived and consequently the said
ground is rejected.

14. The further aspect is that a perusal
of the order impugned dated 02.03.2020
would indicate that no reasons emerge as to
why the claim of the petitioner for
compassionate
appointment
has
been
rejected. It is settled position of law that
every order should be a speaking order in
as much as reasons should emerge
reflecting application of mind by the
competent authority on the disputes which
arrive before him.

15. As already indicated above, the
order impugned dated 02.03.2020 does not
indicate as to why the claim of the
petitioner for compassionate appointment
has been rejected and thus it is apparent
that the order impugned is patently nonspeaking.

16. Keeping in view the aforesaid
discussion, the writ petition is allowed.

17.
The
order
impugned
dated
02.03.2020, a copy of which is annexure 1
to the writ petition, is quashed.

18. The competent authority i.e.
respondent no. 3 is directed to pass a fresh
order on the claim of the petitioner for
compassionate appointment keeping in
view the aforesaid discussion.

19. Let such an order be passed within
six weeks form the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 51
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 14.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ A No. 31358 of 2021

Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sachin
Upadhyay, Shivendra
S
Singh
Rathore, Shivendra Shivam Singh Ra
52 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.,
Ashok
Shukla,
Raj
Kumar
Upadhyaya (R.K. Upadhyaya)

A.
Service
Law
-Constitution
of
India,1950-Article
226-Temporary
Government
Servants(Termination
of
Service Rules),1975-The petitioner was
appointed as Dental Surgeon and he was
terminated
under
Rules
1975
citing
unauthorized absence-The court held that
the
petitioner's
appointment
was
substantive and on a permanent post
making the Rules 1975 inapplicable-The
termination order was stigmatic since it
accused the petitioner of absconding
which requires proper inquiry and an
opportunity to respond-The court cited
several Supreme court judgments that
stigmatic orders must follow due processFailure
to
provide
such
procedural
safeguards
renders
the
termination
arbitrary, illegal, and violative of article 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India-thus,
the termination order was quashed-The
petitioner was directed to be reinstated
with all consequential benefits from the
date of his appointment.(Para 1 to 26)

The writ petition is allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Purshottam Lal Dhingra Vs U.O.I. (1958) AIR
SC 36

2. Shamsher Singh Vs St. of Punj. (1974) 2 SCC 831

3. St. of Bih. Vs Gopi Kishore Prashad (1960)
AIR SC 689

4. Jagdish Mitter Vs U.O.I. & ors. (1964) SC 449

5. Shemsher Singh Vs St. of Punj & ors. (1974)
2 SCC 831

6. Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs Saytendra Nath
Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences,
Calcutta & ors. (1999) 3 SCC 60

7. Kamal Kishore Laskhman Vs Pan American
World Airways (1987) 1 SCC 146
8. Indra Pal Gupta Vs M/C Model Inter College
(1984) 3 SCC 384

9. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Mahaveer C. Singhvi (2010)
SC 3493

10. Guj. Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs Guj. Steel Tubes
Mazdoor Sabha(1980) 2 SCC 593

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shivendra S Singh
Rathore, Advocate, for the petitioner as
well as the learned standing counsel for the
opp. parties/State and R.K. Upadhyaya,
Advocate, for the opp. party No. 4, and
perused the records.

2. The petitioner being aggrieved by
his order of termination dated 30.11.2021
has approached this court seeking a writ in
the nature of Certiorari quashing the said
order.

3. It has been submitted by the learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
that
an
advertisement was issued on 31.12.2017 for
appointment on newly created 595 posts of
Dental Surgeon under the Department of
Medical Health and Child Welfare, U.P.
The petitioner being eligible for the said
selection applied in the said vacancy. He
was successful in the recruitment process
and
vide
order
dated
04.10.2020
appointment letter was issued to him on
permanent post against the substantial
vacancy.

4. Prior to the said advertisement and
selection, the petitioner had appeared for
the MDS exam for post-graduate education
in the Speciality of Pedodontics and
Preventive Dentistry on 14.12.2018 and he
was selected in the post-graduate course
and
had
taken
admission
in
the
Government Dental College and Hospital,
11 All. Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
53
Nagpur, Maharashtra. The result of the
recruitment for the post of Dental Surgeon
under the Medical Health and Child
Welfare, U.P., were not declared till the
petitioner was admitted and joined in 2019
for the post-graduate course and it is only
in 2020 that the results were declared and
he was selected on the post of Dental
Surgeon under the Medical Health and
Child Welfare, U.P. It is in the aforesaid
circumstances that the petitioner made an
application to the Department of Medical
and Health for grant of study-leave. The
respondent did not consider application for
grant of study-leave, consequently, he was
constrained to file a Writ Petition No.
13652 of 2020, Santoshni Samal & anr. v.
State of U.P. & 2 ors., which was disposed
of by this court with a direction to the opp.
parties to pass appropriate order on the
representation of the petitioner, by means
of order dated 15.03.2021.

5. The respondents duly considered
the representation of the petitioner and
rejected the same on the ground that the
petitioner was a Probationer and was not
entitled for the study-leave. The petitioner
being aggrieved by the order of rejection
dated 22.07.2021 filed another writ petition
before this court being Writ Petition No.
22235 of 2021(SS) titled as Dr. Prabhanshu
Srivastava v. State of U.P., on which
notices were issued and it is pending
consideration before this court.

6. It is during pendency of the aforesaid
writ petition that on 20.12.2021 the petitioner
went to join his services at the place of
posting on 30.12.2021, but he was informed
that his services had already been terminated
by means of the impugned order dated
30.11.2021, however, a perusal of the
impugned order indicates that the petitioner
had already joined on 10.10.2020 and from
the very next date he had proceeded on leave
and it is for his unauthorized absence that his
services have been terminated under the Uttar
Pradesh Temporary Government Servants
(Termination of Service) Rules, 1975.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner
while assailing the order of termination dated
30.11.2021 has submitted that he was
appointed on a substantial post according to
the service rules by following the due
procedure and accordingly submitted that he
could not have been subjected to the
provisions of Uttar Pradesh Temporary
Government
Servants
(Termination
of
Service) Rules, 1975 as he did not fall into
the category of temporary governmant
servant. He further submitted that the
definition of 'temporary service' has been
provided under Rule -2, according to which
'temporary service' means officiating or
substantial service on a temporary post or
officiating service on a permanent post under
the Uttar Pradesh Government. He submitted
that he was regularly appointed on a
substantial vacancy and consequently it
cannot be said that he was on 'temporary
service'. On the other hand, there is no
dispute that the post on which the petitioner
was appointed was not a temporary post and
unless these two conditions are fulfilled, a
person would not fall under the definition of
'temporary service', hence the provisions of
Rules of 1975 would not be applicable on the
services of the petitioner.

8. He further submits that apart from
the above, the impugned order is stigmatic
inasmuch as the reason for termination has
been stated in the order itself, which is that
the petitioner has absented himself from
duties since 11.10.2020, due to which his
services could not be availed by the Public
at large and, consequently, his services are
no longer required.
54 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. It is stated that imputation regarding
his absence to be intentional and due to his
non-absence, the public at large has been
adversely effected, is a clearly stigma on
the petitioner and submits that such an
order could not have been passed without
giving due opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner. In support of his submissions he
has relied upon the judgment of the
supreme court in the case of Purshottam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958
SC 36; Shamsher Singh v. State of
Punjab, 1974 (2) SCC 831, to canvass his
submissions that in case the order casts
stigma, the effect of such an order of
termination may have on person's future
prospects of employment, is a matter of
relevant consideration and though it may
have been open for the respondents to have
passed an order simplicitor of termination,
but such an order casting sigma on the
petitioner would be bad, illegal, arbitrary
and accordingly deserves to be set aside.

10. He further submits that from bare
perusal of the impugned order it would be
evident that no notice or any opportunity of
hearing was provided to the petitioner prior
to passing of the said order and accordingly
the said order is clearly illegal, arbitrary
and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.

11. The learned Standing counsel, on
the other hand, has opposed the writ
petition. He has submitted that the
petitioner had submitted his joining on
10.10.2020 and from the very next date,
i.e., 11.10.2020 he absconded from his
duties during the period of probation,
without obtaining any permission/sanction
and, accordingly, as per Rule-3 of the Rules
of 1975 his services have been terminated
by means of the impugned order dated
30.11.2021. Learned Standing Counsel
further submitted that the issue pertaining
to the grant of extraordinary leave/study
leave is under consideration before this
court in Writ Petition No. 22235 of 2021,
Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava v. State of U.P.,
but submits that the unauthorized absence
of the petitioner is clearly an act of
misconduct and there is no infirmity in
passing the order of termination.

12. I have heard rival contentions of
the parties and perused the record.

13. The facts are not in dispute
inasmuch as the petitioner being a medical
graduate had applied for the post of Dental
Surgeon, which was advertised by the U.P.
Public Service Commission on 30.12.2017
and he being eligible was duly appointed to
the said post by means of order dated
04.10.2020. It is prior to declaration of the
result for appointment as Dental Surgeon
that the petitioner had appeared in the
Master
in
Dental
Surgeon
(MDS)
Examination and was successful and was
pursuing his post-graduate course in the
Government Dental College and Hospital,
Nagpur,
Maharashtra,
when
the
appointment
letter
was
issued.
The
petitioner moved the application for grant
of study-leave, which was rejected and is
presently the subject matter of Writ Petition
No. 22235 of 2021. According to the
petitioner, when he attempted to join his
place of posting on 20.12.2021, he was
informed that his services had already been
terminated on 30.11.2021.

14. According to the impugned order
dated 30.11.2021 passed by the Secretary,
Department of Medical Health and Child
Welfare, U.P., it is stated that the petitioner
was in the cadre of Uttar Pradesh Dental
Surgeon and was temporarily employed
and that he had absconded from his
11 All. Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
55
workplace from 11.10.2020 due to which
benefit of his services could not be availed
by the Public at large and consequently his
services are no longer required and
according to the Uttar Pradesh Temporary
Government Servants (Termination of
Service) Rules, 1975 his services are
dispensed with giving him one month's
notice.

15. Considering the arguments of the
petitioner that his services could not have
been terminated invoking the provisions of
Rules of 1975, it is noticed that it was
necessary for the respondents to have
considered as to whether the petitioner falls
in the definition of 'temporary service'. To
invoke the provisions of Section 2 of the
rules of 1975, it was necessary that the
services of the government servant should
not have been 'officiating or substantive on
temporary post' or 'officiating service on
permanent post' under the Uttar Pradesh
Government. There is no dispute that the
petitioner was substantially appointed on a
permanent post and, accordingly, his
services were not on a temporary post and
clearly he was not on officiating service on a
permanent
post.
Basic
ingredients
of
"temporary service" being absent with regard to
the services of the petitioner he could not have
been said to be in temporary service and, hence,
Section 3 of Rules of 1975 would be
inapplicable in the case of the petitioner. Rule-3
clearly provides that services of the government
servant in temporary service are liable to be
terminated at any time by notice in writing
given either by the government servant to the
appointing authority or by the appointing
authority to the government servant, hence, it is
necessary that the services of such employee
have to be 'temporary service'.

16. Accordingly, this court is of the
considered view that services of the
petitioner did not fall within the definition
of 'temporary service' and, hence, the
impugned order has been passed without
jurisdiction, is illegal and arbitrary and
liable to be set aside.

17. Apart from the above, it is further
noticed that stigma has been cast upon the
petitioner to the extent that he has been
held to have absconded from service and
due to his absence from service the Public
at large has been deprived of his services.
This adverse comment upon the petitioner
amounts to stigma and accordingly any
order passed by the respondents casting
stigma on any employee, can be passed
only after giving due opportunity of
hearing.

18. Mere form of the order using
expressions "terminate", 'discharge' etc, is not
conclusive and despite the use of such
innocuous
expressions,
the
Court
can
examine the matter to find out the true nature
of the order terminating the service of the
petitioner. This has been the consistent view
of the Supreme Court in several Constitution
Bench decisions rendered in Parshottam Lal
Dhingra vs. Union of India AIR 1958 SC
36, State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prashad
AIR 1960 SC 689, Jagdish Mitter vs. Union
of India and others 1964 SC 449, Shemsher
Singh vs. State of Punjab and others
1974(2) SCC 831.

19. Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash
Banerjee
vs.
Saytendra
Nath
Bose
National Centre for Basic Sciences,
Calcutta and others, (1999) 3 SCC 60,
observed as follows:-

"25. In the matter of `stigma', this
Court has held that the effect which an
order of termination may have on a
person's future prospects of employment is
56 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
a matter of relevant consideration. In the
seven Judge case in Samsher Singh vs.
State of Punjab [1974 (2) SCC 831],
Ray,CJ observed that if a simple order of
termination was passed, that would enable
the officer to "make good in other walks of
life without a stigma. "It was also stated in
Bishan Lal Gupta vs. State of Haryana
[1978 (1) SCC 202] that if the order
contained a stigma, the termination would
be bad for "the individual concerned must
suffer a substantial loss of reputation
which may affect his future prospects".

20. In Kamal Kishore Lakshman vs.
Pan American World Airways, 1987 (1)
SCC 146, Supreme Court explained the
meaning of 'stigma' and what amounts to
'stigma' as follows(p150):

"According to Webster's New
World Dictionary, it (stigma) is something
that detracts from the character or
reputation of a person, a mark, sign etc.,
indicating
that
something
is
not
considered normal or standard. The Legal
Thesuras by Burton gives the meaning of
the word to be blemish, defect, disgrace,
disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or
shame.
The
Webster's
Third
New
International Dictionary gives the meaning
as a mark or label indicating a deviation
from a norm. According to yet another
dictionary `stigma' is a matter for moral
reproach."

21. A three Judge Bench decision in
Indra Pal Gupta vs. Managing Committee,
Model Inter College (1984) 3 SCC 384, is
a clear authority for the proposition that the
material which amounts to stigma need not
be contained in the order of termination of
the probationer but might be contained in
any document referred to in the termination
order or in its Annexures. Obviously, such
a document could be asked for or called for
by any future employer of the probationer.
In such a case, the order of termination
would stand vitiated on the ground that no
regular inquiry was conducted.

22. Supreme Court in Union of India
and others vs. Mahaveer C. Singhvi AIR,
2010 SC 3493, observed as follows:-

"15.
The
High
Court
also
referred to the Special Bench decision of
this Court is Shamsher Singh v. State of
Punjab and Anr. MANU/SC/0073/1974:
AIR
SC
2192:
MANU/SC/0073/1974:1974(2) SCC 831
which was a decision rendered by a Bench
of seven judges, holding that the decisive
factor in the context of the discharge of a
probationer from service is the substance
of the order and not the form in
determining
whether
the
order
of
discharge is stigmatic or not or whether
the
same
formed
the
motive
for
foundation of the order.

31.............Not only is it clear
from the materials on record, but even in
their
pleadings
the
petitioners
have
themselves admitted that the order of 13th
June, 2002, had been issued on account of
the Respondent's misconduct and that
misconduct was the very basis of the said
order. That being so, having regard to the
consistent view taken by this Court that if
an order of discharge of a probationer is
passed as a punitive measure, without
giving him an opportunity of defending
himself, the same would be invalid and
liable to be quashed, and the same finding
would be also apply to the Respondent's
case. As has also been held in some of the
cases cited before us, if a findings against
a probationer is arrived at behind his back
on the basis of the enquiry conducted into
the allegations made against him/her and
11 All. Dr. Prabhanshu Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
57
if the same formed the foundation of the
order of discharge, the same would be bad
and liable to be set aside. On the other
hand,
if
no
enquiry
was
held
or
contemplated and the allegations were
merely a motive for the passing of an order
of discharge of a probationer without
giving him a hearing, the same would be
valid. However, the latter view is not
attracted/to
the
facts
of
this
case.................This case, in our view, is not
covered by the decision of this Court in
Dipti Prakash Banerjee's case (supra)".

23. In what circumstances, an order of
termination of a probationer can be said to
be punitive depends upon whether certain
allegations which are the cause of the
termination or the motive of the foundation
of the order.

24. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs.
Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha,
(1980) 2 SCC 593, Supreme Court
explained 'foundation' as follows:-

"A termination effected because
the master is satisfied of the misconduct
and of the consequent desirability of
terminating the service of the delinquent
servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the
right in law to terminate with an innocent
order
under
the
standing order
or
otherwise. Whether, in such a case the
grounds are recorded in a different
proceeding from the formal order does not
detract from its nature. Nor the fact that,
after being satisfied of the guilt, the master
abandons the enquiry and proceeds to
terminate. Given an alleged misconduct
and a live nexus between it and the
termination of service the conclusion is
dismissal. even if full benefits as on simple
termination, are given and non-injurious
terminology is used.

On the contrary, even if there is
suspicion of misconduct the master may
say that he does not wish to bother about it
and may not go into his guilt but may feel
like not keeping a man he is not happy
with. He may not like to investigate nor
take the risk of continuing a dubious
servant. Then it is not dismissal but
termination simpliciter, if no injurious
record of reasons or punitive pecuniary
cut-back on his full terminal benefits is
found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then
the moving factor in the discharge."

25.
The
distinction
between
"foundation" and "motive" was explained
in Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra):

"If findings were arrived at in
an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the
back of the officer or without a regular
departmental enquiry, the simple order of
termination is to be treated as "founded"
on the allegations and will be bad. But if
the enquiry was not held, no findings were
arrived at and the employer was not
inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the
same time he did not want to continue the
employee
against
whom
there
were
complaints, it would only be a case of
motive and the order would not be bad.
Similar is the position if the employer did
not want to enquire into the truth of the
allegations because of delay in regular
departmental proceedings or he was
doubtful
about
securing
adequate
evidence. In such a circumstance, the
allegations would be a motive and not the
foundation and the simple order of
termination would be valid.

26. Accordingly applying the tests and
laid down the Supreme Court in the
aforesaid judgements, the order stating that
the petitioner had "absconded" from
58 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
service, due to which the services could not
be available the public at large, clearly
casts stigma upon the petitioner. Any
person who is said to have "absconded"
meaning thereby he has deliberately fled
from his duty without obtaining proper
action, reflects adversely on the conduct of
any comment servant and hence casting an
implication
that
the
petitioner
has
absconded his cast stigma, and such an
importation could not have been levelled
without giving him proper opportunity of
hearing. In the present case no show cause
notice nor any opportunity was given to the
petitioner, and accordingly such an order
casting stigma on him could not have been
passed and hence the same is illegal and
arbitrary and libel to be set aside.

In the light of the above, the writ
petition is allowed. Order dated 30.11.2021
is hereby quashed. The petitioner is
directed
to
be
reinstated
with
all
consequential benefits from the date of his
appointment.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 58
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 14.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 9723 of 2024

Pnb Housing Finance Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Nitesh Kumar Tripathi, Saumya

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
A.
Recovery
Law
-
Constitution
of
India,1950
-
Article
226
-
Writ
-
Maintainability - SARFAESI Act, 2002 -
Section 14 - Execution of an order passed
u/s 14 of the Act, 2002 was sought by
secured creditor - Alternative remedy to
approach the DM or CJM available -
Though the order passed u/s 14 was
challenged by the borrower u/s 17, but
there is no interim order - Effect - Held, it
is the District Magistrate or the Chief
Metropolitan/Judicial
Magistrate
are
obliged to take possession of such assets
and documents relating thereto, and to
forward such assets & documents to the
secured creditor - It is not the secured
creditor, who after obtaining an order u/s
14 of the Act, 2002, is supposed to run
from pillar to post or to the police
personnel to get the order executed -
High
Court
granted
liberty
to
the
petitioner/ secured creditor to move the
application
before
the
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate for execution of the order
passed u/s 14 - High Court further
directed the officer to verify as to whether
there is any interim order in favour of
borrower or not in a proceeding u/s 17.
(Para 4, 5 and 6)
Writ petition disposed off. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:
1. Writ C No. 8867 of 2024; Bank of Baroda Vs
St. of U.P. & ors. decided on 25.10.2024
2. Writ C No. 8867 of 2024; Bank of Baroda Vs
St. of U.P. & anr.decided on 25.10.2024
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.
&
Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh, J.)

Heard.

1. This is a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India seeking
execution / enforcement of the order dated
13.09.2024 passed in Case No. 74239 of
2024 under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the