# Dr. Saba Sarif v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 4 ILRA 670
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-04-16
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 31506 of 2023
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Dr. Yogrndra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-saba-sarif-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53192
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - Writ Petition - seeking a writ of
mandamus - commanding the medical college
(respondent no. 2) to release the petitioner's
original documents - petitioner submitted a
bank guarantee in compliance with a prior
court order - respondent no. 2 released the
original documents - however, court finds
that - Rs. 5,00,000/- as security taken by the
medical college under a bond was not
enforceable and also same was not in
consonance with the public policy - held,
relying on precedents from the Madhya
Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts, the Court
directed to the respondent no. 2 to refund the
security deposit of Rs.5,00,000/- along with
interest at the rate of 4% per anum from the
date
of
payment,
including
the
bank
guarantee, within four weeks - direction
issued accordingly - writ petition is disposed
of.

Writ Petition Disposed of. (E-11)

List of referred Cases: -

## Text

670 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
24. In the result, the petitions
succeed and are allowed. As the petitioners
have
been
subjected
to
unnecessary
harassment and compensation has been
withheld on a specious plea, which is
evidently afterthought and unsustainable in
law, therefore, the petitioners are held
entitled to cost and damages, quantified as
Rs. 25,000/- for each patta, to be paid by
respondent no. 5, within four weeks from
the date of communication of the instant
order.

25. A copy of the order be kept on
the file of each case.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 670
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGRNDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ C No. 31506 of 2023

Dr. Saba Sarif ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ms. Akansha Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - Writ Petition - seeking a writ of
mandamus - commanding the medical college
(respondent no. 2) to release the petitioner's
original documents - petitioner submitted a
bank guarantee in compliance with a prior
court order - respondent no. 2 released the
original documents - however, court finds
that - Rs. 5,00,000/- as security taken by the
medical college under a bond was not
enforceable and also same was not in
consonance with the public policy - held,
relying on precedents from the Madhya
Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts, the Court
directed to the respondent no. 2 to refund the
security deposit of Rs.5,00,000/- along with
interest at the rate of 4% per anum from the
date
of
payment,
including
the
bank
guarantee, within four weeks - direction
issued accordingly - writ petition is disposed
of.

Writ Petition Disposed of. (E-11)

List of referred Cases: -

1. Ruxmaniben Deepchand Gardi Medical
College Vs Dr. Ansul Jain & ors.- Writ Appeal
No. 757 of 2020,

2. Dr. Anshul Jain Vs St. of MP & ors.- Writ
Petition No. 7982/2019,

3. Shitanshu Shekhar Manoharlal Vs St. of
Guj. - P/STA/18840/2014.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf,
J.
&
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,
J.)

1. Supplementary affidavit filed
on behalf of the petitioner is taken on
record.
The
supplementary
affidavit
reveals that in pursuance of the order
dated 22.09.2023 passed by a coordinate
Bench of this Court, the petitioner has
filed the bank guarantee before the
respondent no.2.

2. Upon submission of the bank
guarantee, the respondent no.2 has
released
the
original
certificates/documents to the petitioner.

3. Counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the respondent no.2
is still to refund the security deposit of
4 All. Dr. Saba Sarif Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
671
Rs.5,00,000/- alongwith interest
which was taken from the petitioner as
condition of the bond. Relying on the
Division Bench decision of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal
No.757 of 2020 (Ruxmaniben Deepchand
Gardi Medical College Vs. Dr. Ansul
Jain and others), learned counsel further
submits that the bond that was taken by the
respondent no.2 is not valid and is required
to be treated as null and void.

4. It is to be noted that the Division
Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in the aforementioned writ appeal, had
affirmed an earlier judgment of a learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition No.7982 of
2019 (Dr. Anshul Jain D/o Vimal Jain
Vs. State of MP and others), which in
turn had relied upon a judgment of the
Gujarat High Court judgment in Shitanshu
Shekhar
Manoharlal
Vs.
State
of
Gujarat (P/STA/18840/2014), wherein it
had been held as follows:-

 "17. At this juncture, it would be
relevant to mention that the Supreme Court
time and again has struck down the clauses
or the conditions contained in the service
agreement, which were found to be unfair,
unreasonable, unconscionable and opposed
to the public policy. As stated earlier,
pursuant to the G.R. dated 28.06.2013, the
bonds are required to be executed by the
students while taking the admission in PG
Courses. The students have no choice but
to sign in the agreement bond in the
prescribed format. In the opinion of the
Court such bond agreement could not be
said to be have been executed by free will
or consent of the students, in view of the
provisions contained in the Indian Contract
Act. As per Section 19A of the Indian
Contract Act, when the consent to an
agreement is caused by undue influence,
the agreement is a contract voidable at the
option of the party whose consent was so
caused. Subsection (1) of Section 16 defines
"undue influence" to the effect that a
contract is said to be induced by the "undue
influence" where the relations subsisting
between the parties are such that one of the
parties is in a position to dominate the will
of the other and uses that position to obtain
an unfair advantage over the other.
Subsection (2) of Section 16 further inter
alia provides that a person is deemed to be
in a position to dominate the will of
another, where he holds a real or apparent
authority over the other. At this juncture, it
would be also relevant to refer to Sections
23 of the Contract Act. Section 23 states
that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless inter alia the
Court regards it as opposed to public
policy.
It
also
provides
that
every
agreement
of
which
the
object
or
consideration is unlawful, is void.

 18. The Supreme Court, in the
case of Central Inland Water Transport
Corporation versus Brojo Nath Ganguly
reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 employing
the provisions of the Contract Act into the
principles of reasonableness and fairness
imbibed in Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, has held inter alia that when the
contracts are entered into by the weaker
party under the pressure of circumstances,
which results in inequality of bargaining
power, such contracts would not fall within
the four corners of the definition of "undue
influence" given in Section 16(1) of the
Contract Act, even though at times they are
between the parties one of whom holds a
real or apparent authority over the other.
Such contracts, which affect a large
number of persons or a group of persons, if
they are unconscionable, unfair and
unreasonable, are injurious to the public
672 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
interest. Such a contract or its clause
should be adjudged void under Section 23
of the Contract Act on the ground of being
opposed to the public policy. The Supreme
Court in the said case was examining the
question of validity of a service rule framed
by
a
Government
Company,
namely
Central
Inland
Water
Transport
Corporation. The rule viz. the Rule 9(i)
empowered the corporation to terminate
the services of its employees at will. The
Supreme Court held the said Rule not only
arbitrary,
unreasonable
and
unconscionable infringing Article 14 of the
constitution but the term contained in the
said contract rule as opposed to the public
policy and therefore void under Section 23
of
the
Contract
Act.
The
relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court
may be reproduced as under:

 "91. Is a contract of the type
mentioned above to be adjudged voidable
or void? If it was induced by undue
influence, then under section 19A of the
Indian Contract Act, it would be voidable.
It is, however, rarely that contracts of the
types to which the principle formulated by
us above applies are induced by undue
influence as defined by section 16(1) of the
Indian Contract Act, even though at times
they are between parties one of whom holds
a real or apparent authority over the other.
In the vast majority of cases, however, such
contracts are entered into by the weaker
party under pressure of circumstances,
generally economic, which results in
inequality of bargaining power. Such
contracts will not fall within the four
corners of the definition of "undue
influence" given in section 16(1). Further,
the majority of such contracts are in a
standard or prescribed form or consist of a
set of rules. They are not contracts between
individuals containing terms meant for
those individuals alone, Contracts in
prescribed or standard forms or which
embody a set of rules as part of the
contract are entered into by the party with
superior bargaining power with a large
number of persons who have far less
bargaining power or no bargaining power
at all. Such contracts which affect a large
number of persons or a group or groups of
persons, if they are unconscionable, unfair
and unreasonable, are injurious to the
public interest. To say that such a contract
is only voidable would be to compel each
person with whom the party with superior
bargaining power had contracted to go to
court to have the contract adjudged
voidable. This would only result in
multiplicity of litigation which no court
should encourage and would also not be in
the public interest. Such a contract or such
a clause in a contract ought, therefore, to
be adjudged void. While the law of
contracts in England is mostly judge made,
the law of contracts in India is enacted in a
statute, namely, the Indian Contract Act,
1872. In order that such a contract should
be void, it must fall under one of the
relevant sections of the Indian Contract
Act. The only relevant provision in the
Indian Contract Act which can apply is
section 23 when it states that "The
consideration or object of an agreement is
lawful, unless . . . the court regards it as . .
. opposed to public policy."

 92. The Indian Contract Act does
not define the expression "public policy" or
"opposed to public policy". From the very
nature of things, the expressions "public
policy", "opposed to public policy" or
"contrary to public policy" are incapable of
precise definition. Public policy, however,
is
not
the
policy
of
a
particular
government. It connotes some matter which
concerns the public good and the public
4 All. Dr. Saba Sarif Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
673
interest. The concept of what is for the
public good or in the public interest or
what would be injurious or harmful to the
public good or the public interest has
varied from time to time. As new concepts
take the place of old, transactions which
were once considered against public policy
are now being upheld by the courts and
similarly where there has been a well
recognized head of public policy, the courts
have not shirked from extending it to new
transactions and changed circumstances
and have at times not even flinched from
inventing a new head of public policy.
There are two schools of thought "the
narrow view" school and "the broad view"
school. According to the former, courts can
not create new heads of public policy
whereas the latter countenances judicial
law- making in this area. The adherents of
"the narrow view" school would not
invalidate a contract on the ground of
public policy unless that particular ground
had been well established by authorities.
Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous
spoken more clearly and loudly than in
these words of Lord Davey in Janson v.
Uriefontein Consolidated Mines Limited
"Public policy is always an unsafe and
treacherous ground for legal decision."
That was in the year 1902. Seventyeight
years earlier, & Burros, J., in Richardson
v. Mellish, described public policy as "a
very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will
carry you." The Master of the Rolls, Lord
Denning, however, was not a man to shy
away from unmanageable horses and in
words which conjure up before our eyes the
picture of the young Alexander the Great
taming Bucephalus he said in Enderyby
Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football
Association Ltd.; "With a good man in the
saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in
control. It can jump over obstacles." Had
the timorous always held the field, not only
the doctrine of public policy but even the
Common Law or the principles of Equity
would never have evolved. Sir William
Holdsworth in his "History of English
Law", Volume III, page 55, has said :

 "In fact, a body of law like the
common law, which has grown up
gradually with the growth of the nation,
necessarily acquires some fixed principles,
and if it is to maintain these principles it
must be able, on the ground of public
policy or some other like ground, to
supress practices which, under ever new
disguises, seek to weaken or negative them.

 It is thus clear that the principles
governing public policy must be and are
capable, on proper occasion, of expansion
or modification. Practices which were
considered perfectly normal at one time
have
today
become
obnoxious
and
oppressive to public conscience. If there is
no head of public policy which covers a
case, then the court must in consonance
with public conscience and in keeping with
public good and public interest declare
such practice to be opposed to public
policy. Above all, in deciding any case
which may not be covered by authority our
courts have before them the beacon light of
the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking
precedent, the court can always be guided
by that light and the principles underlying
the Fundamental Rights and the Directive
Principles enshrined in our Constitution."

 93. **** The types of contracts to
which the principle formulated by us above
applies are not contracts which are tainted
with illegality but are contracts which
contain terms which are so unfair and
unreasonable
that
they
shock
the
conscience of the court. They are opposed
674 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to public policy and require to be adjudged
void."

 19. The aforestated decision has
been affirmed by the Constitution Bench in
case of Delhi Transport Corporation versus
DTC Majdoor Congress and Others
reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600. The
said decision has also been followed in the
case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. versus
Nilofer Siddiqui & Ors reported in (2015)
16 SCC 125. As per the legal position
settled in the said decisions, even though
the rights of the citizens are in the nature of
contractual rights, the manner, the method
and the motive of a decision of entering
into a contract are subject to judicial
review to be examined on the touchstone of
reasonableness, fair play, equality and non
discrimination. It has been stated inter alia
that the Courts will not enforce, and will
when called upon to do so, strike down an
unfair and unreasonable agreement or a
clause or condition in the agreement
entered into between the parties who are
not equal in the bargaining power. The
ratio laid down in the said decisions would
also apply were the person has no choice,
rather no meaningful choice but to give his
assent
to
a
condition,
howsoever
unreasonable and unconscionable it may
be, and sign on a dotted line in the
prescribed or standard form of agreement.

 20. If the facts of the present case
are appreciated in the light of the
aforestated legal position, it clearly
transpires that the petitioners who are
the meritorious students and have got
their admission on their own merits in the
PG Courses in the Government Colleges
as per the admission Rules, have been
called upon to give undertaking for
execution of the bond in view of the G.R.
dated 28.06.2013. They have also been
called upon to sign on the dotted lines in
a prescribed form of bond agreement, the
copy of which is produced on record in
Special Civil Application No. 2690 of
2016. The respondent authorities being in
dominating position, the petitioners and
the students similarly situated as the
petitioners have no choice but to give
assent to the conditions mentioned in the
said bond agreement, though the said
conditions are too harsh, unreasonable
and onerous. The concerned respondent
authorities by issuing the circular dated
28.02.2019, have literally tried to cause
fear in the minds of the students that their
stipend will be stopped, and that they will
not be allotted the exam hall tickets, if
they did not furnish the bond agreement.
Thus, the action of the respondents in
compelling the PG students to undertake
to execute fresh bond of Rs. 10,00,000/
for serving in rural areas for three years,
and to extend the bond already furnished
as UG students for a further period of
three years in view of G.R. dated
28.06.2013 and further compelling them
to sign on the dotted lines of the bond
agreement
containing
absolutely
unreasonable
and
unconscionable
conditions, smacks of arbitrary exercise
of powers at the instance of the
respondent
authorities.
Such
bond
agreement and the conditions mentioned
therein being unreasonable, unjust and
unconscionable
are
required
to
be
construed as opposed to the public policy
and therefore void, as also violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution, in view of
the decision of the Central Inland Water
Transport Corporation (supra)."

5. In the present case, we are of the
view that the bond that was executed by the
medical college was not in consonance
with the public policy, and accordingly the
4 All. Smt. Kehkashan Vs.State of U.P. & Ors.
675
bond cannot be enforced by the
respondent no.2.

6. In light of the same, the
respondent no.2 is directed to refund the
security deposit of Rs.5,00,000/- alongwith
interest at the rate of 4% per anum, of the
principal sum, starting from the date of
payment made by the petitioner till the
payment to be made by the respondent no.2
to the petitioner.

7. The above refund should be
made within a period of four weeks from
the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.

8. Further more, the bank guarantee
that has been deposited by the petitioner, in
pursuance of the order of the coordinate
Bench of this Court, should also be
returned to the petitioner alongwith the
refund of the security deposit.

9. With the above directions, the
writ petition is disposed of.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 675
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIKRAM D. CHAUHAN, J.

Writ - C No. 31742 of 2024

Smt. Kehkashan ...Petitioner
Versus
State
of
U.P.
&
Ors.
...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Imtiaz Husain, Sri Siddharth Nandan,
Sri H.N. Singh (Sr. Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ganesh Pratap Singh, Sri R.P.S.
Chauhan, Sri Rajeev Kumar Singh, Sri
Siddharth Khare, Sri Navin Sinha (Sr.
Advocate)

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 226 - U.P. Panchayat Raj Act,
1947 - Section 12-C, - U.P. Panchayat
Raj (Election of Members, Pradhan and
Up-Pradhans) Rules, 1994 - Rule 33, 82,
86, 86(1), 86(2), 86(2)(b), 105, 105(2)-
Writ Petition - challenging the election of the
Gram Pradhan - the petitioner initially secured
664 votes while respondent no. 4 received 658
- however, respondent no. 4 filed an election
petition under Section 12-C of the U.P.
Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, prompting a recount
- being aggrieved, petitioner filed writ petition
- High Court by earlier order remanded the
matter before the prescribed authority to
decide the election petition a fresh - led to a
Supreme Court - Supreme Court directed
recount in present of a Court Commissioner -
recounting revealing 659 votes for respondent
no. 4 and 657 for the petitioner, with 114
ballots declared invalid - the Supreme Court
remanded the matter to the High Court to
quickly review only disputed ballots and decide
the matter without delay - both contesting
parties were allowed to inspect and filed their
objections regarding invalid votes - the Court
relying on the legal maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius held that, any deviation from
the prescribed method, such as using ink dots
or thumb impressions, renders the ballot
invalid and threatens the integrity of the
election process - therefore, court upheld the
rejection of several disputed ballot papers in
the Gram Pradhan election, citing violations of
the mandatory voting procedure under Rules
86 and 105 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules,
1994 - after reviewing the objections to 40 out
of the 114 invalid votes, the Court found 36
ballots to be invalid, while 2 were valid in
favour of petitioner and 2 in favour of
respondent no. 4 - thus, the revised tally
brought petitioner's total to 659 votes and
respondent no. 4's total to 661 votes - thereby
declaring respondent no. 4 as the winning
candidate - directions issued to respondent
authorities to take consequential steps for