# Dr. Sanjay Mittal v. Union Of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 5 ILRA 701
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-05-09
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 5151 of 2023
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-sanjay-mittal-v-union-of-india-ors-54604
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings -
IIT Kanpur Statutes, Statute 13(9)(b) -
Misconduct by Professor - Allegations of
disparaging
remarks
against
a
colleague
belonging to SC category and convening of an
unauthorized
faculty
meeting
questioning
appointment - Inquiry held, charges found
proved - Board of Governors imposed penalty of
withholding two increments without cumulative
effect for two years and debarment from
holding administrative responsibilities for three
years - Validity.

Held: The charges established derogated from
discipline and constituted service misconduct;
penalty of withholding increments is permissible
under Statute 13(9)(b)(ii). However, debarment
from holding administrative responsibilities for a
period of three years is not one of the penalties
enumerated under Statute 13(9)(b). The said
punishment is beyond the authority of the IIT,
manifestly illegal, and stands quashed. Penalty
of
withholding
two
increments
without
cumulative effect sustained.

Writ Petition partly allowed.
702 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

5 All. Dr. Sanjay Mittal Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
701

 (3) Save as otherwise provided in
this Act, the repeal of the Acts referred to
in sub-section (1) shall not have an adverse
effect on the general application of section
6 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses
Act, 1904 (U.P. Act no. 1 of 1904) in
relation to the enforcement of provisions."

17. A careful reading of sub-section
(2) would reveal that notwithstanding
repeal of the Act of 1980 anything done or
any action taken under the acts referred to
in sub-section (1) is to be deemed to have
been done or taken under the new Act and
for such purposes the new Act were to be
treated to have been in force at all material
times. Once we find that the new Act
contains no power with the Director to fill
up a substantive vacancy which has come
into existence later, to be filled from a
candidate
selected
in
an
earlier
advertisement, the action of the Director
would be without jurisdiction. This is
particularly so as the powers of the Director
under the previous Act would continue
under the new Act by virtue of section
31(2) of the Act of 2023 insofar as it is
not inconsistent with the Act. A power
which is not conferred upon the Director
during the currency of new Act cannot be
exercised by tracing the source of such
power from the previous Act, which has
already been repealed.

18. In view of the deliberations and
discussions held above, we hold that the
Director had no jurisdiction to pass the
order in favour of the appellant on
15.01.2024 and such order is, therefore,
held to be without jurisdiction. Though for
a different reason, but we ultimately find
ourselves to be in agreement with the
conclusion drawn by the learned Single
Judge for quashing the order of the
Director.

19. This appeal, consequently fails,
and is dismissed. No order is passed as to
costs.
----------
(2025) 5 ILRA 701
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ A No. 5151 of 2023

Dr. Sanjay Mittal ...Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Avneesh Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Rohan Gupta, Sabhajeet Singh

Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings -
IIT Kanpur Statutes, Statute 13(9)(b) -
Misconduct by Professor - Allegations of
disparaging
remarks
against
a
colleague
belonging to SC category and convening of an
unauthorized
faculty
meeting
questioning
appointment - Inquiry held, charges found
proved - Board of Governors imposed penalty of
withholding two increments without cumulative
effect for two years and debarment from
holding administrative responsibilities for three
years - Validity.

Held: The charges established derogated from
discipline and constituted service misconduct;
penalty of withholding increments is permissible
under Statute 13(9)(b)(ii). However, debarment
from holding administrative responsibilities for a
period of three years is not one of the penalties
enumerated under Statute 13(9)(b). The said
punishment is beyond the authority of the IIT,
manifestly illegal, and stands quashed. Penalty
of
withholding
two
increments
without
cumulative effect sustained.

Writ Petition partly allowed.
702 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed against
an order of the Director, Indian Institute of
Technology, Kanpur dated 01.08.2022,
punishing
the
petitioner
with
the
withholding of two increments, without
cumulative effect, for a period of two years,
and directing that he shall not hold any
administrative responsibility for a period of
three years. The petitioner also challenges
the resolution of the Board of Governors of
the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur
(for short, 'the IIT') dated 23.07.2022,
resolving to impose upon the petitioner
punishments as ordered by the Director of
the IIT.

2. The petitioner is a Professor in the
Department of Aerospace Engineering at
the IIT. He was served with a charge-sheet
dated 25.04.2018 by the Chairman, Board
of Governors of the IIT, carrying the
following
charges,
accompanying
the
formal memorandum:

"Article-1

That the said Dr. Sanjay Mittal,
during a departmental get-together in the
Department of Aerospace Engineering held
on 04.01.2018 made disparaging comment
stating that the standard of the department
was going down due to the new faculty that
has recently joined the Institute.

As Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla
happened to be nearby, the comment was
made
against
none
other
than
Dr.
Subrahmanyam Saderla. He was also
aware that such a disparaging comment in
full public view would tend to lower the
professional character and reputation of
Dr.
Subrahmanyam
Saderla
in
the
department.

Dr. Sanjay Mittal has, therefore,
allegedly committed a serious misconduct
by
attempting
to
humiliate
Dr.
Subrahmanyam Saderla in full public view.
Accordingly, the said Dr. Sanjay Mittal is
prima facie accused of violating Rule 3(a)
and (b) of the Conduct Rules (Schedule-B)
framed under Statute 13(17) of the IIT
Kanpur Statutes.

Article-2

That the said Dr. Sanjay Mittal
vide an email dated 09.01.2018 called a
meeting of all the faculty members of the
Department of Aerospace Engineering,
barring Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla and Dr.
Raghvendra P. Kukillaya, inviting them in
a meeting at 4 PM on 10.1.2018 in AE
Meeting
Room
(NWTF
Building)
ostensibly
to
discuss
the
possible
procedural lapses in the recent hiring in the
department, without any permission from
the HoD or the competent authority of the
Institute. During the meeting, he allegedly
pioneered a discussion amongst his faculty
colleagues alluding that the recent selection
of Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla was not in
keeping with the norms of the Institute.

Dr. Sanjay Mittal was well aware
that the selection of Dr. Subrahmanyam
Saderla was made in a special recruitment
drive for SC/ST/OBC/PWD candidates and
Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla is belonging to
Scheduled Caste Category, yet he called the
meeting to foment, nurture and evoke
discontentment
amongst
his
faculty
colleagues against the selection of Dr.
Subrahmanyam Saderla.

Dr. Sanjay Mittal has, therefore,
allegedly committed a serious misconduct
by attempting to cause discontentment
amongst his faculty colleague against the
5 All. Dr. Sanjay Mittal Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
703
selection of Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla,
knowing very well that Dr. Subrahmanyam
Saderla
belongs
to
Scheduled
Caste
Category and calling his selection in
question would cause immense humiliation
to Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla. The said Dr.
Sanjay Mittal is, therefore, príma facie
accused of violating Rule 3(a) and (b) of
the Conduct Rules (Schedule- B) framed
under Statute 13(17) of the IIT Kanpur
Statutes."

3. There is a separate and detailed
statement of imputations in support of the
two charges, accompanying the chargesheet, besides a list of documents and
witnesses, by which, the charges were
proposed to be proved.

4. The petitioner submitted his written
statement
on
10.05.2018/
12.05.2018,
traversing the charges. Much happened in
this case before the stage of issue of the
charge-sheet,
that
is
to
say,
when
preliminary inquiry was done by a Fact
Finding Committee (for short, 'FFC').

5. After submission of the petitioner's
written statement, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the IIT, on the 31st
of May, 2018, appointed Hon'ble Mr.
Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui, a former
Judge of this Court, as the Inquiry Officer.
One Kripa Shankar, a Professor, was
appointed the Presenting Officer and
disciplinary proceedings were directed to
be held before the Inquiry Officer, jointly
against the petitioner, and Professor Rajeev
Shekhar, Professor Ishan Sharma and Dr.
C.S. Upadhyay. The Inquiry Officer held
the inquiry, which the petitioner alleges,
was in denial of the principles of natural
justice, in the sense of being denied
reasonable opportunity of defence. The
petitioner's request for appointment of an
Advocate as his defence representative was
rejected by the Inquiry Officer, without
referring it to the Disciplinary Authority.
The petitioner's request to appoint a
Professor of the IIT as his defence assistant
too was rejected.

6. It is the petitioner's case that after
the petitioner closed his defence, the
Inquiry Officer did not generally question
him on the circumstances appearing against
the petitioner and the evidence for the
purpose of enabling him to explain any
circumstances, that would go against him.

7. After conclusion of the inquiry, the
Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated
17.08.2018, holding the petitioner, along
with two others, guilty of the misconductm
charged on both counts. The inquiry report
was laid before the Board of Governors of
the IIT on 06.09.2018. The Board did not
find charges, relating to caste based bias or
hatred, made out against the petitioner, but,
nevertheless,
found
the
charges
of
misconduct established.

8. The Board, in their meeting dated
06.09.2018, resolved to supply a copy of
the inquiry report to the petitioner, carrying
the relevant part of the observations of the
Inquiry Officer and omitting those remarks
in the report that did not relate to the
charges. Upon supply of the inquiry report,
the
petitioner
submitted
detailed
representations
dated
03.10.2018,
06.10.2018 and 19.10.2018 against the
findings carried in the inquiry report,
communicated vide memorandum dated
13.09.2018.
The
petitioner's
representations, together with the findings
of the Committee, were again placed before
the Board of Governors in their special
meeting held on 17.10.2018. According to
the petitioner, the Board decided with a
704 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
closed mind and rejected the petitioner's
representations. They held both articles of
charges proved against the petitioner,
pursuant to the resolution of the Board of
Governors dated 17.10.2018. The Director
and Chairman of the Board of Governors
issued a memorandum dated 09.11.2018 to
the petitioner, saying that the Board were
of opinion that the charges against the
petitioner and the two other Professors
were of similar nature and the evidence
against them conclusively proved, that they
have committed misconduct, violating
Rules 3-A and 3-B of the Conduct Rules
framed under Statute 13 (17) of the IIT.

9. It was further remarked that the
Board had decided to award the penalty of
reduction to a lower post or grade to the
petitioner under Statute 13(9)(b)(b) (4) for
a period of one year, after which, the
petitioner's post and grade, presently held,
would be restored.

10. The petitioner was asked to show
cause against the proposed penalty by the
memorandum dated 09.11.2018 on or
before
27.11.2018.
He
submitted
a
representation dated 27.11.2018 to the
Board of Governors in reply to the memo
dated
09.11.2018.
The
petitioner's
representation dated 27.11.2018 was placed
before the Board in their meeting dated
18.01.2019. According to the Board's final
resolution, the penalties of withholding two
increments with cumulative effect for a
period of two years and the petitioner being
forbidden from holding any administrative
responsibility for a period of three years,
were imposed vide office order dated
08.03.2019.

11. Aggrieved by the order dated
08.03.2019, the petitioner instituted Writ-A
No.5103 of 2019 before this Court. The
said writ petition was allowed vide order
dated 11.05.2022, quashing the order dated
08.03.2019, punishing the petitioner and
leaving it open to the Board of Governors
of the IIT to proceed against the petitioner
afresh from the stage of consideration of
the inquiry report and the petitioner's
representations against the report and pass
reasoned orders in accordance with Rule
15(4) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965 (for short, 'the CCS Rules') within a
period of three months. The order of this
Court was laid before the Board of
Governors of the IIT in their meeting held
on 28.06.2022 and they resolved to the
effect that considering the misconduct
found proved against the petitioner, a minor
penalty was warranted under Statute 13(9)
of the Statutes of the IIT. Accordingly, they
resolved to punish the petitioner with the
withholding of two increments without
cumulative effect for a period of two years
under Statute 13(9)(b)(b)(3). The further
punishment, that was inflicted, was that the
petitioner shall not hold any administrative
responsibility for a period of three years. In
accordance with the resolution of the Board
of Governors dated 23.07.2022, a formal
order, inflicting the punishment, was
passed by the Director of the IIT dated
01.08.2022.

12. Aggrieved by the order dated
01.08.2022 passed by the Director and the
resolution of the Board of Governors dated
23.07.2022, amongst others, the present
writ petition has been instituted by the
petitioner.

13. A notice of motion was issued on
19.04.2023. In course of time, a counter
affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent
Nos.2, 3 and 4 and a rejoinder, on behalf of
the petitioner. Parties having exchanged
5 All. Dr. Sanjay Mittal Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
705
affidavits, the writ petition was admitted to
hearing,
which
proceeded
forthwith.
Judgment was reserved.

14. Heard Mr. Ashok Khare, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Avneesh
Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner,
Mr.
Rohan
Gupta,
learned
Counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to
4 and Mr. Sabhajeet Singh, learned Central
Government Counsel appearing on behalf
of the Union of India.

15. It is argued by Mr. Ashok Khare,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.
Avneesh
Tripathi,
learned
Counsel
appearing for the petitioner, that a bare
perusal of charge No.1 would show that it
is based on hearsay. The complainant did
not hear the conversation in the gettogether on 04.01.2018 or the disparaging
comments made by the petitioner, saying that
the standard of the Department was going
down due to the new faculty that has recently
joined the institute. He next submits that the
entire proceedings on charge No.2 are based
on misconceptions. Dr. Abhijeet Kushari,
PW-8, the Acting Head, Department of
Aerospace Engineering on 10.01.2018 and
the sole eye-witness on behalf of the
establishment contradicted the allegations
levelled against the petitioner. None of the
other establishment witnesses were present in
the meeting. It is contended that the
establishment did not produce an iota of
evidence in support of the imputations,
subject matter of charge No.2. It is next
submitted by Mr. Khare that the charges laid
against the petitioner, even if taken to be true
on their face value, would not constitute any
misconduct, by any stretch of imagination.

16. The next point urged is that the
Board have imposed a penalty of not giving
any administrative responsibility to the
petitioner for three years, which is not one
of the penalties envisaged, provided or
permitted under the Statute of the IIT, or
referable to any other provision of the law,
that may apply. The learned Senior
Advocate submits that the real intention
behind debarring the petitioner from
holding any administrative responsibility
for a period of three years was to
jeopardize his career and reputation. It was
particularly directed against the petitioner,
being selected and appointed the Director
of an IIT, for which he was eligible and
suitable. It is argued that knowing well that
the petitioner is at the top of his pay-scale
and the withholding of two increments will
not affect him financially, the real intention
of imposing the penalty was to put a
blemish on his career. It is also argued that
this Court's order dated 11.05.2022 passed
in Writ-A No.5103 of 2019 has been
observed in breach, in that, that the
petitioner's representation and the findings
of the Inquiry Officer have not been
considered by the Board of Governors,
applying mind to the issues and evidence.
Rather, they have maintained the penalty,
earlier imposed.

17. Mr. Rohan Gupta, learned Counsel
appearing for the IIT, on the other hand,
has raised a number of preliminary
objections. The foremost is that since Dr.
Subrahmanyam Saderla, the complainant,
has been harassed by three faculty
members of the IIT, he ought be heard first
before proceeding to final hearing. Dr.
Saderla has not been impleaded as a party,
according to Mr. Gupta, which makes the
writ petition ill-framed for non-joinder. The
order impugned is a communication of the
decision of the Board dated 23.07.2023 and
the said decision has been challenged with
an unexplained delay of over seven months,
after bypassing the alternative remedy
706 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
provided under the Statutes. There is still
another objection, which says that the
petitioner has an alternative remedy under
Statute 13(10) of the Statutes of the IIT,
where he can appeal any decision of the
Board of Governors to the Visitor, who is
none other than the President of India.

18. It is further argued that the fact
that earlier, the writ petition was directly
entertained, does not entitle the petitioner
to bypass the alternative remedy now,
because, when Writ-A No.5103 of 2019
was instituted, one of the grounds was
denial of natural justice. Now, after
remand, the petitioner's version has been
considered and, therefore, he is obliged to
avail the statutory alternative remedy. On
the merits of the matter, it is submitted by
learned Counsel for the IIT that a complaint
was received from Dr. Subrahmanyam
Saderla, Assistant Professor, Department of
Aerospace Engineering, alleging that he
was being harassed by certain faculty
members, including the petitioner. Upon
receipt of the complaint, an External Fact
Finding Committee was constituted on
27.01.2018. The External Fact Finding
Committee
investigated
the
matter,
interacting with various faculty members.
They submitted their report on 08.03.2019,
which found the petitioner, along with
other faculty members, to wit, Professor
Rajeev Shekhar, Professor Ishan Sharma
and Dr. C.S. Upadhyaya, prima facie guilty
of misconduct. This led to initiation of
disciplinary
proceedings
against
the
petitioner with the appointment of a retired
High Court Judge as the Inquiry Officer.
The petitioner was given full opportunity of
hearing and the inquiry report submitted.
The earlier resolution dated 23.07.2022,
adopted by the Board of Governors to
punish the petitioner, was impugned in
Writ-A No.5103 of 2019 and quashed on
the ground that the inquiry report and the
petitioner's representation against the report
had not been considered and a reasoned
decision made. Accordingly, the entire
matter was re-examined and the impugned
order passed.

19. Mr. Rohan Gupta has been at pains
to show, by evidence to this Court, what
the petitioner said of his colleague, Dr.
Subrahmanyam
Saderla
and
how
it
constitutes misconduct. About the penalty
imposed,
regarding
deprivation
of
administrative
assignments
to
the
petitioner, it is submitted by Mr. Gupta that
it
is
purely
an
administrative
and
preventive measure. Though not explicitly
provided in the Statutes, this penalty had to
be imposed to maintain general discipline
on the IIT Campus and to discourage future
misdemeanours of the same kind by any
other employee.

20. We have carefully considered the
submissions advanced on behalf of both
parties by learned Counsel and perused the
record.

21. The petitioner was served with a
charge-sheet, carrying two articles of
charges, both of which he denied by
submitting a written statement of his
defence. The respondents proved the
charges before the Inquiry Officer by
leading
both
documentary
and
oral
evidence. After the inquiry was over, a
copy of the inquiry report was furnished to
the petitioner and his representation invited
against the findings of the Inquiry Officer,
before the Disciplinary Authority, to wit,
the Board of Governors of the IIT took a
decision.
If
there
was
some
nonconsideration of the findings of the Inquiry
Officer and the petitioner's representation
thereagainst by the Board of Governors,
5 All. Dr. Sanjay Mittal Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
707
that fipple was removed by this Court by
quashing the order dated 08.03.2019 earlier
passed, vide judgment and order dated
11.05.2022 passed in Writ-A No.5103 of
2019. The IIT was given liberty to proceed
afresh from the stage of the inquiry report
and
the
petitioner's
representation
thereagainst. Now, the Board of Governors
have considered the matter, looking into the
findings of the Inquiry Officer and the
petitioner's
representation,
giving
due
opportunity to the petitioner to have his say
against the findings in the inquiry report,
which they have considered. In substance,
therefore, there is no procedural irregularity
that goes to the root of the matter, vitiating
the finding of guilt recorded by the Board
of Governors.

22. This is not to say that there are no
processual infractions committed during
the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer did commit
an error in not allowing the petitioner to be
represented by an Advocate, considering
the fact that the Inquiry Officer was himself
a former Judge of the High Court, a legally
trained man. The principle in this regard
has been laid down by the Supreme Court
in Ramesh Chandra v. Delhi University
and others, (2015) 5 SCC 549. In Ramesh
Chandra (supra), it has been held:

"70. In view of the law laid down
by this Court, we are of the view that if any
person who is or was a legal practitioner,
including a retired Hon'ble Judge is
appointed as an enquiry officer in an
inquiry initiated against an employee, the
denial of assistance of a legal practitioner
to the charged employee would be unfair."

23. This Court is of opinion that though
the inquiry was unfair at least on this point,
amongst others, but the fairness of the inquiry
is no longer open to examination now, since
it was not examined or pronounced upon in
the earlier writ petition, to wit, Writ-A
No.5103 of 2019, which was allowed with an
order of remand to the Board of Governors.
The orders in the last mentioned writ petition
did not quash the inquiry report or held it to
be procedurally unfair or vitiated in any
manner. The matter was remitted to be
considered by the Board of Governors from
the stage of the inquiry report and the
petitioner's
representation
thereagainst,
which, in the opinion of this Court, was not
duly considered by the Board while passing
the order of punishment, impugned in the
earlier writ petition. The validity of the
inquiry cannot, therefore, be much seen in
this writ petition. There has been cavil
between parties that the charges themselves
are so vague that the Board of Governors
acted to punish on a non-charge. We do not
think so.

24. The Board of Governors have found
the imputations proved and the question,
whether it was a service misconduct, is not
one with much worth to it. It certainly
derogated from the essence of discipline
when the petitioner questioned the wisdom of
the IIT in recruiting certain persons as
members of the faculty in the Department of
Aerospace Engineering. The wisdom of the
employer in selecting and appointing an
employee cannot be questioned by another
employee. No doubt, there could be
discussions about the suitability of a teacher
by colleagues in an academic institution,
sitting back in the privacy of their homes,
but it could not be the subject matter of
discussion or critical appraisal in a gettogether held on the premises of the IIT or
the Department of Aerospace Engineering.
A meeting of the other faculty members
could certainly not be called to discuss the
merits of the employer's choice of his
employees.
708 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

25.
A
professor
teaching
in
a
university or an academic organization, like
the IIT, may not be trained in the straight
jacket of discipline, but, he has to be
mindful of the protocol which governs his
behaviour, words and conduct towards
others. What he can say of his students,
possibly, he cannot of his peers; certainly
not about his superiors and employers, and
their decisions. The subject matter of the
charges here are a typical example of the
violation of protocol. Given the evidence
considered by the respondents about
behaviour of the petitioner - not to
comment about the behaviour of others,
who are not party to the litigation, we think
that this is not a case, where no misconduct
of any kind was committed by the
petitioner. It is certainly not a case where
the two charges held proved against the
petitioner can be said to be no charges at
all, and, a fortiori, not punishable as service
misconduct.

26. The only point that merits
consideration
is
about
the
penalties
imposed upon the petitioner. The two
penalties imposed are withholding of two
increments without cumulative effect for a
period of two years, and, the other is,
debarring the petitioner from holding any
administrative responsibility for a period of
three years. Statute 13(9) of the Statutes of
the IIT reads:

"13. Terms and Conditions of
Service of Permanent Employees.-

Permanent employees of the
Institute shall be governed by the following
terms and conditions:

(9) The Director may place a
member of the staff appointed at the
Institute under suspension:

(a)
where
a
disciplinary
proceeding against him is contemplated or
is pending, or

(b) where a case against him in
respect of any criminal offence is under
investigation or trial.

Provided that where a member of
the staff is detained in custody for a period
exceeding fortyeight hours, whether in
connection with a criminal offence or under
any law for the time being in force
providing for preventive detention, such
member of the staff shall be deemed to
have been placed by the Director under
suspension with effect from the date on
which he was so detained.

During the period of suspension,
the member of the staff shall be entitled to
the following payments, namely

(a) a subsistence allowance at an
amount equal to the leave salary which the
staff member would have drawn if he had
been on leave on half average pay or on
half
pay
and
in
addition,
dearness
allowance, if admissible on the basis of
such leave salary:

Provided that where the period of
suspension
exceeds
six
months,
the
Director shall be empowered to vary the
amount of subsistence allowance for any
period subsequent to the period of the first
six months as follows:

(i) The amount of subsistence
allowance may be increased by a suitable
amount
not
exceeding
50%
of
the
subsistence allowance admissible during
the period of the first six months, if, in the
opinion of the Director the period of
suspension has been prolonged for reasons
5 All. Dr. Sanjay Mittal Vs. Union Of India & Ors.
709
to be recorded in writing, not directly
attributable to the staff member;

(ii) the amount of subsistence
allowance may be reduced by a suitable
amount, not exceeding 50% of the
subsistence allowance admissible during
the period of the first six months, if, in the
opinion of the Director, the period of
suspension has been prolonged due to
reasons, to be recorded in writing, directly
attributable to the staff member;

(iii) The rate of dearness allowance
will be based on the increase, or, as the case
may be the decreased amount of subsistence
allowances admissible under sub-clauses (i)
and (ii) above.

(b)
Any
other
compensatory
allowance admissible from time to time on
the basis of pay of which the staff member
was in receipt on the date of suspension
subject to the fulfillment of other conditions
laid down for the drawal of such allowances.

However, no payment shall be
made unless the staff member furnished a
certificate that he is not engaged in any other
employment,
business,
profession
or
vocation.

The following penalties may for
good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter
provided, be imposed on any member of the
staff:-

(i) Censure;

(ii) withholding of increments or
promotion;

(iii) recovery from the whole or
part of any pecuniary loss caused to the
Institute by negligence or breach of orders,

(iv) reduction to lower service,
grade or post or to a lower time-scale, or to
a lower stage in a time-scale;

(v) compulsory retirement;

(vi) removal from service which
shall not be a disqualification for future
employment under the Institute;

(vii) dismissal from service which
shall ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment under the Institute.

No order
imposing
on
any
member of the staff any of the penalties
specified at (iv) to (vii) above shall be
passed by any authority subordinate to that
by which he was appointed and except after
an enquiry has been held and the member
of the staff has been given reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the
action proposed to be taken in regard to
him.

No order imposing on any member
of the staff any of the penalties specified at (i)
to (iii) above shall be passed by any authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed
and unless the member of the staff concerned
has been given an opportunity to make a
representation to the Appointing Authority.

Notwithstanding
the
above
provisions it shall not be necessary to
follow the procedure mentioned above in
the following cases:-

(a)
where
an
employee
is
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on
the ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge;

(b)
where
the
authority
empowered to dismiss or remove the
710 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied
that for some reason to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to give to that person an
opportunity of showing cause; or

(c) where the Visitor is satisfied
that in the interests of the security of the
State it is not expedient to give to that
person such an opportunity.

If any question arises whether it
is reasonably practicable to give to any
person an opportunity of showing cause
under clause (b) above the decision thereon
of the authority empowered to dismiss or
remove such person or to reduce him in
rank, as the case may be, shall be, final."

27. A careful perusal of Clauses (i) to
(vii) of Statute 13(9)(b) indicates that the
penalties that can be imposed upon an
employee of the IIT. The penalty of
depriving a member of the IIT staff of his
right
to
hold
any
administrative
responsibility for a fixed or an unlimited
period of time is not one of the
contemplated
penalties
under
Statute
13(9)(b).
Ex
facie,
therefore,
the
respondents have committed a manifest
error of law in awarding the penalty of
debarring the petitioner from holding any
administrative responsibility for a period of
three years. The submission of the learned
Counsel for the IIT, that deprivation from
holding administrative appointments is
purely an administrative or preventive
measure taken by the IIT and not stricto
sensu a penalty awarded, is utterly
unacceptable. The tenor of the impugned
order shows that the penalty of depriving
the
petitioner
from
holding
an
administrative responsibility for a period of
three years, that figures in the order
impugned, is one of the two penalties
imposed
upon
the
petitioner,
in
consequence of disciplinary proceedings. It
is not an administrative or preventive
measure taken by the IIT. The IIT did not
have the authority or the power under the
Statute to impose the said penalty, which
we hold hereby to be manifestly illegal.

28. Before parting with the matter,
there is one more aspect that needs a brief
remark. The other penalty, that has been
imposed,
is
one
of
withholding
of
increments.
Statute
13(9)(b)
clearly
indicates that whereas penalties specified in
Clauses (iv) to (vii) can be imposed after an
inquiry has been held and the member of
the staff given a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause proposed to be taken against
him, the penalties enumerated in Clauses (i)
to (iii) of Statute 13(9)(b) can be imposed
after giving time to make a representation
to the Appointing Authority. The penalty
imposed here is clearly one that falls under
Clause (ii) of Statute 13(9)(b) of the
Statutes of the IIT. No fault, therefore, ca at
all be found with the inquiry held against
the petitioner for the said penalty could be
imposed by merely giving the petitioner a
show cause notice and after considering his
reply by the Appointing Authority.

29. Thus, so far as the first penalty
goes, no legitimate objection about any
kind of procedural unfairness is open to the
petitioner.

30. In the result, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed in part. The
impugned order dated 01.08.2022 passed
by the Director of the IIT and the resolution
of the Board of Governors of the IIT dated
23.07.2022, insofar these impose the
penalty of debarring the petitioner from
holding any administrative responsibility
for a period of three years, are hereby
5 All. Prince Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
711
quashed. There shall be no embargo upon
the
petitioner
from
holding
any
administrative responsibility whatsoever.
The penalty of withholding two increments
without cumulative effect is upheld.

31. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2025) 5 ILRA 711
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 6273 of 2025

Prince Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Abhishek Singh, Shashi Bhushan Rai

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Service
Law
-
Compassionate
Appointment
-
Succession
Certificate
-
Requirement in case of rival claims - Validity of
claim by children from two marriages.

Held: Succession certificate is not mandatorily
required
in
all
cases
of
compassionate
appointment. Where rival claims are set up by
heirs from both the first and second wife,
children born out of even void/illegal marriage
are treated as legitimate under Section 16 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and have equal right
to
be
considered
for
compassionate
appointment. Authority cannot exclude such
children. Impugned order directing petitioner to
obtain succession certificate quashed. Matter
remanded to competent authority to assess rival
claims under Rule 17 of the U.P. Dying-inHarness Rules, 1974 and offer appointment to
the most deserving dependent.

Writ Petition allowed.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Shashi Bhushan Rai,
learned counsel for petitioner and learned
Standing Counsel.

2. By means of this petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution
petitioner has challenged the order dated
03.01.2025 whereby he has been directed
to furnish succession certificate so as to set
up a valid claim for compassionate
appointment.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner
submits that in the matter of compassionate
appointment succession certificate is not
mandatorily required as has come to be
held in the judgment of a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Shakeel Khan v.
State of U.P. and three others Writ A No.
7454 of 2020 disposed of on 12.10.2020.

4. Meeting the above submissions,
learned Standing Counsel Shri Rahul
Malviya submits that the judgment would
be applicable only in those cases where
there is uncontested case and not in the
cases where rival claims are set up. It is
contended that in the present case from the
recitals contained in the letter dated
03.01.2025 itself it is very much clear that
the deceased had two wives and there are
children born out of the marriage with the
first wife as well as the second life. In these
circumstances, therefore, when there are
rival claims set up by the heirs of both the
wives, it would be necessarily required to
have succession certificate as it would
validate the claim of one of the heirs to be
offered
compassionate
appointment
dislodging the claims of others.