# Dr. Virendra Singh & Ors v. Addl. City Magistrate Lko. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 6 ILRA 148
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-12-23
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 1404 of 2022
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/dr-virendra-singh-ors-v-addl-city-magistrate-lko-ors-48649
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Tenancy Law - UP Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1972 - Section 2(e) - Eviction proceeding
initiated by the K.G.M. University - It's
maintainability challenged on the ground
of its being not coming within definition of
local authority - State Govt. has control
over the fund of University - Effect - Held,
under Section 11 of K.G.M.U. Act, 2002
sufficient
power
is
provided
to
the
K.G.M.U. for raising funds by way of fees,
charges etc. other than the funds provided
by
the
State
Government
-
K.G.M.
University fulfils all the pre-requisites of
the local authority as prescribed by the
Supreme Court in R. C. Jain's case - It is
covered by the term local authority and,
therefore,
provisions
of
U.P.
Public
Premises Act are applicable upon the
same. (Para 15 and 17)
Writ petition dismissed (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-

## Text

148 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
section, it appears to the Magistrate that the
nature of the case is such that sentence of
imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year may have to be passed or that it is, for
any other reason, undesirable to try the case
summarily, the Magistrate shall proceed in
a manner provided in this Code. Referring
the aforesaid, he submits that in fact in case
of non-appearance of the appellant, the trial
court has come to the conclusion to invoke
jurisdiction under Section 256 of the
Cr.P.C. and, as such, he has rightly
proceeded to pass the impugned order
dated 23rd of December 2021.

18. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and after perusal of the record, I
find that there is a procedure prescribed
under Section 143 of the N.I. Act for
proceeding in the matter as a summary
trial. Further the argument, which has been
raised by the learned counsel for the State
that the Magistrate has invoked his
jurisdiction under Section 256 of the
Cr.P.C., is unsustainable as from proviso of
sub Clause 1 of Section 143 of the N.I. Act,
it is itself evident that the same can be
invoked. The trial court shall, after hearing
the parties, record an order to that effect
and, in such view, the Magistrate can
proceed under Section 256 of the Cr.P.C.
from summary trial to summon trial.

169 It is evident from the order
dated 23.12.2021 that neither the parties
were heard nor any reason was recorded by
the
Magistrate
while
dismissing
the
complaint filed by the appellant. Further
there seems to be no any provision which
enables the trial court to proceed in the
matter under Section 256 of the Cr.P.C.
Thus, the Additional Court has travelled
beyond its jurisdiction as it has invoked
provisions under Section 256 while passing
the order dated 23rd of December 2021.

20. This Court has also noticed the
conduct of the appellant and the respondent
no.2 wherein it is evident that the appellant
appeared on almost all the dates fixed by
the trial court whereas the respondent no.2
kept on deviating in appearance and on
several
occasions,
when
non-bailable
warrants were issued against him, he
appeared and thereafter again absented. It is
also evident from the order dated 23rd of
December 2021 that the respondent no.2
was also not present before the trial court
on the date fixed.

21. Considering the aforesaid facts
and circumstances and the law settled by
the Apex Court as well as the provision
envisaged under the N.I. Act as well as the
Cr.P.C., I am of the view that the learned
Additional Court while passing the order
dated 23rd of Decmeber 2021 has travelled
beyond its jurisdiction.

22. Thus, the appeal is allowed and
the Judgment and order dated 23rd of
December 2021 is hereby set aside.

23. The learned Trial Court is directed
to proceed accordingly.
----------
(2022)06ILR A148
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 31.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Writ C No. 1404 of 2022

Dr. Virendra Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Addl. City Magistrate Lko. & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
6 All. Dr. Virendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Addl. City Magistrate Lko. & Ors.
149
Ashok Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ajai Kumar Rai, Mohit Jauhari, Namit
Sharma, Narsingh Pal Verma, Shubham Tripathi

A. Tenancy Law - UP Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1972 - Section 2(e) - Eviction proceeding
initiated by the K.G.M. University - It's
maintainability challenged on the ground
of its being not coming within definition of
local authority - State Govt. has control
over the fund of University - Effect - Held,
under Section 11 of K.G.M.U. Act, 2002
sufficient
power
is
provided
to
the
K.G.M.U. for raising funds by way of fees,
charges etc. other than the funds provided
by
the
State
Government
-
K.G.M.
University fulfils all the pre-requisites of
the local authority as prescribed by the
Supreme Court in R. C. Jain's case - It is
covered by the term local authority and,
therefore,
provisions
of
U.P.
Public
Premises Act are applicable upon the
same. (Para 15 and 17)
Writ petition dismissed (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-
1. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Sri R.C. Jain & ors. (1981) 2
SCC 308
2. Kashi Vidya Peeth Vs Motilal & ors. (1996) 10
SCC 456
3. Veermati (Smt.) Vs St. of Uttrakhand; 2008
(3) ARC 369
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.)

1. Heard Sri Prashant Chandra,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Anshuman
Singh,
advocate
for
the
petitioner, Sri Ajay Kumar Rai, along with
Sri Shubham Tripathi, advocate for the
respondent University, Ms. Priyanka Singh,
Advocate holding brief of Sri Namit
Sharma, advocate for respondent Nagar
Nigam and learned Standing Counsel for
the State.

2. This writ petition is filed by four
petitioners
challenging
orders
dated
21.01.2022 passed by respondent no.1
Additional
City
Magistrate/prescribed
authority, Lucknow under the U.P. Public
Premises
(Eviction
of
Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1972 in four separate
proceedings initiated against them. Orders
worded same are filed collectively as
annexure no. 1 to the writ petition.

3. By the impugned orders respondent
no.1 has decided one of the preliminary
objections raised by the petitioners before
respondent
no.1
with
regard
to
maintainability of the proceedings.

4. The facts put simply are that
respondent no.2 King George's Medical
University
(K.G.M.U.)
has
initiated
proceedings under the U.P. Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as Public
Premises Act) for eviction of the petitioners
from certain shops occupied by them since
long.
Petitioners
raised
number
of
objections in their reply, one of them being
that the proceedings under Public Premises
Act are not maintainable as K.G.M.U. has
no right to initiate the proceedings. The
said preliminary objection is rejected by
respondent no.1 holding that property held
by K.G.M.U. is a public premise, hence,
proceedings are maintainable. There are
certain other issues also raised by the
petitioner in their reply submitted before
prescribed authority but since the same are
not yet decided by respondent no.1, hence,
are not being referred to.

5. Learned Senior Advocate for the
petitioners submits that in the impugned
order does not contain any reason and thus
also impugned order appears to be without
any application of mind. He further submits
150 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that the University is not a local body and,
hence, would not be covered by Section
2(e) of the Public Premises Act, and,
therefore, the property held by it is not
public premises. Thus, provisions of Public
Premises Act would not cover it. For the
said purposes, he refers to Section 4(25) of
General Clauses Act 1904 as well as to the
judgment of Supreme Court passed in case
of ''Union of India and Others Vs. Sri R.C.
Jain and Others' [(1981) 2 SCC 308].

6. Opposing the same learned counsel
for respondents University submits that
K.G.M.U. is a local authority and, hence,
procedure provided under the Public
Premises Act would be applicable. He also
places reliance upon the same judgment of
R.C. Jain case (supra) and also upon
''Kashi Vidya Peeth Vs. Motilal and
Others' reported in [(1996) 10 SCC 456]
and judgment of Uttrakhand High Court
passed in case of ''Veermati (Smt.) Vs.
State of Uttrakhand' reported in [2008 (3)
ARC 369].

7. I have considered the submission of
counsel for parties and perused the record
with their assistance.

Section 2(e) of the U.P. Public
Premises Act read as follow:-

"2(e) -"(e) "public premises" means
any premises belonging to or taken on
lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the
State Government, and includes any
premises belonging to or taken on lease by
or on behalf of -

(i) any company as defined in Section
3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not
less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up
share
capitals
held
by
the
State
Government: or

(ii) any local authority; or

(iii) any Corporation (not being a
company as defined in Section 3 of the
Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority)
owned
or
controlled
by
the
State
Government: or

(iv) any society registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860, the
governing body whereof consists, under the
rules or regulations of the society, wholly
of public officers or nominees of the State
Government or both:

and also includes, -

(i) Nazul land or any other premises
entrusted to the management of local
authority (including any building built with
Government funds on land belonging to the
State Government after the entrustment of
the land to that local authority, not being
land vested in or entrusted to the
management of a Gaon Sabha or any other
local authority, under any law relating to
land tenures):

(ii) any premises acquired under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with the
consent of the State Government for a
company (as defined in that Act) and held
by that company under an agreement
executed under Section 41 of that Act
providing for re-entry by the State
Government in certain conditions:"

8. The sole dispute raised before this
Court is whether K.G.M.U. would be
covered within the definition of local
authority under Section 2(e) (ii) of Public
Premises Act. Admittedly, K.G.M.U. is a
University created under the King George's
Medical University Act, 2002 (U.P. Act
No.8 of 2002) (K.G.M.U. Act, 2002). The
term ''local authority' is explained under
Section 4(25) of the U.P. General Clauses
Act, 1904 which reads a follow:-

"Section 4(25): "local authority" shall
mean a municipal board or Nagarpalik,
6 All. Dr. Virendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Addl. City Magistrate Lko. & Ors.
151
Nagar
Mahapalika,
Notified
Area
Committee, Town Area Committee, Zila
Parishad, Cantonment Board, Kshettra
Samiti, Gaon Sabha or any other authority
constituted for the purpose of Local SelfGovernment or village administration or
legally entitled to or entrusted by the State
Government
with
the
control
or
management of municipal or local fund;"

9. For explaining the term ''local
authority' both parties have relied upon the
'R.C. Jain' case. In the said case question
raised was whether Delhi Development
Authority would be a Local Authority for
purposes of Payment of Pensions Act.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon the following portion of
Paragraph -1 of the judgment which reads:-

"The expression "local authority" is
not defined in the Payment of Bonus Act.
One must, therefore, turn to the General
Clauses Act to ascertain the meaning of the
expression. Section 3(31) defines Local
Authority as follows:

"''Local Authority'" shall mean a
Municipal Committee, District Board, Body
of Port Commissioners or other authority
legally entitled to, or entrusted by the
Government
with,
the
control
or
management of a municipal or local fund."

"Local fund" is again not defined in
the General Clauses Act. Though the
expression appears to have received
treatment in the Fundamental Rules and
the Treasury Code, we refrain from
borrowing the meaning attributed to the
expression in those Rules as it is not a
sound rule of interpretation to seek the
meaning of words used in an Act, in the
definition clause of other statutes. The
definition of an expression in one Act must
not be imported into another. "It would be
a new terror in the construction of Acts of
Parliament if we were required to limit a
word to an unnatural sense because in
some Act which is not incorporated or
referred to such an interpretation is given
to it for the purposes of that Act alone" (per
Loreburn, L.C. in Macbeth & Co. v.
Chislett [1910 AC 220 : 102 LT 82] ). For
the same reason we refrain from borrowing
upon the definition of "local authority" in
enactments such as the Cattle Trespass Act,
1871 etc. as the High Court has done."

10. Relying upon the same, learned
Senior Advocate for petitioners submits
that the term ''local authority' cannot be
borrowed or read from another act as the
same has to be interpreted in reference to a
particular
act.
However,
term
''local
authority' including its distinctive attributes
and characteristics are detailed by the
Supreme Court in the ''R.C. Jain' case only.
Paragraph-2, 3 and 4 of the same read:-

"2. Let us, therefore, concentrate and
confine our attention and enquiry to the
definition of "local authority" in Section
3(31) of the General Clauses Act. A proper
and careful scrutiny of the language of
Section 3(31) suggests that an authority, in
order to be a local authority, must be of
like nature and character as a Municipal
Committee, District Board or Body of Port
Commissioners,
possessing,
therefore,
many, if not all, of the distinctive attributes
and
characteristics
of
a
Municipal
Committee, District Board, or Body of Port
Commissioners,
but,
possessing
one
essential feature, namely, that it is legally
entitled to or entrusted by the government
with, the control and management of a
municipal or local fund. What then are the
distinctive attributes and characteristics,
all or many of which a Municipal
Committee, District Board or Body of Port
Commissioners shares with any other local
152 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
authority? First, the authorities must have
separate legal existence as corporate
bodies.
They
must
not
be
mere
governmental agencies but must be legally
independent entities. Next, they must
function in a defined area and must
ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or
indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of
the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain
degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide
for themselves questions of policy affecting
the area administered by them. The
autonomy may not be complete and the
degree of the dependence may vary
considerably but, an appreciable measure
of autonomy there must be. Next, they must
be
entrusted
by
statute
with
such
governmental functions and duties as are
usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such
as
those
connected
with
providing
amenities to the inhabitants of the locality,
like health and education services, water
and
sewerage,
town
planning
and
development,
roads,
markets,
transportation, social welfare services etc.
etc. Broadly we may say that they may be
entrusted with the performance of civic
duties
and
functions
which
would.
otherwise be governmental duties and
functions. Finally, they must have the
power to raise funds for the furtherance of
their activities and the fulfilment of their
projects by levying taxes, rates, charges, or
fees. This may be in addition to moneys
provided by government or obtained by
borrowing or otherwise. What is essential
is that control or management of the fund
must vest in the authority.

3. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi
v. Birla Cotton Mills [AIR 1968 SC 1232 :
(1968) 3 SCR 251, 288] Hidayatullah, J.,
described some of the attributes of local
bodies in this manner:

"Local
bodies
are
subordinate
branches of governmental activity. They
are democratic institutions managed by the
representatives of the people. They function
for public purposes and take away a part of
the government affairs in local areas. They
are political subdivisions and agencies
which exercise a part of State functions. As
they are intended to carry on local selfgovernment the power of taxation is a
necessary adjunct to their other powers.
They function under the supervision of the
government.
4. In Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1963 SC 1890 : (1964) 3
SCR 686] one of the questions was whether
the State Trading Corporation was a local
authority as defined by Section 3(31) of the
General Clauses Act, 1897. It was held that
it was not, because it was not an authority
legally entitled to or entrusted by the
government with, control or management
of a local fund. It was observed that though
the corporation was furnished with funds
by the government for commencing its
business that would not make the funds of
the corporation "local funds"."

11. A reading of the aforesaid
judgment shows that a local authority
would be an authority which first of all
must be legally entitled or entrusted by the
Government
with
the
control
and
management of municipal or local fund.
The
other
distinctive
attributes
and
characteristics detailed in the said judgment
are that the authority should have a separate
independent existence and must not be a
mere government agency: they must
function in a defined area; they must enjoy
a certain degree of autonomy i.e. it should
be in a position to decide for themselves
question of policy affecting the area
administered by them; they must be
entrusted by statute such government
functions and duties as are usually
entrusted to local bodies such as health,
6 All. Dr. Virendra Singh & Ors. Vs. Addl. City Magistrate Lko. & Ors.
153
education, water sewerage, town planning
and
development
of
road,
markets,
transportation, social welfare etc. Broadly
speaking, they must be entrusted to perform
civic duties and functions which would
otherwise be government duties and
functions. Also, they must have the power
to raise funds which may be in addition to
the funds provided by the government by
fees, taxes, charges or otherwise.

12. Whether a state University is
having a local fund is an issue considered
by the Supreme Court in case of ''Kashi
Vidya Peeth Vs. Motilal and Others';
[(1996) 10 SCC 456]. In the said case, the
Supreme Court was considering whether
Kashi Vidya Peeth would be covered by the
term local authority and its fund as local
fund. Paragraph-4 to 8 relevant for our
purposes reads:-

"4. It is not in dispute that the
establishment
of
university
and
construction of the buildings including staff
quarters, hostels, playground etc. is a
public purpose provided if it is done by an
authority within the meaning of Section
3(31) of General Clauses Act. The main
emphasis of Shri Chowdhary is that unless
the authority is one that is analogous to the
one like municipality, it would not be a
local authority. The State has the control
over
the
local
fund
held
by
the
municipalities etc. but the funds held or
controlled by the university are not under
the control of the State Government and
that, therefore, unless the procedure
prescribed in Chapter VII of the Act is
followed, it is not public purpose. We do
not find the contention to be acceptable.

5. Section 4(3)(i) of the Universities
Act postulates thus:

"4. (3) As from the date appointed
under sub-section (2)--
(i) the society known as the Kashi
Vidyapith, Varanasi shall be dissolved, and
all property moveable and immovable, and
rights, powers and privileges of the society
shall be transferred to and vest in the
University and shall be applied to the
objects and purposes for which the
University is established;"

6. Section 8 of the Act envisages the
inspection and control over the universities
and it postulates, among other things, that
the State Government shall have the right
to cause an inspection made by such person
or persons as it may direct, of the
university or any constituent college or any
institute maintained by the university,
including its buildings etc. to cause an
enquiry made in the like manner in respect
of
any
matters
connected
with
the
administration
and
finances
of
the
university.

7. Section 33 gives power of control
over the provident fund etc. of the teaching
staff. Section 55(3) obligates the university
to prepare annual accounts and the
balance sheet duly audited which shall
together with the copies of the report be
submitted by the Executive Council to the
court and to the State Government. Section
55(8) gives control to the State Government
over the finances as well. Section 55-A
gives power to impose surcharge and to
take action against the erring ViceChancellor. It also gives power to have the
control over the grants made by the State
Government, Government of India or the
University Grants Commission or any
international organisation or any other
fund by the funding authorities. It would
thus be clear that the State Government has
financial control over the university.

8. It is true that the university is
supposed
to
be
autonomous
in
its
management. But the limited question that
arises for consideration is whether the
154 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
State has control over the funds of the
university? As seen from the above
provisions, the State has sufficient control
over the funds to be expended by the
university. Though the expenditure is to be
made by the university, the funds come
from the contributions made by various
authorities. Under those circumstances, it
is a local fund."

13. So far as the K.G.M.U. is
concerned
Section
25(i),
25(iv)
of
K.G.M.U. Act, 2002 are parallel to the
Universities Act referred to in the Kashi
Vidya Peeth case (supra) which reads as:-

"25- Powers and duties of Executive
Council (1) The Executive Council shall be
the principal executive body of the
university and subject to the provisions of
this Act, have the following powers,
namely:

(i) to hold control of the property and
funds of the University;

(iv) to administer any funds placed at
the disposal of the University for specific
purpose;"

14. Sections 47(2) and 47(3) of
K.G.M.U. Act, 2002 provide:-

"47 (2) A copy of the annual accounts
and the balance-sheet shall be submitted to
the State Government which shall cause the
same to be audited.

47 (3)The annual accounts and the
balance sheet audited shall be printed and
copies thereof shall, together with copies of
the audit report, be submitted by the
Executive Council to the Court and the
State Government."

Therefore State Government also has
control over the fund of the University.
Thus, the law settled in Kashi Vidya Peeth
case (supra) is squarely applicable to
KG.M.U. and it can be safely held that the
fund held by the K.G.M.U. is local fund.

15. So far as other attributes of local
body are concerned, Section 11 of
K.G.M.U. Act, 2002 confers all powers
with regard to teaching, research and
advancement
and
dissemination
of
knowledge,
admitting
students
and
awarding
them
degrees,
diplomas,
certificates etc. and other similar and
connected activities including to fix and
collect fees and other charges as well as
power for management and treatment of the
patient in its hospitals and all other
incidental things to their power in the field
specified. Both Education and health are
services required to be provided by the
local authority. Therefore, the K.G.M.U. is
providing
essential
civil
duties
and
functions required to be provided by the
Government through local authorities.
Under Section 11 of K.G.M.U. Act
sufficient power is also provided to the
K.G.M.U. for raising funds by way of fees,
charges etc. other than the funds provided
by the State Government. As discussed
above it can safely be said that K.G.M.U.
fulfils all the pre-requisites of the local
authority as prescribed by the Supreme
Court in the case of R.C. Jain (supra).

16. In Veermati (Smt.) case (supra)
reported in [(2008) 3 ARC 369], the same
issue, i.e., whether the University is a local
authority or not with regard to U.P. Public
Premises
Act,
1972
came
up
for
consideration before Uttarakhand high
court. The court after a detailed discussion
held that:-

"11. In view of the discussion above, I
hold that the approach of the learned
6 All. Ms. Suneeta Bharti & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
155
District Judge that the University is a local
authority and the premises in question
owned by Kumaon University are the
public premises is correct. The contention
of the learned Counsel for the petitioner
that the provisions of the Act are not
applicable to the case at hand is not
acceptable. To my mind the case law,
(1998) 3 SCC 530: (AIR 1998 SC 1125),
does not help the petitioner. The findings
recorded by the learned District Judge on
this score do not call for any interference
in writ jurisdiction by this Court."

17. In view thereof, it is held that
K.G.M.U. is covered by the term local
authority and, therefore, provisions of U.P.
Public Premises Act are applicable upon
the same.

18. Therefore, no interference with
the impugned order is called for.

19. The writ petition lacks on merits
and the same is dismissed.
----------
(2022)06ILR A155
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Writ-C No. 4529 of 2021
with Writ-C No. 5265 of 2021

Ms. Suneeta Bharti & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Sanjeev Singh, Sri Suresh Bahadur Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Rohit Pandey
A. Education Law - University Grant
Commission Act, 1956 - UGC (Minimum
Standards and Procedure for Award of
M.Phill./Ph.D. Degrees) Regulations, 2016
- Research Eligibility Test - Applicability
of Regulation on State Universities -
Regulations outlined by the University
Grants Commission are obligatory upon all
the State Universities and Institution
through the Republic - However, in view
of the decree of the Apex Court in the case
of Kalyani Mathivanan, it is vibrant that
unless or until, any procedures enclosed
by the UGC are espoused and instigated
by the State Legislation, the same will be
relatively
mandatory
and
will
be
comparatively directory. (Para 24)
B.
Education
Law
-
UGC
(Minimum
Standards and Procedure for Award of
M.Phill./Ph.D. Degrees) Regulations, 2016 -
Deen Dayal Upadhya, Gorakhpur University
Research Ordinance 2018 - Cancellation of
admission on the ground of non-fulfillment
of Clause 3.1 (b), which provide that only
those candidates will be qualified for
admission in Ph.D. Course, who fortified
second division marks in undergraduate
course
-
Legality
of
clause
3.1
(b)
challenged - Held, Clause 3.1 (b) being in
consonance with the regulations framed by
the UGC and not in violation of the same, is
not foist or incompatible to the regulations
outlined by the UGC - University has not
committed any illicitness or aberration in
cancelling the admission of the petitioners.
(Para 24, 25 and 27)
C.
Education
Law
-
Cancellation
of
admission - Doctrine of estoppels -
Applicability
-
Held,
question
of
application
of
estoppel
against
Statute/Public Policy does not arise, as
the Ordinance, 2018 outlined by the
respondent-University has a statutory
dynamism and the respondent-University
cannot be constrained to take admission
of a student against the qualifications
prescribed in statutes. (Para 29 )
D. Jurisprudence - Rule of equity -
Applicability - Role of the court - Equity