# Er. Prabhu Dayal Agrawal & Ors. Revisionists v. Joint Registrar Co-Operative Society & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2024) 11 ILRA 453
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-14
- **Case number:** S.C.C. Revision No. 146 of 2023
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/er-prabhu-dayal-agrawal-ors-revisionists-v-joint-registrar-co-operative-society-51071
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Civil Law -Transfer of Property Act, 1882Section 106- in the absence of any contract
between the parties or any local law usage to
the contrary- the tenancy is terminable upon
notice by the landlord in 15 days' advance-
notice would not be rendered invalid merely
because the period mentioned therein was short
-notice is a must to determine the tenancy and
once the tenancy has been determined, tenant
is liable to be evicted at the instance of the
landlord by instituting the suit-impugned order
set aside.
Revision allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

11 All. Er. Prabhu Dayal Agrawal & Ors. Vs. Joint Registrar Co-Operative Society & Anr.
453
Compensation
Commissioner/
Deputy
Labour Commissioner, U.P., Ghaziabad
Region, Ghaziabad in E.C.A. Case No.-
164 of 2015 (Smt. Seema Devi Vs. Sri
Vimal Jain and another), is set aside.

17. The matter is remanded back to
the concerned Employees Compensation
Commissioner to decide the claim petition
as fresh after affording opportunity of
hearing to the parties within a period of six
months from the date of production of
certified copy of this order, unless there is
any legal impediments.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 453
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

S.C.C. Revision No. 146 of 2023

Er. Prabhu Dayal Agrawal & Ors.
 ...Revisionists
Versus
Joint Registrar Co-Operative Society &
Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Revisionists:
Arvind Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Tej Bhanu Pandey

Civil Law -Transfer of Property Act, 1882Section 106- in the absence of any contract
between the parties or any local law usage to
the contrary- the tenancy is terminable upon
notice by the landlord in 15 days' advance-
notice would not be rendered invalid merely
because the period mentioned therein was short
-notice is a must to determine the tenancy and
once the tenancy has been determined, tenant
is liable to be evicted at the instance of the
landlord by instituting the suit-impugned order
set aside.
Revision allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Smt. Anju Srivastava Vs Saurabh Birla &
anr.:2020(140) ALR 576

2. Waqf Allal Aulad/Waqf Alkhair Allahtala, Dr.
Ziaul Haq Vs Ist ADJ, Bijnor:2008 SCC OnLine
All 862

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Arvind Srivastava,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Rahul Malviya, learned Standing Counsel
for the State-respondent.

2. This revision application has
been directed against the judgment and
decree dated 16.12.2022 dismissing the suit
of the plaintiff.

3. As many as five issues were
framed. While the issue no.1 is qua damage
caused to the property by the tenant, issue
no.2 is qua non-application of the U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No.13 of
1972). The most crucial issue is the third
issue as to whether the plaintiff has been
able to determine the tenancy by issuance
of notice. The entitlement of the plaintiff
for damages @ Rs.600/- per day as issue
no.4 and default in payment of rent by the
defendant-respondent being issue no.5 have
all been decided against the plaintiff.

4. The submission advanced by
learned counsel for the revision-applicant
is, when the trial court had determined
issue no.2 against the defendant-respondent
holding that Act No.13 of 1972 did not
apply, the Court was neither to see the
default in payment of arrears of rent, nor
could have seen into the niceties with
454 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which the notice as was claimed to have
been issued and served. He submits that as
per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, the lease of any immovable property
except for agricultural or manufacturing
purposes, in the absence of any contract or
local law, usage to the contrary, shall be
deemed to be on month to month basis and
is liable to be terminated with 30 days' of
notice in advance.

5. None of the other sub-sections
2, 3 and 4 according to learned Advocate,
provides for any format of notice making it
compulsory for the landlord to describe the
period of default and the amount due to be
paid by the tenant. Thus according to him
trial court manifestly erred in holding that
the notice terminating the tenancy of the
defendant-respondent was not valid and
non suited the plaintiff. Regarding issue
nos.4 and 5 learned counsel argues that Act
No.13 of 1972 was not applicable and was
rightly so held, the trial court could not
have gone into the question of default in
payment of arrears of rent. In support of his
submission, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon paragraph no.19 of the
judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court
in the matter of Smt. Anju Srivastava v.
Saurabh Birla and another:2020(140)
ALR 576.

6. Countering the submission, Sri
Malviya, learned Standing Counsel for the
State-respondents has sought to defend the
judgment and order for the reasons
assigned in determining the issue nos.3, 4
and 5.

7. Having heard learned counsel
for the respective parties and having
perused the record and the judgment passed
by
the
Judge,
Small
Cause
dated
16.12.2022, I find there to be the only issue
no.3 which if is determined in favour of the
plaintiff, petitioner would deserve remand
order by this Court for the suit to be
decided afresh.

8. For better appreciation of the
point raised before the Court to question
the finding on issue no.3, I find it
appropriate to reproduce Section 106 of
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which runs
as under:

"106. Duration of certain
leases
in
absence
of
written
contract or local usage.?
(1)In the absence of a
contract or local law or usage to
the contrary, a lease of immovable
property
for
agricultural
or
manufacturing purposes shall be
deemed to be a lease from year to
year, terminable, on the part of
either lessor or lessee, by six
months' notice; and a lease of
immovable property for any other
purpose shall be deemed to be a
lease
from
month
to
month,
terminable, on the part of either
lessor or lessee, by fifteen days'
notice.
(2)Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, the
period mentioned in sub-section (1)
shall commence from the date of
receipt of notice.
(3)A notice under subsection (1) shall not be deemed to
be invalid merely because the
period mentioned therein falls short
of the period specified under that
sub-section,
where
a
suit
or
proceeding is filed after the expiry
of the period mentioned in that subsection.
11 All. Er. Prabhu Dayal Agrawal & Ors. Vs. Joint Registrar Co-Operative Society & Anr.
455
(4)Every notice under subsection (1) must be in writing,
signed by or on behalf of the
person giving it, and either be sent
by post to the party who is intended
to be bound by it or be tendered or
delivered personally to such party,
or to one of his family or servants
at his residence, or (if such tender
or delivery is not practicable)
affixed to a conspicuous part of the
property."

9. From a bare reading of the
aforesaid provisions, it is clear that except
where the immovable property is leased out
for agricultural or manufacturing purposes,
in the absence of any contract between the
parties or any local law usage to the
contrary what is prescribed under Subsection 1 of Section 106, the tenancy is
terminable upon notice by the landlord in
15 days' advance.

10 Still further, Sub-section 3 of
Section 106 clarifies that a notice would
not be rendered invalid merely because the
period mentioned therein was short as
prescribed under Sub-section 1, in the event
suit proceedings have been initiated after
expiry of the period mentioned in Subsection-1. The intendment of the legislature
therefore, appears to be very clear that
notice is a must to determine the tenancy
and once the tenancy has been determined,
tenant is liable to be evicted at the instance
of the landlord by instituting the suit. The
only caveat could have been Section 20(4)
of Act No.13 of 1972 which ofcourse, is
not applicable as has already been held by
the trial judge while determining issue
no.2. It would have been a different case
altogether, had the tenant-respondent took
up the plea of deposit made in time to seek
benefit under Section 114 of the Transfer of
Property Act but neither any such pleading
had been raised, nor any such issue was
framed. Thus the findings qua issue no.3
returned by the trial judge in the judgment
and decree impugned here in this petition is
clearly unsustainable.

11. In so far as the issue nos.4 and
5 regarding default in payment of rent, I
find that a coordinate Bench of this Court
has considered a number of judgments
dealing with such matters where the
question of termination of tenancy arose
and the issue was whether the default part
in the conduct of the tenant has to be seen
or not and it was held that this question
could not have been gone into. The court
has heavily relied upon paragraph no.6
judgment in the case of Waqf Allal
Aulad/Waqf Alkhair Allahtala, Dr. Ziaul
Haq v. Ist ADJ, Bijnor:2008 SCC OnLine
All 862 which runs as under:

"6. If Rent Control Act does
not apply, then tenant is liable to
eviction simply after termination of
tenancy. Default or no default is
wholly immaterial. Revisional court
itself held that building in dispute
belonged to Waqf-allal-aulad and
was beyond the purview of U.P. Act
No.13 of 1972. Thereafter, there
was absolutely no sense in holding
that the notice of termination of
tenancy was invalid on the ground
that tenant was not defaulter when
notice was given. The view taken by
the lower revisional court is quite
strange and utterly untenable. Even
if Rent Control Act applies and in
the notice wrong period of default
and
wrong
rate
of
rent
is
mentioned, still notice does not
become invalid vide Full Bench
authority of Gokaran Singh Vs. Ist
456 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Hardoi and others, 2000 (1)
ARC 653."

12. Looking to the intendment of
the legislature under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, I find that once
the tenancy has stood terminated by the
issuance of notice as the landlord inclined
himself to terminate it, the question of
default can ofcourse, rightly should not
have been gone into. The proposition of
law as discussed in the aforesaid judgment
appears to be absolutely incorrect and
therefore, I do not find any good ground to
differ with the same.

13. Learned Standing Counsel
representing the respondents could not
place any judgment to the contrary, nor
could say that the judgment cited before the
Court is no more a good law for being
reversed or any contrary view by a larger
Bench.

14. In view of the above, this
petition succeeds and is allowed. The order
passed by the Judge, Small Causes dated
16.12.2022 and the decree issued in respect
thereof dated 16.12.2022 are hereby set
aside.

15. The matter is remitted to the
trial court to decide afresh on the basis of
the pleadings already raised and the
evidence led by the parties.

16. Since the suit is of the year
2019, it not only stands restored but is also
directed to be adjudicated within the next
four months of production of certified copy
of this order.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 456
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE VIPIN CHANDRA DIXIT, J.

Writ -C No. 22925 of 2024

Gajendra Pratap Soni ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Kartikeya Saran

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Ms. Archana Singh, C.S.C., Sri Komal
Mehrotra, Sri Sudarshan Singh

The petitioner has already run the coco outlet
for a period of three years - impugned order
rejected Petitioner's selection- Petitioner had
already received the benefit of operating the
coco outlet-cannot have any right to seek the
same once again.

W.P. dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

AIR CMDE Navish Bahri (Retd.) Vs U.O.I. & ors.
[W.P. (C) 10686/2020 & CM. Nos.33540/2020
and 13155/2021 decided on November 23,
2021]

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.
& Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit, J.)

1. Heard Sri Kartikeya Saran, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner, Sri Sudarshan Singh, Smt.
Archana Singh and Sri Girish Chandra
Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respective respondents.

2. This is a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
wherein the writ petitioners is aggrieved by