# Faraheem Qureshi v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 1 ILRA 272
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-01-21
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 43911 of 2019
- **Bench:** Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/faraheem-qureshi-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52978
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Criminal Law -Indian Penal Code,1860 -
Section 295-A-Applicant made certain post on
social media -F.I.R -only those words - spoken
or
written
with
deliberate
and
malicious
intention- to hurt the religious feelings of any
class of citizen-can be categorized as offence
u/s 295-A I.P.C-if it intends to insult a particular
political party or a group who are not
inextricably associated with any religion or its
belief will not attract the ingredients of Section
295-A I.P.C-entire proceedings quashed.

Application disposed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

272 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
should have been filed, thus, treating the
aforesaid as a complaint he should have
followed the procedure as laid down under
Sections 200 Cr.P.C. onwards.

15.
Having
gone
through
the
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and the legal proposition of
law, this Court finds that while summoning
the applicants the court concerned has
treated the same as a complaint case but
has not followed the procedure as required
calling the complainant to record her
statements under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and
followed other procedure as required under
a complaint case. Therefore, the order
impugned dated 19.07.2024 is quashed to
the extent that the case shall be treated as a
complaint case and after issuing notice to
opposite party no. 2 the court concerned
shall proceed in accordance with law as
required in a complaint case.

16. The parties are at liberty to move
recall application before this Court, if they
feel aggrieved by this order.

17. The application is accordingly
partly allowed.
---------
(2025) 1 ILRA 272
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.01.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 43911 of 2019

Faraheem Qureshi ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Amir Khan

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law -Indian Penal Code,1860 -
Section 295-A-Applicant made certain post on
social media -F.I.R -only those words - spoken
or
written
with
deliberate
and
malicious
intention- to hurt the religious feelings of any
class of citizen-can be categorized as offence
u/s 295-A I.P.C-if it intends to insult a particular
political party or a group who are not
inextricably associated with any religion or its
belief will not attract the ingredients of Section
295-A I.P.C-entire proceedings quashed.

Application disposed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Amish Devgan Vs U.O.I., (2021) 1 SCC 1

2. Ramji Lal Modi Vs St. of U.P., AIR 1957 SC
620

3. Mahendra Singh Dhoni Vs Yerraguntla
Shyamsundar & anr., (2017) 7 SCC 760
(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh
Deshwal, J.)

1. Compromise affidavit filed on
behalf of the applicant is taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Amir Khan, learned
counsel for the applicant, Sri Saurabh
Kumar, holding brief of Sri Hemant
Sharma, learned counsel for the opposite
party no. 2 and Sri Pankaj Saxena, learned
A.G.A. for the State.

3. The present 482 Cr.P.C. application
has been filed to quash the entire
proceedings
of
charge
sheet
dated
18.02.2019 in Criminal Case No. 620 of
2019 under Section 295-A I.P.C., Police
Station-
Khurja
Nagar,
District-
Bulandshahr, pending in the court of
1 All. Faraheem Qureshi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
273
learned
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahr as well as
cognizance order dated 05.07.2019 passed
by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahr.

4. Contention of learned counsel for
the applicant is that applicant made certain
post on social media which is the basis for
the F.I.R. in question. It is further
submitted, even if entire allegation of F.I.R.
as well as post of the applicant on social
media is taken as true even then offence u/s
295-A I.P.C. is not made out as the basic
ingredient u/s 295-A I.P.C. is deliberate
and malicious intent to outrage religious
feelings but in the post of the applicant,
there is nothing which shows that it is
directly or indirectly related to any religion
or intended to outrage any religious
feelings. It is further submitted that now the
applicant and opposite party no. 2 have also
settled their dispute amicably and a written
compromise dated 20.11.2024 has also
been entered into between them in which
opposite party no. 2 has clearly stated that
he does not want to pursue the impugned
proceeding.

5. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has
submitted that it is a State case which relates to
the public at large and merely because
opposite party no. 2 was the first informant,
impugned proceeding cannot be quashed on
the basis of compromise between the applicant
and the first informant.

6. Considering the submissions of parties
and on perusal of record, it appears that the
applicant has posted a message on social
media which is being quoted as under :-

पुलवामा अटैक, कह ीं 2019 की
तैयार तो नह ीं, मुझे तो ऐसा ह लगता है, ये
राजनीतत बडी कुत्ती चीज़ है। आप लोग क्या
सोचते हो।

7. This message was itself basis for
lodging of F.I.R. and thereafter, filing
impugned charge-sheet as no other material
except the statement of opposite party no. 2
as well as the aforesaid message was the
ground for filing the charge-sheet.

8. To attract the liability u/s 295-A
I.P.C., basic condition is that the intention
must be to outrage the religious feelings of
any class of citizens, by words, either
spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, insults or
attempts to insult the religion or the
religious beliefs of the class of citizens.
Section 295-A I.P.C. is being quoted as
under :-

"295A. Whoever, with deliberate
and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of any class of citizens of
India, by words, either spoken or written,
or by signs or by visible representations or
otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of that
class, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both."

9. From the perusal of the definition of
Section 295-A I.P.C., it is clear that to
attract the liability under this section,
intention must be to outrage the religious
feeling or religious belief of any class of
citizen. If from the words, spoken or
written or by any other mode, it appears
that it was not for outraging the religious
feeling but for other purpose like attacking
on a political party or a particular group
which is not associated in any manner to
274 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
any particular religion, then the offence
under this section will not be attracted. It is
also clear from Section 295-A I.P.C. that
the intention to outrage the religious feeling
should
be
deliberate
and
malicious.
Therefore, if a person insults a religion
unwittingly or carelessly or without any
deliberate or malicious intention to outrage
the religious feeling, that will also not
attract the liability u/s 295-A I.P.C.

10. Vires of Section 295-A I.P.C. was
challenged before the Apex Court in the
case of Ramji Lal Modi Vs. State of U.P.,
AIR 1957 SC 620, which was heard by the
Constitution Bench and after hearing the
matter, the Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court upheld the validity of Section 295-A
I.P.C. and observed that it does not affect
the fundamental right guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India. Paragraph nos. 8 and 9 of Ramji Lal
Modi (supra) are being quoted as under :

"8. It is pointed out that Section
295-A has been included in Chapter XV of
the Penal Code which deals with offence
relating to religion and not in Chapter VIII
which deals with offences against the
public
tranquility
and
from
this
circumstance it is faintly sought to be
urged, therefore, that offences relating to
religion
have
no
bearing
on
the
maintenance of public order or tranquillity
and consequently, a law creating an
offence relating to religion and imposing
restrictions on the right to freedom of
speech and expression cannot claim the
protection of clause (2) of Article 19. A
reference to Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution, which guarantee the right to
freedom of religion, will show that the
argument is utterly untenable. The right to
freedom of religion assured by those
articles is expressly made subject to public
order, morality and health. Therefore, it
cannot be predicated that freedom of
religion can have no bearing whatever on
the maintenance of public order or that a
law creating an offence relating to religion
cannot under any circumstances be said to
have been enacted in the interests of public
order.
Those
two
articles
in
terms
contemplate that restrictions may be
imposed on the rights guaranteed by them
in the interests of public order.

9. The learned counsel then
shifted his ground and formulated his
objection in a slightly different way. Insults
to the religion or the religious beliefs of a
class of citizens of India may, says the
learned counsel, lead to public disorders in
some cases, but in many cases they may not
do so and, therefore, a law which imposes
restrictions on the citizens' freedom of
speech and expression by simply making
insult to religion an offence, will cover both
varieties of insults i.e. those which may
lead to public disorders as well as those
which may not. The law insofar as it covers
the first variety may be said to have been
enacted in the interests of public order
within the meaning of clause (2) of Article
19, but insofar as it covers the remaining
variety will not fall within that clause. The
argument then concludes that so long as
the possibility of the law being applied for
purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution
cannot be ruled out, the entire law should
be held to be unconstitutional and void. We
are unable, in view of the language used in
the impugned section, to accede to this
argument. In the first place, clause (2) of
Article 19 protects a law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the right to freedom of speech and
expression "in the interest of public order",
which is much wider than "for maintenance
of public order. If, therefore, certain
activities have a tendency to cause public
1 All. Faraheem Qureshi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
275
disorder, a law penalising such activities as
an offence cannot but be held to be a law
imposing reasonable restriction "in the
interests of public order" although in some
cases those activities may not actually lead
to a breach of public order. In the next
place, Section 295-A does not penalise any
and every act of insult to or attempt to
insult the religion or the religious beliefs of
a class of citizens but it penalises only
those acts of insults to or those varieties of
attempts to insult the religion or the
religious beliefs of a class of citizens,
which are perpetrated with the deliberate
and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of that class. Insults. to
religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or
without
any
deliberate
or
malicious
intention to outrage the religious feelings
of that class do not come within the section.
It only punishes the aggravated form of
insult to religion when it is perpetrated
with the deliberate and malicious intention
of outraging the religious feelings of that
class. The calculated tendency of this
aggravated form of insult is clearly to
disrupt the public order and the section,
which penalises such activities, is well
within the protection of clause (2) of Article
19 as being a law imposing reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right to
freedom
of
speech
and
expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). Having
regard to the ingredients of the offence
created by the impugned section, there
cannot, in our opinion, be any possibility of
this law being applied for purposes not
sanctioned by the Constitution. In other
words, the language employed in the
section is not wide enough to cover
restrictions both within and without the
limits
of
constitutionally
permissible
legislative action affecting the fundamental
right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and
consequently, the question of severability
does not arise and the decisions relied
upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner have no application to this case."

11. The Apex Court again considered
Section 295-A I.P.C. in the case of
Mahendra Singh Dhoni Vs. Yerraguntla
Shyamsundar and Another, (2017) 7
SCC 760. In that case, the Hon'ble Apex
Court observed that Section 295-A I.P.C.
does not stipulate everything to be
penalised and every act would be insult or
attempt to insult the religion or religious
belief. It was further observed by the Apex
Court that Section 295-A I.P.C. penalises
only those acts of insult or attempts to
insult the religion or religious belief which
are deliberate and malicious with the
intention to outrage the religious feeling of
a class of citizen. Paragraph no. 6 of
Mahendra Singh Dhoni (supra) is being
quoted as under :

6. On a perusal of the aforesaid
passages, it is clear as crystal that Section
295-A does not stipulate everything to be
penalised and any and every act would
tantamount to insult or attempt to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of a class of
citizens. It penalises only those acts of
insults d to or those varieties of attempts to
insult the religion or religious belief of a
class of citizens which are perpetrated with
the deliberate and malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of that
class of citizens. Insults to religion offered
unwittingly or carelessly or without any
deliberate or malicious intention to outrage
the religious feelings of that class do not
come within the section. The Constitution
Bench has further clarified that the said
provision only punishes the aggravated
form of insult to religion when it is
perpetrated
with
the
deliberate
and
malicious
intention
of outraging
the
276 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
religious feelings of that class. Emphasis
has been laid on the calculated tendency of
the said aggravated form of insult and also
to disrupt the public order to invite the
penalty.

12. The above legal position was again
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of
Amish Devgan Vs. Union of India, (2021)
1 SCC 1, wherein the Apex Court observed
that first part of Section 295-A I.P.C.
specially refers to deliberate and malicious
intention on the part of maker to outrage
religious feeling of any class of citizens and
last part referred to harm-based element,
that is, insult or attempt to insult religions
or religious belief of that class. Paragraph
no. 100 of Amish Devgan (supra) is being
quoted as under :

100. The two provisions have
been interpreted earlier in a number of
cases including Ramji Lal Modi v. State of
U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620, Kedar Nath Singh
v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, Bilal
Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7
SCC 431. It could be correct to say that
Section
295-A
of
the
Penal
Code
encapsulates of all three elements, namely,
it refers to the content-based element when
it refers to words either spoken or written,
or by signs or visible representation or
otherwise. However, it does not on the
basis of content alone makes a person
guilty of the offence. The first portion refers
to deliberate and malicious intent on the
part of the maker to outrage religious
feeling of any class of citizens of India. The
last portion of Section 295-A refers to the
harm-based element, that is, insult or
attempt to insult religions or religious
belief of that class. Similarly, sub-section
(2) to Section 505 refers to a person
making publishing or circulating any
statement or report containing rumour or
alarming news. Thereafter, it refers to the
intent of the person which should be to
create or promote and then refers to the
harm-based element, that is, likely to create
or promote on the ground of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, caste,
etc. feeling of enmity. hatred or ill-will
between
different
religions,
racial
language, religious groups or castes or
communities, etc.

13. From the above analysis and legal
position, it is clear that only those words
which have been spoken or written with
deliberate and malicious intention to hurt
the religious feelings of any class of
citizen, can be categorised as offence u/s
295-A I.P.C. It is further observed that
merely because particular word or post on
social media intends to insult a particular
political party or a group who are not
inextricably associated with any religion or
its belief will not attract the ingredients of
Section 295-A I.P.C. as it does not in any
manner affect or outrage the religious
feeling or belief of a class of citizen.

14. From the perusal of the post of the
applicant made by him on social media
which has been quoted as above, it is clear
that no offence u/s 295-A I.P.C. is made
out and there is no material on record that
apart from this post, any other post on
social media has been made by the
applicant
which
could
attract
the
ingredients of offence u/s 295-A I.P.C.
Therefore, impugned proceedings deserves
to be quashed.

15. This Court also observes that the
objection of learned A.G.A. is also correct
that if any F.I.R. has been lodged by
particular person relating to offence against
the society then on the basis of compromise
between
the
accused
and
the
first
1 All. Krishna Chandra Singh @ Munna Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
277
informant, proceedings cannot be quashed
in such cases which are against the public
at large.

16. In view of the above, entire
proceedings
of
charge
sheet
dated
18.02.2019 in Criminal Case No. 620 of
2019 under Section 295-A I.P.C., Police
Station-
Khurja
Nagar,
District-
Bulandshahr, pending in the court of
learned
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahr as well as
cognizance order dated 05.07.2019 passed
by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate,
Khurja,
Bulandshahr,
are
hereby quashed.

17. This application is accordingly
disposed of.
---------
(2025) 1 ILRA 277
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.01.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJEEV SINGH, J.

Application U/S 483 No. 453 of 2024

Krishna Chandra Singh @ Munna Singh
 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Pankaj Kumar Verma, Karam Chand Yadav

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 145 & 482:- Application U/s
482 - for direction to the trial court - to decide
the pending Criminal Revision within stipulated
time to be fixed by this court - court finds that,
during pendency of application, criminal revision
in
question
has
already
been
decided,
consequently present application is become infructuous and is dismissed accordingly - Court
finds that, in the cases of Imtiyaz Ahmad Vs St.
of UP & Another, Sonu Agnihotry Vs Chandra
Shekhar & ors.& All India Judges Association &
other Vs UOI & ors.Hon'ble Apex Court directed
that endeavour should be made within five
years to increase the judge-to-population rations
in trial judiciary to 50 per million - however,
from perusal of personal affidavits filed by the
Chief Secretary as well as Principal Secretary
Law, Govt. of UP, - ration of 25 per million has
not been achieved till the year 2024 - held, -
issue is having wider impact on our judiciary
system and therefore direction issued to
creation of 9149 courts is related to interest of
public at large - registry is also directed to
registered this application as PIL as a separate
case and place it before the Hon'ble Chief
justice for appropriate direction. (Para - 10, 11,
12, 14)

Application pending as PIL. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs Neeraj Chaubey & ors. -
2010 (10) SCC 320,

2. Sonu Agnihotry Vs Chandra Shekhar & ors. -
2024 SCC online SC 3382,

3. All India Judges Association & ors.Vs U.O.I. &
ors. - 2002 (4) SCC 247,

4. Imtiyaz Ahmad Vs St. of UP & anr. - Misc.
Application No. 2362-2370/2019 in Criminal
Appeal No. 254-262 / 2012.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajeev Singh, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant and Shri Kuldeep Pati Tripathi,
learned
Additional
Advocate
General
assisted by Shri Rao Narendra Singh,
learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present application has been
filed with the prayer to direct respondent
no. 2, I Additional Session Judge, Bahraich