# Fatima Begum & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 916
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-07
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 9282 of 2022
- **Bench:** Brij Raj Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/fatima-begum-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54737
- **Pages:** 16

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916 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
complaint filed in Delhi except with the change of place of occurrence in order to create a
jurisdiction.
***********

 17.A
two-Judge
Bench
of
this
Court
inK.
Jayaramv.BDA[K.
Jayaramv.BDA, (2022) 12 SCC 815 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1194] observed : (SCC para 14)

 14. It is necessary for us to state here that in order to check multiplicity of proceedings
pertaining to the same subject-matter and more importantly to stop the menace of soliciting inconsistent
orders through different judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by remaining silent or by
making misleading statements in the pleadings in order to escape the liability of making a false statement,
we are of the view that the parties have to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either
past or present concerning any part of the subject-matter of dispute which is within their knowledge. In
case, according to the parties to the dispute, no legal proceedings or court litigations were or are pending,
they have to mandatorily state so in their pleadings in order to resolve the dispute between the parties in
accordance with law.

The said petition was dismissed on various counts including forum hunting.

16. A ground abandoned by the applicant at the time of previous two petitions, although
available at that time cannot be agitated at a subsequent period of time. The challenges in this
matter have been in piecemeal by the applicant. Even a challenge of proceedings in Application
U/S 482 No. 31531 of 2022 (Ram Dular Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Another) was abandoned by
him but now the same is being taken up in a new petition being the present one.

17. Thus this Court holds that the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is a repeated
attempt of the same applicant for setting aside the proceedings against him pending before the trial
court which is not maintainable. This is even forum hunting by him.

18. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus dismissed.

19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 916
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 9282 of 2022

Fatima Begum & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties
4 All. Fatima Begum & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
917
Issue for consideration
The applicant filed an application u/s 482 CrPC seeking to quash the entire criminal proceedings in the
complaint case alleging rape under the false promise of marriage.

Headnotes
A. Indian Penal Code,1860-Section 375, 376-Criminal Procedure Code,1973-Section 482Quashing of proceedings-Rape Vs Consensual sex-Promise of marriage-Subsequent breach Vs.
False promise from inception-Material of sterling quality showing consensual relationship
turning acrimonious-Frivolous and vexatious proceedings-Private grudge-Abuse of process of
court-Criminal proceedings maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive to settle a personal
score out of retaliation cannot be sustained-Entire proceedings quashed.(Para 15 to 25)
Held
The court held that the offence of rape is not made out because Applicant no. 3 was always ready to marry.
The breakdown of the alliance was caused solely by the conduct of the complainant whose prior relationship
and private photos were exposed and her subsequent marriage to another man on the scheduled wedding
date. Out of vengeance, the complainant filed a false case to settle a personal score. Applying the principles
laid down in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal and the structured four step test from Pradeep Kumar
Kesarwani, the court ruled that allowing the trial to continue would be a gross abuse of the judicial process.
(E-6)

Case law Cited
Pradeep Kumar Keshawani Vs State of U.P. & Anr. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1947, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs
State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2019) 9 SCC 608, Pramod Kumar Navratna Vs State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
(2026) SCC OnLine SC 154,Mohammad Wajid Vs State of U.P., (2023) SCC OnLine SC 951, Deepak Gulati Vs
State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 ,Sajal Bose Vs The State of West Bengal & Ors (2026) SCC OnLine SC
525, State of Haryana Vs Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 Salib Vs State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 194referred to.

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code,1860, Criminal Procedure Code,1973

List of Keywords
Abuse of process of court, Quashing of criminal proceedings, Allegation of rape, False promise of marriage,
Deceptive intent from inception, Consensual relationship, rape, Broken marriage alliance, Private photographs,
Settling personal scores, Sterling quality material.

Case Arising from
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 9282 OF 2022
Fatima Begum & 2 Ors Vs. The State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy Home And Anr.
From the Judgment and order dated 07.04.2026 of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for Applicant(s)
Nadeem Murtaza, Inam Uddin Ahmad,
Sheeran Mohiuddin Alavi, Shubham Tripathi
Advs. for Opposite Party(s)
G.A., Salman Abbas , Vikas Vikram Singh

(Delivered by Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh, J.)

1. The present application has been filed seeking quashing of the entire proceedings of
Complaint Case No.53786 of 2022, Nazish Fatima Vs. Mohd. Abbas and others, Police Station
918 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Hazratganj, District Lucknow and the summoning order dated 19.11.2022 passed by the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate-IV, Lucknow.

2. It is the case of the applicants that applicant no.1 is an old aged house-wife, whereas
applicant no.2 is the retired Engineer from the U.P. State Cement Corporation and applicant no.3 is
an engineering graduate, currently working in a private multinational company at Noida. It is said
that applicants are innocent and have been falsely implicated by opposite party no.2 by making
false allegation with oblique motive. It is said that applicant no.3 came in contact with opposite
party no.2 through matrimonial website, namely, Shaadi.com and consequently both of them met at
Barista Coffee House, Rana Pratap Marg, Hazratganj, Lucknow on 04.09.2021. Opposite party no.2
introduced herself as a conservative and religious person and informed that she is pursuing
D.Pharma from the Integral University, Lucknow. Opposite party no.2 told applicant no.3 that her
father had been residing and working in a Motor Garage, in Saudi Arabia for the past twenty five
years and had recently returned to India during the Covid-19 pandemic and now he is running a
General Store in Muftiganj, Lucknow. Due to the aforesaid, it was informed by the opposite party
no.2 that there are compatibility issues in her family and thus, she wants to get married at the
earliest and get settled in her life.

3. It is said that applicants no.1 and 2 after intimation to the family members of opposite
Party no.2, visited her home along with close relatives on 30.10.2021 and the Engagement
Ceremony of applicant no.3 and opposite party no.2 was done, wherein applicants no.1 and 2 also
handed presented a Gold Ring, Cash of Rs.20,000/- and sweets etc. In return, the family members
of opposite party no.2 visited the house of the applicants on 13.11.2021. On 13.02.2022, applicants
no.1 and 2 visited the residence of opposite party no.2 to finalize the dates of marriage and on
mutual agreement, the dates for Nikah and Walima were fixed as 04.11.2022 and 07.11.2022
respectively. Thereafter, parents of opposite party no.2 visited the residence of brother of applicant
no.1 on 14.02.2022 on the occasion of the Birth Anniversary of Hazrat Ali and they spent time
together discussing the future marriage plans.

4. It is said that shockingly in February, 2022, applicant no.3 started receiving messages on
Instagram Id from an unknown person and on 23.02.2022, several obscene and vulgar photographs
of opposite party no.2 were shared by the said person, who was identified as one Haris Javed
Ansari by opposite party no.2. Applicant no.3 came to know that opposite party no.2 was in
relationship with the aforesaid person, namely, Haris Javed Ansari of Shahjahanpur and, therefore,
on the news of the engagement of applicant no.3 opposite party no.2, the said person decided to
intervene and stop the marriage of applicant no.3. Applicant no.3 also came to know that one Aman
Husaini of Varanasi was also in relationship with opposite party no.2 earlier and the photographs of
opposite party no.2 are with Aman Husaini as well as with Haris Javed Ansari. The aforesaid
details were informed to opposite party no.2 and her family members, on which on 27.02.2022,
parents of opposite party no.2 called the applicants to Shahnajaf Imambara, Hazratganj and there
opposite party no.2 took oath on the religious book that she has no relation with the aforesaid
persons at present. On 03.03.2022, father of opposite party no.2 visited the house of the applicants
and informed that he would take action against Haris Javed Ansari for sharing private photographs
of opposite party no.2 on internet and thereafter opposite party no.2 visited Shahjahanpur along
with her parents and called Haris Javed Ansari to the Police Station Sadar Bazar, Shahjahanpur and
4 All. Fatima Begum & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
919
was made to sign the apology letter. Opposite party no.2 herself shared the photograph of the
apology letter as well as the photograph of Haris Javed Ansari signing the apology letter and the
mobile phone screen shot of Haris Javed Ansari as proof that he was the one messaging and sharing
private photographs on Instagram application.

5. It is said that opposite party no.2 demanded Rs.15,000/- through Whats App chat from
applicant no.3 and when the aforesaid transaction could not be done due to technical fault, opposite
party no.2 got angry and blocked the WhatsApp of applicant no.3. Thereafter, parents of opposite
party no.2 proceeded to get her marriage fixed with one Zaim Ali Zamin, whilst the applicants
awaited response from them. The applicants could not comprehend when they came across the
Wedding Invitation Card as well as the online invitation video of the marriage of opposite party
no.2 with Zain Ali Zamin, which was scheduled to take place on 04.11.2022 itself, i.e. the date on
which earlier the marriage of applicant no.3 was fixed with the opposite party no.2.

6. Sri Nadeem Murtaza assisted by Sri Shubham Tripathi and Inamuddin Ahmad, counsel
for the applicants submits that in February, 2022, applicant no.3 started receiving messages on
Instagram Id from an unknown person and on 23.02.2022 several obscene and vulgar photographs
of opposite party no.2 were shared by the said person. This fact has been stated in paragraph-14 of
the application. However, while replying to the said paragraph, opposite party no.2 has admitted
the fact. He further submits that opposite party no.2 was in relation with the aforesaid person,
namely, Haris Javed Ansari of Shahjahanpur and on the news of engagement of applicant no.3 with
opposite party no.2, the said person decided to intervene and stop the marriage of opposite party
no.2. It is submitted that in such scenario, the marriage could not be solemnized as certain
differences arose between the parties as opposite party no.2 was in relation with another man. Since
the marriage could not be solemnized, out of retaliation opposite party no.2 instituted the criminal
proceedings by filing the present complaint against the applicants just to settle her personal score.

7. Counsel for the applicants further submits that even if it is assumed that there was
physical relationship between applicant no.3 and opposite party no.2, then the same is consensual
and such relationship does not come within the purview of Section 376 IPC.

8. Counsel for the applicants by placing reliance upon the judgement of the Hon?ble
Supreme Court rendered in the case of Pradeep Kumar Keshawani Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947 has submitted that there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex and in a case where there is a promise of marriage, the Court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide
intention. He has further relied upon paragraph-20 of the aforesaid judgment, where four guidelines
have been framed while entertaining the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and in guideline (ii)
it is provided that whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would
persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
Counsel for the applicants has pointed out that the attending circumstances are very relevant in the
present case, wherein it is established that opposite party no.2 had relationship with some other
person on account of which the marriage could not be solemnized. Once this fact has been
920 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
admitted, then the judgement of the Hon?ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Pradeep
Kumar Kesharwani (supra) comes to the rescue of the applicant.

9. Counsel for the applicants by placing reliance upon the judgement of the Hon?ble
Supreme Court rendered in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and
another, (2019) 9 SCC 608 has submitted that in the case of woman engaging in sexual relations
on false promise to marriage, the Court has to be very careful and after examining the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court may take decision on the given facts.

10. Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned AGA-I on the other hand by opposing the case has
submitted that the offence is serious in nature, therefore, statement of the prosecutrix is selfsufficient to prosecute the applicants. Therefore, the trial court has rightly summoned the applicants
and no interference is required by this Court.

11. Heard learned counsel for the applicants as well as learned AGA and perused the
record. However, no one has put in appearance on behalf of opposite party no.2 though name of the
counsels have been shown in the cause list.

12. Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) held as under:-

 "12 This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC
involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed
act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions
(or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction,
consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar which was a case involving the invoking of the
jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed:

 "15. ? An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities
of the case. ?Consent? is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an
active will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of."

 This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this Court in Kaini Rajan v
State of Kerala:

 "12. ? ?Consent?, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not
only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral
quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and asset. Whether
there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant
circumstances.?

 14 In the present case, the ?misconception of fact? alleged by the complainant is the
appellant?s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has
observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the
maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but
subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh, this Court held:
4 All. Fatima Begum & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
921
 "12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established
and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry,
did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on
such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a
consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such
a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the
rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section
376 of the IPC."

 Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana
("Deepak Gulati"):

 "21. ? There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a
false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false
promise of marriage by the accused.."

 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of
making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage
in sexual relations, there is a ?misconception of fact? that vitiates the woman?s ?consent?. On the
other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false
promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time
of giving it. The ?consent? of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
?misconception of fact? where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the
said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed:

 "21. .. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a
false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false
promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently.

 ....
 "24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise
to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ?failure
to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to
come within the meaning of the term ?misconception of fact?, the fact must have an immediate
relevance?. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl
922 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that
from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.? (Emphasis supplied)

 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the ?consent? of
a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the
proposed act. To establish whether the ?consent? was vitiated by a ?misconception of fact? arising
out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time
it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman?s decision to engage in the sexual act."

13. In the case of Pramod Kumar Navratna Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2026
SCC OnLine SC 154, Hon?ble supreme Court held as under:-

 "18. It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the mere fact that the parties
indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every
case. An offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was
made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any
intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage
had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. The issue for
consideration is whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the
FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the
accused-appellant arising out of FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 and the Chargesheet
No.269/2025.

 19. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to
discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts
of the present case unmistakably indicate towards a classic case of a consensual relationship
turning acrimonious. Upon perusal of the records of the case, it is evident that the complainantrespondent No. 3 is a married lady with a ten years old child. The said marriage was solemnized
on 02.06.2011 and although divorce proceedings are currently pending adjudication between her
and her husband, by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the complainant-respondent No. 3
was eligible for being married with the accused-appellant on 18.09.2022, the date on which the
first of the multiple instances of acts of rape on the false pretext of marriage has been committed by
the accused-appellant are alleged. Therefore, even for the sake of argument, if the contention of the
respondent No. 1 State and the complainant-respondent No. 3 is accepted that there indeed was a
false promise of marriage based on which the accused-appellant indulged in sexual activities, such
a promise would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted upon as the victim
herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on the date of the first alleged act of offence i.e.
18.09.2022 nor on any subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual activities, till
the point of the date of registration of FIR l.e. 06.02.2025. The said embargo arises from subclause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which categorically prohibits marriage
between two individuals if either of them have a living spouse. The said position of law has been
reiterated under sub-clause (1) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
4 All. Fatima Begum & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
923
 22. The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in identifying the genuine cases
filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the
said offence. There should be a promise of marriage made by the accused solely with a view to
obtain consent for sexual relations and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the
very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix
giving her consent for sexual relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the accused
must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases of consensual
relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and
disagreement or a future change of mind. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, the
respondent No. 1-State and the complainant -respondent no.3 has failed to place any material on
record to show how the accused-appellant on the subsequent meetings managed to repeatedly coax
and dupe the complainant-respondent no.3 into having physical relations with him on the false
pretext of marriage considering the fact that within initial meetings, both parties were aware about
the marital status of the victim and therefore it cannot be, by any stretch imagination said that the
consent of the complainant-respondent No. 3 has been vitiated or obtained on fraud and
misrepresentation made by the accused-appellant.

 23. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu
Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, wherein the following observations were
made:

 "29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to
misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been made from the very
beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship.
Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said
consent is vitiated and not a valid consent."

14. Now, the question which falls for consideration is that whether the act of applicant
no.3, as alleged in the complaint, comes within the purview of Section 376 IPC and whether the
allegation of committing rape on the false promise of marriage by applicant no.3 is proved prima
facie on the basis of averments made in the complaint coupled with the attending circumstances of
the case. Before dealing with this issue, it is relevant to recollect the attending facts and
circumstances of the case again, which run as under:-

 "Applicant no.3 came in contact with opposite party no.2 through matrimonial website
and thereafter they met at a Coffee House on 04.09.2021. After introduction of each other, parents
of applicant no.3 visited the house of opposite party no.2 along with their close relatives on
30.10.2021 and engagement ceremony was also done, wherein they exchanged the gifts including
gold ring and cash. After much deliberations, dates for Nikah and Walima were fixed as
04.11.2022 and 07.11.2022 respectively. In the meantime, applicant no.3 and opposite party no.2
met so many times and established physical relation on their free will and consent. All of sudden, in
February, 2022, applicant no.3 received messages and obscene and vulgar photographs of
opposite party no.2 on Instagram Id from an unknown person and later on it came to the
knowledge of applicant no.3 that the said person is Haris Javed Ansari from Shahjahanpur.
Applicant no.3 also came to know that one Aman Hussaini of Varanasi was also in relationship
924 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
with opposite party no.2 earlier and the obscene and vulgar photographs of opposite party no.2 are
also with him. After intervention of the parents of opposite party no.2, on 27.02.2022 at Shahnajaf
Imambara, Hazratganj, Lucknow opposite party no.2 took oath on the religious Book ?Quran? that
she has no relation with the aforesaid persons at present. Thereafter, father of opposite party no.2
visited the house of the applicants and informed them that he would take action against Haris
Javed Ansari for the aforesaid act, pursuant to which they visited Shahjahanpur and at the Police
Station Sadar Bazar, Shahjahanpur an apology letter was written and signed by Haris Javed
Ansari and photograph of the same was also sent to applicant no.3. Thereafter, marriage of
opposite party no.2 was fixed with one Zaim Ali Zamin without intimation to the applicants on
04.11.2022 i.e. the date on which earlier marriage of applicant no.3 was fixed with opposite party
no.2."

15. After going through the aforesaid attending facts and circumstances coupled with the
allegation made in the complaint, it is amply clear that because of the conduct of opposite party
no.2, the marriage could not be solemnized and parents of opposite party no.2 fixed the marriage of
opposite party no.2 with another person without intimation to the applicants. It is not the case that
promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual
relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such
false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual
relations as narration of the aforesaid attending facts and circumstances of the case, clearly indicate
that applicant no.3 is always ready to perform marriage with opposite party no.2 from the very
beginning, but because of the intervening unfortunate developments regarding conduct of opposite
party no.2, the marriage between them could not be solemnized, for which applicant no.3 cannot be
blamed. One relevant fact is to be noted here that applicant no.3 and opposite party no.2 were in
contact near about five months and during this period they established physical relation so many
times on their free will and consent, but at no point of time, opposite party no.2 made a complaint
that applicant no.3 physically assaulted or out of coercion he established physical relation with her.
Hon?ble Supreme Court time and again held that mere fact that the parties indulged in physical
relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case and an offence
under Section 375 IPC could only be made out if promise of marriage was made by the accused
solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said
promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on
the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. However, in the present case the essential
ingredients are missing and the facts unmistakably indicate towards a classic case of a consensual
relationship turning acrimonious.

16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid Vs. State of U.P., 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 951 while dealing with the duty of the court in cases where an accused seeks quashing
of an FIR or proceedings on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous, or
vexatious, or instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, held as under:-

 "34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused
comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such
4 All. Fatima Begum & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
925
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with
care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against
the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure
that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant
would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the
Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or
not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments
and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution
need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the
overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials
collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have
been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration
of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of
private or personal grudge as alleged.? (Emphasis supplied).

17. If this Court considers the attending circumstances of the present case in the light of the
aforesaid judgement, then it is clear that opposite party no.2 in order to settle her personal score and
out of vengeance, instituted the present criminal proceedings by filing a complaint against the
applicants subsequently on 02.06.2022 i.e. after applicant no.3 came to know about the conduct of
opposite party no.3 and her physical relations with other persons, therefore, the offence under
Section 376 IPC and allegation of rape by applicant no.3 on false promise of marriage is bereft of
record.

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra) while
dealing with the terms ?Rape? and ?consensual sex? and by relying upon the judgement of the
Supreme Court rendered in the case of Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675
held as under

 "18. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case where
there is a promise of marriage, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had
actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls in the ambit of cheating or deception.

 19. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court in
the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675. This Court made the following
observations:

 "18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or
through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in
a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual
926 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually
wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect
only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within a ambit of cheating or deception. There is a
distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court
must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the
accuse; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances
which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her,
despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be
convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala
fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

 21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
"failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are
not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In
order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact, the fact must have
an immediate relevance." Section 90, IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to
pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry
her.? (Emphasis supplied)

19. Further, in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra), Hon?ble Supreme Court has
framed four guidelines for entertaining the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and in guideline
(ii) it is provided that whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would
persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
For the sake of convenience, the aforesaid four guidelines framed by the Hon?ble Supreme Court
are extracted herein below:-

 "20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for
quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C.:-

 (1) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and
indubitable, l.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality"

 (II) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the
assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to
reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
4 All. Fatima Begum & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
927
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations
as false.

 (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by
the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?"

 (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of
the court, and would not serve the ends of Justice?

 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would
save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as,
proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the
conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of
2013)]."

20. Recently, a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sajal Bose
Vs. The State of West Bengal and others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 525 while dealing with the
similar question held as under:-

 "31.