# Ferasat v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 4 ILRA 370
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-04-23
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 475 of 1984
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Jitendra Kumar Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ferasat-v-state-of-u-p-54592
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - appeal - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Murder -
Conviction
-
Eyewitness
testimony
corroborated by medical evidence - Nonappearance of appellant and counsel -
Not always necessary to adjourn the
matter in case both appellant or his
counsels/lawyers are absent -Appeal can
be decided on merits after perusal of
record and judgment - Appointment of
amicus curiae not mandatory - if the case
is decided on merits in the absence of the
appellant, the higher court can remedy the
situation - in the case of direct evidence,
motive is of little significance or no
significance. (Para -3,21)

(B) Criminal law - Dying declaration -
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section
161 , Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section
32(1) - Statement of deceased recorded
4 All. Ferasat Vs. State of U.P..
371
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. admissible as
dying declaration when related to cause of
death and deceased dies subsequently.
(Para -18)

Accused, step-son of deceased, was not
contributing to household - had strained
relationship with deceased - inflicted multiple
knife blows in presence of eyewitness - Prompt
FIR - Motive proved - Statement of deceased
treated as dying declaration - conviction under
Section 302 IPC challenged. (Para - 7, 10, 18)

HELD: - Appellate Court rightly relied on
credible
eyewitness
testimony
and
dying
declaration to affirm conviction under Section
302 IPC. Absence of appellant does not preclude
merit-based disposal. Appointment of Amicus
Curiae
is
discretionary,
not
mandatory.
Conviction and sentence upheld. (Para -
20,22,23)

Criminal appeal dismissed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED: -

## Text

370 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decided the same to bring the successor on
record, thus, the abovementioned case is
factually different to the instant case.

23. The recall application is moved on
the ground that it has unfairly been
submitted before the contempt court that
the order passed by the Writ Court has been
complied
with
though,
it
was
misrepresented before the Court. In the
recall application in paragraph nos. 4, 5
and 6, it has specifically been stated that
the interest of late payment of gratuity of
some installments have not been paid yet
and from perusal of the reply in
paragraph
no.
12
of
the
counter
affidavit/objections filed by the opposite
party, it is apparent that the same has not
specifically been denied, rather it has
been said that as per the availability of
the funds, the payment has been made,
but what happened with respect to the
payment of interest as per the rate of 7%
on the delayed payment is silent.

24.

It
is
trite
law
that
misrepresentation is amount to fraud and
fraud vitiates all proceedings and this Court
is of considered opinion that this law will
also similarly apply in the contempt
petition in an event, the order is passed on
misrepresentation or fraud on behest of
either of the parties.

25. In light of the aforesaid
submissions and discussions, this Court is
of considered opinion that the recall
application is maintainable.

26.

Consequently,
the
recall
application succeeds, thus, the recall
application is allowed and the order dated
20.2.2024 is hereby recalled.

Order on Contempt Petition

1. The Contempt Application (Civil)
No. 3413 of 2023 is restored on it's original
number.

2. List/put up this matter in the next
month.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 370
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE JITENDRA KUMAR SINHA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 475 of 1984

Ferasat ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
M. Islam

Counsel for the Respondents:
D.G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - appeal - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Murder -
Conviction
-
Eyewitness
testimony
corroborated by medical evidence - Nonappearance of appellant and counsel -
Not always necessary to adjourn the
matter in case both appellant or his
counsels/lawyers are absent -Appeal can
be decided on merits after perusal of
record and judgment - Appointment of
amicus curiae not mandatory - if the case
is decided on merits in the absence of the
appellant, the higher court can remedy the
situation - in the case of direct evidence,
motive is of little significance or no
significance. (Para -3,21)

(B) Criminal law - Dying declaration -
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section
161 , Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section
32(1) - Statement of deceased recorded
4 All. Ferasat Vs. State of U.P..
371
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. admissible as
dying declaration when related to cause of
death and deceased dies subsequently.
(Para -18)

Accused, step-son of deceased, was not
contributing to household - had strained
relationship with deceased - inflicted multiple
knife blows in presence of eyewitness - Prompt
FIR - Motive proved - Statement of deceased
treated as dying declaration - conviction under
Section 302 IPC challenged. (Para - 7, 10, 18)

HELD: - Appellate Court rightly relied on
credible
eyewitness
testimony
and
dying
declaration to affirm conviction under Section
302 IPC. Absence of appellant does not preclude
merit-based disposal. Appointment of Amicus
Curiae
is
discretionary,
not
mandatory.
Conviction and sentence upheld. (Para -
20,22,23)

Criminal appeal dismissed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED: -

1. Surya Baksh Singh Vs St. of U.P., (2014) 14
SCC 222

2. Pradeep Bisoi @ Ranjit Bisoi Vs. St. of Odisha
, 2019 (11) SCC 500

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar
Birla, J.
&
Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha, J.)

1. List has been revised. No one
appears on behalf of appellant to press
the present appeal. The appeal is of the
year 1983.

2. As per office report dated
3.3.2022, the sole appellant, Firasat, is
not traceable. NBW was issued against
the
appellant
by
the
order
dated
05.02.2024 of this Court. But the same
could not be executed as the appellant no
longer resides on available address.
Sureties are also not traceable.

3. This appeal is being heard and
disposed of in view of law propounded by
Hon'ble Apex Court in Surya Baksh Singh
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 14 SCC
222, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that
it is always not necessary to adjourn the
matter in case both appellant or his
counsels/lawyers are absent and the Court
can decide the appeal on merits after
perusal of the record and the judgement of
the trial Court. It has further been observed
that if the case is decided on merits in the
absence of the appellant, the higher court
can remedy the situation. It has also been
observed that appointment of Amicus
Curiae is also on the discretion of the court.
In paragraph 26 of the said judgement, it
was held that it is always not essential for
the High Court to an appoint Amicus
Curiae, paragraphs 24 and 26 of the said
judgement whereof are quoted as under:

"24. It seems to us that it is
necessary for the Appellate Court which is
confronted with the absence of the convict
as well as his Counsel, to immediately
proceed against the persons who stood
surety at the time when the convict was
granted bail, as this may lead to his
discovery and production in Court. If even
this exercise fails to locate and bring forth
the convict, the Appellate Court is
empowered to dismiss the appeal. We fully
and respectfully concur with the recent
elucidation of the law, profound yet
perspicuous, in K.S. Panduranga v. State of
Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 721. After a
comprehensive
analysis
of
previous
decisions our learned Brother had distilled
the legal position into six propositions:

"19.1. that the High Court cannot
dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution
simpliciter without examining the merits;
372 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

19.2. that the Court is not bound
to adjourn the matter if both the Appellant
or his Counsel/lawyer are absent;

19.3. that the court may, as a
matter of prudence or indulgence, adjourn
the matter but it is not bound to do so;

19.4. that it can dispose of the
appeal after perusing the record and
judgment of the trial court.

19.5. that if the accused is in jail
and cannot, on his own, come to court, it
would be advisable to adjourn the case and
fix
another
date
to
facilitate
the
appearance of the Appellant-accused if his
lawyer is not present, and if the lawyer is
absent and the court deems it appropriate
to appoint a lawyer at the State expense to
assist it, nothing in law would preclude the
court from doing so; and

19.6. that if the case is decided on
merits in the absence of the Appellant, the
higher court can remedy the situation.

25.....

26. Reverting back to the facts of
the present case a perusal of the impugned
order makes it abundantly evident that the
High Court has considered the case in all
its complexities. The argument that the
High Court was duty-bound to appoint an
amicus curiae is not legally sound.
Panduranga correctly considers Mohd.
Sukur Ali v. State of Assam (1996) 4 SCC
729 as per incuriam, inasmuch as the latter
mandates the appointment of an amicus
curiae and is thus irreconcilable with Bani
Singh vs. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 720.
In the case in hand the High Court has
manifestly discussed the evidence that have
been led, and finding it of probative value,
has come to the conclusion that the
conviction is above Appellate reproach
correction and interference. In view of the
analysis of the law the contention raised
before us that it was essential for the High
Court to have appointed an amicus curiae
is wholly untenable. The High Court has
duly undertaken the curial responsibility
that fastens upon the Appellate Court, and
cannot be faulted on the approach adopted
by it. In this respect, we find no error."

4. The aforesaid view has been
followed by the Hon'ble Full Bench in
Criminal Reference No.1 of 2024, In Re-
Procedure To Be Followed In Hearing Of
Criminal Appeals vs. State of U.P., decided
on 22.01.2025, paragraph Nos. 151 and 152
whereof are quoted as under:

"151. The crux of the aforesaid
observations
of the three celebrated
judgments
rendered
by
the
Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Bani Singh and others
Vs. State of U.P. 11, Surya Baksh Singh Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh 12 and K.S.
Panduranga Vs. State of Karnataka 13,
thus, covers the entire length and breadth
of Question No. 5 formulated by the
Division
Bench
at
Lucknow
for
consideration by this Bench and no fresh
exercise, in our considered opinion, is
required to be undertaken by this Bench,
including on one point which has been
highlighted by the Division Bench at
Lucknow i.e. whether the amicus curiae
may be appointed even when the presence
of the convict, appellant or accusedrespondent may be secured and without his
consent.

152.
The
aforesaid
legal
precedents would evidently canvass that the
emphasis of the Apex Court has been on
providing opportunity of being heard to the
appellant who is willing to cooperate with
the appellate court or his counsel and in
this regard a process to cause his presence
for the purpose of giving opportunity of
being heard is required to be issued to him
and when the court is satisfied that such
appellant is deliberately avoiding his
4 All. Ferasat Vs. State of U.P..
373
presence before the court, in such a
situation, the court may dispose of the
appeal in the manner approved by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh and
others Vs. State of U.P. 11, Surya Baksh
Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 12 and
K.S. Panduranga Vs. State of Karnataka 13
(i.e. after perusing the record/evidence visa-vis judgment of the trial court with the
assistance of prosecutor and Amicus, if
appointed) and we do not have any reason
to deviate from the settled proposition laid
down by the Apex Court in the above
mentioned
cases,
moreover,
the
appointment of amicus is only for the
purpose to provide fair trail to the
appellant and also for rendering the
assistance to the Court."

5. Under such circumstances, we
proceed to consider the present appeal on
merit with the help of Sri Rahul Asthana,
learned A.G.A. for the State.

6. The present appeal has been filed by
the appellant assailing his conviction and
sentence passed by Sri Mahesh Chandra,
the learned Additional Sessions Judge-8th,
Bareilly vide judgement and order dated
11.01.1984 whereby the appellant has been
convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. and has
been sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for life and he has further been sentenced to
pay fine of Rs. 5,00/- and in default of
payment of fine, R.I. for one year has also
been awarded. The sentences have been
ordered to run concurrently.

7. The prosecution story, in brief, is
that the deceased Chutai had married with
one Hasin Bi about three years back from
the date of occurrence. Hasin Bi had seven
children including Firasat from earlier
marriage. Firasat had started separate
working but he was not contributing
towards the expenses of the family. The
deceased Chutai used to demand monetary
contribution from the accused but the
accused did not pay heed to it. The
deceased Chutai asked the accused Firasat
to live separately but even then the accused
continued to live with Chutai. On account
of this the relationship between the accused
and the deceased had got strained and
altercations, exchange of abuses, between
the two had taken place multiple times. On
23.06.1983, about mid day, informant Aziz,
who is brother-in-law of the deceased
Chutai visited his house. Appellant/accused
Firasat came there armed with a knife and
stated that he would kill him as he had
made his life miserable, after saying this,
the accused gave several blows of knife to
Chutai and made good his escape. The
informant Aziz then took injured Chutai to
the police station in his rickshaw and
lodged the report. Originally, the case was
registered under Section 307 I.P.C. but
after the death of Chutai, the case was
converted into Section 302 I.P.C. The
police, after investigation, submitted charge
sheet against appellant-accused Firasat @
Guddu.

8. The learned trial court framed
charge against the accused under Section
302 I.P.C. to which the accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed for trial. Prosecution
examined eight witnesses in support of its
case. PW-1 Dr. S.K. Jain, Medical Officer,
district Hospital, Bareilly stated that on
25.06.1983 he conducted the post mortem
of the dead body of Chutai and found
following ante mortem injuries on his dead
body:-

"(i). Incised wound 2.5cm * 1.5
cm chest cavity deep on front of chest 6cm
medial to right nipple of 3 o'clock position.
Margin clean cut. Transversely placed.
374 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(ii). Incised wound 2cm. x 1.5cm
cavity deep on right side abdomen 9cm.
above umblicus at 11 O'clock position
transversaly placed, margin clean cut.

(iii). Incised wound 1.5cm x
0.5cm muscle deep on front of the left
upper arm 6cm above elbow joint.

(iv). Incised wound 1cm. x 0.5cm
skin deep on outer side of left elbow joint.

(v). Incised wound 1.5cm x 0.5cm
skin deep on the outer side of left fore arm
5cm below elbow joint.

(vi). Incised wound 2cm x 1cm x
2cm deep on back of left 3cm below and
below Axilla (Arm Pit).

(vii). Incised wound 1cm x 0.5cm
skin deep on front of left knee joint.

(vii). Incised wound 1cm x 0.5cm
skin deep on back of left thigh 6cm above
knee."

9. In the opinion of PW-1, the cause of
death was shock and haemorrhage as a
result of above injuries. PW-1 has proved
the post mortem report Ext. ka1.

10. Informant/PW-2 Aziz has stated
that the deceased Chutai was his brother-inlaw and he had married Hasin Bi about
three years back. Hasin Bi had seven
children from her earlier marriage. A child
was also born with Chutai but the child had
died. This witness has further stated that
the entire expenses of households were
borne by Chutai and the accused Firasat,
step son of Chutai, used to spend money on
cinema and did not contribute anything
towards households. It is further stated by
PW-2 that Firasat used to demand pocket
money from Chutai and on this account the
relationship between them was strained.
This witness has further stated that on the
date of occurrence he was sitting at the
house of Chutai (deceased) talking to him.
At about 12:30 P.M., accused Firasat came
there armed with a knife and started
abusing Chutai and threatened to kill him
and gave several knife blows. PW-2 raised
alarm but the accused managed to escape
after inflicting five or six injuries to Chutai.
This witness has further stated that he did
not intervene as he was unarmed. PW-2
further stated that he took the injured
Chutai to the police station on his rickshaw
and lodged the report Ext. ka3. While being
taken to police station, the injured Chutai
was in conscious and full senses and was
talking to PW-2. At the police station the
Sub-Inspector recorded the statement of
Chutai and then sent him to the hospital for
medical examination along with one
Constable. However, on the same day
Chutai died due to injuries.

11. PW-3 Smt. Bijjan, an old lady has
stated that about mid day on the date of
occurrence she heard some noise and she
reached at the door of Chutai when she saw
accused Firasat @ Guddu coming out of
the door with blood stained knife in his
hand. The accused escaped towards masjid
and his shirt was also blood stained.

12. PW-4 Sub-Inspector H.S. Bhargoti
is a formal witness who has proved the
chick F.I.R. of this case as Ext. ka4. PW-4
is also an Investigating Officer who
conducted the investigation of this case.
PW-4 has recorded the statement of injured
Chutai at the police station and has filed a
copy of the same in the trial court, which is
Ext. ka5. He sent Chutai for medical
examination with Constable Sobran Singh
to the District Hospital. This witness has
also
recorded
the
statement
of
the
informant and prepared site plan of the
place of occurrence, which is Ext. ka6.
From the spot He took in possession blood
stained and plain soil and sealed it into two
boxes, which are Ext. 1 and 2. He also
4 All. Ferasat Vs. State of U.P..
375
prepared fard statement as Ext. ka7. PW-4
also cut and took in his possession blood
stained 'Ban' of the cot, on which the
deceased was sitting at the time of alleged
occurrence being committed. This witness
also recorded the statement of several
witnesses and on 24.06.1983, after Chutai
succumbed to his injuries, made the
conversion of the case from Section 307
I.P.C. to Section 302 I.P.C.

13.
PW-5
Head
Constable
Raj
Bahadur Singh has deposed that on
23.06.1983 at about 01:05 P.M. at P.S.
Baradari, Aziz had lodged F.I.R., which
was prepared by him. This witness has
further stated that while Chutai remained at
the police station he was in his senses and
was talking. This witness further stated that
S.I. H.S. Bhargoti recorded the statement of
injured Chutai at the police station on the
same day at about 3:30 P.M.

14. P.W.-6 Sobran Singh has deposed
to the effect that on 23.06.1983 he took the
injured Chutai to the hospital for medical
examination and he was talking up to the
gate of the hospital but when he was taken
inside the hospital Chutai died. PW-6 came
back to the PW-5 Raj Bahadur with a
report from the hospital that the injured is
dead and recorded the same in the G.D.
report.

15. PW-7 S.I. Sahdev Singh has stated
that on 24.06.1983 he was posted at P.S.
Baradari. He prepared panchayatnama
under direction of his superior officer along
with Constable Lal Singh and Malkhan
Singh.
This
witness
has
proved
panchayatnama (inquest) as Ext. ka15. This
witness has further stated that the dead
body of the deceased was sealed by him
and
sent
for
post
mortem
through
Constbable Lal Singh and Malkhan Singh.
The sample of seal is Ext. ka16. Photo lash
(photo dead body) is Ext. ka17, challan lash
(challan dead body) is Ext. ka18, Challan
and letter of C.M.O. is Ext. ka19. Letter of
R.I. in Ext. ka20.

16. PW-8 Constable Lal Singh has
proved the inquest report and has stated in
his deposition before the learned trial court
that on 24.06.1983 S.I. Sahdeo Singh
prepared the inquest of deceased Chutai in
his presence. Learned trial court has
recorded the finding that PW-1 is eyewitness and his testimony is wholly
reliable.

17. The grounds taken in the appeal
are that the conviction is bad in the eye of
law and is against the weight of the
evidence on record and the sentence is too
severe. Now this Court is tasked with the
duty to re-appreciate the evidence and
come to the conclusion whether the learned
trial court has appreciated the evidence in
the right perspective or not?

18. PW-2 is informant, who is eyewitness and he is categorical in his
statement that the accused inflicted several
knife blows on the deceased Chutai in his
presence. There is nothing in his crossexamination which could contradict him.
This witness has further stated that he took
the injured Chutai to the police station
where the first information report was
lodged by this witness and the statement of
the injured was recorded by Sub-Inspector
which is Ext. ka5, in which the injured
Chutai has stated that it was the accused,
who inflicted several knife blows on him. It
is settled preposition of law that the
statement of an injured person recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is treated as
dying declaration if the person making the
same dies subsequently and the statement
376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relates to the cause of his death as affirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Pradeep Bisoi @ Ranjit Bisoi Vs. State of
Odisha reported in 2019 (11) SCC 500.
Relevant paragraph No.10 is delineated
below:-

"10. Sub-section (2) to Section
162 incorporate a clear exception to what
has been laid down in sub-section (1). The
statement recorded by police under Section
161, falling within the provisions of clause
(1) of Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act,
thus, is clearly relevant and admissible. In
Mukeshbhai Gopalbhai Barot (supra),
this Court had occasion to consider
Sections 161 and 162 of Cr.P.C. and
Section 32 of the Evidence Act. In the
above case, the victim, who received burn
injuries on 14.09.1993 was admitted to
Civil
Hospital.
Her
statement
was
recorded by Executive Magistrate and by
the Police. The statement recorded by
police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was
discarded by the High Court taking the
view that it had no evidentiary value. The
view of the High Court was not accepted
by this Court. In paragraph Nos. 4 and 5,
this Court held that the statement of
persons recorded under Section 161 can
be treated as dying declaration after
death. In paragraph Nos. 4 and 5,
following has been laid down:-

"4. We have considered the
arguments advanced by the learned counsel
for the parties. At the very outset, we must
deal with the observa- tions of the High
Court that the dying decla- rations Ex.44
and 48 could not be taken as ev- idence in
view of the provisions of Section 161 and
162 of the Cr.P.C. when read cumulatively. These findings are, however, erro-
neous. Sub-Section (1) of Section 32 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with
several situations including the relevance
of a state- ment made by a person who is
dead. The provi- sion reads as under:

Sec.32. Cases in which statements
of relevant fact by person who is dead or
cannot be found, etc., is relevant. -

Statements, written or verbal, of
relevant facts made by a person who is
dead, or who cannot be found, or who has
become incapable of giving evidence, or
whose attendance cannot be procured
without an amount of delay or expense
which, under the circumstances of the case,
appears to the Court unreasonable, are
themselves relevant facts in the following
cases:-

(1) When it relates to cause of
death. - When the statement is made by a
person as to the cause of his death, or as to
any of the circumstances of the transaction
which resulted in his death, in cases in
which the cause of that person's death
comes into question.

Such statements are relevant
whether the person who made them was or
was not, at the time when they were made,
under expectation of death, and whatever
may be the nature of the proceeding in
which the cause of his death comes into
question."

We see that the aforesaid dying
declara- tions are relevant in view of the
above provi- sion. Even otherwise, Section
161 and 162 of the Cr.P.C. admittedly
provide for a restric- tive use of the
statements recorded during the course of
the investigation but sub-Section (2) of
Section 162 deals with a situation where
the maker of the statement dies and reads
as under:

"(2) Nothing in this section shall
be deemed to apply to any statement falling
within the provi-sions of clause (1) of
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(1 of 1872), or to affect the provisions of
section 27 of that Act."
4 All. Ferasat Vs. State of U.P..
377

 5. A bare perusal of the
aforesaid provision when read with Section
32 of the Indian Evi- dence Act would
reveal that a statement of a person
recorded under Section 161 would be
treated as a dying declaration after his
death. The observation of the High Court
that the dying declarations Ex.44 and 48
had no ev- identiary value, therefore, is
erroneous. In this view of the matter, the
first dying dec- laration made to the
Magistrate on 14th Sep- tember 1993
would, in fact, be the First In- formation
Report in this case."

19. PW-3 Bijjan, though, she is not an
eye-witness, has testified to the effect that
when she heard the sound of quarrel she
reached the house of Chutai but could only
see the accused making good his escape
with blood stained knife. This witness is
wholly reliable on this point which
corroborates the testimony of PW-2. The
medical evidence of PW-1 also supports
the prosecution case and corroborates the
testimony of PW-2 as the Doctor has found
eight incised wounds on various parts of
the body including vital part like chest and
abdomen as already referred to supra. Other
witnesses are formal witnesses. PW-4 is the
Investigating Officer, who has conducted
investigation of the case and proved
various prosecution papers. PW-5 is formal
witness. Other witnesses are formal in
nature who have already been referred to in
the judgement.

20. In view of the discussions made
above, since the PW-2 is eye-witness of the
occurrence who is wholly reliable and Ext.
ka5, the statement under Section 161
Cr.P.C. of the deceased acquires the status
of dying declaration after his death, we are
of the view that no infirmity or irregularity
has been committed by the learned trial
court while appreciating the evidence on
record and recording the finding of
conviction and passing the sentence

21. So far as the motive is concerned,
it is well settled that in the case of direct
evidence, motive is of little significance or
no significance. However, PW-2 has
proved the motive of the commission of
crime by the appellant/accused as the
strained relationship between the deceased
and accused on account of demand of
money by the deceased from the accused
for
household
expenses.
The
first
information report is prompt and there is no
delay in lodging the F.I.R. which lends
additional credence to the prosecution case.

22. In view of above, this appeal lacks
merit and deserves to be dismissed. The
appeal is dismissed. The judgement and
order dated 11.01.1984 passed by learned
Additional Session Judge-8th, Bareilly in
S.T. No.- 402 of 1983 (State Vs. Firasat) is
affirmed.

23. Since, the accused appellant is
absconding, his bail bonds are cancelled
and the sureties are discharged. He shall be
taken into custody forthwith. The Chief
Judicial
Magistrate
and
Senior
Superintendent of Police/Superintendent of
Police concerned shall ensure the arrest of
the accused-appellant, Firasat.

24. Let a copy of this order be
communicated
by
the
Registrar
(Compliance)
to
the
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate
concerned
for
compliance
forthwith.

25. The Chief Judicial Magistrate
concerned is also directed to send his
compliance report within one month to
Court from the date of receipt of this order.
378 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 378
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Writ - A No. 1059 of 2025

Dr. Gyanvati Dixit ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sudeep Kumar, Avdhesh Kumar Pandey,
Shreshth Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Ashuthosh Singh

A.
Service
Law
-
UP
Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 - Section 16-G - Ch.
III - Reg. 39 of Regulation - Suspension -
No charge sheet was issued - Effect -
Approval to the suspension was granted
by DIOS - Validity challenged - Held,
there may not be any charge sheet at the
time of issuance of suspension order
dated 09.11.2024 but at the time of
approving the suspension order, there
must be a charge sheet containing specific
charges
showing
seriousness
thereof
before the DIOS and if there was no
charge sheet before the DIOS at the time
of granting approval of the suspension
order, the impugned approval order dated
20.12.2024 would vitiate - DIOS had no
material before him to form a view so as
to approve the suspension order as per
procedure prescribed under the Act, 1921.
(Para 35 and 41)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Satya Pal Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2006
SCC OnLine All 602
2. Hari Singh Rajput Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2015
SCC OnLine All 8499

3. Deshraj Singh Vs St. of U.P.; 2019 SCC
OnLine All 4473

4. Ram Vijay Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2023
SCC OnLine All 1310

5. Writ-A No.909 of 2020; C/M of Janta Inter
College & anr.Vs St. of U.P. and 3 Others
decided on 06.05.2020

6. C/M Maharajganj Inter College & anr.Vs
District Inspector of Schools, Maharajganj and
another; 1999 SCC OnLine All 693

7. Ram Kripal Katiyar Vs District Inspector of
Schools & ors.; MANU/UP/0556/2009

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sudeep Kumar, assisted by Sri
Shreshth Srivastava and Sri Ashutosh
Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner,
Sri Sanjeev Kumar Singh, learned Standing
Counsel for the State-opposite parties no.1
to 4 and Sri Ashutosh Singh, learned
counsel for opposite party no.5.

2. By means of this petition, the
petitioner has prayed following main
reliefs:-

"I. Issue a writ order or direction
in nature of certiorari quashing the order
dated
20/12/2024
bearing
reference
no.6240-46/2024-25
2025,
passed
by
respondent no. 4. A copy of which is
contained in ANNEXURE NO. 1 to this writ
petition.

II. Issue a writ, order or direction
in nature of Mandamus commanding the
respondents to allow the petitioner to
continue on the Principal of Shri Dayanand
Rameshwar Prasad Hansrani Arya Kanya