# Gandhi Ashram Khadi Bhandar, Jaitpur District Mahoba Camp Office & Anr. Revisionists v. Vijay Kumar Sharma & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 1 ILRA 116
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-12-09
- **Case number:** SCC Revision No. 181 of 2022
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/gandhi-ashram-khadi-bhandar-jaitpur-district-mahoba-camp-office-anr-49108
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act, 1887-Sections 15(2), 15(3) -
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 21,
Order
XV,
Rule
5-Eviction-Objection
against pecuniary jurisdiction-Suit was
instituted by plaintiff-respondents before
the Judge, Small Cause Court, whose
pecuniary jurisdiction is upto Rs. 25000/-
However suit was valued at Rs. 57060Defendants'
application
whereby
objecting
to
the
Court's
pecuniary
jurisdiction,
was
rejected-Post
amendment to Act of 1887 brought about
by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act,
2015, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Small
Cause Court to try a small cause suit,
including a eviction suit has been raised
from Rs. 25000 to Rs. 1,00,000-Ipso facto,
tenant has allowed the trial to proceed
through all stages and taken the objection
about lack of pecuniary jurisdiction at a
stage when, post remand, trial has been
concluded and judgment already on the
anvil of delivery. (Paras 1 to 18)

The revision is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

116 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
passed expeditiously after hearing all the
parties concerned in accordance with law.

42. The petition stands disposed of.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 116
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.12.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

SCC Revision No. 181 of 2022

Shri
Gandhi
Ashram
Khadi
Bhandar,
Jaitpur District Mahoba Camp Office &
Anr. ...Revisionists
Versus
Vijay Kumar Sharma & Anr.
 ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionists:
Sri Shailendra

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Gulrez Khan

A. Civil Law - Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act, 1887-Sections 15(2), 15(3) -
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 21,
Order
XV,
Rule
5-Eviction-Objection
against pecuniary jurisdiction-Suit was
instituted by plaintiff-respondents before
the Judge, Small Cause Court, whose
pecuniary jurisdiction is upto Rs. 25000/-
However suit was valued at Rs. 57060Defendants'
application
whereby
objecting
to
the
Court's
pecuniary
jurisdiction,
was
rejected-Post
amendment to Act of 1887 brought about
by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act,
2015, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Small
Cause Court to try a small cause suit,
including a eviction suit has been raised
from Rs. 25000 to Rs. 1,00,000-Ipso facto,
tenant has allowed the trial to proceed
through all stages and taken the objection
about lack of pecuniary jurisdiction at a
stage when, post remand, trial has been
concluded and judgment already on the
anvil of delivery. (Paras 1 to 18)

The revision is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Om Prakash Agarwal Since deceased thru
legal Lrs & ors. Vs Vishan Dayal Rajpoot & anr.
(2019) 14 SCC 526

2. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd & ors. Vs Motorola
India Pvt. L.t.d (2009) 2 SCC 337,

3. ICOMM Tele Ltd. Vs Punjab State Water
Supply Sewerage Board & ors. (2019) 4 SCC
401

4. Parkins Eastman Architects DPC & anr. Vs
HSCC (India) Ltd. AIR 2020 SC 59

5. TRF Ltd Vs Energo Engineering Projects Ltd.
(2017) 8 SCC 377

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

This revision under Section 25 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887
(for short, 'the Act of 1887'), is directed
against an order of the Additional District
Judge/ Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Banda
dated 17.11.2022 made in S.C.C. Suit No. 2
of
2008,
rejecting
the
defendants'
application,
objecting
to
the
Court's
pecuniary jurisdiction.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the
facts giving rise to this revision are that
S.C.C. Suit No. 2 of 2008 was instituted by
the plaintiff-respondents before the District
Judge, Banda, sitting as the Judge, Small
Cause Court. This was done, because at the
time of institution of the suit, the pecuniary
jurisdiction to try a small cause suit with
the Judge, Small Cause Court, that is to say,
the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) in the State of
Uttar Pradesh, was up to the valuation of
1 All. Shri Gandhi Ashram Khadi Bhandar, Jaitpur District Mahoba Camp Office & Anr.
 Vs.Vijay Kumar Sharma & Anr.
117
Rs. 25,000/-. The suit here was valued at Rs.
57,060/-

3.

The
suit
was,
therefore,
instituted before the District Judge and
tried by the Additional District Judge/
Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Banda, who
decreed it vide his judgment and decree
dated 25.07.2016. A revision against the
said decree was carried to this Court by
the
tenant-revisionist,
being
S.C.C.
Revision No. 50 of 2019. This Court
vide
judgment
and
order
dated
13.09.2022 set aside the decree and
remanded the suit for trial afresh, except
Issue No. 4, the finding whereon was
upheld. That issue related to the defence
of the tenant being struck off under
Order XV Rule 5 CPC.

4.

Post
remand,
the
tenantrevisionist raised an objection through
an application dated 17.11.2022 before
the Trial Judge that on account of change
in pecuniary jurisdiction of the Judge,
Small Cause Court vide U.P. Civil Laws
(Amendment)
Act,
2015
w.e.f.
07.12.2015, it was the Judge, Small
Cause Court, who was competent to try
the suit and not the Additional District
Judge, exercising those powers in case
of
a
suit
beyond
the
pecuniary
jurisdiction of the Judge, Small Cause
Court. This application has been rejected
by the learned Additional District Judge,
trying the suit vide the order impugned
dated 17.11.2022.

5. Aggrieved, this revision has been
preferred by the tenant-revisionist.

6. Heard Mr. Shailendra, learned
Counsel for the revisionists and Mr.
Gulrez Khan, learned Counsel for the
plaintiff-respondent No. 1.

7. It is submitted by the learned
Counsel for the revisionists that once the
pecuniary jurisdiction was altered by
virtue
of
the
U.P.
Civil
Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2015, the suit that was
up for trial before the Additional District
Judge in consequence of the order of
remand, obliged the learned Judge to
direct
a
return
of
the
plaint
for
presentation to the Court of competent
jurisdiction. By rejecting the application
questioning his pecuniary jurisdiction, the
Trial Judge has assumed jurisdiction not
vested in him. The order impugned is,
therefore, patently illegal. It is pointed
out that when the suit was instituted,
going by the valuation thereof, which is
Rs. 57,060/-, it was certainly beyond the
jurisdiction of the Judge, Small Cause
Court. But, after remand, in view of the
supervening amendments vide U.P. Civil
Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, that has
come into effect from 07.12.2015, the
suit is not cognizable by the Additional
District Judge, but by the Judge, Small
Cause Court. The trial before
the
Additional District Judge, therefore, is
without jurisdiction.

8. The learned Counsel for the
revisionists has placed reliance on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Om
Prakash Agarwal since deceased through
legal
representatives
and others
v.
Vishan Dayal Rajpoot and another,
(2019) 14 SCC 526. Learned Counsel for
the revisionists has drawn attention of the
Court to the holding in Om Prakash
Agarwal (supra), which reads:

"54. As noted above, the proviso
to sub-section (2) provides that figure Rs
5000 shall be construed to Rs 25,000. By the
U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015,
the figure of Rs 25,000 stood substituted by
118 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Rs 1 lakh. Reading sub-section (2) read with
proviso and U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment
Act), 2015 clearly means that small cause
suits with valuation not exceeding Rs 1 lakh
shall be cognizable by the Court of Small
Causes. When a small cause suit not
exceeding value of Rs 1 lakh is cognizable
by the Court of Small Causes, obviously, no
other court can take cognizance. The
Additional District Judge to whom small
causes suit in question was transferred since
its valuation was more than of Rs 25,000
was not competent to take cognizance of the
suit after the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment)
Act, 2015 w.e.f. 7-12-2015, when the suit in
question became cognizable by the Small
Cause Court i.e. the Court of Civil Judge,
Senior Division. To the above extent, the
judgment of the learned Single Judge in
Shobhit Nigam case [Shobhit Nigam v.
Batulan, 2016 SCC OnLine All 2605 :
(2016) 119 ALR 826] has to be approved
and the judgment of the Single Judge in
Pankaj Hotel [Pankaj Hotel v. Bal Mukund,
2017 SCC OnLine All 2855 : (2018) 1 All
LJ 17] laying down that even after 7-122015, the Additional District Judge had
jurisdiction to decide the suit in question
cannot be approved."

9. The learned Counsel for the
plaintiff-respondent
has
opposed
the
motion to admit this revision to hearing.
He urges that the principle in Om
Prakash
Agarwal,
otherwise
well
settled, is that objection, as to pecuniary
jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest
point of time and not after the trial has
gone through. He submits that in this
case, the trial has been concluded and
judgment is to be delivered. Therefore,
the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction cannot
be raised by the tenant at this stage,
which in any case he has raised mala fide
to delay judgment in the eviction suit.

10.

This
Court
has
carefully
considered the submissions advanced by
the learned Counsel for parties and perused
the record in support of the motion.

11. In the first instance, the
jurisdiction to try suits for eviction by the
lessor against the lessee of a building after
determination of the lease was conferred
upon the Judge, Small Cause Court vide
The
Uttar
Pradesh
Civil
Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 37
of 1972) enacted by the State Legislature
with Presidential assent. This was so,
because under the Central Statute, the
Small
Cause
Court
does
not
enjoy
jurisdiction by virtue of Clause (4) of the
Second Schedule to the Act of 1887 to
entertain
a
suit
for
possession
of
immovable property or for the recovery of
an interest in such property.

12. Suits for eviction after the
determination of lease do not involve
generally questions of title and, therefore,
the State Amendment was brought to
entrust these suits to a Court following a
summary procedure. But, while conferring
jurisdiction upon the Judge, Small Cause
Court, the pecuniary jurisdiction introduced
vide U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972 was limited to
a value of Rs. 5000/-. By U.P. Act No. 17
of 1991, enforced w.e.f. 15.01.1991, the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the Judge, Small
Cause Court was enhanced from Rs. 5000/-
to Rs. 25,000/-, amending Section 15 (2)
and (3) of the Central Act.

13. The Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1972 also amended
Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam
Civil Courts Act, 1887 as applicable in the
State of U.P., where by virtue of subSection (2) of Section 25, the State
Government
was
empowered
by
1 All. Shri Gandhi Ashram Khadi Bhandar, Jaitpur District Mahoba Camp Office & Anr.
 Vs.Vijay Kumar Sharma & Anr.
119
notification in the Official Gazette to confer
upon any District Judge or Additional
District Judge the jurisdiction of a Judge of
the Court of Small Causes under the Act of
1887 for the trial of suits, irrespective of
their value. Under sub-Section (3) of
Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam
Civil Courts Act, 1887, as amended by U.P.
Act No. 37 of 1972, the State Government
was empowered to delegate to the High
Court by notification in the Official Gazette
its powers under sub-Section (2) of Section
25. In substance, therefore, by notifications
issued by the High Court, the power to try
small cause suits beyond a limited
pecuniary jurisdiction and of unlimited
value was conferred upon the District
Judges, including the Additional District
Judges in the State.

14. There is no doubt that post
amendment to the Act of 1887 brought
about by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment)
Act, 2015, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the
Judge, Small Cause Court to try a small
cause suit, including a suit for eviction, has
been raised from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs.
1,00,000/-. This has been effected by the
amendment made to the proviso to subSection (2) of Section 15 of the Act of
1887. The suit at the time it was instituted
way back in the year 2008 with a valuation
of Rs.57,060/- was beyond the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the Judge, Small Causes
Court and, therefore, instituted before the
District Judge, exercising powers of the
Judge, Small Causes Court in a suit beyond
the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small
Causes Court. There was no occasion also
to raise any objection at that time relating
to the pecuniary jurisdiction. However,
judgment in the suit was delivered by the
Additional District Judge on 25.07.2016
and raise in the pecuniary jurisdiction of
the Judge, Small Causes Court, was
brought about by the U.P. Civil Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 07.12.2015.
It is certainly not the revisionists' case that
judgment was reserved prior to 07.12.2015
and that it was delivered on 25.07.2016
with no opportunity to him to raise an
objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction,
based on the supervening amendment.

15. The tenant-revisionists challenged
the decree passed by the Additional District
Judge before this Court vide S.C.C.
Revision No. 50 of 2019. A perusal of the
judgment in the said revision, which was
allowed, setting aside the decree passed by
the Additional District Judge, does not
show that it was urged ever before this
Court in revision that the Additional
District Judge was no longer competent to
try the suit, as it had been removed from
his pecuniary jurisdiction, by virtue of the
amendment that came in before the Trial
Judge's judgment. Post remand also, it does
not appear from a reading of the order
impugned that the tenant has raised or at
least pressed his objections about the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned
Additional District Judge at the earliest
point of time. The order impugned reveals
that after the remand, the whole trial has
gone through and judgment alone remains
to be delivered. It is at this stage that the
revisionists seem to have pressed their
application dated 17.11.2022, which has
come to be rejected by the Trial Judge.
Objection
as
to
lack
of
territorial
jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction ought
to be taken at the earliest point of time, else
it would be deemed to have been waived.
This is the clear purport of the provisions
of Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which read:

"21. Objections to jurisdiction.-
-(1) No objection as to the place of suing
120 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
shall be allowed by any Appellate or
Revisional Court unless such objection was
taken in the Court of first instance at the
earliest possible opportunity and in all
cases where issues are settled at or before
such settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.

(2) No objection as to the
competence of a Court with reference to the
pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be
allowed by any Appellate or Revisional
Court unless such objection was taken in
the Court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity, and, in all cases
where issues are settled, at or before such
settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.

(3) No objection as to the
competence of the executing Court with
reference to the local limits of its
jurisdiction shall be allowed by any
Appellate or Revisional Court unless such
objection was taken in the executing Court
at the earliest possible opportunity, and
unless there has been a consequent failure
of justice."

 (emphasis by Court)

16. This question was one that
directly fell for consideration of their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in Om
Prakash Agarwal, where it was observed:

"57.
The
policy
underlying
Section 21 of Code of Civil Procedure is
that when the case has been tried by a court
on merits and the judgment rendered, it
should not be liable to be reversed purely
on technical grounds, unless it has resulted
in failure of justice. The provisions akin to
Section 21 are also contained in Section 11
of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 and Section
99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
Court had the occasion to consider the
principle behind Section 21, Code of Civil
Procedure and Section 11 of the Suit
Valuation Act, 1887 in Kiran Singh v.
Chaman Paswan [Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340] . In para 7 of
the judgment following was laid down:
(AIR p. 342)

"7. ... The policy underlying
Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure
Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation
Act is the same, namely, that when a case
had been tried by a court on the merits and
judgment rendered, it should not be liable
to be reversed purely on technical grounds,
unless it had resulted in failure of justice,
and the policy of the legislature has been to
treat
objections
to
jurisdiction
both
territorial and pecuniary as technical and
not open to consideration by an appellate
court, unless there has been a prejudice on
the merits. The contention of the appellants,
therefore, that the decree and judgment of
the District Court, Monghyr, should be
treated as a nullity cannot be sustained
under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation
Act."

61. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi
v. DLF Universal Ltd. [Harshad Chiman
Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7
SCC 791] , this Court had again considered
Section 21 and other provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure. In para 30, following
has been laid down: (SCC pp. 803-04)

"30. ... The jurisdiction of a court
may be classified into several categories.
The important categories are (i) territorial
or
local
jurisdiction;
(ii)
pecuniary
jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. So far as territorial and
pecuniary
jurisdictions
are
concerned,
objection to such jurisdiction has to be
taken at the earliest possible opportunity
and in any case at or before settlement of
issues. The law is well settled on the point
that if such objection is not taken at the
earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at
1 All. Shri Gandhi Ashram Khadi Bhandar, Jaitpur District Mahoba Camp Office & Anr.
 Vs.Vijay Kumar Sharma & Anr.
121
a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to
subject-matter, however, is totally distinct
and stands on a different footing. Where a
court has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the suit by reason of any
limitation imposed by statute, charter or
commission, it cannot take up the cause or
matter. An order passed by a court having
no jurisdiction is a nullity."

63. Now, reverting back to the
facts of this case it is apparent from the
judgment
dated
22-10-2016
of
the
Additional District Judge, that no objection
to the competence of the Additional District
Judge to decide the case was taken by any
of the parties. No objection having been
taken to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the
Additional District Judge, Section 21 of the
Civil Procedure Code comes into play. Subsection (2) of Section 21 provides that no
objection as to the competence of the court
with reference to the pecuniary limits of the
jurisdiction shall be allowed by any
appellate or Revisional Court unless
conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled.
No objection has been raised by the
respondent tenant regarding competence of
the court. Sub-section (2) precludes the
revisionist to raise any objection regarding
competence of the court and further
Revisional Court ought not to have allowed
such objection regarding competence of
Court of Additional District Judge to decide
the suit. The respondent tenant did not raise
any objection regarding competence of the
court and took a chance to obtain
judgments in his favour on merits, he
cannot be allowed to turnaround and
contend that the Court of Additional
District Judge had no jurisdiction to try the
small cause suit and the judgment is
without jurisdiction and nullity. Section 21
has been enacted to thwart any such
objection by unsuccessful party who did
not
raise
any
objection
regarding
competence of court and allowed the matter
to be heard on merits. Further, in deciding
the small cause suit by the Additional
District Judge, the tenant has not proved
that there has been a consequent failure of
justice.

64. The High Court in the
impugned judgment has not adverted to
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the judgment of Shobhit Nigam [Shobhit
Nigam v. Batulan, 2016 SCC OnLine All
2605 : (2016) 119 ALR 826] also, effect of
Section 21 was neither considered nor
raised. Section 21 contains a legislative
policy which policy has an object and
purpose. The object is also to avoid retrial
of cases on merit on basis of technical
objections.

65. There is another judgment of
the Single Judge of the High Court referred
to by the learned counsel for the respondent
i.e. SCC Revision No. 305 of 2016,
Tejumal v. Mohd. Sarfraz [Tejumal v.
Mohd. Sarfraz, 2016 SCC OnLine All 2606
: (2017) 121 ALR 392] . In the above case,
the learned Single Judge had allowed the
revision under Section 25 against the
judgment dated 12-8-2016 passed by the
Additional District and Sessions Judge on
the ground that the judgment of the
Additional District Judge was without
jurisdiction. In paras 7 to 9 of the
judgment, the High Court had noticed the
judgment of this Court in R.S.D.V. Finance
Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works
Ltd. [R.S.D.V. Finance Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree
Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC
130] wherein it was held that in view of
Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, objection as to the place of
suing should be taken by the party
concerned in the court of first instance at
the earliest possible opportunity and the
objection to this effect shall not be allowed
by the appellate or Revisional Court but
122 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relying on the judgment of this Court in
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [Kiran
Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC
340] , the learned Single Judge held that
defect of jurisdiction whether pecuniary or
territorial or to the subject-matter cannot be
cured and can be set up at any stage of the
proceeding.

69. We thus hold that even when
the Court of Additional District Judge was
not competent to decide the small causes
suit in question on the ground that the
pecuniary jurisdiction is vested in the Court
of Small Causes i.e. Civil Judge, Senior
Division w.e.f. 7-12-2015, no interference
was called in the judgment of the
Additional District Judge in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court in
view of the provisions of Section 21 of the
Civil Procedure Code."

17. The aforesaid position of the law
makes it clear that ''pecuniary jurisdiction'
and ''territorial jurisdiction' are different
from ''jurisdiction relating to subject matter'
or inherent lack of jurisdiction. The first
two have to be raised at the earliest
opportunity; else, these must be deemed to
be waived. As remarked by the Supreme
Court in Om Prakash Agarwal, the
legislative policy is not to defeat a
concluded trial on merits on the basis of a
technical objection, like pecuniary or
territorial jurisdiction. This precisely is the
case here, where the tenant has allowed the
trial to proceed through all stages and taken
the objection about lack of pecuniary
jurisdiction at a stage when, post remand,
the trial has been concluded and the
judgment already on the anvil of delivery.

18. In the considered opinion of this
Court, there is no merit in this revision. It
fails and is dismissed.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 122
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Civil Misc. Transfer Application No. 68 of 2022
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 278 of 2016
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 394 of 2022
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 466 of 2022
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 505 of 2022
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 778 of 2022
And
Transfer Application (Civil) No. 809 of 2022

Smt. Juglesh Kumari & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Ifco Tokiyo General Insurance Co. Ltd.,
Agra ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Prashant Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:

A. Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - Sections 24(1)(b) & 24-Transfer
application-maintainability
of-Certain
questions referred for consideration by
Larger
Bench-(1)
Whether
Tribunal
constituted under Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is a court subordinate to High Court
for purpose of exercise of power of
transfer u/s 24(1)(b) of Code-(2) Whether
by extension of principle laid down by Full
Bench in Kamal Yadav case a Tribunal
constituted under Motor Vehicles Act,1988
is a court subordinate to High Court for
purpose of Section 24(1)(b) of the Code-
(3) Whether decision of single Judge in
Shankar Lal Jaiswal's case correctly lays
down law in holding that a Tribunal
constituted under Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is not court subordinate to High
Court within meaning of section 24 of
Code-Till decision of Larger Bench there
shall
be
interim
stay
of
further
proceedings in pending petitions before
Claim Tribunals.(Para 1 to 8) (E-6)