# Ganga Prasad v. D.D.C. Agra & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 170
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-29
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 14851 of 1984
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ganga-prasad-v-d-d-c-agra-ors-45558
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

U.P C&H Act-challenging
order-allowing
revision-disturbing
petitioner's
chak-excluding
0.79 acres-used as sahan-for ingress & egresswithout
considering-evidences
on
record-no
reasons recorded-for differing with the Courts
below-failed to reappraise-reasons given by C.O &
S.O.C-cannot pass judgements as court of original
jurisdiction-Petition-succeeds-allowed in part.

Held, the D.D.C, while deciding a revision
cannot write his judgment like that of a court
exercising original jurisdiction. He has to write
his judgments in the fashion of a court of
revision. The powers of the DDC, in view of the
third proviso to sec 48 of the Act, have been
immensely enlarged retrospectively w.e.f 1980,
that would apply in this case. Post amendment,
the DDC, exercises a most non conservative
kind of revisional jurisdiction where he is a
court entitled to decide all questions of fact and
law, like a court of regular appeal. But that
notwithstanding, the obligation of a revisional
court to exercise jurisdictionin the manner a
court f revision is supposed to do, cannot be
said to be done away with. As a revisional
court, the DDC is obliged to reappraise the
reasoning of the C.O and SOC, and then
reverse, affirm or modify the orders impugned
before him. He cannot write his judgment in
the fashion of a third court of original
jurisdiction, after the CO and SOC have dealt
with the matter as authorities of original and
Appellate
Jurisdiction.
This
court
finds
impugned order to be flawed. Writ succeeds
and is allowed in part.

Writ Petition partly allowed. (E-8)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appreciation
of
evidence
and
law.
Therefore the present writ petition is
misconceived and lacks merit.

23. The writ-petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.

24. No order as to costs.
----------
(2020)02ILR A170

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.1.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ B No. 14851 of 1984

Ganga Prasad ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. Agra & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.D. Pathak, Sri Anil Kumar Aditya, Sri
Hemant Sharma

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri N.B. Nigam

A.
U.P C&H Act-challenging
order-allowing
revision-disturbing
petitioner's
chak-excluding
0.79 acres-used as sahan-for ingress & egresswithout
considering-evidences
on
record-no
reasons recorded-for differing with the Courts
below-failed to reappraise-reasons given by C.O &
S.O.C-cannot pass judgements as court of original
jurisdiction-Petition-succeeds-allowed in part.

Held, the D.D.C, while deciding a revision
cannot write his judgment like that of a court
exercising original jurisdiction. He has to write
his judgments in the fashion of a court of
revision. The powers of the DDC, in view of the
third proviso to sec 48 of the Act, have been
immensely enlarged retrospectively w.e.f 1980,
that would apply in this case. Post amendment,
the DDC, exercises a most non conservative
kind of revisional jurisdiction where he is a
court entitled to decide all questions of fact and
law, like a court of regular appeal. But that
notwithstanding, the obligation of a revisional
court to exercise jurisdictionin the manner a
court f revision is supposed to do, cannot be
said to be done away with. As a revisional
court, the DDC is obliged to reappraise the
reasoning of the C.O and SOC, and then
reverse, affirm or modify the orders impugned
before him. He cannot write his judgment in
the fashion of a third court of original
jurisdiction, after the CO and SOC have dealt
with the matter as authorities of original and
Appellate
Jurisdiction.
This
court
finds
impugned order to be flawed. Writ succeeds
and is allowed in part.

Writ Petition partly allowed. (E-8)

List of cases cited: -

1. Gulab Chand & Ors vs DDC & ors 2019 (6) ADJ 857

2. Haridas & ors vs DDC & Anr 2005 SCC online
All 2263; 2005 (98) RD 593
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

Order on Civil Misc. Intervening
Application No.2 of 2019

1. This is an application on behalf of
one Suresh Chandra Rawat, who has
sought to intervene in these proceedings.
The applicant could be heard under
Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of the Rules of
Court without formal impleadment as a
party. However, when the case was called
on, no one appeared on behalf of the
applicant who is represented by Sri Anil
Kumar Aditya, Advocate.

2. This application is, accordingly, rejected.

Order on the Writ Petition

3. This writ petition has been filed
challenging an order of the Deputy
4 All. Ganga Prasad Vs. D.D.C. Agra & Ors.
171
Director
of
Consolidation
dated
04.08.1984, passed in Chak Revision
No.580/878 Ram Niwas Vs. Khached Mal
and
Others,
whereby
the
Revision
aforesaid
brought
by
the
secondrespondent has been allowed, disturbing
the petitioner's chak, that was maintained
to the petitioner's satisfaction until the
appellate determination by the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation. The petitioner's
case is that Khasra No.854, admeasuring a
total area of 0.93 acres, is part of his
original holding to the extent of the entire
area. In the said plot number, the petitioner
had his Abadi being 0.11 acres whereas the
remainder area of this plot, being 0.79
acres was utilized by the petitioner as his
courtyard (Sehan) and also for the
purposes of ingress and egress to his
house. It is asserted by the petitioner that
the rest of the area of Plot No.854, that is
to say, other than that which is Abadi is
unfit for cultivation. It is pointed out that
in the provisional consolidation scheme,
the petitioner's Abadi in 0.11 acres of Plot
No.854, was excluded from consolidation
operations as chak out land whereas the
remainder of the area was proposed by the
ACO to be included in the petitioner's
Chak.

4. This proposal was objected to by
the second-respondent before the C.O.,
and, further, in Appeal before the SOC
under Section 21 of the U.P. Consolidation
of Holdings Act, (for short 'the Act'). The
Consolidation
Officer
decided
the
objections
preferred
by
the
second
respondent, along with a number of others,
relating to the village by a common order
dated 05.03.1984. The petitioner's chak in
Khasra No.854 was not disturbed.

5. The second-respondent, aggrieved
by the order of the Consolidation Officer,
Sahpau, District Mathura, preferred an
appeal to the SOC, Mathura being Appeal
No.1143 under Section 21(2) of the Act.
The appeal aforesaid was allowed in part
resulting in some improvement of rights
for Ram Niwas. Though, he was given
land comprising Plot Nos.827, 828 and
853, the petitioner's Chak in Plot No.854
was not interfered with.

6. Aggrieved, the second-respondent
went up in Revision to the Deputy
Director of Consolidation, who heard and
determined it by the impugned order dated
04.08.1984. The Revision was allowed
drastically affecting the petitioner's Chak,
by excluding from it an area of 0.79 acres.
It makes for the entire area, according to
the petitioner, that abuts his Abadi and is
used by him as his courtyard (Sehan).

7. Though, no one has appeared on
behalf of the contesting respondent No.2,
the Court has looked into the counter
affidavit filed on his behalf. The material
allegations
raising
challenge
to
the
impugned order are carried in paragraph
No.3 of the writ petition. These have been
met in paragraph No.4 of the Counter
Affidavit.
It
is
contended
that
the
petitioner is not the sole tenure holder of
Plot No.854, admeasuring 0.93 acres. The
entire area is not his original holding. The
petitioner is a co-sharer in Plot No.854,
including the 0.11 acres of Abadi, that is a
joint Abadi of Ramji Lal, Bhola and others
with a 1/3rd share, Ganga Ram (1/3rd
share), Ram Prakash and Ram Niwas
(1/3rd share). It is not the exclusive
holding of the petitioner either for the part
that is Abadi, or the remainder of it that is
agricultural, according to respondent No.2.
The contesting respondent has also averred
that doors of the petitioner's house do not
open into Plot No.854 and the remainder
172 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of the area of the said plot is agricultural in
nature, that has also been cultivated. It is
pleaded that the door of the petitioner's
house opens in the north. It is also asserted
that the second-respondent's house is
situate adjacent to the petitioner's where
doors of all houses of the co-sharers open
towards the north and not towards the
south, that is to say, the site of the land in
dispute. It has been denied that the land
has been utilized as the petitioner's
courtyard (Sehan). It has also been
asserted that the case urged before this
Court, that the land in dispute is the
petitioner's courtyard (Sehan), was never
urged before the Deputy Director of
Consolidation.

8. Heard Sri Hemant Sharma, learned
counsel for the petitioner. No one appears
for the second-respondent or respondent
Nos.3, 4 and 5. Sri Kailash Prakash
Pathak, learned State Law Officer, has
been heard on behalf of respondent No.1.

9. This Court has considered the
submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioner and Sri Kailash Prakash
Pathak,
learned
State
Law
Officer
appearing on behalf of the State, who has
defending the impugned order.

10. It may be true that the petitioner
is not the sole tenure holder of Plot
No.854, but the said fact does not figure in
the order impugned, or the orders of the
Authorities below. Assuming that the
petitioner and respondent No.2, alongside
the other respondents are co-sharers, the
Deputy Director of Consolidation was
required to consider petitioner's case that
the area of Plot No.854, that has been
entered in the second-respondent's Chak,
is his courtyard (Sehan) and that it
provides ingress and egress to his house.
The second-respondent's case that the
doors open to the other side, is also a case
which
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation was required to consider.
The order of the Deputy Director of
Consolidation,
however,
shows
that
nothing of this kind has gone into
consideration, while recording the order
impugned. The order of the Deputy
Director of Consolidation proceeds largely
on a consideration of the fact that the
second-respondent is a small tenure
holder, and by the orders of the Authorities
below, he has been given four Chaks.

11. No doubt, in accordance with the
proviso to Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of
Section 19 of the Act, a tenure holder is
not to be allotted more than three Chaks,
except with the approval in writing of the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation.
However, when the Deputy Director of
Consolidation is seized of the matter, he
may have good reason to depart from this
restriction. That, however, is not the point
on which the validity of the impugned
order turns. The impugned order, in the
opinion of this Court, is manifestly illegal
as it does not consider the petitioner's case
at all that the balance area of Plot No.854
(substantially) has been given away to the
second-respondent, where the petitioner's
courtyard (sehan) is located, as well as his
way, that provides him ingress and egress
to his house. There is, in fact, absolutely
no
consideration
bestowed
to
the
petitioner's case by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation. The conclusions drawn are
based on a one side consideration of the
second-respondent's case.

12. In addition, the impugned order
passed
by
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, also appears to be flawed
for another reason.
4 All. Ganga Prasad Vs. D.D.C. Agra & Ors.
173

13. This Court in Gulab Chand and
Others Vs. DDC and Others has held
thus:

"22.
This
Court
is
rather
disconcerted to find that a reading of the
judgment of the Consolidation Officer, the
Assistant
Settlement
Officer,
and
particularly, the impugned order passed by
the Deputy Director of Consolidation in
Revision,
read
like
three
original
judgments, all written in exercise of a
concurrent jurisdiction. The judgment of a
Revisional Court cannot proceed to
address the issues laid before it by parties,
deal with them and decide, for that is to be
done by the Court or Authority of first
instance. The judgment of a Revisional
Court has to open, go through and end like
a judgment of reappraisal of what the two
Courts or Authorities below have done.
The approach of reappraisal has to be
supervisory, and not open appellate. May
be, in the case of a revision under Section
48 of the Act, the standard of reappraisal is
wider than that traditionally associated
with exercise of Revisional jurisdiction.
But, all the same, a Revisional Court
cannot decide and write its judgment as if
it were a Court of first instance, without
referring to and affirming or reversing the
findings of the two Authorities below, in
the context of the present Act. In the
present case, the impugned judgment has
precisely done that. It reads like an
original judgment written in the third
instance. It does not give any reason to
disagree with what the Appellate Court has
said, though it may have given its own
reasons. In the context of dealing with
criminal appeals and revisions, concerned
about the trappings of an Appellate or
Revisional Court's judgment or order, and
how it should read and proceed, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court In Re: To
issue
certain
guidelines
regarding
inadequacies
and
deficiencies
in
criminal trials (Suo Motu Writ (Crl.)
No.1
of
2017
vide
order
dated
30.03.2017,
issued
the
following
guidelines regarding the manner in which
Appellate
and
Revisional
Courts
in
criminal matters ought to write judgments,
and what are the essentials to be adhered
to
while
writing
an
Appellate
or
Revisional judgment. The said guidelines
hold equally good in case of exercise of
any Appellate or Revisional Authority by a
Court or other Authority in any other
jurisdiction. Guideline no.7 in Suo Motu
Writ (Crl.) No.1 of 2017 (supra) reads
thus:

"7. Repetition of pleadings,
evidence, and arguments in the judgments
and orders of the Trial Court, Appellate
and
Revisional
Courts
be
avoided.
Repetition
of
facts,
evidence,
and
contentions before lower Courts make the
judgments cumbersome, and takes away
the
precious
time
of
the
Court
unnecessarily. The Appellate/ Revisional
Court judgment/order is the continuation
of the lower court judgment and must
ideally start with " in this appeal/revision,
the impugned judgment is assailed on the
following grounds" or "the points that
arise
for
consideration
in
this
appeal/revision are". This does not of
course, take away the option/jurisdiction
of the Appellate/Revisional Courts to renarrate facts and contentions if they be
inadequately or insufficiently narrated in
the judgment. Mechanical re narration to
be avoided at any rate."

23. Particularly, relating to the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of
Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act,
the aforesaid issue though in the context of
a title matter was considered by this Court
in Haridas and others vs. Deputy
174 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Director of Consolidation and another,
2005 SCC OnLine All 2263: 2005(98)
RD
593,
where
dealing
with
the
obligations of a Revisional court while
writing its opinion, it was held thus:

"8. It is well settled that, while
setting aside the judgment of inferior
Court or Tribunal a Revisional Court or
higher Tribunal has to deal with the
findings given by the inferior Court or
Tribunal and is required to consider the
entire evidence on record. Thus while
recording the contrary findings the Deputy
Director of Consolidation was under
obligation to consider entire evidence on
record and also to record reasons of
differing
with
the
findings
of
Consolidation Officer and Settlement
Officer Consolidation. ....."
(emphasis supplied)

14.

The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, while deciding a Revision
cannot write his judgment like that of a
Court exercising original jurisdiction. He
has to write his judgments in the fashion of
a Court of Revision. The powers of the
Deputy Director of Consolidation, in view
of the third proviso to Section 48 of the
Act, have been immensely enlarged
retrospectively w.e.f. 1980, that would
apply in this case. Post amendment, the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation,
exercises a most non conservative kind of
revisional jurisdiction where he is a Court
entitled to decided all question of fact and
law, like a Court of regular appeal. But
that notwithstanding, the obligation of a
Revisional Court to exercise jurisdiction in
the manner a Court of Revision is
supposed to do, cannot be said to be done
away with. As a Revisional Court, the
Deputy Director of Consolidation is
obliged to reappraise the reasoning of the
Consolidation Officer and the SOC, and
then reverse, affirm or modify the orders
impugned before him. He cannot write his
judgment in the fashion of a third Court of
original
jurisdiction,
after
the
Consolidation Officer and the SOC have
dealt with the matter as Authorities of
original and Appellate jurisdiction.

15. This Court finds the impugned
order to be flawed on both counts.

16. Accordingly, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed in part. The
impugned order dated 04.08.1984 passed
by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in
Revision No.580/878 Ram Niwas Vs.
Khached Mal and Others is hereby
quashed with a remit of the matter to the
Deputy Director of Consolidation to
decide the Revision afresh, bearing in
mind what has been said in the body of
this judgment, and after hearing all parties.
The Deputy Director of Consolidation
shall decide the Revision afresh within a
period of six months from the date of
receipt of a certified copy of this order.

17. There shall be no order as to
costs.
----------
(2020)02ILR A174

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.10.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ C No. 21 of 2019

Adesh Singh Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
Collector/D.M. Bareilly & Ors.
 ...Respondents