# Gangadhar Tiwari v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1479
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-20
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 61435 of 2010
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Kunal Ravi Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/gangadhar-tiwari-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54667
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

4 All. Gangadhar Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1479
production of evidence, we have relegated the petitioner to approach the competent forum
under law. Thus, we are of the view amongst the amounts claimed by the petitioner, the disputed
claims cannot be adjudicated in the present proceedings, further, the petitioner has also failed to
seek adjustment of the amount of sand/ morum already excavated

97. Thus, in view of the above the present writ petition is partly allowed in terms of the
observations made above.

98. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1479
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE KUNAL RAVI SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 61435 of 2010
Alongwith
Writ C No. 51093 of 2010

Gangadhar Tiwari ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether compensation for electrocution injury can be awarded under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991,
and whether the District Magistrate/Additional Collector had jurisdiction to grant such relief?

Whether the compensation awarded was adequate, or required enhancement in light of permanent disability
and prolonged deprivation due to interim stay?
HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Articles 21, 226 - Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 -
Sections 6, 6(1), 22 - Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 - Section 6: - Writ Petitions - under Article
226 - one petition filed against U.P. Power Corporation, filed for enhancement of compensation under the
Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 - another petition filed by Power Corporation assailing the Award -
petitioner sustained 40% permanent disability due to electrocution from a broken high-voltage wire, despite
prior intimation to the Electricity Department - Claim Petition - allowed, awarding to the tune of rupees 4 Lac
only - but stayed in connected writ - applicability of Act, 1991 and jurisdiction of District Magistrate -
petitioner pleaded entitlement to enhanced compensation for medical expenses, loss of earning, and mental
agony - respondents objected that Act, 1991 is inapplicable and order without jurisdiction - Court finds
electricity is a hazardous substance - Act, 1991 applies - District Magistrate competent, and prolonged
deprivation warrants enhancement - compensation under Article 21 is a constitutional remedy, strict liability
applies - held, petitioner entitled to Rs. 9,00,000 (Rs. 4,00,000 medical expenses + Rs. 5,00,000 enhanced
compensation) - hence, Writ-C No.61435 of 2010 allowed, Writ-C No.51093 of 2010 dismissed - with direction
to the Power Corporation to pay within 4 weeks, failing which 9% interest payable from date of impugned
order.
(Para - 29, 30, 31)
1480 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Leading WP Allowed & Connected WP Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Pradeep Kumar Bind & Anr. (2017)
U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. District Magistrate, Dehradun & Ors. (1997) 2 UPLBEC 1344
Neetu Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2014)
Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 791
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141
Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985) 4 SCC 677
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746
Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344
M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari (2002) 2 SCC 162
Parvati Devi v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi (2000) 3 SCC 754,
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395.

LIST OF ACTS
Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 - Electricity Act, 2003 - Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 - Constitution
of India.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Writ Petition, Electrocution, hazardous substance, strict liability, compensation, Article 21, jurisdiction, Public
Liability Insurance Act, electricity accident, permanent disability, ex parte award, enhancement of
compensation, Allowed.

CASE ARISING FROM
Writ-C No.61435 of 2010 filed by claimant-petitioner (Gangadhar Tiwari) seeking enhancement of
compensation awarded under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.

Connected Writ-C No.51093 of 2010 filed by U.P. Power Corporation challenging the award of compensation
by the Additional Collector/Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): - Shri Kamlakar Dwivedi,
Counsel for Respondent(s): - Shri Devesh Vikram, Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Shri Sushil Kumar
Pandey for Power Corporation.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J.
&
Hon'ble Kunal Ravi Singh, J.)

1. Heard Shri Kamlakar Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner (respondent no.2 in
connected Writ-C No.51093 of 2010; Shri Devesh Vikram, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel
for State respondents and Shri Sushil Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for respondent nos.3 & 4-
Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam (Electricity Distribution Division-II), Sant Ravidas Nagar
(Bhadohi)1 (the petitioners in connected Writ-C No.51093 of 2010).

FACTS

2. Since the controversy involved in both the writ petitions are similar, with the consent of
learned counsel for parties, they are being decided by this common order.
4 All. Gangadhar Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1481
3. The facts of Writ-C No.61435 of 2010 are being taken as leading case for deciding the
controversy.

4. The facts of the case in brief are that on 09.12.2006, when the claimant-petitioner
(Gangadhar Tiwari) was going to answer the call of nature in the morning, he came into contact
with live electrical wire of 11000 KV and sustained severe burn injuries due to electrocution.
Somehow with the help of stick and bamboos the petitioner was separated from the live electrical
wire due to which the life of the petitioner was saved. It is alleged that the electrical wire was
broken on 7.12.2006 and on the same day Gram Pradhan had informed about the same to the
concerned Junior Engineer of the Electricity Distribution Division, Wahida Nagr Power House,
Distt. Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi but inspite of the information, the broken electrical wire was
neither repaired nor electric supply was stopped. The information of the said unfateful incident was
also given to the Police Station, Koirauna, Distt. Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi. The petitioner was
treated in several hospitals and due to the said electrocution the petitioner has sufferred from 40%
permanent disability.

5. The petitioner filed a Claim Petition No.7 of 2007 in the court of Additional Collector/
Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi under Section 6 (1) of Public Liability
Insurance Act, 19912 claiming Rs.10 lacs as compensation. The claim petition was allowed on
21.5.2010 awarding compensation of Rs.4 lacs in favour of the petitioner.

6. It is alleged that the Addl. Collector/ Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar has
not paid compensation to the petitioner towards loss of actual earning, mental agony and medical
expenses. Such situation has impelled the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction by way of
instant writ petition for the following reliefs:-

 "(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus enhancing the amount of
Rs.4,00,000/- awarded by Additional Collector/ Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant Ravidas Nagar,
Bhadohi in Claim Petition No.7 of 2007 under Section 6 (1) of Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991
to Rs.10,00,000/- and directing the respondent no.2 to pay the enhanced amount to the petitioner."

7. The order dated 21.5.2010 passed by the Addl. Collector/ Accident Claim Tribunal, Sant
Ravidas Nagar was challenged by the U.P. Power Corporation3 in connected Writ-C No.51093 of
2010. In the said writ petition, following interim order was passed by the Coordinate Bench of this
Court on 26.08.2010:-

 "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel appearing for the
respondents.

 Notices on behalf of respondents no. 1 and 3 have been accepted by learned standing
counsel. He prays for and is granted one month's time to file counter affidavit. Three weeks
thereafter is allowed to the petitioner to file rejoinder affidavit.

 Issue notice to respondent no. 2 through registered post.
1482 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 Steps be taken within two weeks. Office shall send notice returnable at an early date.

 List this case on the date fixed by the office in the notice.

 Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the order passed by Additional District
Magistrate, Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi) is without jurisdiction as the Public Liability Insurance
Act,1991 is not applicable to U.P. Corporation or a person who receive any injury or death or
damage. Hence the petitioner is entitled for interim relief.

 Until further order of this Court, the effect and operation of order dated 21.5.2010
passed by Additional District Magistrate, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Bhadohi (annexure 2 to the writ
petition) shall remain stayed."

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that although the information of
broken wire was already furnished by the Gram Pradhan to the Electricity Department but the
Electricity Department in gross negligence did not repair the high voltage wire, which resulted in
the 40% permanent disability of the petitioner.

9. He further argued that even the Claim Petition No.7 of 2007 was allowed on 21.05.2010
but the Tribunal has not awarded compensation towards actual earning, mental agony and medical
expenses.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the Act, 1991 is fully applicable in the
instant case and the objection qua its maintainability is misplaced.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT-NIGAM

11. Learned counsel for the Nigam has vehemently opposed the relief claimed by the
claimant-petitioner (Gangadhar Tiwari). He states that the Corporation is the licensee under the
provisions of Electricity Act, 20034 and Nigam comes under it. The Nigam is distributing
electricity within the area of their operation strictly in accordance with law to the satisfaction of the
consumers. It is alleged that in the said claim petition the notices issued to the Nigam could not be
served and as such Nigam could not acquire knowledge about the pendency of the said claim
petition. Without there being any finding on the ordersheet to the effect that the service of notice
could not be effected on the Nigam by hand or by registered post, straightaway order for
publication of notice was passed and an alleged copy was filed on record after its publication and
the matter was directed to be decided exparte. Eventually the claim petition was allowed on
21.5.2010 granting compensation to the petitioner for a sum of Rs.4 lacs.

12. Learned counsel for the Nigam further contended that the order impugned dated
21.5.2010 is totally arbitrary and patently illegal and the same is liable to be quashed. He submits
that the claim petition filed by the petitioner purporting to be under Section 6 (1) of the Act, 1991
will not apply for grant of compensation in case of electrocution. The Act, 2003 is a special
4 All. Gangadhar Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1483
enactment and there is provisions for enquiry in case of accident to be conducted by the Electrical
Inspector under Section 161 of the Act, 2003. Therefore, unless the enquiry under Section 161 of
the Act, 2003 is conducted, no compensation can be awarded by any court or authority. The notices
in the said claim petition were not actually served upon the Nigam and as such the order impugned
is arbitrary and illegal being exparte.

13. Learned counsel for the Nigam lastly submitted that only in this backdrop the Division
Bench has rightly passed the interim order dated 26.8.2010 as the order impugned is without
jurisdiction and the Act, 1991 is not applicable to U.P. Power Corporation or a person, who receive
any injury or death or damage.

ARGUMENT OF STATE RESPONDENTS

14. Shri Devesh Vikram, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel, while adopting the
submissions made by learned counsel for the Nigam vehemently argued that the Act, 1991 is not
applicable in the instant matter. He submitted that the Act, 1991 is made for business handling
hazardous substances to provide immediate relief to victims of industrial accidents, as such the
order passed by the Addl. Collector is illegal and without jurisdiction.

REJOINDER ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner-claimant, in rejoinder arguments, vehemently
opposed the contention of learned counsel for Nigam and submitted that the Addl. District
Magistrate has rightly proceeded to accord compensation under the Act, 1991 as the same would
definitely be attracted in the instant matter. He submits that similar controversy has earlier been
raised in Writ-C No.12492 of 2017 (Purwanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Pradeep Kumar Bind
& Anr.) in which the Division Bench has refuted the similar contentions raised by learned counsel
for Nigam and proceeded to dismiss the writ petition on 27.3.2017.

16. Learned counsel for the claimant-petitioner, in this backdrop, has submitted that the
Addl. Collector is competent to accord compensation under the Act, 1991. The claimant-petitioner
has sustained permanent disability and while passing the order impugned the Addl. Collector has
not only accorded ex-gratia payment of Rs.4 lacs but also accorded said amount towards medical
expenses. The petitioner is entitled for ex-gratia payment under the Act, 1991.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submissions, has also placed
reliance on the judgment passed in U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. District Magistrate,
Dehradun & Ors.5, wherein learned Single Judge while considering the Act, 1991 and Environment
(Protection) Act, 19866 has found that the electricity is hazardous and also substance and,
therefore, learned Single Judge had denied to interfere in the impugned award. Learned Single
Judge had also provided that the claimant in addition to the amount awarded to them by the
impugned award may also institute any other proceeding for claiming further relief.

18. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the relief has rightly been accorded by
Addl. Collector under the Act, 1991, which warrant no interference. It is contended that on account
1484 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of pendency of instant proceedings as well as continuation of interim order for more than 15 years,
the claimant-petitioner has suffered a lot. Due to sustaining grievous injury causing permanent
disability, the claimant-petitioner is not capable to discharge his day to day work. He submits that
the compensation is not commensurate to his disability and as such indulgence may be accorded in
favour of the claimant-petitioner.

ANALYSIS BY THE COURT

19. Heard rival submissions, perused the record and respectfully considered the judgments
cited at Bar.

20. The precise objection as raised by learned counsel for the Nigam is that in the instant
proceeding the Act, 1991 is not applicable. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be apt to
have a glance on the judgment in Purwanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Pradeep Kumar Bind &
Anr. (Supra), which is reproduced as under:-

 "Heard Mr Narendra Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mrs Subhash
Rathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for respondent no.2.

 This writ petition, filed by the Electricity Distribution Company, challenges the order
dated 29.12.2016 passed by respondent no.2-District Magistrate, whereby compensation of
Rs.5,79,456.00 has been awarded, on the application made by respondent no.1, who suffered
permanent disability on account of an electrocution accident. The challenged is raised on two
grounds. Firstly, that the provisions of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (in short 'the
Insurance Act') are not attracted in view of the fact that such accidents are covered by the rules
framed under the Electricity Act, 2003. Secondly, that even if it is held that the provisions of the
Insurance Act are attracted, the Collector has no power to grant anything more than what is
prescribed in the Schedule appended to the Act.

 In our opinion, both the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner
deserve to be rejected outright. Section 22 of the Insurance Act clearly provides that the provisions
of this Act and any rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law. It may be true that a person, like respondent no.1, may have
a remedy under the provisions of the rules framed under the Electricity Act, 2003, but that itself
would not debar him from making an application under the provisions of the Insurance Act more
particularly, in view of the provisions contained in Section 22 thereof. Hence, the first submission
deserves to be rejected outright and is rejected as such.

 The second submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is based on
Section 3 of the Insurance Act, which places a liability to give relief in certain cases on the
principle of "no fault-liability". The application made by respondent no.1 was not under Section 3,
but it was under Section 6 of the Insurance Act, which does not put any restriction on the powers of
the Collector to award an amount as relief which appears to him to be just. Section 3 confers
power only to give the minimum relief to a victim in terms of a scale as provided for in the
Schedule. Insofar as the power of the Collector to award relief under Section 6 of the Insurance Act
4 All. Gangadhar Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1485
is concerned, it is unlimited and it is left to the Collector to make an award determining the amount
of relief which appears to him to be just. This power cannot be curtailed and is not curtailed by
the provisions of this Act or any other Act.

 It is needless to mention that the learned counsel for the petitioner, though made
submissions as aforementioned, he did not point out any provisions in support of his contention or
judgment of either this Court or any other High Court or the Supreme Court.

 In the circumstances, we find no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed.
"

21. In the said judgment, the Court had considered Section 22 of the Act, 1991 and negated
the claim of Electricity Department and held that in addition to the Act, 2003, the Act, 1991 would
also be attracted in the instant matter. As such the objection raised by Nigam that Act, 1991 is not
applicable in the instant matter is not tenable as the same has been clearly answered by the Division
Bench in the aforesaid judgment.

22. In a similar matter, vide judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge in U.P.
State Electricity Board & Ors. v. District Magistrate Dehradun & Ors. (Supra), it has been held that
electricity is both hazardous and substance and it is also admitted that the petitioner has sustained
permanent disability from electrocution.

23. Nothing is brought on record to suggest that the aforesaid judgments have been
annulled or modified or they donot hold the field.

24. We have also occasion to peruse the judgment and order dated 19.09.2014 passed in
Writ-C No.23783 of 2010 (Neetu Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors.), wherein the Division Bench has
also considered the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin v.
State of Maharashtra7. For ready reference, para 18 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-

 "18 In the case reported in 2012 (9) SCC 791: Raghuvansh Dewanchand Bhasin Vs.
State of Maharashtra, while considering the ambit and scope of Article 21 and its violation, and
court's right to payment compensation, their lordships held as under:-

 17 It is trite principle of law that in matters involving infringement or deprivation of a
fundamental right; abuse of process of law, harassment etc., the courts have ample power to award
adequate compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong done to him but also
to serve as a deterrent for the wrongdoer.

 18 In Rudul Sah Vs. State of Bihar, Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ, speaking for a Bench of three
learned Judges of this Court had observed thus: (SCC p. 147, para 10)

 "10. ...One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be
prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in
1486 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements
of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt."

 19 In Bhim Singh, MLA Vs. State of J & K, holding illegal detention in police custody of
the petitioner Bhim Singh to be violative of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the
Constitution, this Court, in exercise of its power to award compensation under Article 32, directed
the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner. Relying on Rudal Sah , O. Chinnappa
Reddy, J. echoed the following views: (SCC p.686, para 2)

 "2. ... When a person comes to us with the complaint that he has been arrested and
imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights were
invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his
being set free. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding
suitable monetary compensation..."

 20. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa, clearing the doubt
and indicating the precise nature of the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution to award compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, which had arisen
because of the observation that "the petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of
a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial" in Rudul Sah (SCC p. 147, para
10), J.S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated as under: (Nilabati Behera case, SCC pp.
762-63, para 17)

 "17 It follows that 'a claim in public law for compensation' for contravention of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an
acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on
strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a
fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for
the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign
immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there
can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this
principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the
contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and
enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the
Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in
Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights."

 (emphasis supplied)

 21. In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship
then was), explaining the scope and purpose of public law proceedings and private law
proceedings stated as under: (Nilabati Behera case, SCC pp. 768-69, para 34)
4 All. Gangadhar Tiwari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1487
 "34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law
proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under
Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of
the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in
public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and
indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but
also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests
and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting "compensation"
in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of
fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing
the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the
fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be
understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in
the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public
law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the
citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer
for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved
party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit
instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law."
(emphasis supplied)

 22. The power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to grant monetary
compensation in exercise of its jurisdiction respectively under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution of India to a victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21of the Constitution are
violated are thus, well-established. However, the question now is whether on facts in hand, the
appellant is entitled to monetary compensation in addition to what has already been awarded to
him by the High Court. Having considered the case in the light of the fact- situation stated above,
we are of the opinion that the appellant does not deserve further monetary compensation."

25. The Division Bench has also considered the judgment passed by the Apex Court in
Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India8. Eventually, the Division Bench in Neetu
Devi (Supra) has accorded indulgence in favour of claimant-petitioner (in the said writ petition).

26. This Court in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board vs. District Magistrate,
Dehradun9, has also considered the issue that electricity falls within the definition of "hazardous
substance" and the accident, caused on account of it, is covered under the provisions of the Act,
1991. Relevant extract of the judgment, as contained in paragraphs 42 to 44, is being quoted below:

 "42. Hence in my opinion 'hazardous substance' as defined in Section 2 (d) of the 1991
Act is not to be confined to a substance specified in the notification issued by the Central
Government, but it includes all substances which come under the definition of 'hazardous
substance' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, with this exception that if any such
substance is also notified by the Central Government under Section 2 (d) of the 1991 Act then it
will be a 'hazardous substance' only if it exceeds the quantity specified in the said notification. Thus
the notification issued by the Central Government under Section 2 (d) of the 1991 Act can only
1488 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
narrow down the scope of 'hazardous substance' as defined under the Environment (Protection Act,
1986, but substances which are not specified in the said notification will nevertheless be regarded
as 'hazardous substances' under the 1991 Act if they come within the definition of 'hazardous
substances' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

 43. I have already stated above that electricity is "hazardous substance" as defined under
the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and hence I reject the submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioners that it is not a hazardous substance since it has not been included in the
Notification dated 24-3-1992.

 44. THE principle of strict Liability Section 3 (2) of the 1991 Act places a strict liability
(liability without fault) in cases of such accident due to 'hazardous substances' and it is not
necessary for the claimant to plead that the death or injury was caused by wrong or negligent act
of any person..."

27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari10 has held that the
Electricity Board is liable to pay compensation even though there was no negligence on its part.
InParvati Devi & Ors. v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors.11, the Supreme Court observed
that once it is established that the death occurred on account of electrocution while walking on the
road, necessarily the authorities concerned must be held to be negligent and the legal heirs of the
deceased are entitled for compensation.

28. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India12, Hon'ble Supreme Court has heldthat where an
enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on any
one on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and
absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident.

CONCLUSION

29. We find that the issue in hand is no more res integra. In the light of the above cited
judgments, we find that the quintessence is that the compensation has rightly been accorded under
the Act, 1991. It is writ large that the petitioner had set up the claim under the Act, 1991 on the
ground that he had received grievous injury and during treatment he has incurred expenses of more
than Rs.4 lacs towards medical costs and other expenses. We find that under the present facts and
circumstances the order impugned is required to be modified qua the amount of compensation.
As a stay order was operating in the connected writ petition, therefore, the amount quantified by the
District Magistrate was never paid to the petitioner. The petitioner has been deprived of the
compensation amount, which he is legally entitled to receive.

30. The stay order was granted on the ground of jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to
pass the order. However, as observed above, the District Magistrate has the jurisdiction to pass an
order under the Act. Therefore, the ground of jurisdiction is unsustainable. The incident is of the
year 2006 and the order of compensation was passed in the year 2010. Ordinarily, the deprivation
of the compensation amount would require granting of damages and interest to the petitioner as
despite an award for grant of compensation, no amount came to be given for a period of 16 years.
4 All. Atul Behari Lal & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
1489
Therefore, in the interest of justice and to balance the equities, we deem it appropriate that
a further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- be quantified over and above to what has been awarded as medical
expenses and enhanced compensation to be awarded to the petitioner.

ORDER AND DIRECTIONS

31. We accordingly modify the order impugned to the extent that the petitioner is entitled
for compensation of Rs.9,00,000/- in total (Rs.5,00,000/- as enhanced compensation and
Rs.4,00,000/- as medical expenses). The Corporation/Nigam is directed to disburse the aforesaid
amount to the claimant-petitioner within four weeks, failing which the claimant-petitioner will be
entitled for 9% interest over the said amount towards delayed payment from the date of impugned
order

32. In view of above, WRIT - C No. - 61435 of 2010 stands allowed andWrit - C No.
51093 of 2010 stands dismissed.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1489
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 1001056 of 1993

Atul Behari Lal & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
(i) Whether the disputed holding recorded in the name of late Sri Daulat Singh was his exclusive
holding or was ancestral joint Hindu family property in which the petitioners had acquired
interest by birth;
(ii) Whether the authorities below correctly determined the nature of the land as irrigated under
Section 4-A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960; and
(iii) Whether the computation of surplus area was made in accordance with law after correctly
considering grove, abadi and usar land as well as the number of family members entitled to
additional ceiling area.
HEADNOTE
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 - ss.4-A, 10(2), 13 - Ceiling proceedings -
Notice under Section 10(2) issued to legal heirs of deceased tenure-holder Daulat Singh treating
46.86 acres as surplus land - Petitioners contended that disputed land was ancestral 'sir' and
'khud kasht' property of their grandfather Bankey Bihari Lal and that late Sri Daulat Singh was
recorded only in a representative capacity on behalf of the joint Hindu family - Further case of
petitioners that petitioner no.1 was born prior to the date of vesting and had acquired
coparcenary rights by birth; substantial area had been wrongly treated as irrigated; and grove,
abadi and usar land as well as entitlement to additional ceiling area on account of family