# Ghaziabad Development Authority v. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court, Ghaziabad & Anr

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 782
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-07-25
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 5135 of 2016
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ghaziabad-development-authority-v-district-judge-appellate-authority-civil-49276
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Civil Law - U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 - Sections 18 (4A) & 18(6) - Transfer of Property Act,
1882- Sections 111 (g),105 & 108-
Indian
Easements
Act-
Section
52-
Appeal
of
the
respondent
no.2
-
direction to reconsider the case of
respondent no.2 -Notice under Section
111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882- It is clear that there was a clear
intention on the part of the G.D.A. to
handover the exclusive possession of the
plot, and perusal of the stipulation of
the
agreement
and
brochure
and
possession memo do not reflect or
indicate in any manner that G.D.A.
wanted to retain the possession of the
plot and wished to grant only the
permissive right to respondent no.2 to
run
the
school-To
ascertain
as
to
whether a document is a lease deed or
not, the title of the deed is not relevant
and
the
only
relevant
point
for
consideration is the intention of the
parties in executing the said deed. If the
terms and conditions stipulated in the
document
principally
satisfy
the
condition that exclusive possession of
the plot has been delivered with the
right to enjoy the property, it is a lease,
and if only the right to use the property
has been granted while the possession is
retained by the owner, the document is
not a lease deed- G.D.A. has treated the
document to be a lease is also apparent
from the fact that notice has been issued
to respondent no.2 under Section 111(g)
of the Act, 1882.

In order to ascertain as to whether the
agreement is a lease or not, the terms and
conditions
of
the
agreement
and
the
brochures have to be considered along with
the intention of the parties executing the said
deed. Where the said terms and conditions
show that exclusive possession has been
delivered to the other party, then the same is
a lease but where only the right to use the
property is granted then the document would
not be a lease. (Para 35, 40, 41, 42, 47)

Petition rejected. (E-3)

Judgements/ Case law relied upon:-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,892 of 49,522. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39892 for what follows._

782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"11. Secondly, the High Court
ought to have seen that when a remedy of
appeal under Section 104 (1)(i) read with
Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, was directly available,
Respondents 1 and 2 ought to have taken
recourse to the same. It is true that the
availability of a remedy of appeal may not
always be a bar for the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. In
A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan
2000 (7) SCC 695, this Court held that
"though no hurdle can be put against the
exercise of the constitutional powers of the
High Court, it is a well-recognised principle
which gained judicial recognition that the
High Court should direct the party to avail
himself of such remedies before he resorts to
a Constitutional remedy"

12. But courts should always bear in
mind a distinction between (i) cases where such
alternative remedy is available before civil
courts in terms of the provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure, and (ii) cases where such
alternative remedy is available under special
enactments and/or statutory rules and the fora
provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial
authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases
falling under the first category, which may
involve suits and other proceedings before civil
courts, the availability of an appellate remedy
in terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to
be construed as a near total bar. Otherwise,
there is a danger that someone may challenge
in a revision under Article 227, even a decree
passed in a suit, on the same grounds on which
the Respondents 1 and 2 invoked the
jurisdiction of the High Court. This is why, a 3member Bench of this Court, while overruling
the decision in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander
Rai 2003 (6) SCC 675, pointed out in Radhey
Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath 2015 (5) SCC 423 that
"orders of civil court stand on different footing
from the orders of authorities or tribunals or
courts other than judicial/civil courts".

13.
Therefore
wherever
the
proceedings are under the Code of Civil
Procedure and the forum is the civil court,
the availability of a remedy under the CPC,
will deter the High Court, not merely as a
measure of self imposed restriction, but as a
matter of discipline and prudence, from
exercising its power of superintendence
under the Constitution. Hence, the High
Court ought not to have entertained the
revision under Article 227 especially in a
case where a specific remedy of appeal is
provided under the Code of Civil Procedure
itself."

34. In such view of the fact, as the
petitioners have the remedy of filing
application under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C.
for rejection of plaint if the suit is barred by
any provision of law, this Court finds that this
is not a fit case where this Court should
exercise its power under Article 227 of
Constitution of India to quash the plaint.

35. Thus, for the reasons given above,
the writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India lacks merit and is
accordingly, dismissed with no order as to
costs.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 782
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 5135 of 2016
(Civil)

Ghaziabad Development Authority
 ...Petitioner
Versus
District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil
Court, Ghaziabad & Anr. ...Respondents
9 All. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court,
 Ghaziabad & Anr.
783
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Mahendra Pratap, Sri Mahesh Narain
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Rajesh Srivastava, Sri Himanshu Tiwari,
Sri Kashif Zaidi, Sri Shashi Nandan (Senior
Adv.)

Civil Law - U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 - Sections 18 (4A) & 18(6) - Transfer of Property Act,
1882- Sections 111 (g),105 & 108-
Indian
Easements
Act-
Section
52-
Appeal
of
the
respondent
no.2
-
direction to reconsider the case of
respondent no.2 -Notice under Section
111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882- It is clear that there was a clear
intention on the part of the G.D.A. to
handover the exclusive possession of the
plot, and perusal of the stipulation of
the
agreement
and
brochure
and
possession memo do not reflect or
indicate in any manner that G.D.A.
wanted to retain the possession of the
plot and wished to grant only the
permissive right to respondent no.2 to
run
the
school-To
ascertain
as
to
whether a document is a lease deed or
not, the title of the deed is not relevant
and
the
only
relevant
point
for
consideration is the intention of the
parties in executing the said deed. If the
terms and conditions stipulated in the
document
principally
satisfy
the
condition that exclusive possession of
the plot has been delivered with the
right to enjoy the property, it is a lease,
and if only the right to use the property
has been granted while the possession is
retained by the owner, the document is
not a lease deed- G.D.A. has treated the
document to be a lease is also apparent
from the fact that notice has been issued
to respondent no.2 under Section 111(g)
of the Act, 1882.

In order to ascertain as to whether the
agreement is a lease or not, the terms and
conditions
of
the
agreement
and
the
brochures have to be considered along with
the intention of the parties executing the said
deed. Where the said terms and conditions
show that exclusive possession has been
delivered to the other party, then the same is
a lease but where only the right to use the
property is granted then the document would
not be a lease. (Para 35, 40, 41, 42, 47)

Petition rejected. (E-3)

Judgements/ Case law relied upon:-

1.
New
Okhla
Industrial
Development
Authority Vs Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (Dead)
thru L.Rs, Civil Appeal No.382 of 2012.(cited)

2. C.M. Beena & anr. Vs P.N. Ramachandra
Rao 2004(3) SCC 595 (relied)

3. Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed Vs Tufelhussein
Samasbhai Sarangpurwala 1988 (1) SCC 155.
(relied)

4. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs R.N.
Kapoor AIR 1959 SC 1262 (relied)

5. The New Bus Stand Shop Vs Corporation of
Kozhikode & Ors. 2009 (10) 455.(relied)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Mahesh Narain Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri
Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Sri Kashif Zaidi, learned
counsel for the respondents.

2. This petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India has been filed by
the
petitioner-Ghaziabad
Development
Authority
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
'G.D.A.') challenging the order dated
14.04.2016 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad by
which he has allowed the appeal of the
respondent no.2 under Section 18(6) of
U.P. Urban Planning and Development
Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act,
784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1973') and directed the petitioner to
reconsider the case of respondent no.2
under Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.

3. The facts, in brief, are that G.D.A.
floated a scheme for allotment of plots to
Creche/Nursery/Primary/High
School/Degree
College,
Educational
Institutions and invited application for the
same. The G.D.A. issued a brochure
containing
terms
and
conditions
of
registration and allotment of plots.

4. Under the scheme floated for
allotment of plots, respondent no.2 applied
for allotment of a plot alongwith the
registration amount. The G.D.A. informed
respondent
no.2
vide
letter
dated
24.06.2008 that the plot situated at
Indirapuram, Nyay Khand-1, Ghaziabad
has been allotted to the society with the
approval dated 20.06.2008 of State of U.P.
The Vice Chairman of the G.D.A. issued a
consequential order dated 24.06.2008.

5. The rate of the plot was Rs.3600/-
per sq. meter and the area of the plot was
7363.96 per sq. meter. The total value of
the plot was Rs.2,65,10,256/-. Respondent
no.2 was also directed to pay a sum of
Rs.53,02,052/- towards the location charge
and Rs.31,81,231/- as lease rent.

6. On depositing the aforesaid amount
as well as fulfillment of terms of allotment,
the G.D.A. executed an agreement dated
31.08.2008 titled as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के
सनमाषणािष गासियाबाद सवकास प्रासधकरण की भूसम का संसवदा'
(hereinafter referred to as 'agreement') in
favour of the respondent no.2.

7. The agreement was registered in
the office of Sub-Registrar, Ghaziabad on
the
payment
of
stamp
duty
of
Rs.24,50,000/-. The G.D.A., thereafter,
delivered the possession of the said plot to
respondent no.2 on 30.09.2008. Thereafter,
respondent no.2 submitted a plan for the
construction of the building on the said
plot, but the plan submitted by respondent
no.2 was not approved by the G.D.A.

8. The record reflects that a notice
under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to
as 'Act, 1882') was issued by G.D.A.
calling upon respondent no.2 to show cause
as to why the agreement be not cancelled
for non-construction of building over the
said plot within five years from the date of
allotment which is a breach of the condition
of the agreement. The reply was submitted
by respondent no.2, but G.D.A. being
dissatisfied with the reply of respondent
no.2 cancelled the aforesaid agreement on
30.06.2014. Accordingly, a communication
was sent to respondent no.2 vide letter
dated 02.07.2014 informing about the
cancellation of the agreement.

9. Feeling aggrieved by the order of
cancellation of agreement and allotment of
plot, respondent no.2 preferred an appeal
bearing Appeal No.55 of 2014 under
Section 18(6) of the Act, 1973 on the
ground that respondent no.2 is entitled to
benefit of Section 18 (4-A) of the Act, 1973
on payment of the surcharge.

10. The appeal was opposed by the
petitioner
contending
inter-alia
that
respondent no.2 is not entitled to the
benefit of Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973
as only an agreement has been entered into
between the parties and the lease deed is
yet to be executed between the parties. The
said appeal was allowed by the Additional
District Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad vide
order dated 14.04.2016, which is impugned
in the present writ petition.
9 All. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court,
 Ghaziabad & Anr.
785

11. The case of respondent no.2 is
that the order of G.D.A. dated 02.07.2014
cancelling the allotment of plot for
construction of schools was per se illegal
and in the teeth of Section 18(4-A) of the
Act, 1973. Further case of respondent no.2
is that stipulation contained in para 6.1 of
the brochure, which is also part of the
agreement, is binding upon the parties,
therefore, respondent no.2 is entitled to the
benefit of the said clause and Section 18(4A) of the Act, 1973.

12. Respondent no.2 in the counter
affidavit has averred that they are ready and
willing to pay the additional surcharge as
provided in Section 18(4-A) of the Act,
1973, and this aspect was not considered by
the G.D.A. while cancelling the allotment
of plot in favour of respondent no.2. The
further case of the respondent no.2 was that
though the agreement has been styled as
'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के सनमाषणािष गासियाबाद सवकास
प्रासधकरण की भूसम का संसवदा' but in fact, the
agreement is lease deed as the terms and
conditions stipulated in the agreement
decipher that it has all the trappings of the
lease.

13. The further case of respondent
no.2 was that as per the stipulation
contained in the agreement, the brochure is
also part of the agreement, therefore, the
stipulation contained in the brochure is
binding upon the parties. Thus, respondent
no.2 is entitled to the extension of time for
a period of five years
for raising
construction over the said plot on payment
of charges as prescribed under Section
18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.

14. Challenging the aforesaid order,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
contended that it is evident from the
agreement that agreement has been styled
as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के सनमाषणािष गासियाबाद
सवकास प्रासधकरण की भूसम का संसवदा' and cannot be
termed as lease deed, therefore, Section
18(4-A) is not attracted and thus, appeal
under Section 18(6) of the Act, 1973 filed
by
the
respondent
no.2
was
not
maintainable. Accordingly, it is contended
that the order impugned is illegal and
without jurisdiction.

15. The further contention advanced
by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that in view of the clear stipulation in the
agreement that the construction has to be
raised within five years from the date of
agreement failing which the G.D.A shall
have the right to cancel the agreement and
re-enter in the said plot, so, it is submitted
that
on
non-fulfillment
of
the
said
condition, the agreement stands cancelled.
He contends that the appellate court has
failed to appreciate the law correctly while
holding that the agreement reflects that it
has all the trappings of a lease deed,
therefore, Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973
are attracted in the instant case and the
G.D.A. had ignored this aspect of the
matter while cancelling the allotment. In
support of the case, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgement of Apex Court in the case of
New
Okhla
Industrial
Development
Authority Vs. Ravindra Kumar Singhvi
(Dead) through L.Rs passed in Civil
Appeal No.382 of 2012.

16.

Rebutting
the
aforesaid
contention, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned
Senior Counsel for the respondents has
placed
various
stipulations
of
the
agreement to contend that though the
agreement may be titled as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में
स्कूल के सनमाषणािष गासियाबाद सवकास प्रासधकरण की
भूसम का संसवदा' but the stipulation contained
therein reflects clear intention of the
786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner that exclusive possession of plot
has been delivered to respondent no.2 for
enjoyment, thus, the agreement is a lease
deed, therefore, the finding of the appellate
court is correct and based upon proper
appreciation of the law. He further
contends that admittedly a notice under
Section 111(g) of the Act, 1882 has been
issued by the petitioner for cancellation of
agreement which reflects that the petitioner
has also treated the said agreement as a
lease deed. Thus, it is contended that had
the G.D.A. not treated the agreement to be
a lease deed, it would not have issued a
notice under Section 111(g) of the Act,
1882. In support of his argument, he has
placed reliance upon the judgements of the
Apex Court in the cases of C.M. Beena
and Another Vs. P.N. Ramachandra Rao
2004(3) SCC 595 & Khalil Ahmed Bashir
Ahmed
Vs.
Tufelhussein
Samasbhai
Sarangpurwala 1988 (1) SCC 155.

17. I have considered the rival
submissions of the parties and perused the
record.

18. The controversy in the present
case revolves around the question whether
the agreement has trapping of the lease or
not.

19. If the answer to this question is
'yes', obviously Section 18(4-A) of the Act,
1973 would be applicable and respondent
no.2 is entitled to consideration of its claim
for extension of a further period of five
years for raising construction over the plot
on payment of charge as provided in
Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.

20. To appreciate the aforesaid
question, it would be apt to reproduce the
relevant clause of the agreement in which
petitioner has been referred to as 'संसवदाकताष'
and respondent no.2 has been referred to as
'संसवदाग्रासहता':-

"चूंसक संसवदाकताष िारा सवकससत योिना के
अन्तगषत स्कूल के सनमाषण हेतु सनयोसित भूखण्ड
सनयमानुसार योिना घोसर्त कर सदनांक 24.06.2008 को
स्कूल भूखण्ड न्याय खण्ड-1 स्थित इस्िरापुरम् योिना में
इस कायाषलय के पत्र संख्या-915/व्य०अनु/08, सदनांक
24.06.2008 िारा आवंसर्टत सकया गया िा। साईर्ट प्लान के
अनुसार भूखण्ड क्षेत्रफल 7363.96 वगषमीर्टर है । सिसकी
सीमायें इस सवलेख के अन्त में अंसकत हैं तिा संलग्न थिल
सचत्र में भी स्पष्ट है, को अंकन रू. 3,18,12,308.00 (रूपये
तीन करोड़ अट्ठारह लाख बारह हिार तीन सौ आठ मात्र)
आंसशक प्रीसमयम रू. 67,50,000.00 व 20 प्रसतशत
लोकेशन चािष रू. 53,02,052.00 कुल आंसशक प्रीसमयम
रू. 1,20,52,052.00 व लीि सकराया रूपये 31,81,231.00
एवं कुल बकाया रू. 1,97,60,256.00 (रूपये एक करोड़
सत्तान्नबे लाख साठ हिार दो सौ छप्पन मात्र) का भुगतान
सनम्नानुसार 05 वर्ष वासर्षक सकश्तों में 21 प्रसतशत ब्याि
ससहत सकये िाने बाबत संसवदाग्रासहता अदा करने हेतु
सहमत हुए है। अतः सकश्तों का सववरण सनम्नानुसार हैः-

क्र
म
रासश
ब्याि 21%
कुल देय
रासश
देय
सतसि
1
.
39,52,05
2.00
41,49,65
5.00
81,01,,
707.00
24062009
2
.
39,52,05
2.00
33,19,72
4.00
72,71,7
76.00
24062010
3
.
39,52,05
2.00
24,89,79
3.00
64,41,8
45.00
24062011
4
.
39,52,05
2.00
16,59,86
2.00
56,11,9
14.00
24062012
5
.
39,52,05
2.00
8,29,931
.00
47,81,9
83.00
24062013

देय सतसि पर भुगतान करने पर 3.5 प्रसतशत
ब्यान में छूर्ट दी िायेगी। देय सतसि पर भुगतान न करने पर
देय रासश पर 21 प्रसतशत असतररक्त ब्याि देय होगा।
भूखण्ड का कब्जा एग्रीमेन्ट कराने के उपरान्त हिान्तररत
सकया िायेगा। देय सतसि पर कब्जा न लेने पर रू. 500/-
प्रसतमाह चौकीदार शुल्क िमा कराना होगा। भूखण्ड पर
9 All. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court,
 Ghaziabad & Anr.
787
सनमाषण एग्रीमेन्ट की सतसि से 05 वर्ष के अिर पूणष करना
होगा। शेर् सनयम व शते ब्रोशर के अनुसार होंगी।

अतः यह संसवदा सनम्न बातों का साक्षी हैः-

1. यह सक उपयुषक्त भूखण्ड सिसकी सीमाओं
को संलग्न रेखासचत्र में सदखाया गया है और प्रश्नगत स्कूल
भूखण्ड हाई स्कूल के सनमाषण हेतु आवंसर्टत सकया गया है
तो सभी भार व देनदाररयों से मुक्त है तिा सववाद रसहत
सम्पदा है सिसे इस सवलेख में आगे स्कूल के सनमाषण हेतु
संसवदा भूखण्ड कह कर सम्बोसधत सकया गया है,
संसवदाग्रासहता को 90 (नब्बे) वर्ष की अवसध हेतु संसवदा
पर हिान्तररत सकया िा रहा है सकन्तु प्रासधकरण के पक्ष
में सनम्नसलस्खत असधकार सदैव आरसक्षत होंगेः-

(क) यसद प्रासधकरण उक्त क्षेत्र का सवकास
सकया िाना आवश्यक समझे तो संसवदा भूखण्ड के नीचे
तिा ऊपर िल सम्बाहक, नासलयों, सीवरों या सबिली के
तारों को िालने, बनाने या सबछाने का असधकार।

(ख) संसवदा भूखण्ड या उसके सकसी भाग में
होने वाले सभी खानों और खसनिों के सम्पूणष असधकार।

(ग) ...

(घ) ...

4. संसवदाग्रासहता अपने खचष से संसवदा
भूखण्ड पर प्रासधकरण िारा सलस्खत रूप से अनुमोसदत
रेखासचत्र वाह्य असिक्षेप तिा सििाईन व स्थिसत के अनुसार
एक स्कूल के सलए भवन का सारभूत एवं सशल्प कौशल में
सनमाषण करायेगा, सिसमें स्कूल भवन, नासलयों शौचालयों
तिा संयोिनों के संबंध में सवसहत प्रासधकरण तिा नगर
पासलका सनयमावली तिा उपसवसधयों के अनुसार सभी
आवश्यक सीवरों, नासलयों तिा अनुसंलग्नकों का प्रासवधान
होगा।

15. संसवदाग्रासहता को संसवदा भूखण्ड पर
संसवदा की सदनांक से 05 वर्ष तक स्कूल भवन को सनमाषण
करना और उसे पूरा करना आवश्यक होगा समय पर
सनमाषण पूणष नहीं सकया गया तो भूसम वासपस ले ली
िायेगी।

16. और इस संसवदा के पक्षों िारा उनके
बीच एतद्द्वारा सनम्नसलस्खत सम्बन्ध में सहमसत और
घोर्णा की िाती हैः-

(क) इसके पूवष सकसी बात को अन्यिा होते
हुए भी यसद प्रासधकरण के मतानुसार (सिसका अस्न्तम
तिा बाध्य होगा) संसवदाग्रासहता अिवा उसके अधीन दावा
करने वाले सकसी भी व्यस्क्त िारा पूवष की शतों या
प्रसंसवदाओं में से सकसी का उल्लंघन सकया गया हो,
सिनका पालन तिा सम्पादन सकया िाना उनका कतषव्य
िा तिा सवशेर्तया और इस उपखण्ड की व्यापकता पर
प्रसतकूल प्रभाव िाले सबना, यसद संसवदाग्रासहता पूवषवत
प्रासवधानों के अनुसार सम्पूणष संसवदा भूखण्ड पर स्कूल
भवन सनमाषण सनधाषररत अवसध में पूणष करने में असफल
रहता है या स्कूल भवन सनमाषण करने से पूवष संसवदा
भूखण्ड का अन्तरण पररत्याग बंधक या अभ्यापणष करता
है या अन्तररत भूखण्ड के सम्पूणष भाग से कम भाग का
अन्तरण पररत्याग बंधक का अभ्यापणष करता है या
पूवाषसकत खण्ड -2 में उस्ल्लस्खत अवसध के भीतर इस
संसवदा में उस्ल्लस्खत प्रीसमयम को सकसी सकश्त का
भुगतान नहीं करता है या यसद संसवदाग्रासहता या कोई ऐसा
व्यस्क्त सिसमें इस संसवदा के असधकार एतद्द्वारा सनसहत
सकये गये हों, सदवासलया सनणीत हो गया है या प्रासधकरण
के सलए वह वैध होगा सक (अनुबन्ध के उल्लघंन के सम्बन्ध
में प्रासधकरण िारा कायषवाही करने के सलए सकसी
असधकार पर प्रसतकूल प्रभाव िाले सबना) वह संसवदा या
उसके सकसी भाग पर अन्तररत सम्पूणष भूखण्ड के नाम
पर पुनः प्रवेश कर लें और उक्त दशा में यह संसवदा
समाप्त हो िायेगा और तत्पिातः-

यसद पुनः प्रवेश के समय, संसवदाग्रासहता िारा
संसवदा भूखण्ड पर स्कूल भवन का सनमाषण सकया गया हो
तो संसवदाग्रासहता पुनः प्रवेश के सदनांक से तीन माह की
अवसध के भीतर उस पर से सभी सनमाषण कायष या स्कूल
भवन िुड़नार तिा विुएं िो सकसी समय या उक्त अवसध
के दौरान उक्त अवसध में भूखण्ड पर या उसमें िुड़ी या
लगायी गयी हों, हर्टा लेगा और उक्त थिान को ऐसी अच्छी
दशा में लायेगा, िैसी सक संसवदा देने के समय िी, पर
उपरोक्त के सम्बन्ध में चूक सकये िाने पर वे उक्त भूखण्ड
और उस पर होने वाले आवश्यक िुड़नार और विुओं के
सम्बन्ध में संसवदाग्रासहता को सकसी प्रसतकर का भुगतान
सकये सबना प्रासधकरण की सम्पसत्त हो िायेगी। यसद
संसवदाग्रासहता सनसदष्ट अवसध के भीतर सनमाषण कायों स्कूल
भवन, िुड़नारों और विुओं को नहीं हर्टा लेता है तो
संसवदा भूखण्ड का पुनः आवंर्टन कर सलया िायेगा।

(ख) ..."

21. It is evident that respondent no.2
was directed to pay location charges to the
tune of Rs.53,02,052/- and lease rent of
Rs.31,81,231/-. It is also apt to refer to the
letter of Executive Engineer (Expenditure)
of the G.D.A. dated 29.08.2008 addressed
to respondent no.2 stating therein that
respondent
no.2
had
deposited
Rs.67,50,000/-, 20% of location charge to
the tune of Rs.53,02,052/- and 10% of the
lease rent to the tune of Rs.31,81,000/-.

22. On depositing of the said amount,
the agreement was executed on 31.08.2008
and possession memo was prepared,
thereafter, the plot was delivered to
788 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
respondent no.2. The contents of the
possession memo are being reproduced
herein below:-

मैने उपरोक्त प्लार्ट का असधकार आि
सदनांक .......... को ......... बिे मध्यान्ह पूवष/पिात प्राप्त कर
सलया है। प्लार्ट की पूणष पट्टे में दशाषयी गई/ नाप मेरे सामने
की गई है, सिससे मैं पूणषतः सन्तुष्ट हाँ।"

23. Perusal of the letter dated
29.08.2008 reveals that respondent no.2
after depositing the amount in compliance
with the letter dated 29.08.2008 got the
agreement dated 31.08.2008 executed.
Stipulation under the agreement, extracted
above, shows that construction was to be
raised by respondent no.2 within a period
of five years from the date of execution of
the agreement. Further, clause 1 of the
agreement stipulates that the plot is free
from all encumbrances and has been
allotted for 90 years and possession thereof
has been delivered to respondent no.2.

24. At this stage, it would also be apt
to refer to the language used in the
possession memo, extracted above, which
recites that respondent no.2 has obtained
exclusive possession of the plot. The
stipulation contained in the agreement as
well as the reading of the possession memo
clearly reflects that exclusive possession of
the plot has been delivered to respondent
no.2. It does not indicate that there was any
intention on the part of the petitioner not to
deliver the exclusive possession of the plot
to the respondent no.2.

25. The aforesaid fact is further
fortified from the stipulation in the
agreement that the plot has been given to
respondent
no.2
for
90
years.
The
agreement does not stipulate any condition
from which it can be inferred that there was
any intention on the part of the petitioner to
retain the exclusive possession of the plot
with it and grant only a permissive right to
respondent no.2 to run the school.

26. The aforesaid contention is further
supported by the conditions contained in
the brochure which is a part of the
agreement. The fact that the brochure is
treated to be a part of the agreement is also
evident from the allotment letter dated
24.06.2008 and letter dated 29.08.2008 of
the petitioner which states that ''सनयम व शते
ब्रोशर के अनुसार होंगी'.

27. In this context, it would also be
apposite to reproduce para 5, 6, 7, 10.10,
and 10.11 of the brochure:-

5.0 भुर्ताि िी प्रकिया तथा िब्जा हेतु
शतें

सवद्यालयों/शैसक्षक संथिाओं की भूसम के मूल्य
के भुगतान की प्रसक्रया सनम्नवत होगीः-

5.1 आवंसर्टत भूखण्ड के मूल्य की 25 प्रसतशत
धनरासश संथिा को आवंर्टन पत्र िारी होने की सतसि के
30सदन के अिर िमा करानी होगी, सिसमें पंिीकरण
रासश समायोसित कर ली िायेगी।

5.2 25 प्रसतशत धनारासश तिा लीि रेंन्ट एवं
लोकेशन चािेि (यसद लागू हों) िमा होने के उपरान्त
रसिस्टिष एग्रीमेंर्ट कराकर ही कब्जा सदया िायेगा।

5.3 अवशेर् 75 प्रसतशत धनारासश पांच
सालाना सकश्तों में 21 प्रसतशत वासर्षक ब्याि ससहत िमा
करानी होगी। समय से सकश्तों का भुगतान करने पर ब्याि
में 3.5 प्रसतशत की छूर्ट दी िायेगी। प्रिम सकश्त आवंर्टन
की सतसि से एक वर्ष के अिर देय होगी।

5.4 रसिस्टिष एग्रीमेंर्ट से पूवष भूखण्ड के कुल
मूल्य का 10 प्रसतशत लीि रेन्ट िमा करना होगा।

5.5 समि भुगतान बैंक िराफ्ट/पे-आिषर के
माध्यम से गासियाबाद सवकास प्रासधकरण के कैस
काउन्टर पर प्रत्येक कायष सदवस में प्रातः 10.00 बिे से
2.00 बिे तक िमा सकये िा सकते है। िराफ्ट/पे-आिषर
उपाध्यक्ष गासियाबाद सवकास प्रासधकरण के नाम एवं
गासियाबाद में भुगतान योग्य होने चासहए।

5.6 सनधाषररत सतसि तक कब्जा नहीं लेने पर
सनयमानुसार शुल्क देय होगा।

5.7 भूखण्डों का क्षेत्रफल अनुमासनत है,
सिसमें थिल पर सवचलन हो सकता है। क्षेत्रफल में कमी या
बढ़ोत्तरी के सलए कोई आपसत्त मान्य नहीं होगी। वािसवक
9 All. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court,
 Ghaziabad & Anr.
789
क्षेत्रफल के आधार पर ही देय धनरासश की गणना आवंसर्टत
मूल्य पर की िायेगी।

5.8 भूखण्ड के क्षेत्रफल में थिल के अनुसार
पररवतषन होने की दशा में यसद आवंर्टी िारा इस आधार पर
भूखण्ड सनरि करने/ पररत्याग का अनुरोध सकया िाता है
तो उसकी िमा धनरासश सबना सकसी ब्याि के वापस कर
दी िायेगी।

5.9 भुगतान की समय सीमा आसद के सवर्य में
प्रासधकरण/ शासन के आदेश मान्य होंगे।

6.0 भवि किमाणर् अवकिः

6.1 आवंर्टी भवन मानसचत्र सक्षम प्रासधकारी से
स्वीकृत कराकर ही अपने व्यय पर सनमाषण करेगा। भवन
सनमाषण की अवसध संसवदा पंिीकरण की सतसि से 5 वर्ष की
दी िायेगी। परन्तु आवंर्टी को तीन वर्ष के अिर अध्यापन
कायष प्रारम्भ करना होगा। सनधाषररत अवसध के अिर
सनमाषण पूणष नहीं सकया िाता है तो सनयमानुसार सरचािष
देकर यह अवसध बढ़ाई िा सकेगी सकन्तु 5 वर्ष से असधक
समय के सलए असभवृस्ि नहीं की िायेगी और दस वर्ष तक
भी सनमाषण न करने की दशा में संसवदा सनरि कर भंग कर
दी िायेगी तिा असधसनयम के प्रासवधान के अनुसार पुनः
प्रवेश कर सलया िायेगा।

6.2 आवंर्टी आवंसर्टत भूखण्ड का उपसवभािन
अिवा संयोिन नहीं करेगा।

6.3 आवंसर्टत भूखण्ड पर सकया गया सकसी भी
प्रकार का अनासधकृत सनमाषण सनयमानुसार ध्वि कर सदया
िायेगा।

7.0 पट्टा कवलेि

7.1 संथिा को भूखण्ड 90 वर्ष की अवसध
हेतु पट्टे पर सदया िायेगा। संथिा िारा समि देय
धनरासश िमा कराकर अस्न्तम सकश्त की सनधाषररत सतसि
से तीन माह में सनधाषररत प्रोफामाष पर अपने खचे पर पट्टा
सवलेख कराना होगा अन्यिा आवंर्टन/अनुबन्ध सनरि कर
सदया िायेगा।

7.2 आवंसर्टत भूखण्ड के कुल प्रीसमयम का
10 प्रसतशत लीि रेन्ट 90 वर्ष की लीि अवसध हेतु असग्रम
रूप से कब्जा प्राप्त करते समय देय होगा।

7.3 पट्टा सवलेख तैयार करने में स्टाम्प,
रसिस्टरी, लीि िीि एवं उसकी प्रसत तिा अन्य सभी खचे
आवंर्टी को स्वयं करने होंगे।

10.10 संथिा को भूखण्ड या उस पर सनसमषत
सकये गये भवन को प्रासधकरण की अनुमसत के सबना
सकसी अन्य को थिनान्तररत करने का असधकार नहीं हैं।
अगर आवंर्टी सकसी अन्य समान कायष करने वाले संथिा
को उक्त सम्पसत्त थिानान्तररत करने हेतु प्रासधकरण से
अनुमसत मांगता है तो प्रासधकरण के सनयम एवं शतों के
अधीन हिानान्तरण शुल्क के भुगतान पर आवंर्टी को
सम्पसत्त थिानान्तरण करने की अनुमसत दी िा सकती है।
इस संबंध में प्रासधकरण का सनणषय अस्न्तम होगा, िो
आवंर्टी को मान्य होगा।

10.11 संथिा को प्रासधकरण की पूणष
सहमसत से संथिा की थिापना/सनमाषण कायष हेतु सवत्तीय
आवश्यकताओं की पूसतष हेतु सकसी सरकारी संथिा या
सरकार िारा मान्यता प्राप्त सकसी सवत्तीय संथिा से ऋण
के सलए भूखण्ड को संथिा के पक्ष में बंधक रखने हेतु
अनुमसत प्रासधकरण िारा सनधाषररत सनयम एवं शतों पर
दी िा सकती है।"

28. Conjoint reading of Para 5.1 and
Para 5.2 of the brochure suggests that on
deposit of 25% price of the land and lease
rent and location charge, the possession can
be delivered after the execution of the
agreement between the parties.

29. Para 5.4 of the brochure stipulates
that 10% of the lease rent has to be
deposited before the execution of the
registered agreement.

30. Para 5.6 of the brochure provides
that charges as per rules have to be paid if
the possession of the plot is not taken
within the stipulated time.

31. Para 6.1 of the brochure provides
that in case the construction could not be
raised within the stipulated period of five
years, a further extension of five years can
be granted for construction on payment of
the surcharge as per rules. Para 7 of the
brochure relates to the execution of the
lease deed.

32. Para 10.10 of the brochure
provides that the plot cannot be transferred
by respondent no.2 without permission of
the G.D.A. However if respondent no.2
wants to transfer the plot to any other
society engaged in the same work, the same
can be transferred after permission from the
G.D.A. however, the decision of the
G.D.A. in this respect shall be final.
790 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

33. Para 10.11 permits respondent
no.2 to mortgage the property to any
Government institution or any institution
recognised
by
the
Government
after
permission from the G.D.A.

34. The conditions detailed above
from the brochure, which is a part of the
agreement, also reveal that the agreement
was to be executed after the deposit of 10%
lease rent and in case, the possession is not
taken within the stipulated time, respondent
no.2 shall be liable to pay charges as per
rules.

35. Further condition stipulated in
para 6.1 of the brochure provides that five
years period can be extended on payment
of surcharge if the construction is not raised
within the time stipulated in the agreement.
Respondent no.2 in view of clause 10.10 of
the agreement can transfer the plot after
permission from the G.D.A. Respondent
no.2 can also mortgage the property for any
financial assistance to any Government
institution or institution recognised by the
Government after permission from the
G.D.A. Thus, it is clear that there was a
clear intention on the part of the G.D.A. to
handover the exclusive possession of the
plot, and perusal of the stipulation of the
agreement and brochure and possession
memo do not reflect or indicate in any
manner that G.D.A. wanted to retain the
possession of the plot and wished to grant
only the permissive right to respondent
no.2 to run the school.

36. The Apex Court in the case of
Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R.N.
Kapoor AIR 1959 SC 1262 has held that it
is the substance of the agreement that
matters and not the form, for otherwise
clever drafting can camouflage the real
intention of the parties. While considering
the question as to whether the document is
a licence or lease, it expounded four
conditions in the judgment, on the
existence of which a document can be
termed as 'lease'. In the context of the
present case, paragraph 27 of the said
judgement is being reproduced herein
below:-

"27.There is a marked distinction
between a lease and a licence. S. 105 of the
Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of
immoveable property as a transfer of a
right to enjoy such property made for a
certain time in consideration for a price
paid or promised. Under S. 108 of the said
Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in
possession of the property. A lease is
therefore a transfer of an interest in land.
The interest transferred is called the
leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his
right to enjoy the property during the term
of the lease, and it follows from it that the
lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the
lessor. Whereas S. 52 of the Indian
Easements Act defines a licence thus:

"Where one person grants to
another, or to a definite number of other
persons, a right to do or continue to do, in
or upon the immoveable property of the
grantor, something which would, in the
absence of such right, be unlawful, and
such right does not amount to an easement
or an interest in the property, the right is
called a licence."

Under the aforesaid section, if a
document gives only a right to use the
property in a particular way or under
certain terms while it remains in possession
and control of the owner thereof, it will be
a licence. The legal possession, therefore,
continues to be with the owner of the
property, but the licensee is permitted to
make use of the premises for a particular
purpose'. But for the permission, his
occupation would be unlawful. It does not
9 All. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court,
 Ghaziabad & Anr.
791
create in his favour any estate or interest in
the property. There is, therefore, clear
distinction between the two concepts. The
dividing line is clear though sometimes it
becomes very thin or even blurred. At one
time it was thought that the test of exclusive
possession was infalliable and if a person
was given exclusive possession of a
premises, it would conclusively establish
that he was a lessee. But there was a
change and the recent trend of judicial
opinion is reflected in Errington v.
Errington 1952-1 All. ER 149, wherein
Lord Denning reviewing the case law on
the subject summarizes the result of his
discussion thus at p.155:

"The result of all these cases is
that, although a person who is let into
exclusive possession is, 'prima facie', to be
considered to be tenant, nevertheless he
will not be held to be so if the
circumstances negative any intention to
create a tenancy."

The Court of Appeal again in
Cobb v. Lane, 1952-1 All ER 1199,
considered the legal position and laid down
that the intention of the parties was the real
test for ascertaining the character of a
document. At p. 1201, Somervell. L. J.,
stated:

"................
the
solution
that
would seem to have been found is, as one
would expect, that it must depend on the
intention of the parties."

Denning, L. J., said much to the
same effect at p. 1202:

"The question in all these cases is
one of intention: Did the circumstances and
the conduct of the parties show that all that
was intended was that the occupier should
have a personal privilege with no interest
in the land ?"

The following propositions may,
therefore, be taken as well-established: (1)
To ascertain whether a document creates a
licence or lease, the substance of the
document must be preferred to the form;
(2) the real test is the intention of the
parties-whether they intended to create a
lease or a licence; (3) if the document
creates an interest in the property, it is a
lease; but, if it only permits another to
make use of the property, of which the legal
possession continues with the owner, it is a
licence; and (4) if under the document a
party gets exclusive possession of the
property, 'prima facie', he is considered to
be a tenant; but circumstances may be
established which negative the intention to
create a lease. Judged by the said tests, it is
not possible to hold that the document is
one of licence. Certainly it does not confer
only a bare personal privilege on the
respondent to make use of the rooms. It
puts him in exclusive possession of them,
untrammelled by the control and free from
the directions of the appellants. The
covenants are those that are usually found
or expected to be included in a lease deed.
The right of the respondent to transfer his
interest under the document, although with
the consent of the appellants, is destructive
of any theory of licence. The solitary
circumstance that the rooms let out in the
present case are situated in a building
wherein a hotel is run cannot make any
difference in the character of the holding.
The intention of the parties is clearly
manifest, and the clever phraseology used
or the ingenuity of the document- writer
hardly conceals the real intent. I, therefore,
hold that under the document there was
transfer of a right to enjoy the two rooms,
and, therefore, it created a tenancy in
favour of the respondent."

37. In the case of Khalil Ahmed
Bashir Ahmed (supra), the Apex Court in
paragraph 10 of the judgement held that if
an interest in immovable property entitling
792 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the transferee to enjoyment was created, it
was lease; if a permission to use land
without exclusive possession alone was
granted, a licence was the legal result. In
the said case, the Apex Court was
considering the effect of a document which
according to the appellant was a lease while
according to respondent/owner of the
property, it was a licence. The Apex Court
after considering the stipulations contained
in the document and by applying the
aforesaid principle of law found that
document was a licence. Accordingly, it
negated the contention of the appellant.

38. In the case of C.M. Beena and
Another
(supra),
the
Apex
Court
considered the effect of a document which
according to the respondent was a licence
whereas according to the appellant, it was a
lease. The Apex Court held that in
determining the question as to whether the
document is lease or licence, an endeavour
shall be made to find out as to whether the
deed confers a right to possess exclusively
coupled with the transfer of a right to enjoy
the property or merely a right to use the
property while possession is retained by the
owner. It further held that in considering
the said question, the conduct of the parties
before and after the creation of the
relationship is of relevance to find out the
real intention of the parties. Paragraphs 9,
10, and 11 of the aforesaid judgement are
being reproduced herein below:-

"9. A few principles are well
settled. User of the terms like "lease" or
"licence", "lessor", or "licensor", "rent" or
"licence fee" is not by itself decisive of the
nature of the right created by the
document. An effort should be made to find
out whether the deed confers a right to
possess exclusively coupled with transfer of
a right to enjoy the property or what has
been parted with is merely a right to use
the property while the possession is
retained by the owner. The conduct of the
parties before and after the creation of
relationship is of relevance for finding out
their intention.

10.
Given
the
facts
and
circumstances of a case, particularly when
there is a written document executed
between the parties, question arises as to
what are the tests which would enable
pronouncing
upon
the
nature
of
relationship between the parties. Evans &
Smith state in The Law of Landlord and
Tenant (Fourth Edition)-

"A lease, because it confers an
estate in land, is much more than a mere
personal or contractual agreement for the
occupation of a freeholder's land by a
tenant. A lease, whether fixed-term or
periodic, confers a right in property,
enabling the tenant to exclude all third
parties, including the landlord, from
possession, for the duration of the lease, in
return for which a rent or periodical
payment is reserved out of the land. A
contractual licence confers no more than a
permission on the occupier to do some act
on the owner's land which would otherwise
constitute
a
trespass.
If
exclusive
possession
is
not
conferred
by
an
agreement,
it
is
a
licence......[The
fundamental difference between a tenant
and a licensee is that a tenant, who has
exclusive possession, has an estate in land,
as opposed to a personal permission to
occupy. If, however, the owner of land
proves that he never intended to accept the
occupier as tenant, then the fact that the
occupier pays regular sums for his
occupation does not make the occupier a
tenant."

11. In Hill and Redman: Law of
Landlord and Tenant (Seventeenth Edn.,
Vol.1) a more detailed discussion also
9 All. Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. District Judge/Appellate Authority, Civil Court,
 Ghaziabad & Anr.
793
laying down the determinative tests, is to be
found stated as follows:

"It is essential to the creation of a
tenancy of a corporeal hereditament that
the tenant should be granted the right to
the exclusive possession of the premises. A
grant under which the grantee takes only
the right to use the premises without being
entitled to exclusive possession must
operate as a licence and not as a lease. It
was probably correct law at one time to say
that the right of exclusive possession
necessarily characterized the grant as that
of a lease; but it is now possible for a
licensee to have the right to exclusive
possession.