# Goan Sabha Sonbarsa, Pargana Tehsil, Gonda v. Shyam Sundar Chaudhary

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 1265
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-20
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Review Application Defective No. 288 of 2023
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/goan-sabha-sonbarsa-pargana-tehsil-gonda-v-shyam-sundar-chaudhary-53999
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

1 All. Goan Sabha Sonbarsa, Pargana Tehsil, Gonda Vs. Shyam Sundar Chaudhary
1265
"equal pay for equal work." Thus, the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present case.

28. The petitioners have also raised a grievance of differential treatment vis-a-vis similarly
situated Uptron employees absorbed earlier and granted protection of last pay drawn. No cogent
justification has been placed on record by the respondents to demonstrate a rational basis for such
distinction under the same policy framework.

29. In absence of any intelligible differentia, such differential treatment is inconsistent with
the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

30. In view of the grounds urged in the review application, the statutory scheme governing absorption
under the 2011 Rules, the Government Order dated 20.12.2011, and the legal principles laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments relied upon by the review-applicants, this Court is of the
considered view that the reliefs sought in clauses (f) and (h) warrant appropriate directions.

31. The review application is allowed. The judgment and order dated 03.08.2023 passed in
Writ - A No. 962 of 2010 shall stand modified to the following extent:

(i) The respondents shall re-fix the pay of the petitioners by taking into account the regular
service rendered by them in U.P. Uptron India Ltd. and the service rendered by way of adjustment
in the U.P. Civil Secretariat prior to absorption, strictly in accordance with the Government Order
dated 20.12.2011 and the 2011 Rules.

(ii) Consequential service benefits arising out of such re-fixation shall be extended to the
petitioners within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this
order.

(iii) It is clarified that pensionary benefits, if any, shall be governed by the applicable statutory
rules and binding judicial precedents.

32. There shall be no order as to costs.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 1265
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application Defective No. 288 of 2023

Gaon Sabha Sonbarsa, Pargana Tehsil, Gonda ...Petitioner(s)
Versus
Shyam Sundar Chaudhary ...Opposite Party
1266 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Issue for Consideration
Whether the application seeking condonation of delay of about 12 years in filing the application for review of
the order dated 15.12.2011 passed by this Court allowing Second Appeal No. 769 of 1983, deserves to be
allowed

Head Notes
The Code of Civil Procedure,1908-Section 114, Order XLVII Rule 1; The Limitation Act, 1963Section 5- The judgment dated 15.12.2011, which is sought to be reviewed, only records and
accepts the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant and it does not even make a
mention of any submission advanced on behalf of the opposite parties. Although the High Court
had allowed the Second Appeal on 15.12.2011, the decree holder-appellant himself remained
lethargic for about nine years and has filed an application for execution of the decree only in the
year 2020. The judgment-debtor - Gaon Sabha claims that notice of the execution application
has been served upon it recently. Although the execution application was not barred by the
period of limitation, but the delay of nine years in filing the application for execution and
thereafter not taking steps promptly to ensure service of notice of the execution application on
the judgment debtor - Gaon Sabha, is a relevant circumstance showing that when the decree
holder himself has been lethargic and has not acted with reasonable promptitude, condonation
of delay in filing the review application will not cause any prejudice to the respondent - decree
holder- Properties in dispute are not personal properties of the Gram Pradhan and the same
include a pond, a temple and a bhita (a mound or a smal hillock), which are public properties.
Held- Applicant makes out a case for condonation of delay in filing the review application. Accordingly, the
application is allowed and the delay in filing of the review application is condoned. (Para 11 & 13) (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi: (2001) 6 SCC 496; Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board: 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 1969; State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang: (2019) 10 SCC 408; Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam:
(2015) 3 SCC 569; State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao: (2005) 3 SCC 752

List of Acts
The Code of Civil Procedure,1908; The Limitation Act-1963

List of Keywords
Delay of 12 years; review application; decree holder himself has been lethargic; has not acted with reasonable
promptitude; application for execution filed only in the year 2020; properties in dispute are not personal
properties of the Gram Pradhan; but public properties.

Case Arising From
Review of the order dated 15.12.2011 passed by this Court allowing Second Appeal No. 769 of 1983.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Pankaj Gupta
 Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Tarun Kumar Pandey, Dharmendra Kumar Gupta

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

Order on IA-03 of 2023:

1. Heard Sri Pankaj Gupta, the learned counsel for the review applicant-Gaon Sabha, Sri
Tarun Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel for the appellant/opposite party - Om Prakash
Chaudhary and perused the records.
1 All. Goan Sabha Sonbarsa, Pargana Tehsil, Gonda Vs. Shyam Sundar Chaudhary
1267

2. Although the office has reported that the notices stand served on the opposite parties, only
the appellant/opposite party has put in appearance and filed objections against the application for
condonation of delay.

3. The present application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of about 12 years in
filing the application for review of the order dated 15.12.2011 passed by this Court allowing
Second Appeal No. 769 of 1983.

4. In the affidavit filed in support of the application it has been stated that Gram Sabha was the
opposite party no.1 in Second Appeal No.769 of 1983, which has been allowed by means of a
judgment dated 15.12.2011. The land in question belongs to Gaon Sabha, it is recorded as talab,
bhita and abadi land, which are public utility lands. An old temple also exists on a part of the land
in question. The suit was barred by the provisions of Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act. The appeal has been allowed without referring to any submission made by the
learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha.

5. The legal heirs of the applicant filed Execution Application no. 6 of 2020 for execution of
the order dated 15.12.2011. Upon receipt of its notice the review application has been filed.

6. In the objection filed by the appellant against the application for condonation of delay in
filing the review application, it has inter alia been stated that a copy of the order dated 15.12.2011
was served upon the Gaon Sabha on 07.09.2012. Therefore, the order was in the knowledge of
Gaon Sabha. Gaon Sabha had filed SLP (Civil) No.16059 of 2012 challenging the order dated
15.12.2011 and the SLP was dismissed by means of an order dated 21.09.2012. The order has been
recorded in revenue records on 16.04.2013.

7. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao: (2005) 3 SCC 752, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that: -

"14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held
that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The
expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of
justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the
party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet
another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for
such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public
interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share
the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same
for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take
responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is
imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to
have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the
officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what
constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to
1268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially
slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of
their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that
those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition
of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary
if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such
matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to
the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow
pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for
considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise ? is a routine. Considerable delay of
procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain
amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default
no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The
expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justiceoriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's
delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental
conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented
process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit.
No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be
laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by
the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision
or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt
action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made
personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an
individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue
the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is
an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants."

8. The aforesaid judgment was follows in Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam:
(2015) 3 SCC 569, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that "If the court is convinced
that there had been an attempt on the part of the government officials or public servants to defeat
justice by causing delay, the court, in view of the larger public interest, should take a lenient view
in such situations, condone the delay, howsoever huge may be the delay, and have the matter
decided on merits."

9. In State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang: (2019) 10 SCC 408, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

"7. ... it was necessary for the Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and
the slow pace in reaching a government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the
State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law
1 All. Goan Sabha Sonbarsa, Pargana Tehsil, Gonda Vs. Shyam Sundar Chaudhary
1269
of limitation would harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the
State, should not be condoned.

8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the
Government's functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would
result in injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost
for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected."

10. However, in Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: -

"261. ...Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it
abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for
condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that
delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient
cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides
and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But
courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due
to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking
condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private
litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this
everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate
delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more
particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to
questions of law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain
for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant
with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and neverexhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because,
say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation
of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and
leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure
that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be
permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law."

11. I proceed to examine the facts of the case to ascertain whether the same make out a
case for condonation of delay in filing the review application. It is stated in the affidavit filed
in support of the application for condonation of delay that the land in dispute is a public
utility land recorded as talab, bhita and aabadi, and an old temple exists on a part of the land.
The judgment dated 15.12.2011, which is sought to be reviewed, only records and accepts
1270 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant and it does not even make a mention
of any submission advanced on behalf of the opposite parties. Although the High Court had
allowed the Second Appeal on 15.12.2011, the decree holder-appellant himself remained
lethargic for about nine years and has filed an application for execution of the decree only in
the year 2020. The judgment-debtor - Gaon Sabha claims that notice of the execution
application has been served upon it recently. Although the execution application was not
barred by the period of limitation, but the delay of nine years in filing the application for
execution and thereafter not taking steps promptly to ensure service of notice of the
execution application on the judgment debtor - Gaon Sabha, is a relevant circumstance
showing that when the decree holder himself has been lethargic and has not acted with
reasonable promptitude, condonation of delay in filing the review application will not cause
any prejudice to the respondent ? decree holder. This fact is also very relevant that the
properties in dispute are not personal properties of the Gram Pradhan and the same include a
pond, a temple and a bhita (a mound or a smal hillock), which are public properties.

12. In Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi: (2001) 6 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that: -

"13. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like
forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature's bounty. They maintain delicate
ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which
enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e.
Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed
their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological
disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large.
Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non -abadi
sites."

13. Keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the
aforesaid facts make out a case for condonation of delay in filing the review application.
Accordingly, the application is allowed and the delay in filing of the review application is
condoned.

Order on memo of review application:

14. Issue notice of the review application to the opposite parties.

15. The learned counsel for the review applicant shall take requisite steps in this regard within
one week.

16. List the review application immediately after service of notice along with service
report and the record of Second Appeal No.769 of 1983 and the Matter U/A 227 No.7284 of
2025.
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1 All. Miss Shabnam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1271
(2026) 1 ILRA 1271
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
THE HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12344 of 2025

Miss Shabnam ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to compel police authorities to register an FIR under Section 154
Cr.P.C./Section 175 BNSS without availing statutory remedies under Sections 154(3), 156(3), 190, and 200
Cr.P.C. ?

Whether departmental action can be directed against police officers for non-compliance with the Supreme
Court's dictum in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.?

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section - 36, 154, 154(3), 156(3), 190, 200, -
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section - 30, 175(3), - Constitution of India - Article
226 - Writ Petition - seeking mandamus for registration of an FIR and departmental action against the
concern police officers for non-compliance with Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. - Applications moved under
section 154 CrPC and 36 CrPC / section 30 of BNSS are pending - petitioner relied on the Supreme Court's
dictum - while the State cited Waseem Haider v. State of U.P., emphasizing availability of statutory remedies
under Sections 154(3), 156(3), 190, and 200 Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 175(3) BNSS) - The Court
observed that since a statutory mechanism exists for lodging FIRs and pursuing remedies stage-by-stage, the
petitioner must follow the same - held - statutory remedies under Cr.P.C./BNSS must be followed and the
departmental action may be taken by competent authorities if police fail to register FIR despite cognizable
offence information - hence, the petition is disposed of at the admission stage, granting liberty to the
petitioner to pursue remedies strictly in accordance with law. (Para - 6, 7, 8)
Writ Petition Disposed of. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2014) 2 SCC 1,
Waseem Haider v. State of U.P. & Others, (2021) 2 ADJ 86; 2020 SCC OnLine ALL 1866,
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1.

LIST OF ACTS

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Constitution of India.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Writ Petition - Mandamus - FIR Registration - Section 154 Cr.P.C. / Section 175 BNSS - Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
/ Section 175(3) BNSS - Alternative Remedy - Departmental Proceedings - Lalita Kumari Dictum - main
grievance - in accordance with law - dictum - petition disposed of.