# Govind Pratap Singh & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 1 ILRA 1
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-01-06
- **Case number:** Misc. Bench No. 6 of 2016
- **Bench:** Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, Attau Rahman Masoodi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/govind-pratap-singh-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43393
- **Pages:** 2

## Headnote

(A)Constitution of India, Art.-226-Habeas
Corpus
petition-detention
on
groundpetition trying for bail-while the day on
which impugned detention order passedbail
application
already
rejected-hence
order passed without application of mindother
co-accused
including
father
of
petitioner are even in jail-no question of
claiming parity-detention order quashed.
Held: Para-16
We have taken notice of the fact that in
the impugned order dated 30.1.2015, it
has been mentioned that the petitioner
is making endeavour to come out on bail.
One of the grounds taken for invoking
provisions of the National Security Act is
that after dismissal of application for bail
by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda, the
application for bail of the petitioner is
pending adjudication in Case Crime
No.254 of 2014 (supra) in the Court of
Sessions Judge, Gonda. Admittedly, the
said fact has been wrongly recorded in
the impugned order. Application for bail
of the petitioner had been dismissed on
23.1.2015. As on the date when the
proceedings under the National Security
Act were initiated, application for bail on
behalf of the petitioner in the murder
case was not even pending. Thus, a nonexistent circumstance has been taken
into account for invoking the provisions
of National Security Act. It is evident
that the order has been passed without
application of mind.
The
apprehension
of
the
detaining
authority that the petitioner shall be
released on bail appears to be without
any cogent material and it appears to
have been passed on mere ipse dixit of
the
detaining
authority.
In
these
circumstances, the order of detention is
not based on sufficient material as well
as
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
detaining authority.
(B)Constitution of India, Art.-226-detention
order-96 days unexplained delay-detention
order lost its importance-quashed.
Held-Para-19In view of the aforesaid discussions, we
are of the view that on the date of
passing of the detention order, there was
no subjective satisfaction of the District
Magistrate Gonda and there was no
possibility of being released on bail
because on the date of p

## Text

1 All.
 Govind Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.01.2016
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, J.
THE HON'BLE ATTAU RAHMAN MASOODI, J.
Misc. Bench No. 6 of 2016
Govind Pratap Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Jitendra Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Constitution of India-Art.-226-petitioner
the pharmacists claiming-authorization to
prescribed medicines-in absence of doctorsuch relief can not be granted-in view of
Pharmacy
Practice
Regulation
2015section 2b (I) and 2 (d)-dispensing of
prescription-except
preparation
and
delivery of a drugs or device to a patientnothing more-petition dismissed.
Held: Para-3
At the very outset we may observe that this
is a very hazardous proposition made by the
petitioner and is directly against the
interest of public at large. The petitioners
are not practitioners of medicine nor they
do
hold
any
such
qualification
for
prescribing
medicines.
Even
otherwise
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
Sri Abdul Moin has rightly pointed out that
the definition clause as contained in the
Pharmacy
Practice
Regulations,
2015
authorizes the Practice of Pharmacy to
mean dispensing of prescriptions and not
prescribing medicines. The said regulations
have been published and are contained at
item no.153 at page 260 of part III of
Lucknow Law Times, 2015.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J.)
1. Heard Sri Jitendra Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Abdul
Moin, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for the respondents.
2. The petitioners are admittedly
pharmacists. Their prayer is that a
direction should be issued to permit the
petitioners to prescribe medicines to
patients in the absence of a Medical
Officer in the hospital.
3. At the very outset we may
observe that this is a very hazardous
proposition made by the petitioner and is
directly against the interest of public at
large. The petitioners are not practitioners
of medicine nor they do hold any such
qualification for prescribing medicines.
Even otherwise learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel Sri Abdul Moin has
rightly pointed out that the definition
clause as contained in the Pharmacy
Practice Regulations, 2015 authorizes the
Practice of Pharmacy to mean dispensing
of prescriptions and not prescribing
medicines. The said regulations have been
published and are contained at item
no.153 at page 260 of part III of Lucknow
Law Times, 2015.
4. Having perused the same we find
that the following is the definition
contained in Regulation 2 (b)(i) and 2(d)
of the Pharmacy Practice Regulations,
2015 :-
"2(b)(i)
Interpretation,
evaluation
and implementation of medical orders;
dispensing of prescriptions, drug orders;
(d)
"
Dispensing"
means
the
interpretation, evaluation, supply and
implementation of a prescription, drug
order, including the preparation and
delivery of a drug or device to a patient or
2
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
patient's agent in a suitable container
appropriately
labeled
for
subsequent
administration to, or use by, a patient."
5. In view of the aforesaid definition
clause the judgments which have been
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner and have been brought on
record do not come to his aid with the
enforcement of this new regulation. The
petitioners have thus no right to prescribe
medicines.
6. The writ petition is misconceived
and is accordingly dismissed.
-------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 28.01.2016
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AJAI LAMBA, J.
THE HON'BLE ADITYA NATH MITTAL, J.
Habeas Corpus No. 54 of 2015
Azad Vikram Singh
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India
...Respondent
Counsel for the Petitioner:
R.P. Mishra
Counsel for the Respondent:
Govt.Advocate, A.S.G., Ajay Kumar Singh
(A)Constitution of India, Art.-226-Habeas
Corpus
petition-detention
on
groundpetition trying for bail-while the day on
which impugned detention order passedbail
application
already
rejected-hence
order passed without application of mindother
co-accused
including
father
of
petitioner are even in jail-no question of
claiming parity-detention order quashed.
Held: Para-16
We have taken notice of the fact that in
the impugned order dated 30.1.2015, it
has been mentioned that the petitioner
is making endeavour to come out on bail.
One of the grounds taken for invoking
provisions of the National Security Act is
that after dismissal of application for bail
by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gonda, the
application for bail of the petitioner is
pending adjudication in Case Crime
No.254 of 2014 (supra) in the Court of
Sessions Judge, Gonda. Admittedly, the
said fact has been wrongly recorded in
the impugned order. Application for bail
of the petitioner had been dismissed on
23.1.2015. As on the date when the
proceedings under the National Security
Act were initiated, application for bail on
behalf of the petitioner in the murder
case was not even pending. Thus, a nonexistent circumstance has been taken
into account for invoking the provisions
of National Security Act. It is evident
that the order has been passed without
application of mind.
The
apprehension
of
the
detaining
authority that the petitioner shall be
released on bail appears to be without
any cogent material and it appears to
have been passed on mere ipse dixit of
the
detaining
authority.
In
these
circumstances, the order of detention is
not based on sufficient material as well
as
subjective
satisfaction
of
the
detaining authority.
(B)Constitution of India, Art.-226-detention
order-96 days unexplained delay-detention
order lost its importance-quashed.
Held-Para-19In view of the aforesaid discussions, we
are of the view that on the date of
passing of the detention order, there was
no subjective satisfaction of the District
Magistrate Gonda and there was no
possibility of being released on bail
because on the date of passing of the
detention order, any application for bail
was not pending and even the bail of the
similarly placed named co-accused, who
is the father of the petitioner had also
not been granted. The delay of 96 days
in passing the impugned detention order