# Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 1551
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-09
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 8940 of 2025
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/greater-noida-industrial-development-authority-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54178
- **Pages:** 15

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2 All. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1551
(2026) 2 ILRA 1551
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ C No. 8940 of 2025

Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether a revision under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973
against a demand notice is maintainable;
Whether the revisional authority has jurisdiction to review its own order;
Whether absence of opportunity of hearing vitiates the revisional order; and
Whether the allottee was entitled to grant of zero period benefit in the facts of the case.
HEADNOTE
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 - s. 41(3) - Revision - Maintainability - Review
jurisdiction - Opportunity of hearing - Lease allotment - Reduction of land area -Zero period

Held: On 14.12.2022, GNIDA issued a demand notice regarding lease premium and lease rent
calculated up to 15.12.2022, amounting to Rs.1,06,78,71,600.15 - The opposite party no.2 filed
a revision under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, read with
Section 12 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 - The revision was allowed by the
order dated 19.10.2023, holding that the allottee is entitled to be granted zero period benefit till
execution of the supplementary deed on 29.04.2014.
The power conferred upon the State Government under Section 41(3) is wide enough to examine
the propriety of a demand - After having submitted to the jurisdiction of the revisional authority
and having contested the revision on merits and having filed successive review applications, the
petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the plea of non-maintainability for the first time in writ
proceedings - Court held that the revisional authority has no power to review its orders - Court
found no force in the submission of the petitioner that the impugned revisional order was passed
without giving an opportunity of hearing, as the record revealed that the petitioner had filed
detailed objections against the revision, which were taken into consideration while deciding the
revision and were dealt with appropriately.
Although the lease-deed was executed on 24.11.2010, a supplementary lease-deed was
executed on 29.04.2014, reducing the area of the leased land by about 40%. The opposite party
no.2 was not at fault for the substantial decrease in the area leased out and suffered for the
delay in finalisation of the area - Execution of lease deed in respect of land which GNIDA had no
right to transfer and subsequent execution of a correction deed decreasing the land area was
without any fault of the opposite party no.2 - The lessee could not even prepare a development
plan till a possession certificate in respect of the revised land area was issued on 05.05.2014 -
The Court held that the revisional authority has not committed any error or illegality and that the
1552 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
opposite party no.2 is entitled to be granted the benefit of zero period till execution of the
supplementary deed on 29.04.2014 - Accordingly, the orders dated 29.05.2024 and 07.11.2024
passed by the Revisional Authority on the review applications filed by the petitioner were set
aside, while the finding that the lessee is entitled to get zero period benefit till execution and
registration of the supplementary deed dated 29.04.2014 is upheld, with consequential
directions. (Paras 22,23,24, 34, 35, 36, 41, 44, 45) (E-5)
CASE LAW CITED
Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCC 33;
Harjinder Singh v. State of U.P., 2011 SCC OnLine All 2094;
M/s Apace Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., Writ-C No. 3010 of 2022;
M/s Eco Green Build Tech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2025:AHC-LKO-30241-DB;
Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society (2013) 11 SCC 531;
Meghmala v. J. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383.

List of Acts
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976
List of Keyword
Demand notice; Revision; Maintainability; Review jurisdiction; Opportunity of hearing; Zero period; Lease
allotment; Reduction of land area; Estoppel; Jurisdictional challenge.
CASE ARISING FROM
From orders dated 19.10.2023, 29.05.2024 and 07.11.2024 passed by the State Government under Section
41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973
Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Sachin Upadhyay
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C.; Apoorva Tewari; Siddharth Nandwani;
(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Upendra Nath Mishra, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Sachin Upadhyay,
Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Rahul Shukla, the learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for the State and Shri J.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Siddharth
Nandwani, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2.

2. By means of means of the instant writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India the petitioner-Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as
'GNIDA') has challenged the validity of an order dated 19.10.2023, passed by the opposite party
no.1 - the State Government, in Revision No.6430/77-4-23/01 Appeal/23, under Section 41(3) of
U. P. Urban Development and Planning Act, 1973 (Annexure No.3 to the petition), order dated
2 All. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1553
29.05.2024, passed by the opposite party no.1 in Case No.2836/77-4-24/01/Appeal/23, under
Section 41(3) of U. P. Urban Development and Planning Act, 1973 (Annexure No.2 to the petition)
and order dated 07.11.2024 (Annexure No.7 to the petition).

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that in the year 2010 GNIDA had invited
applications for allotment of land for developing residential township in Sector 16-C, Greater
Noida (West) as per scheme code BRS03/2010. The tender submitted by M/s Mahagun India
Private Limited (the opposite party no.2) was accepted and an allotment letter dated 19.08.2010
was issued in its favour. On 24.11.2010, GNIDA executed a lease-deed in favour of the opposite
party no.2 in respect of land bearing plot No. GH-04, situated in Sector 16C, Greater Noida
admeasuring 2,41,570 square meters, for a total premium of Rs.279,27,90,770/-. The opposite party
no.2 paid Rs.27,92,79,077/- and the balance amount of premium was to be paid in instalments
between the period 19.02.2011 and 19.08.2020. As per the terms and conditions of the lease, the
opposite party no.2 was obliged to submit a building plan and the master plan showing the phases
for execution of the project for approval within six months from the date of possession and it was
required to commence construction within 12 months from the date of delivery of possession,
which was the date of execution of the lease-deed. The project was to be completed in a maximum
of five phases within a period of seven years from the date of execution of the lease-deed, which
could be extended by three years, subject to payment of the stipulated time extension charges.
Clause-4 of the lease-deed specifically provided that in case the lessee fails to complete the project
within the aforesaid period, including the extended period of 10 years, the allotment and the lease
shall be cancelled.

4. On 26.07.2011, GNIDA informed the opposite party no.2 that a correction deed was
required to be executed, changing the leased area from 2,41,570 square meters to 1,45,737.80
square meters and the correction deed was executed on 22.04.2014. On 05.05.2014, physical
possession of the leased land was handed over to the opposite party no.2 and a possession
certificate was issued.

5. On 10.05.2016, the opposite party no.2 wrote a letter to GNIDA, stating that out of the
revised area of 1,45,737.80 square meters, physical possession of only 1,37,400.80 square meters
had been handed over to it and possession of 8,337 square meters of land had not been delivered to
the lessee because of some pending litigation. Subsequently, possession of land bearing khasra
no.189, measuring 3,070 square meters and khasra no.257, measuring 950 square meters (totalling
to 4,020 square meters), was given to the lessee, but physical possession of land bearing khasra no.
192, measuring 4,317 square meters was not delivered to the lessee. The lessee stated that GNIDA
was not entitled to charge any interest on the outstanding amount till possession of the entire leased
land was handed over to it.

6. On 28.10.2016, the opposite party no.2 submitted a drawing of the project for approval of
GNIDA. On 23.01.2017, the opposite party no.2 moved an application for extension of time for
completion of the project by allowing an initial three years' period and zero period for construction
and completion of a minimum 15% area, and paid Rs.50,56,625/- as time extension fee. On
30.01.2017, GNIDA sent a letter to the opposite party no.2, informing that the zero period from
12.05.2011 till 24.08.2012 (470 days) had been granted. It was stated in the letter that the time for
1554 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
completing the first phase stood expired on 09.03.2015 and the first phase of the project ought to
have been completed by 07.11.2016. Paid time extension for completion of the first phase of the
project was granted till 09.03.2017.

7. On 09.10.2016 GNIDA approved the development plan for the total plot area measuring
1,45,737.80 square meters, which was valid for a period of five years.

8. On 23.02.2017 the petitioner issued a partial occupancy certificate for 10 towers constructed
by the opposite party no.2. On 07.03.2017 the opposite party no.2 requested for execution of sublease-deeds in favor of the allottees. On 19.04.2017 GNIDA issued a letter to the opposite party
no.2 demanding payment of the pending dues. On 25.01.2018, an allottee of the opposite party no.2
filed a complaint before GNIDA, stating that the opposite party no.2 was executing conveyance
deeds in respect of areas exceeding the area approved by GNIDA in the partial occupancy
certificate. On 09.02.2018, GNIDA issued an occupancy certificate in respect of 1649 units in nine
residential blocks and commercial blocks to the opposite party no.2.

9. The opposite party no.2 filed an application before the Additional District Magistrate
(Finance and Revenue), Gautam Buddha Nagar, for refund of excess stamp duty paid by it, which
application was rejected by means of an order dated 21.08.2018. The opposite party no.2
challenged the order dated 21.08.2018 by filing Writ-C No. 36468 of 2018 before this Court sitting
at Allahabad. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed off by means of an order dated 01.11.2018
by providing that the opposite party no.2 may file an application before the Joint Secretary,
Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, who shall re-adjudicate the matter regarding refund of
stamp duty in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of
Committee-GFIL Versus. Libra Buildtech Private Limited and others reported in (2015) 16 SCC
31 and the order dated 28.05.2018 passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 16639 of 2018.

10. On 22.08.2019, GNIDA issued a notice to the opposite party no.2, stating that it had
committed default in payment of Rs.32,36,93,305/-. The letter informed them that a policy for rescheduling the dues was in vogue and in case the petitioner wanted to avail the benefit under the
policy, he could submit an application until 31.08.2019. The letter asked the petitioner to deposit
the balance amount by 31.08.2019 or to apply for re-scheduling the payment of dues, failing which
proceedings for the cancellation of the lease would be initiated.

11. On 23.12.2019, opposite party no.2 gave a letter to GNIDA stating that the area of land
allotted and leased and the amount payable by the lessee was altered and adjusted by GNIDA and
the opposite party no.2 had not been handed over possession of the entire land area as per the
allotment letter and the initial lease-deed. The affected area was more than 30% of the total area
allotted, which had effected the project planning, execution and cash flow of the company and,
therefore, the opposite party no.2 was eligible for getting the zero period benefit as per the policy.
The opposite party no.2 requested that approval be accorded for a zero-interest period from day one
i.e. 19.08.2010 to 05.05.2014 (the date of handing over possession).

12. In this regard, the contention of GNIDA is that land measuring 1,45,737 square meters had
been allotted and handed over to the opposite party no.2 on 05.05.2014. The demands had been
2 All. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1555
revised accordingly, the amount already deposited had been adjusted and the balance amount was
payable in 16 half-yearly instalments. The opposite party no.2 had already been granted the benefit
of a zero period from 12.05.2011 till 24.08.2012 by means of a letter dated 30.01.2017. GNIDA
claims that the lessee was not entitled to any further benefit of zero period. GNIDA issued a notice
dated 31.01.2020 directing the opposite party no.2 to pay the pending lease premium and stating
that in case of failure of the opposite party no.2 to pay the amount, its lease shall be cancelled.

13. The opposite party no.2 filed Writ-C No. 6647 of 2020 before this Court sitting at
Allahabad, regarding refund of stamp duty. On 03.03.2020, this Court passed an order in the
aforesaid writ petition directing the State and GNIDA to file counter affidavits clarifying as to
whether the State of U.P. or GNIDA is the authority responsible for refund of the proportionate
amount of stamp duty.

14. On 14.12.2022, GNIDA issued a demand notice regarding lease premium and lease rent
calculated till 15.12.2022, amounting to Rs.1,06,78,71,600.15. The opposite party no.2 filed a
revision under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, read with
Section 12 of the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Act with the following prayers:
-

"I. To issue a suitable order or direction calling for the record and quashing the
impugned order dated 14.12.2022 passed by the respondent authority vide letter
No.ग्रे.नौ./डबल्िसा/2022/4307.

II. To issue a suitable order or direction directing the respondent to pay excess stamp
duty amounting to Rs.6,14,18,000/- (Rupees Six Crores Fourteen Lakhs Eighteen Thousand only)
alongwith interest @ 18% p.a. calculated w.e.f. 25.11.2010 till actual payment to petitioner;

III. To issue a suitable order or direction directing the respondent authority to declare
the period from 2011 to 2015 as 'zero period' due to farmer agitation, subsequent waiver of the
entire interest of the zero period and adjustment with principal amount of the land premium paid to
Respondent for plot no. GH-04, Sector-16C, Greater Noida (WEST) and reschedule the payment
plan of the said plot of land as the entire project of the petitioner company was stalled without any
fault of the petitioner, firstly due to farmer agitation, and Secondly due to inaction of Greater
Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA) in regard to repeated request for Zero period;

IV. To issue a suitable order or direction directing the respondent authority to declare
the period from 15-03-2020 to 25-09-2020 as 'zero period' due to outbreak of Noval Corona Virus
(COVID-19), subsequent waiver of the entire interest of the zero period and adjustment with
principal amount of the land premium paid to Respondent for plot no. GH-04, Sector-16C, Greater
Noida (West);

V. To issue a suitable order or direction directing the respondent authority to declare the
period from 01-04-2021 to 30-06-2021 as 'zero period' due to second wave of Covid-19 as a force
majeure event and subsequent waiver of the entire interest of the zero period sand adjustment with
1556 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
principal amount of the land premium paid to Respondent for plot no. GH-04, Sector-16C, Greater
Noida (West);

VI. To issue a suitable order or direction. directing the respondent authority to declare
the period from 10-06-2020 to 07-11-2022 as 'zero period' due to pending litigation between
authority and the builders in Supreme Court in WP (C) No. 940 of 2017 Bikram Chatterji & Anr Vs
Union of India, subsequent waiver of the entire interest of the zero period and adjustment with
principal amount of the land premium paid to Respondent for plot no. GH-04, Sector-16C, Greater
Noida (West);

VII. Issue appropriate orders for awarding damages for the financial loss and loss of
time suffered by the petitioner;

VIII. Pass such other and further orders as this Hon'ble Authority may deem fit and
property in the facts and circumstances of this case."

15. GNIDA filed objections against the revision inter alia stating that the petitioner had
already been granted the benefit of zero period from 12.05.2011 to 24.08.2012 and the instalments
payable after the zero period were postponed by six months each. The petitioner had submitted a
representation dated 24.12.2019 for being given the benefit of zero period in terms of the
Government Order dated 05.12.2019, which was examined by a committee. The committee
recommended that after the Hon'ble Supreme Court cancelled the acquisition of land in village
Shahberi, 95,832.20 square meters of land was affected and only 145,737.80 square meters of land
remained to be allotted. GNIDA had communicated with the opposite party no.2 for execution of a
declaration/correction deed on 26.07.2011, but the allottee caused a delay in execution of the deed
till 22.04.2014. As the delay in execution of the declaration/correction deed has been caused by the
allottee, it is not entitled to get the benefit of time extension. It is specifically stated in its reply that
plot no. GH04, Sector C, allotted to the opposite party no.2, consists of lands bearing Khasra
numbers 190, 192, 261, 262, 263, 266, 255, 253, 252, 251, 249, 248, 269, 290, 271, 272, 274, 275,
270, 268, 245, 246, 243 and 250 situated in village Chipiana Khurd and as per a report dated
22.01.2020 submitted by the legal department of the authority, no writ petitions were pending
regarding the aforesaid lands.

16. The report submitted by the committee further stated that the building plan was approved
on 12.05.2016 and the completion certificate of 1802 flats constructed in 10 towers in the first
phase of the project was issued on 23.02.2017, which shows that constructions had been raised till
that date.

17. The revision was allowed by the impugned order dated 19.10.2023, passed by the State
Government holding that although the land was allotted to the opposite party no.2 and a lease-deed
was executed on 24.11.2010, as the acquisition of land in village Shahberi was quashed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court a supplementary lease-deed was executed on 29.04.2014 reducing area of
the leased land. This High Court had also quashed the acquisition of a part of the land by an order
dated 12.05.2011. In these circumstances, it was not possible to raise any construction on the land.
The land allotted to the opposite party no.2 got affected by the orders passed by the Court due to
2 All. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1557
fault of the GNIDA and there was no fault of the allottee in it and, therefore, the allottee is entitled
to be granted zero period benefit till execution of the supplementary deed on 29.04.2014. The
revisional authority further held that the High Court had passed a stay order dated 16.03.2016 in
respect of 9,937 square meters area of the allotted land, which continued to remain operative till
04.08.2017 and declared zero period for the aforesaid area for the aforesaid period. The revisional
authority further ordered that the allottee will be entitled to a reduction of the interest rate as per the
Government Order dated 09.06.2020 and zero period for the Covid-19 pandemic in furtherance of
the Government Order dated 20.07.2022. The revisional authority directed GNIDA to ensure
refund of the amount of excess stamp duty in compliance with the Government Order dated
25.06.2019. The revisional authority set aside the notice dated 14.12.2022, directed the GNIDA to
recalculate the dues of the opposite party no.2 and directed the opposite party no.2 to deposit 25%
of the amount of dues within one month and to pay the balance amount in four six-monthly
instalments.

18. GNIDA has contended that Writ-C No.6647 of 2020 filed by the opposite party no.2
regarding refund of excess amount paid as stamp duty is still pending consideration of this Court
sitting at Allahabad and this fact was concealed by the opposite party no.2 and the State
Government has passed the impugned order dated 23.10.2023 directing refund of the amount of
stamp duty ignoring the fact of pendency of writ petition regarding the aforesaid prayer. Placing
reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and
others Vs. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others: (2013) 11 SCC 531,
the learned Counsel for GNIDA has submitted that a person who indulges in misleading,
concealing and clever drafting is guilty of fraud and is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of any
Court of law.

19. The petitioner has also placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Meghmala Vs. J. Narssimha Reddy: (2010) 8 SCC 383 in which the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed as under: -

"28. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by
making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853). In
Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that
'no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by
fraud, for fraud unravels everything.'

* * *

33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate
the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a
design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression 'fraud' involves two
elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.
(Vide Dr. Vimla Vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres
(India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. T. Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005
1558 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
SC 3110; K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; and Regional
Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170).

34. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a
view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void
ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not
amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud
cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata.
Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii)
without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a
material document would also amount to a fraud on the Court. (Vide S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu
(supra); Gowrishankar & Anr. Vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202;
Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319; Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal AIR
2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education AIR 2003
SC 4628; and Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836).

36. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is
proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the
questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata
are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the Court.
Every Court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the order so
obtained is non est."

20. On 28.12.2023, GNIDA filed an application before the State Government for review of the
order dated 19.10.2023 and it filed another application dated 01.03.2024 for recalling the order
dated 19.10.2023 inter alia stating that the revisional authority had not taken into consideration the
fact that the zero period benefit had already been granted to the opposite party no.2 and further, that
there was no stay order passed in respect of the plot in question. This application was decided by
means of an order dated 29.05.2024 recalling the direction for declaring zero period from
16.03.2016 to 04.08.2017 in respect of 9,937 square meters land as there was no stay order
operating in respect of the said land. The remaining pleas of GNIDA were rejected.

21. GNIDA filed yet another application for review of the order dated 29.05.2024 which was
rejected by means of an order dated 07.11.2024 passed by the State Government stating that the
original allotment was made in favour of the opposite party no.2 on 24.11.2010. A supplementary
deed was executed on 29.04.2014 because acquisition of 95,832.20 square meters was affected by
means of an order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The land could not be demarcated
immediately and it has been demarcated by letters dated 17.04.2012, 08.07.2013, and 04.02.2014,
issued by GNIDA. Thereafter, a declaration deed was executed on 22.04.2014, it was registered on
29.04.2014 and a possession certificate in respect of the revised land area was issued. It does not
appear that the opposite party no.2 has caused a delay in the matter and, therefore, a zero period
was declared from 24.11.2010 till 22.04.2014. The revisional authority directed GNIDA to
ascertain the benefits to which the opposite party no.2 is entitled. The Revisional Authority
clarified that in case the allottee has deposited any excess amount, the same would not be refunded
to it in furtherance of the order dated 07.11.2024.
2 All. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1559

22. Assailing the validity of the aforesaid orders, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that all the orders passed by the revisional authority are without jurisdiction as Section
41 (3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act provides for filing revision against orders
by which any case is decided. He has submitted that it has been held by a Division Bench of this
Court in the judgment dated 30.05.2022, passed in the case of M/s Apace Buildltech Private
Limited Vs. State of U.P. and two others: Writ-C No. 3010 of 2022, that the condition precedent
for the State Government to exercise its powers under Section 41 (3) of the Act of 1973 is that there
has to be a record of a case disposed off or there has to be an order passed by the
Authority/Chairman. In the absence of any case disposed of or an order passed by the
authority/Chairman, the State Government is not vested with the powers of revision. The demand
notice cannot be termed to be a case disposed off or an order passed by the Authority and a revision
filed under Section 41 (3) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act against a demand
notice will not be maintainable.

23. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Section 41(3) of the
Act of 1973 makes it mandatory to provide an opportunity of hearing before any order is passed,
but the order dated 29.05.2024 has been passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner.

24. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that in the order dated
27.03.2025, passed in Case No.1508/77-4-25-53-Appeal 2023 titled M/s Easter Agro Products
Industries Private Limited Vs. UPCIDA, Lakhanpur, Kanpur, the revisional authority itself
has held that an application for review of an order passed in revision is not maintainable. In the
judgment dated 21.05.2025, passed by a Division bench of this Court in M/s Eco Green Build
Tech Private Limited Vs. State of U.P. Writ-C No. 26214 of 2020 (Neutral Citation 2025AHCLKO-30241-DB) it has been held that the revisional authority has no jurisdiction to review its
order.

25. The learned counsel for the petitioner GNIDA has submitted that all the orders passed by
the revisional authority are without jurisdiction.

26. The opposite party no.2 has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition suffers
from the latches.

27. Upon this objection being raised, the petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit stating that
the order on the second review application was passed on 07.11.2024. The opposite party no.2
preferred an application dated 10.02.2025 seeking approval of occupancy certificate and sub leasedeed for proportionate area of the project. A payment intimation notice was issued to the opposite
party no.2 on 17.02.2025 and thereafter the file was sent to the Finance Department of the
petitioner authority for obtaining approval for filing of the writ petition. Thereafter opinion of a
Chartered Accountant was obtained, who initially gave an opinion without considering the zero
period policy. Therefore, the matter was again sent to the Chartered Accountant. Upon examination
of the documents and opinions, it was found that the petitioner authority stands at the risk of
suffering loss to the tune of Rs.149.93 Crores and, therefore, guidelines/reconsideration of the State
Government was sought. A letter for review was prepared, but the same was retracted as the
1560 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner authority decided that the State Government does not have the power to review its orders
passed under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Development and Planning Act, 1973. In June, 2025
the petitioner authority again sought legal opinion in the matter and thereafter the petitioner's
counsel advised that a writ petition should be filed after the summer vacations challenging the order
dated 19.10.2023, passed by the State Government on the ground that the demand notice should not
be construed as an order as per the order dated 30.05.2025, passed by a Division Bench of this
Court in the case of M/s Apace Buildltech Private Limited Vs. State of U.P. and two others:
2022:AHC-LKO:30003-DB.

28. In the counter affidavit filed by the opposite party no.2 it has been stated that the demand
notice dated 14.12.2022 was in the nature of a final order as the petitioner had made quantification
of the alleged liability of the opposite party no.2 and had demanded the quantified amount, failing
which coercive measures would be taken against it. This is not a demand notice and this is final
order of demand coupled with a threat of coercive measures in case of non-compliance with the
order. Therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. Regarding the petitioner's plea of nonmaintainability of the revision and the review applications on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the
opposite party no.2 has stated that these pleas were never raised by the petitioner before the
revisional authority. The petitioner cannot be permitted to raise new pleas for the first time before
this Court which pleas were not raised either in the revision or in the two review applications filed
by the petitioner itself. The opposite party no.2 has further stated that although the review
applications filed by the petitioner were not maintainable, para 17 of the impugned order dated
19.10.2023 was modified by the revisional authority on the basis of concession/ undertaking given
by the opposite party no.2 as it did not intend to join issue with the petitioner authority and to put a
quietus to the disputes in the interest of allottees of the project who are still awaiting execution of
the sub lease-deeds in their favour, which has been withheld owing to the continuing disputes
between the petitioner and the opposite party no.2.

29. In reply to the objection regarding maintainability of the Revision, the learned Counsel for
the opposite party has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of
Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra: (2006) 12 SCC 33 and a judgment rendered by a Single
Judge Bench of this Court in Harjinder Singh Vs. State of U. P.: 2011 SCC OnLine All 2094.

30. In Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

'9.'Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in
entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same inter alia appears
to have been without jurisdiction as has been held by this Court in some decisions including'State
of U.P.'v.'Brahm Datt Sharma'[(1987) 2 SCC 179],'Special Director'v.'Mohd. Ghulam
Ghouse'[(2004) 3 SCC 440] and'Union of India'v.'Kunisetty Satyanarayana'[(2006) 12 SCC 28],
but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle viz. when a notice is issued
with premeditation, a writ petition would be maintainable. In such an event, even if the court
directs the statutory authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield
any fruitful purpose. (See'K.I. Shephard'v.'Union of India'[(1987) 4 SCC 431). It is evident in
the instant case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so both in the
counter-affidavit as also in its purported show-cause notice.
2 All. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1561

10.'The said principle has been followed by this Court in'V.C., Banaras Hindu
University'v.'Shrikant'[(2006) 11 SCC 42], stating:

'48. The Vice-Chancellor appears to have made up his mind to impose the punishment of
dismissal on the respondent herein. A post-decisional hearing given by the High Court was illusory
in this case.

49. In'K.I. Shephard'v.'Union of India'[(1987) 4 SCC 431 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 438 : AIR
1988 SC 686] this Court held: (SCC p. 449, para 16)

'It is common experience that once a decision has been taken, there is a tendency to
uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose.' '

(See also'Shekhar Ghosh'v.'Union of India'[(2007) 1 SCC 331 : (2006) 11 Scale 363]
and'Rajesh Kumar'v.'D.C.I.T.'[(2007) 2 SCC 181 : (2006) 11 Scale 409] )

11.'A bare perusal of the order impugned before the High Court as also the statements
made before us in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, we are satisfied that the
statutory authority has already applied its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the
liability or otherwise of the appellant. If in passing the order the respondent has already
determined the liability of the appellant and the only question which remains for its
consideration is quantification thereof, the same does not remain in the realm of a show-cause
notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was maintainable.'

(Emphasis added)

31. In Harjinder Singh v. State of U.P.: (Supra), a Single Judge Bench of this Court held
that: -

"10. ... it is apparently clear that a wide power has been conferred upon the State
Government to act suo-moto or an application by a person and to call for the records for satisfying
itself with regard to legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued by the
Development Authority or its Chairman. The State Government has been conferred a power to
issue such directions in the matter under Section 41(3) as it may deem fit.

11.'In the opinion of the Court, the power conferred upon the State Government under
Section 41(3) is wide enough to entitle it to examine the propriety of the demand of Rs. 22,16,640/-
as compounding fee on the plea raised by the present petitioner that it was exorbitant. It is for the
State Government to satisfy itself whether in the fact of the case such demand of compounding fee
is legal and proper or not and to issue such direction as it may deem fit.

12.'Since the State Government has failed to exercise its powers vested in it under Section
41(3) of the Act 1973. The order impugned dated 12.12.2011 cannot legally be sustained. It is held
that the State Government is not correct in holding that the revision-petition as filed against the
1562 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order of the Vice-Chairman demanding the compounding fee, was not maintainable. The order is,
therefore, set aside. The revision is restored to its original number."

32. M/s Apace Buildltech Private Limited Vs. State of U.P. and two others: Writ-C No.
3010 of 2022 had been filed challenging the demand notices and an order dated 28.10.2020 passed
by the State Government in purported exercise of its revisional powers vested in it under Section
41(3) of the U.P. Planning and Development Act read with Section 12 of U.P. Industrial Area
Development Act, 1976. The petitioners had sought a direction to the respondent-New Okhla
Industrial Development Authority to decide the claim of Zero Period. The order dated 28.10.2020
was challenged on the ground that an opportunity of hearing was not provided to the petitioner and
the order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. This Court accepted this
submission and held that adequate opportunity of hearing was not provided to the petitioner.
Having observed this, the Court further noticed that if the order dated 28.10.2020 was quashed for
the reason of non-observance of the principles of natural justice, the matter will have to be remitted
to the State Government for decision of the revision petition afresh. The Division Bench held that
'The demand notice dated 17.01.2018, in our considered opinion, cannot be termed to be a case
disposed of or an order passed by the Noida authority. In this view, the revision petitioner under
Section 41(3) of the Urban Planning and Development Act against the demand notice dated
17.01.2018 is not maintainable.' Yet, the Division Bench did not quash the order passed in revision
holding that 'no fruitful purpose would be served even if we quash the order passed by the State
Government on 18.10.2020. (sic: 28.10.2020)'

Regarding the prayer for issuing a direction to the Noida Authority for deciding the petitioner's
claim in respect of Zero Period Policy, this Court found that the petitioner's claim for benefit of
Zero Period Policy had not been rejected. Therefore, this Court disposed off the writ petition with a
direction to New Okhla Industrial Development Authority to take a reasoned decision on the claim
of the petitioner in respect of the Zero Period Policy.

33. Thus it is significant to note that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (Supra) was not placed before the Division Bench deciding
the case of Apace Buildtech (Supra) and, therefore, it has not been taken into consideration by the
Division Bench. In the case of Apace Buildtech the revision had been allowed without giving an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.