# Guru Bachan Singh @ Bhangadi & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 515
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-12-13
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 45708 of 2019
- **Bench:** Ram Krishna Gautam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/guru-bachan-singh-bhangadi-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45097
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

A. Code of Criminal Procedure - Section
340, Section 343(2), Section 482 -
Complaint
by
a
superior
court
to
Magistrate-Inquiry, under Section 340 of
Cr.P.C.-Exemption of public servant from
requirement
u/s
200/202
Cr.P.CComplaint
accordingly
registeredPendency of appeal against decision of
the judicial proceeding-Section 343(2) of
Cr.P.C.-Judicial
discretion
to
the
Magistrate-No mention by applicants to
adjourn the hearing of the case until the
appeal is decided-Circulars Letters of
High Court, on its administrative side-
Unless specifically proceeding is stayed
by superior courts, including High Court,
proceedings at Trial court are not to be
stayed. (Para 6, 8, 9 & 13)

Criminal Misc. Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C
rejected. (E-8)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

1 All. Guru Bachan Singh @ Bhangadi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
515
Cr LJ 1005: AIR 1989 SC 1, Apex Court
propounded "In exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 High Court would not
embark upon an enquiry whether the
allegations in the complaint are likely to
be established by evidence or not".

9. Meaning thereby, exercise of
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is within the limits, propounded as
above.

10. Accordingly, there remains
nothing for any indulgence in this
proceeding. The prayer for quashing
summoning order as well as proceeding of
the aforesaid complaint case is refused and
the application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is hereby
dismissed.

11. However, in the interest of
justice, it is provided that if the applicants
appear and surrender before the court
below within thirty days from today and
apply for bail, then the bail application of
the applicants be considered and decided
in view of the settled law laid by this
Court in the case of Amrawati and
another Vs. State of U.P. reported in
2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgment
passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in
2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra
Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P.

12. For a period of thirty days from
today or till the disposal of the application
for grant of bail whichever is earlier, no
coercive action shall be taken against the
applicants.

13. However, in case, the applicants
do not appear before the Court below
within the aforesaid period, coercive
action shall be taken against them.
----------
(2020)1ILR 515

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAM KRISHNA GAUTAM, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 45708 of 2019

Guru Bachan Singh @ Bhangadi & Ors.
 ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Sarvesh Kumar Dubey, Sri Abhishek
Narayan Pandey, Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Code of Criminal Procedure - Section
340, Section 343(2), Section 482 -
Complaint
by
a
superior
court
to
Magistrate-Inquiry, under Section 340 of
Cr.P.C.-Exemption of public servant from
requirement
u/s
200/202
Cr.P.CComplaint
accordingly
registeredPendency of appeal against decision of
the judicial proceeding-Section 343(2) of
Cr.P.C.-Judicial
discretion
to
the
Magistrate-No mention by applicants to
adjourn the hearing of the case until the
appeal is decided-Circulars Letters of
High Court, on its administrative side-
Unless specifically proceeding is stayed
by superior courts, including High Court,
proceedings at Trial court are not to be
stayed. (Para 6, 8, 9 & 13)

Criminal Misc. Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C
rejected. (E-8)

List of cases cited: -

1. S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram, AIR
2015 SC 2757

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ram Krishna Gautam, J.)
516 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. This proceeding, under Section
482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
(hereinafter, in short, referred to as
'Cr.P.C.'), by Guru Bachan Singh @
Bhangadi, Guru Dev Singh @ Dadua and
Durvijay Singh @ Natiya, with a prayer
for quashing of the impugned summoning
order, dated 16.9.2019, passed by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukkhabad,
in Case No. 316 of 2018, under Section
419, 465, 466, 468, 471 and 120B of
Indian Penal Code (In short, hereinafter,
referred to as 'IPC'), Police StationKotwali Fatehgarh, District-Farrukkhabad,
and,
thereby,
quashing
of
entire
proceeding of aforesaid case.

2. Learned counsel for applicants
argued that the impugned order was passed
on the basis of report and its registration,
in an enquiry, under Section 370 of
Cr.P.C., and this was with no reason, fact
or appreciation of enquiry made by the
learned Special Judge. Applicants have
been summoned, for offences, punishable,
under Sections 419, 465, 466, 468, 471
and 120B of IPC for alleged deceit and
fabrication of surety bond for which a
previous enquiry was pending before the
court. Moreso, an Appeal, before this
Court, under Setion 343 of Cr.P.C., being
Criminal Appeal No.1555 of 2018, Guru
Bachan Singh and others vs. State of U.P.
and another, has been filed, wherein, this
Court, vide order, dated 21.3.2018, had
admitted Appeal for hearing, while, calling
for a counter affidavit, to be filed, and the
said Appeal has yet not been decided.
Hence, as per sub-section (2) of Section
343 of Cr.P.C., it was incumbent upon the
Magistrate to wait till out-come of the
Appeal and till then, above proceeding
ought
to
have
been
stayed,
but,
straightaway, impugned order has been
passed by taking cognizance in it. Thus, it
was misuse of process of law and
irregularity, apparent on the record. Hence,
this Application, under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C., with above prayer.

3. Learned AGA, representing State
of U.P., has vehemently opposed this
Application.

4. Before delving into points pressed
by the learned counsel for applicants, it
would be appropriate that firstly have a
glance of Section 340 of Cr.P.C.

5. Section 340 of Cr.P.C. provides a
procedure regarding cases mentioned in
Section 195 of Cr.P.C. and as per section
340 of Cr.P.C., when upon an application
made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any
Court is of opinion that it is expedient in
the interests of justice that an inquiry
should be made into any offence, referred
to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
section 195, which appears to have been
committed in or in relation to a proceeding
in that Court or, as the case may be, in
respect of a document produced or given
in evidence in a proceeding in that Court,
such Court may, after such preliminary
inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,-

(a) record a finding to that effect;

(b) make a complaint thereof in
writing;

(c) send it to a Magistrate of the
first Class having jurisdiction;

(d) take sufficient security for
the appearance for the accused before such
Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is
non-bailable and the Court thinks it
necessary so to do, send the accused in
custody to such Magistrate; and

(e) bind over any person to
appear and give evidence before such
Magistrate.
1 All. Guru Bachan Singh @ Bhangadi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
517

.........

6. Thus, in an inquiry, under Section
340 of Cr.P.C., a complaint is to be filed
by the court, concerned, and when a
complaint is being filed and order for its
registration is made, meaning, thereby
cognizance has been taken at that very
moment for an offence for which instant
complaint has been registered. Hence,
impugned complaint was registered prior
to impugned order, dated 16.9.2019.
Hence, very argument pressed by learned
counsel for applicants that the Magistrate
took
cognizance,
without mentioning
reason, is not tenable. The complaint was
filed and it was registered. Hence,
cognizance, at that stage, was taken by the
Magistrate.

7. Apex Court, in the case of S.R.
Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram,
reported in AIR 2015 SC 2757, has
propounded that it is neither practicable
nor desirable to define as to what meant by
taking cognizance. Whether the Magistrate
has taken cognizance of the offene or not
will depend upon facts and circumstances
of a particular case. By way of recording
of complainant's statement, under Section
200 of Cr.P.C. the Magistrate cannot be
said to have ipso facto taken cognizance.
After proceeding, under Section 200 of
Cr.PC., either to summon, under Section
204 of Cr.P.C. or to make further inquiry,
under Section 202 of Cr.P.C. or to reject
the complaint, under Section 203 of
Cr.P.C., are three stages, and those three
stages are said to be a part of taking
cognizance, i.e., depending upon facts and
circumstances of every case.

8. In the present case, complaint was
filed by a superior court to a Magistrate.
After making its inquiry, under Section
340 of Cr.P.C., this complaint was registered.
There was an exemption for a public servant,
who filed a complaint, in exercise of its
official duty from further statement, under
Sections 200 Cr.P.C. and 202 of Cr.P.C.
Hence, the Magistrate took cognizance in that
case, at that very stage, when it was got
registered. Hence, this formal order of
summoning is only, after taking cognizance,
which was previously taken.

9. Sub-Section (2), of Section 343 of
Cr.P.C., provides that where it is brought
to the notice of such Magistrate, or of any
other Magistrate to whom the case may
have been transferred, that an appeal is
pending against the decision arrived at in
the judicial proceeding out of which the
matter has arisen, he may, if he thinks fit,
at any stage, adjourn the hearing of the
case until such appeal is decided.

10. Thus, Legislature, has given a
judicial discretion to the Magistrate,
concerned, that after having notice of
pendency of an Appeal against the order
and decision made, under Section 340 of
Cr.P.C., the Magistrate may, at any stage,
may adjourn the proceeding till judgment
in Appeal and there is no material on
record, which may show that this was
mentioned
before
the
Magistrate,
concerned, and without making a mention
to
this
effect,
applicants
have,
straightaway, invoked jurisdiction, under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., of this Court.

11.

Under
above
facts
and
circumstances, this direct invoking of
jurisdiction, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,
of this Court, is neither was required nor
desirable.

12.

Learned
counsel
for
the
applicants argued that once the Appeal is
518 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
pending, then, it is obvious that the subordinate
court
must
restrain
from
proceeding further.

13. This Court, in present scenario of
pendency of cases at Trial court level, has issued
Circulars Letters, on its administrative side that
unless specifically proceeding is being stayed by
superior
courts,
including,
High
Court,
proceedings at Trial court, are not to be stayed.
Hence, this argument of learned counsel for
applicants is also not tenable.

14. In view of what has been
discussed above, this Application, under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., being devoid of
merits, deserves dismissal and it stands
dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2020)1ILR 518

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 2359 of 2015

Banke Lal Agrawal ...Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Dr. Mithilesh Bansal & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rahul Agarwal, Sri Dinesh Kumar, Sri
Nirvikar Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Abu Bakht, Sri Abhitab Agarwal, Sri
P.K. Jain

A. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (Act No. 13 of
1972) - Eviction - S. 20(2)(f) - Ingredients of
denial of title by a tenant - there must be
clear denial of title of the landlord by the
tenant - tenant's bona fide calling upon his/
her landlord/landlady to prove his/ her
ownership or putting the landlord/ landlady
to prove his/ her title so as to protect
himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a
protection made available to him by Rent
Control Law but without disowning his
character of possession over the tenancy
premises as tenant cannot be said to have
denied the title of his/ her landlord/
landlady or disclaimed the tenancy. (Para 16
& 17)

B. Rent Control Law - Eviction - Principle
of forfeiture by disclaimer - where the
tenant denies the landlord's title to
recover rent from him bona-fide on the
ground of seeking information of such
title or having such title established in
Court in order to protect himself - tenant
is not to be charged with disclaiming the
landlord's title - But where the disclaimer
is done with an express repudiation of
the tenancy under the landlord, it would
operate as forfeiture - Where after
creation of the tenancy if the title of
landlord is transferred or devolves upon a
third person, the tenant is not estopped
from denying such title - However, if the
tenant having been apprised of the
transfer, assignment or devolution of
rights
acknowledges
the
title
of
transferee either expressly or by paying
rent to him, the rule of estoppel once
again comes into operation. (Para 18)

Held - Defendant-petitioner/tenant has not
denied the title of the landlady & deposited
entire rent on the first date of hearing and
continued to deposit/ pay rent to the plaintiffrespondent/ landlady - Finding of the court
below on the ground of denial of title of the
plaintiff respondent as a ground for eviction
from the disputed shop, set aside. (Para 21)

Matter Under Article 227 allowed. (E-5)
List of cases cited: -

1. Keshar Bai Vs Chhunulal (2014) 11 SCC 438

2. Sheela Vs Firm Prhlad Rai Prem Prakash
(2002)
3
SCC
375