# Gurupal Singh v. State Of U.P. & Ors - **Citation:** (2016) 3 ILRA 746 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-03-30 - **Bench:** Rajan Roy - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/gurupal-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43596 - **Pages:** 4 ## Text 746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract.- Three years - When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him." 28. For the computation of limitation to plaintiff-appellant, the word 'plaintiff' has to be read with the definition in Section 2(i)(i) of the Limitation Act which defines "plaintiff includes any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue". In present case the claim of plaintiff for the relief claimed arose only after the death of his brother Ram Nath, when he allegedly became heir, legal representative and owner of half of the property of Ram Nath. Thus plaint case is that the plaintiff- respondent had derived his right to sue for the relief claimed from the Ram Nath after his death. As held above the limitation for cancellation had started to Ram Nath during his lifetime immediately after the execution of sale deed in question on 29.05.1981. the provisions of section 9 of Limitation Act are mandatory in nature which makes it explicitly clear that if time of limitation had begun running, then any subsequent in ability to institute suit cannot stop it. Therefore if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the plaintiff-respondent had no knowledge of execution of sale deed in question dated 29.05.1981, in that case also limitation would not stop running because it had already started during the life-time of Ram Nath. Therefore it is held that original suit of plaintiff-respondent instituted in year 1988 is time barred. Third substantial question of law is accordingly decided in affirmative, in favour of appellant and against plaintiff-respondent. 29. For the reasons discussed above, this Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 29.03.1991 of the trial court and the judgment dated 19.11.1991 of the first appellate court are set aside and the original suit no. 115/ 1988 is hereby dismissed with costs of whole proceedings. -------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: LUCKNOW 30.03.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J. Service Single No. - 6637 of 2016 Gurupal Singh ...Petitioner Versus State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for Petitioner Ateequzzaman Siddiqui Counsel for Respondents C.S.C., C.B. Singh 3 All. Gurupal Singh Vs State Of U.P. & Ors. 747 In the present case advertisement is under challenge which is issued by the Authorized Controller for filling up four posts of Assistant Teacher. Court held that there is nothing to indicate that he is only required to perform day-to-day functions. The petitioner has not brought on record any such direction issued by the Regional Dy. Director (Education), Director or the State Government which may prohibit the Authorized Controller from taking such action. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. (Delivered by Hon'ble Rajan Roy, J.) 1. Heard Sri Hemant Kumar Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner herein claims to be Member of the General Body of the Society which allegedly runs the school in question. 3. Admittedly, there appears to be some dispute pertaining to the Management. It is also not in dispute that the Finance & Accounts Officer, Basic Education, Balrampur has been appointed as Authorized Controller of the school in question and is functioning as such. The said appointment is not under challenge in this writ petition. Challenge herein is to an advertisement issued by the Authorized Controller for filling up four posts of Assistant Teacher. 4. Contention of Sri Mishra is that the Authorized Controller cannot issue such an advertisement nor proceed to fill up the same. He can only perform day-to-day functions. Such action could be taken only after prior approval of the Regional Dy. Director Education, the Director or the State government and not otherwise. 5. First and foremost, the Member of the General Assembly of the Society has no locus standi to challenge the impugned advertisement. Even otherwise, contention of Sri Mishra is misconceived and contrary to the provisions contained in Section 6 of the U.P. Junior High Schools (Payment of Salary of Teachers and Employees) Act 1978. Sub-Sections 3 and 4 of Section 6 referred above reads as under: "(3) Where the Management fails to comply as aforesaid or to show cause, or the Regional Deputy Director, Education, considers the cause shown to be insufficient, he may by order supersede the management, for such period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order, and authorise any person (hereinafter referred to as the Authorized Controller), to take over the management of the institution for the said period : Provided that the Regional Deputy Director, Education, may where he considers it necessary or expedient so to do- (i) extend the said period from time to time, so however, that the period so extended does not exceed five years in the aggregate; or 748 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES (ii) revoke the order at any time: Provided further that noting in clause (ii) of the preceding proviso shall bar the passing of a fresh order under this section. (4) On an order being made under sub-Section (3), the Authorized Controller shall, to the exclusion of the management and subject only to the directions, if any, of the Regional Deputy Director, Education, the Director or the State Government, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the management, including management of the property belonging to or vested in the institution and in particular operate singly the Bank Account referred to in Section 5 : Provided that nothing in this section shall be considered to confer on the Authorized Controller the power to transfer any such property (except by way of letting from month to month in the ordinary course of management) or to create any charge thereon (except as a condition of receipt of any grant-in-aid of the institution from the State Government). 6. It is not in dispute that the Authorized Controller has been appointed under SubSection 3, therefore, the first condition mentioned in Sub-Section 4 is satisfied. A reading of Sub-Section 4 leaves no doubt that the Authorized Controller, so appointed shall to the exclusion of the Management and subject only to the directions, if any, of the Regional Dy. Director (Education), Director or the State Government, exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Management including management of the property belonging to or vested in the institution and any particular part of Single Bank Account referred to in SubSection 5; provided that nothing in this section shall be considered to confer on the Authorized Controller the power to transfer any such property (except by way of letting from month to month in the ordinary course of management). As per sub-Section (5) of Section 6 any order or permission given under this section shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other enactment or instrument relating to the Management and control of the institution or relating to the property belonging to or vested in the institution. There is no such stipulation in sub-Section (4) of Section 6 requiring the Authorized Controller to take prior approval of any other authority before issuing such advertisement as is impugned herein. 7. There is nothing to indicate that he is only required to perform day-to-day functions. The petitioner has not brought on record any such direction issued by the Regional Dy. Director (Education), Director or the State Government which may prohibit the Authorized Controller from taking such action. 8. In view of the above, apart from absence of locus even on merits the writ petition is misconceived and lacking in merits. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. -------- 3 All. State Of U.P. & Ors. Vs Tej Ram Kashyap 749 APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.2.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT CHANDRACHUD, C.J. THE HON'BLE YASHWANT VARMA, J. Special Appeal Defective No. - 160 of 2016 State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Appellants Versus Tej Ram Kashyap ...Respondent Counsel for Appellants Vivek Shandilya Counsel for Respondent Abhay Raj Singh This special appeal has arisen from a judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2015. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and has directed the correction of his date of birth in the service record of the Irrigation Department of the State Government as 15 February 1959 in place of 15 February 1956. The respondent was appointed as a helper in the Irrigation Department on 1 November 1978. The application submitted by the respondent for appointment indicates that he was 22 years of age and had failed at the High School examination. The age of the respondent was entered in his service book as 15 February 1956. The date of entry in the service book is 17 February 1984 and bears the thumb impression of the respondent together with his signature. On 22 June 2004, the respondent submitted an application to the effect that his date of birth has been wrongly recorded as 15 February 1956 instead and in place of 15 February 1959. In support thereof, the respondent relied upon a certificate issued by the Principal of the Rajkiya Inter College, Bareilly dated 29 March 1990 indicating that the date of birth of the respondent in the records of the institution is 15 February 1959. Court held that after considering both on facts as we have indicated and having due regard to the provisions of law noted above, the learned Single Judge was manifestly in error in entertaining the writ petition and in directing the grant of relief for correction in the date of birth of the respondent from 15 February 1956 to 15 February 1959. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained in the first phase having been filed in 2015, for seeking correction in the date of birth. When the writ petition was filed, the respondent was virtually on the eve of his retirement. A long time after the respondent had entered into service, a correction in the date of birth in the service record ought not to have been entertained. We, accordingly, allow the special appeal and set aside the impugned order and judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 2 December 2015. (Delivered by Hon'ble Dr D Y Chandrachud, C.J.)