# H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and

- **Citation:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad #39655
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2000
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/h-d-singh-v-reserve-bank-of-india-and-39655
- **Pages:** 3

## Text

2ALL Archana Srivastava V. Vice Chancellor, University of Allahabad 27
decision aforestated will be applicable to
the facts of the present case.

6. In Robert D'Souza Vs. Executive
Engineer, Southern Railway and another,
1982 (1) SCC 645, it was held that striking of
the name of the concerned employee from the
rolls for unauthorised absence from duty for 8
consecutive days amounted to termination of
services on the ground of misconduct and
termination of service on such grounds
without complying with minimum principles
of natural justice would not be justified. In
H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India and
others, (1985) 4 SCC 201, the Supreme Court
held that striking of the name from the rolls
for the reasons of unauthorised absence from
duty amounted to arbitrary action. In State
Bank of India Vs. Workmen of State Bank of
India and another, JT 1990 (3) SC 589, the
Supreme Court considered the effect of
discharge from service on similar ground on
one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof and
held that it was not a discharge simplicitor or
a simple termination of service but one
camouflaged for termination based on serious
misconduct. In Mafatlal Narandas Barot Vs.
J.D. Rathod, Divisional Commissioner, State
Transport Mehsana and another, AIR 1966 SC
1364, it has been held that, "an employer may
visit the punishment of discharge or removal
from service on a person who has absented
himself without leave and without reasonable
cause, but this cannot entail automatic
removal from service without giving such
person reasonable opportunity to show cause
why he be not removed."

7. In D. K. Yadav Vs. M/s J.M.A.
Industries Limited, JT 1993 (3) SC 617, the
decisions aforestated have been relied on and
it has been held that termination of services of
the workmen therein in terms of Clause
13(2)(iv) of the Standing Orders which
provided for automatic loss of lien on the post
in case of expiry of eight days' absence from
duty was struck down on the ground of having
been passed in breach of principles of natural
justice. Learned Single Judge, in our opinion,
committed no error in quashing the order of
termination. The appeal is, therefore, liable to
be dismissed.

Accordingly the appeal fails and is
dismissed, however, without any order as to
costs.
Appeal dismissed.

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By the Court

1. The petitioner passed her B.A.
examination from Allahabad University in
1996 in second division with 57.19% marks.
In January 1997 notification was published in
newspaper inviting applications for LL.B. first
28 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
year admission for the session 1996-97.
Petitioner filled up the form and deposited it
in the office on 13.1.1997. Receipt no.4580
was issued to her on same day. For 1996-97
there was no entrance examination and
admissions were on the basis of marks
secured by the candidates in graduation or
post graduation examination. Intimation card
was issued by Dr. H.N. Tiwari, chairman
LL.B. admission committee on 25.11.1998.
The petitioner deposited admission fee on
26.11.98 and she was enrolled as LL.B. first
year student of Allahabad University. She was
issued enrolment certificate by faculty of law
on 24.2.1999. She joined regular law classes.
In the short counter affidavit it is stated that
the university received a complaint of large
scale bungling in admissions of LL.B. first
year of 1996-97. The university, thereafter,
constituted a committee which found that 214
candidates had been wrongly admitted. Their
admissions were cancelled. The petitioner's
name was also included in this list. According
to the respondents, the petitioner's original
application was not available in their office.
This is the sole ground on the basis of which
the petitioner's admission of LL.B. first year
has been cancelled.

I have heard Sri Rajesh Tripathi, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.S. Baghel,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

2. In pursuance of the order passed by this
court detailed counter affidavit has also been
filed. But there is no denial of the receipt
issued by the university or the signature of the
assistant. The only reason for cancellation of
the admission is that the application form of
the petitioner is not traceable in university
records. The question is whether this was
sufficient to give rise to an inference in law
that the petitioner was guilty of malpractice as
alleged in the counter affidavit. Copy of the
receipt issued by the university has been filed
as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. It clearly
mentions, "Received an application form for
admission",
from
the
petitioner.
The
university has failed to bring on record any
material to show that this receipt was forged.
It claims that since the admission form filled
by the petitioner is not available in university
record the admission has been manipulated by
the office. In other words the petitioner is
being held guilty because of university's
failure to trace the admission form in record.
In law no one can take benefit of its won
mistake. The recital in the receipt is clear and
specific. It cannot be overlooked. In absence
of denial about the receipt it cannot be
assumed
that
petitioner
obtained
the
admission without any application form.
Moreover there is no allegation that the
university took any action against any staff
and
found
that
these
receipts
were
manoeuvred. Therefore, it is, reasonable to
assume that the petitioner deposited her
admission form in the university for securing
admission in LL.B. first year for the session
1996-97. She was admitted by the Chairman
LL.B. admissions Sri H.N. Tiwari of the
university and intimation card was also issued
to her. It has not been explained how the
intimation card was issued by the chairman
admission committee because normally the
intimation card was issued by the chairman
admission committee because normally the
intimation card must have been issued on
admission form and not otherwise. Petitioner
deposited her fees also. All these facts clearly
establish that the petitioner was not at fault
and if the petitioner's application form was
not traceable in the university office, it was
the fault of the respondents for which the
petitioner cannot be penalised.

3. In the rejoinder affidavit it is alleged
that the committee of enquiry constituted by
the university did not afford any opportunity
to the petitioner and the university too acting
on this report cancelled petitioner's admission
without affording any opportunity, therefore,
entire proceedings were against principles of
natural justice. In my opinion it is not
necessary to decide this as I have held that on
the facts the order cancelling petitioner's
2ALL Ch. Badri Dass V. The A.D.J., Dehradun and others 29
admission was contrary to law and it
cannot be upheld.

4. In the result, this petition succeeds and
is allowed. A writ of mandamus is issued to
the respondents to permit the petitioner to
pursue her studies in LL.B. first year course
for session 1996-97 and she be permitted to
undertake LL.B. first year examination to be
held by the university. Since the petitioner
could not attend her classes due to the fault of
the university, the shortage in attendance is
condoned. This order shall be complied by the
university within 15 days.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

A certified copy of this order be issued to
the learned counsel for the parties within 48
hours on payment of usual charges.
Petition Allowed.

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By the Court

1. The petitioner has challenged the
judgment of the trial court dated 23.11.1978
dismissing the suit filed by him. Against the
judgment of the trial court the petitioner
preferred a revision and the learned revisional
court vide its order dated 14.2.1983 dismissed
the revision against the petitioner. The
petitioner filed a S.C.C. Suit No. 39 of 1974
on 9.2.1974 for recovery of Rs. 831.41p. as
arrears of rent, ejectment and damages with
the allegations that respondent no.3 was
tenant in the disputed premises at the rate of
Rs. 73 .13p. per month. However, the rent
being not paid since 1.9.1972 a notice dated
29.5.1973 was sent to him but inspite of the
service of the notice, the rent was not paid
and, therefore, he was liable for eviction on
the ground mentioned under Section 20(2)(a)
of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act') The respondent-tenant
filed written statement and claimed benefit of
the deposit having been made by him under
Section 20(4) of the Act. The trial court
having found that respondent no.3 had
deposited the entire arrears of rent on the first