# Habib v. State of U.P. through District Magistrate, Rampur and others

- **Citation:** (2002) 1 ILRA 239
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 1999-05-31
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6125 of 1997
- **Bench:** Anjani Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/habib-v-state-of-u-p-through-district-magistrate-rampur-and-others-39808
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Motor Vehicles Act- 1939 - section 110D-Claim petition - the review application
cannot be entertained either under the
old Act or under the new Act. Since there
is no specific provision to review the
revision, which is to be created under
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
240
only statute, the Tribunal has no power
to review the same (Held in para 3)

Cases regarded -
A.I.R. 1966 SC 641
R.D. 1997 P. 562
A.L.R. (34) 1998 P. 456

In this view of the matter, the order of
the Tribunal, impugned in the present
writ petition dated 28.11.1996 is not
supported by any law and therefore
deserves to be quashed.

## Text

1All] Habib V. State of U.P. through District Magistrate, Rampur and others
239
demonstrates that the petitioner is a
person connected with the crime, referred
to above, and therefore he is not the
person with whom the fire arm should be
retained in public interest. The appellate
authority has also taken the same view,
thus this writ petition.

3. The question as to whether mere
involvement in a criminal case or
pendency of a criminal case can be a
ground for revocation of the license under
Arms Act, has been dealt with by a
Division Bench of this Court reported in
1978 A.W.C.122- Sheo Prasad Misra
Versus The District Magistrate, Basti
and others, wherein the Division Bench
relying upon the earlier decision reported
in 1972 A.L.J. 573- Masi Uddin Versus
Commissioner, Allahabad, found that
mere involvement in criminal case cannot
in any way affect the public security or
interest and the order cancelling or
revoking the license of fire arm has been
set aside. The present impugned orders
also suffer from the same infirmity as was
pointed out by the Division Bench in the
above-mentioned cases. I am in full
agreement with the view taken by the
Division Bench that these orders cannot
be sustained and deserve to be quashed
and are hereby quashed.

4. There is yet another reason that
during the pendency of the present writ
petition, the petitioner has been acquitted
from the aforesaid criminal case and at
present there is neither any case pending,
nor any conviction has been attributed to
the
petitioner,
as
is
evident
from
Annexure
SA-1
and
11
to
the
supplementary affidavit filed by the
petitioner. In this view of the matter, the
petitioner is entitled to have the fire-arm
license. It is submitted by petitioner's
counsel that the petitioner has been
acquitted of the charges.

5. In this view of the matter, if there
is nothing else, which may disentitle the
petitioner for renewal of his fire-arm
license, the respondents are directed to
renew
the
fire-arm
license
of
the
petitioner. The writ petition deserves to be
allowed and is hereby allowed. The orders
dated 31.5.1999 and 7.9.1999 (Annexure1 and 3 to the writ petition) passed by
respondent no. 1 and 2 are quashed
subject to the aforesaid directions.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.02.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6125 of 1997

Smt. Raj Kumar Devi and others

 ...Petitioners
Versus
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Upper
District Judge, IInd District Jaunpur and
others

 ...Respondents.

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri B.R. Yadav
Sri D.S.P. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Dinesh Pathak
Sri H.O.K. Srivastava
Sri H.P. Misra
S.C.

Motor Vehicles Act- 1939 - section 110D-Claim petition - the review application
cannot be entertained either under the
old Act or under the new Act. Since there
is no specific provision to review the
revision, which is to be created under
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
240
only statute, the Tribunal has no power
to review the same (Held in para 3)

Cases regarded -
A.I.R. 1966 SC 641
R.D. 1997 P. 562
A.L.R. (34) 1998 P. 456

In this view of the matter, the order of
the Tribunal, impugned in the present
writ petition dated 28.11.1996 is not
supported by any law and therefore
deserves to be quashed.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar J.)

1. By means of the present writ
petition
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India, petitioners Smt. Raj
Kumari & others have challenged the
order dated 28.11.1996, Annexure-1 to
the writ petition, passed by Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal/Upper District
Judge, IInd, district Jaunpur, respondent
No. 1 in Misc. Case No. 17 of 1996. The
petitioners, who were claimants before the
Motor
Accident
Claims
Tribunal,
Jaunpur, which shall hereinafter be
referred to as 'Tribunal' filed a claim
petition under Section 110-D of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 before the Tribunal
and the Tribunal after hearing the parties
have given an award awarding a sum of
Rs. 2,64,600/- in favour of the petitionersclaimants vide its order dated 22.7.1994
in M.A.O. No. 11 of 1987. Thereafter, the
owner and driver of the said vehicle i.e.
respondent nos. 2 and 4, instead of filing
an appeal under section 110-D of the Act,
filed a restoration application before the
Tribunal and the Tribunal after giving full
opportunity of hearing to the respondent
nos. 2, 3 and 4 has modified the earlier
award dated 22.7.1994 by which the
award has been reduced from Rs.
2,64,600/- to Rs. 2,04,600/- vide its order
dated 23.8.1996. Thereafter the owner of
the vehicle, the respondent no. 2 filed a
review application before the Tribunal
and the claimants have filed their
objections to the said review application,
on which the Tribunal after going through
the
records
accepted
the
review
application and directed that claim to be
retried
again
vide
its
order
dated
28.11.1996. Against this order, the
present writ petition has been filed by the
petitioners. This Court vide its order dated
21.2.1997
has
stayed
the
further
proceedings in claim petition in question.

2. I have heard learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners as
well as the contesting respondents and
also learned counsel for respondent no. 3,
New India Assurance Company, Jaunpur.
In
my
opinion,
the
Tribunal
has
committed an error of law; firstly when it
reduced the earlier award dated 22.7.1994
thereby
reducing
the
amount
of
compensation from Rs. 2,64,600/- to Rs.
2,04,600/- vide its order dated 23.8.1996,
but that is not under challenge in the
present writ petition. Coming to the
challenging of the impugned order, Sri
D.S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioners argued that in the facts and
circumstances of the case the Tribunal has
committed an error in accepting the
review application filed by the owner of
the vehicle and directed to be retried the
award which is, upon a perusal of the
order impugned in the present writ
petition, because of discovery of certain
evidences coming into existence. Learned
counsel for the petitioners has relied upon
a Division bench decision of this Court
reported in 1998 (34) A.L.R., 456 - New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. Versus Smt.
Bimla Devi and Others, wherein this
Court relying upon the earlier decision of
Supereme Court reported in A.I.R. 1966
1All] Smt. Raj Kumar Devi and others V. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and others
241
S.C., 641 - Harbhajan Singh Versus
Karan Singh and the decision of Full
Bench of this Court reported in 1997
R.D., 562 - Smt. Shivragi Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation, has
held that the review application cannot be
entertained either under the old Act or
under the new Act. The Division Bench
further relying upon the two decisions,
referred to above, has observed that since
there is no specific provision to review
the revision, which is to be created under
only statute, the Tribunal has no power to
review the same. In this view of the
matter, the order impugned in the present
writ petition deserves to be quashed.

3. Sri Dinesh Pathak, learned
counsel for the respondent no.3 argued
firstly; the maintainability of the writ
petition instead of filing of an appeal,
which has been answered by a Division
Bench (supra). Sri Pathak has further
relied upon a decision of learned single
Judge of this Court reported in 1995 (2)
Transport and accidents Cases, 464 but
in view of the Division bench decision, I
am bound by the decision of the Division
Bench. In this view of the matter, the
order of the Tribunal, impugned in the
present writ petition dated 28.11.1996 is
not supported by any law and it therefore
deserves to be quashed.

4. In view of what has been stated
above, this writ petition deserves to be
allowed and is hereby allowed. The order
dated 28.11.1996, Annexure-1 to the writ
petition, passed by Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, Jaunpur, is set aside.
The petitioners will be entitled for their
costs.
---------

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 8.2.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE A.K. YOG, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5979 of 2002

Sardar Harbir Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
Additional District Judge, Court No. 14,
Meerut and others
 ...Respondents.

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ravi Kant
Sri Amit Krishan

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.
Sri Pankaj Mithal

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 -
Section 21 (i) (a) Release Applicationtenant
possessing
residential
accomodation in same city-tenant can
not object the release application.

Held- Para 15

Besides the above, in the explanation of
Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, is attracted
and tenant cannot object to the release
application filed by the land lord as he
has acquired a residential building -
wherein his son is admittedly living.

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.K. Yog, J.)

1. The dispute relates to residential
accommodation - House No. 254-255.
Ghoshi Mohalla, Lal Kurti, Meerut Cant.
Meerut. The accommodation, on the
ground floor, consists of two rooms. The
said house consists of ground floor and
first floor. On the ground floor, Landlady
has in her possession the following
accommodation: Two rooms - 17` x 8`