# Hansh Raj Singh v. The Managing Director and others

- **Citation:** (2000) 3 ILRA 306
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2000
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hansh-raj-singh-v-the-managing-director-and-others-39515
- **Pages:** 4

## Text

3All] Hansh Raj Singh V. The Managing Director and others 306
correct. Interest is payable under
Section 8(1) on the tax which is
admittedly payable as defined in the
explanation to Section 8(1). The deposit
of tax by the petitioner at 1/12th of the
estimated advance tax could not be
regarded as tax admittedly payable. Since
the tax admittedly payable is calculated
on the turn over as disclosed monthly
deposits merely represents 1/12th of the
deposit on advance tax on the basis of the
previous year's liability. It is not the tax
calculated on the turn over as per account
books or the returns in fact no return is
required to be filed in the first two
months. Hence in the relevant years no
interest could be charged. There is no
doubt about the fact that the entire tax had
been deposited along with the quarterly
returns.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied on the decision of this Court in
M/s Agarwal Automobiles Vs CST 1997
UPTC 843 and we fully agree with the
view taken in the aforesaid decision.
Learned Standing Counsel submitted
that against the impugned order the
petitioner has right of appeal and hence
the petition should be dismissed on the
ground of alternative remedy. We are not
inclined to accept this argument because
the writ petition was filed in the year 1984
and hence it would not be proper to
dismiss the petition on the ground of
alternative remedy after a lapse of 16
years. It is settled law that alternative
remedy is not an absolute bar.

10. Learned Standing Counsel has
submitted that in paragraph 6 of the
judgment of this Court in Agarwal
Automobiles Case (Supra) which has
been relied upon by the learned counsel
for the petitioner it has been stated that
the assessee has to deposit the tax during
the month itself and cannot postpone it till
the end of the succeeding month. Learned
counsel for the petitioner does not dispute
this proposition but it is not the admitted
tax as contemplated under Section 8(1) of
U.P. Trade Tax Act as no return are
required to be filed for the first two
months of the quarter when a dealer
resorts to the second proviso of Rule 41.
Hence the tax payable by him according
to monthly average of the preceding year
cannot be treated as the tax admittedly
payable by the dealer.

11. In fact for this reason the
contention
of
the
learned
Standing
Counsel in Agarwal Automobiles case
(supra) has been rejected in paragraph 11
of that decision.

12. For the reasons mentioned above
the writ petition is allowed and the
amount of interest deposited by the
petitioner is directed to be refunded for
the assessment years 1976-77, 1977-78
and 1978-79 with interest at Rs. 12%
from the date of deposit till the date of
refund within 3 months of production of
copy of this order before the assessing
authority.

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By the Court

1. Heard Sri K.S. Rathore, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rakesh
Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent
no. 1 to 3.

On the consent of counsel for the
parties the writ petition is taken up for
final disposal at the stage of admission.
The
petitioner
while
serving
as
cashier/clerk in the ate Bank of Patiala,
Chowk Area, Allahabad was placed under
suspension by order dated June 17, 1995
(Annexure-1) since he was involved in a
criminal case and remained in jail being
arrested by the police. The Criminal case
and remained in jail being arrested by the
police. The Criminal case ended in
acquittal by a judgment and order dated
16.9.1995 (Annexure-2) and thereupon
the order of suspension was revoked and
the petitioner joined his service on
20.2.1995. The total period of suspension
was 145 days. The petitioner then made a
representation to treat the whole period of
suspension as duty, .on receiving which
the Managing Director of the State Bank
of Patiala informed the petitioner to apply
for leave for the aforesaid period. The
aforesaid factual position stands admitted
by the counsel appearing for both the
patties.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner
referring to Regulation 46 (2) (b) of the
Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulation,
1948, as set out in the rejoinder affidavit
submits that in view of the acquittal of the
petitioner,
The
whole
period
of
suspension should be treated as duty and
full pay and allowances should be paid to
the petitioner since he was acquitted of
the charge.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, on the other hand contends
that
the
petitioner
committed
a
misconduct, inasmuch as, without prior
permission he left for his native place and
got involved in a murder case and though
ultimately he was acquitted by the Court,
he is not entitled to full pay and
allowances for the period of suspension
on principle of "no work no Pay"

4. Undisputedly, the petitioner was
found not guilty of the charge of murder
and was accordingly acquitted. In such a
fact situation question arises whether the
petitioner would be entitled to full pay
and allowances for the whole period of
suspension.

The
relevant
part
of
Regulation 46 of the Reserve Bank of
India (Staff) Regulation, 1946 of which
3All] Hansh Raj Singh V. The Managing Director and others 308
reference has been made in the rejoinder
affidavit is extracted hereunder:

"46 (2) (b) Any payment made to an
employee under sub- Regulation:
(ii) shall be subject to adjustment of his
pay and allowances which shall be made
according to the circumstances of the case
and in the light of the decision as to
whether such period is to be accounted for
as a period on duty or leave.

Provided that full pay and allowances will
be admissible only if the employee---

(a).............................................
(b) is acquitted of all blame or satisfies
the Competent Authority, in the case of
release from detention or of his detention
being set aside by a Competent court that
he had not been guilty of improper
conduct resulting in his detention."

5. A reading of the said Regulation
would show that full pay and allowance
will be admissible to an employee if he
satisfies the authority that he has been
found not guilty and acquitted of the
charge. The case of the respondents is
that the petitioner is not entitled to salary
for the whole period of suspension, in
view of clause 13.1 to 13.6 (wrongly
typed as 3.36) of the Bipartite settlement,
1966. The copy of the Bipartite
settlement has been produced before me.
A reading of the aforesaid clauses does
not show that an employee is not entitled
to full salary and allowance for the
suspension period for his being involved
in a criminal charge. The submission of
the learned counsel for respondents that
the petitioner had committed misconduct,
inasmuch as, he absented himself from
duty and got involved in a criminal case
and, therefore, he is not entitled to salary
for the period of suspension merits no
consideration in view of the fact that
admittedly no disciplinary proceedings
has been initiated against him for his
alleged absence form the Headquarters
without prior permission.

6. In the course of argument, learned
counsel for the respondents referred to a
decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v.
Superintendent
Engineer,
Gujrat
Electricity Board, Gujrat & another
1997 (1) E.S.C. 565, and submitted that in
view of the law laid down in the said case
the petitioner is not entitled to full pay
and
allowances
for
the
period
of
suspension. The aforesaid reported case
has no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. The
petitioner in that case was charged with
an offence under section 302/34 I.P.C.
and upon trial was found guilty and
sentenced for life. In view of the
conviction and sentence action was taken
against him and he was dismissed from
service. Challenging the said order of
dismissal he approached the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. While the writ petition was
pending he was acquitted of the offence
by the High Court. In view of such
acquittal, the court disposed of the writ
petition and directed to reinstate him in
service but denied back wages. He
moved a letters patent appeal and was
unsuccessful. Then he moved the Apex
Court by filing special leave petition. In
such fact situation, their Lordships held
that since the petitioner had involved
himself in a criminal case, though he was
later acquitted, he had disabled himself
from rendering the service on account of
conviction and incarceration in jail.
309 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
7. The case in hand, however, stands
on a different footing. Besides there is
specific provision in the Regulation
referred to earlier which provides that full
pay and allowances would be admissible
if the employee is acquitted of all the
blame.

8. In view of the discussions made
above, I am inclined to allow the present
writ petition. Resultantly, the writ
petition is allowed. The respondents are
directed to treat the whole period of
suspension of the petitioner as duty and
pay him salary and other allowances for
the said period within two months hence.
In the circumstances, there will be no
orders as to costs.

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By the Court

1. Heard Sri W.H. Khan for the
petitioner and Sri B.K. Bist for the U.P.
Higher Education Services Commission
and
the
learned
Standing
Counsel
representing the State.

2. Pursuant to the advertisement no.
27,28,29 issued by U.P. Higher Education
Services
Commission,
Allahabad
in
National Daily including 'Times of India'
dated 5.7.2000 the petitioner applied for
the post of Lecturer in Political Science.
The application was sent through Speed
Post on 31.7.2000 from Lohiya Nagar
Post Office, Patna. According to the
advertisement aforestated the last date for
receipt of application was 5.8.2000 as
would be evident from Clause III of the
advertisement which reads as under:-

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