# Hanuman Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 11 ILRA 313
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-11-06
- **Case number:** Writ -A No. 10219 of 2024
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hanuman-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51010
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Petitioner
was appointed on 1.1.1984 as a Mali on
daily wager. Respondents by means of
order dated 3.11.2013 regularized the
services of the petitioner from the date
the said order was passed i.e.23.11.2013.
Petitioner
superannuated
from
the
services
on
30.4.2024.

After
his
superannuation he started representing
that his services deserve to be regularized
from 2001 onwards. Held: During his
services after passing of the order of
regularization no grievance was raised by
the petitioner. Petitioner accepted the
order of regularization in 2013 and not
challenged the order of regularization till
the date of his superannuation. Court was
of the opinion that the claim of the
petitioner suffers from unexplained delay
and laches of 11 years, as such, no
interference is required in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. (Para 8)

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

11 All. Hanuman Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
313
including his pay and other allowances as
well as seniority, as a consequence of his
appointment, only with effect from the date
of his joining.

24. With the aforesaid directions
and observations, the writ petition is
allowed.

25. A copy of this order be
communicated to the Principal Secretary,
Secretariat Administration Section - 5
(Establishment),
Government
of
Uttar
Pradesh, Lucknow and the Joint Secretary,
Secretariat Administration Section - 5
(Establishment),
Government
of
Uttar
Pradesh,
Lucknow
by
the
Registrar
(Compliance) within ten days from today.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 313
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ -A No. 10219 of 2024

Hanuman Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Shiv Pal Singh, Suresh Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Petitioner
was appointed on 1.1.1984 as a Mali on
daily wager. Respondents by means of
order dated 3.11.2013 regularized the
services of the petitioner from the date
the said order was passed i.e.23.11.2013.
Petitioner
superannuated
from
the
services
on
30.4.2024.

After
his
superannuation he started representing
that his services deserve to be regularized
from 2001 onwards. Held: During his
services after passing of the order of
regularization no grievance was raised by
the petitioner. Petitioner accepted the
order of regularization in 2013 and not
challenged the order of regularization till
the date of his superannuation. Court was
of the opinion that the claim of the
petitioner suffers from unexplained delay
and laches of 11 years, as such, no
interference is required in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution. (Para 8)

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited:

1. U.O.I. Vs Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648

2. U.O.I. Vs N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25

3. Chairman, State Bank of India v. M J James,
(2022) 2 SCC 301

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shiv Pal Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner and the Standing
counsel for the respondents.

2. The petitioner has prayed for
following reliefs:

"(I) Issue a writ, order or
direction
in
the
nature
of
Mandamus thereby commanding
and directing the opposite parties
to treat the regularization of the
services of petitioner w.e.f. 2001
when
the
regularization
rules
applicable upon the petitioenr were
notified,
for
the
purpose
of
pensionary
benefits
with
all
consequential benefits.
(II) Issue a writ, order or
direction
in
the
nature
of
314 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Mandamus thereby commanding
and directing the opposite parties
to add the services rendered by the
petitioner on the daily wages for
the purpose of pensionary benefits
with
all
consequential
service
benefits to the petitioner, in the
interest of justice..."

3. It has been submitted that the
petitioner was appointed on 1.1.1984 as a
Mali on daily wager Group D post in
Horticulture Department, Faizabad under
the Superintendent, Government Garden.
As his services were not regularized
despite his working for substantially long
length of time, he had approached thsi
Court by filing writ petition bearing Writ
Petition No.6615 (S/S) of 2004 where by
means of an interim order granted on
5.11.2004 the respondents were directed
to consider granting him minimum of pay
scale and also for regularization within 8
weeks. As the order of the writ Court was
not complied, a contempt petition was
preferred
being
Contempt
Petition
No.824 (C) of 2005 (Hanuman Singh Vs.
Sri
Manmohan
Sinha,
Director,
Horticulture) where the proceedings were
dropped after recording the statement of
the opposite parties that the petitioner
shall be paid minimum of pay scale w.e.f.
7.11.2004. The writ petition No. 6615
(S/S) of 2004 was finally allowed by
means
of
order
dated
27.5.2013
considering that the petitioner has been
working for thirty years, the respondents
were directed to create a post in case the
same was not available and pass an order
regularizing his services within a period
of one month. In compliance of the
directions of this Court vide order dated
27.5.2013, the respondents by means of
order dated 3.11.2013 regularized the
services of the petitioner on the post of
Mali from the date the said order was
passed i.e.23.11.2013. The petitioner
continued as a regular employee and
finally was superannuated from the
services on 30.4.2024.

4.

It
is
only
after
his
superannuation that he started representing
against
the
order
of
regularization,
particularly, with regard to the date of his
regularization and representations were
submitted on 15.5.2024 and finally the
present writ petition has been field seeking
a direction that his services deserve to be
regularized from 2001 on-wards.

5. Learned Standing counsel, on
the other hand, has opposed the writ
petition. He has submitted that the
grievances of the petitioner with regard to
regularization was already canvassed by
him by filing two writ petitions before this
Court and this Court had duly considered
the claim of the petitioner and allowed his
writ petition No.6615 (S/S) of 2004 by
means of judgment and order dated
27.5.2013. It is on the direction of the writ
Court that his services were regularized by
means of order dated 23.11.2013 and the
petitioner continued on the strength of the
said
order
till
the
date
of
his
superannuation. He never raised any
grievance during currency of his services
and after lapse of 11 years, he has filed this
writ petition. In the aforesaid circumstances
it has been submitted that the petitioner
himself has accepted the order dated
23.11.2013 and even in the present writ
petition he has only sought a writ of
mandamus directing the respondents for
consideration of his representation from
2001 on-wards rather than challenging the
validity of the order dated 23.11.2013 while
the said claim is highly time bared and the
petition suffers from unexplained delay and
11 All. Hanuman Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
315
latched of 11 years and accordingly
deserves to be dismissed.

6. I have heard the rival
contentions and perused the record.

7. From the aforesaid facts it is
clear that the petitioner has been working
on the post of Mali since 1984 in
Horticulture Department and when his
services
were
not
regularized
he
approached this Court by filing writ
petition No.6615 (S/S) of 2004. The said
writ petition was allowed by means of
judgment and order dated 27.5.2013
directing the respondents to duly consider the
claim of the petitioner for regularization and
it is in pursuance of the directions issued by
this Court that by means of order dated
23.11.2013 the services of the petitioner were
regularized w.e.f. from the said date and he
continued in services till the date of
superannuation in 2024 and raised no
grievance
with
regard
to
date
of
regularization. The petitioner has accepted
the order dated 23.11.2013 and never
represented or raised any grievance regarding
the same and eve till date he has not even
challenged the validity of the said order but
only after his superannuation he has sought
further relief of being regularized from 2011
on wards. In the entire writ petition there is
no averment with regard to the delay in
approaching this Court by filing present writ
petition. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear
that the petitioner has been vigilant about his
rights as a government servant and he has
already approached this Court on several
occasions seeking right of regularization and
it cannot be said that he was not aware of the
relevant legal provisions with regard to his
rights of regularization.

8. At this point, it is relevant to
mention certain judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court explaining the effect of
delay, latches and acquiescence in service
matters.

(1) Union of India v.
Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:

"To
summarise,
normally, a belated service
related
claim
will
be
rejected on the ground of
delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a
writ petition) or limitation
(where remedy is sought by
an
application
to
the
Administrative
Tribunal).
One of the exceptions to the
said rule is cases relating
to a continuing wrong.
Where a service related
claim
is
based
on
a
continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there
is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to
the date on which the
continuing
wrong
commenced,
if
such
continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury.
But there is an exception to
the
exception.
If
the
grievance is in respect of
any order or administrative
decision which related to
or affected several others
also, and if the reopening
of the issue would affect the
settled
rights
of
third
parties, then the claim will
not be entertained. For
example, if the issue relates
to payment or refixation of
pay or pension, relief may
316 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
be granted in spite of delay
as it does not affect the
rights of third parties. But
if the claim involved issues
relating to seniority or
promotion, etc., affecting
others, delay would render
the claim stale and doctrine
of laches/limitation will be
applied. Insofar as the
consequential
relief
of
recovery of arrears for a
past period is concerned,
the principles relating to
recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. As a
consequence,
the
High
Courts will restrict the
consequential
relief
relating
to
arrears
normally to a period of
three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ
petition."
(emphasis supplied)
(2) Union of India v. N
Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:

"Delay,
laches
and
acquiescence
20. The principles
governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence
are
overlapping
and
interconnected
on
many
occasions. However, they
have
their
distinct
characters
and
distinct
elements. One can say that
delay is the genus to which
laches and acquiescence are
species. Similarly, laches
might be called a genus to a
species
by
name
acquiescence.
However,
there may be a case where
acquiescence is involved, but
not laches. These principles
are common law principles,
and
perhaps one
could
identify that these principles
find place in various statutes
which restrict the period of
limitation and create nonconsideration
of
condonation
in
certain
circumstances.
They
are
bound to be applied by way
of
practice
requiring
prudence of the court than of
a strict application of law.
The
underlying
principle
governing these concepts
would be one of estoppel.
The question of prejudice is
also an important issue to be
taken note of by the court.

Latches
21.
The
word
"laches" is derived from
the
French
language
meaning "remissness and
slackness". It thus involves
unreasonable
delay
or
negligence in pursuing a
claim
involving
an
equitable
relief
while
causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on
the part of a party to do an
act which law requires
while asserting a right, and
therefore, must stand in the
way of the party getting
relief or remedy.

22. Two essential
factors to be seen are the
length of the delay and the
11 All. Hanuman Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
317
nature of acts done during
the interval. As stated, it
would
also
involve
acquiescence on the part of
the party approaching the
court
apart
from
the
change in position in the
interregnum. Therefore, it
would be unjustifiable for a
Court of Equity to confer a
remedy on a party who
knocks its doors when his
acts
would
indicate
a
waiver of such a right. By
his conduct, he has put the
other party in a particular
position, and therefore, it
would be unreasonable to
facilitate
a
challenge
before the court. Thus, a
man responsible for his
conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to
avail a remedy.
23. A defence of
laches can only be allowed
when there is no statutory
bar. The question as to
whether there exists a clear
case of laches on the part
of a person seeking a
remedy is one of fact and
so also that of prejudice.
The said principle may not
have any application when
the existence of fraud is
pleaded and proved by the
other side. To determine the
difference
between
the
concept
of
laches
and
acquiescence is that, in a
case involving mere laches,
the principle of estoppel
would apply to all the
defences that are available
to a party. Therefore, a
defendant can succeed on
the various grounds raised
by the plaintiff, while an
issue
concerned
alone
would be
amenable
to
acquiescence.

Acquiescence

24.
We
have
already
discussed
the
relationship
between
acquiescence on the one
hand and delay and laches
on the other.

25.
Acquiescence
would mean a tacit or
passive acceptance. It is
implied
and
reluctant
consent to an act. In other
words,
such
an
action
would qualify a passive
assent.
Thus,
when
acquiescence takes place, it
presupposes
knowledge
against a particular act.
From the knowledge comes
passive
acceptance,
therefore instead of taking
any action against any
alleged refusal to perform
the
original
contract,
despite
adequate
knowledge of its terms, and
instead being allowed to
continue
by
consciously
ignoring it and thereafter
proceeding
further,
acquiescence
does
take
place. As a consequence, it
reintroduces a new implied
agreement
between
the
parties.
Once
such
a
318 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
situation arises, it is not
open to the party that
acquiesced itself to insist
upon the compliance of the
original
terms.
Hence,
what is essential, is the
conduct of the parties. We
only
dealt
with
the
distinction involving a mere
acquiescence.
When
acquiescence is followed by
delay,
it
may
become
laches. Here again, we are
inclined to hold that the
concept of acquiescence is
to be seen on a case-tocase basis."
(emphasis
supplied)

(3) Chairman, State Bank
of India v. M J James,
(2022) 2 SCC 301:

"36. What is a
reasonable time is not to be
put
in
a
straitjacket
formula
or
judicially
codified in the form of
days, etc. as it depends
upon
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case.
A right not exercised for a
long time is nonexistent.
Doctrine
of
delay
and
laches
as
well
as
acquiescence are applied to
non-suit the litigants who
approach
the
court/appellate authorities
belatedly
without
any
justifiable explanation for
bringing
action
after
unreasonable delay. In the
present case, challenge to
the order of dismissal from
service by way of appeal
was after four years and
five
months,
which
is
certainly
highly
belated
and beyond justifiable time.
Without
satisfactory
explanation justifying the
delay, it is difficult to hold
that
the
appeal
was
preferred
within
a
reasonable
time.
Pertinently, the challenge
was
primarily
on
the
ground that the respondent
was not allowed to be
represented
by
a
representative
of
his
choice.
The
respondent
knew that even if he were to
succeed on this ground, as
has happened in the writ
proceedings, fresh inquiry
would not be prohibited as
finality is not attached
unless there is a legal or
statutory bar, an aspect
which
has
been
also
noticed in the impugned
judgment.
This
is
highlighted to show the
prejudice caused to the
appellants by the delayed
challenge.
We
would,
subsequently, examine the
question of acquiescence
and its judicial effect in the
context of the present case.
xxx
38. In Ram Chand
v. Union of India [Ram
Chand v. Union of India,
(1994) 1 SCC 44] and State
of U.P. v. Manohar [State
of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005)
11 All. Hanuman Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
319
2 SCC 126] this Court
observed
that
if
the
statutory authority has not
performed its duty within a
reasonable time, it cannot
justify the same by taking
the plea that the person
who has been deprived of
his
rights
has
not
approached
the
appropriate
forum
for
relief.
If
a
statutory
authority does not pass any
orders and thereby fails to
comply with the statutory
mandate within reasonable
time, they normally should
not be permitted to take the
defence
of
laches
and
delay. If at all, in such
cases, the delay furnishes a
cause of action, which in
some cases as elucidated in
Union of India v. Tarsem
Singh [Union of India v.
Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC
(L&S)
765]
may
be
continuing cause of action.
The State being a virtuous
litigant should meet the
genuine claims and not
deny them for want of
action
on
their
part.
However,
this
general
principle would not apply
when, on consideration of
the
facts,
the
court
concludes
that
the
respondent had abandoned
his rights, which may be
either express or implied
from
his
conduct.
Abandonment
implies
intentional
act
to
acknowledge, as has been
held in para 6 of Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd.
v.
State
of
U.P.
[Motilal Padampat Sugar
Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 :
1979
SCC
(Tax)
144]
Applying this principle of
acquiescence to the precept
of delay and laches, this
Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal
Nigam v. Jaswant Singh,
(2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007)
1 SCC (L&S) 500] after
referring
to
several
judgments, has accepted
the following elucidation in
Halsbury's
Laws
of
England: (Jaswant Singh
case [U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11
SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 500], SCC pp. 47071, paras 12-13)
"12. The statement
of law has also been
summarised in Halsbury's
Laws of England, Para
911, p. 395 as follows:
'In
determining
whether there has been
such delay as to amount to
laches, the chief points to
be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on
the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of
position that has occurred
on the defendant's part.

Acquiescence
in
this sense does not mean
standing
by
while
the
320 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
violation of a right is in
progress, but assent after
the
violation
has
been
completed and the claimant
has become aware of it. It
is
unjust
to
give
the
claimant a remedy where,
by his conduct, he has done
that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it; or where by
his conduct and neglect,
though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the
other party in a position in
which it would not be
reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards
to be asserted. In such
cases lapse of time and
delay are most material.
Upon these considerations
rests
the
doctrine
of
laches.'
13. In view of the
statement
of
law
as
summarised
above,
the
respondents are guilty since
the
respondents
have
acquiesced in accepting the
retirement and did not
challenge the same in time.
If they would have been
vigilant enough, they could
have filed writ petitions as
others did in the matter.
Therefore,
whenever
it
appears that the claimants
lost time or whiled it away
and did not rise to the
occasion in time for filing
the writ petitions, then in
such
cases,
the
court
should be very slow in
granting the relief to the
incumbent. Secondly, it has
also to be taken into
consideration the question
of acquiescence or waiver
on
the
part
of
the
incumbent whether other
parties are going to be
prejudiced if the relief is
granted. In the present
case, if the respondents
would
have
challenged
their
retirement
being
violative of the provisions
of the Act, perhaps the
Nigam could have taken
appropriate steps to raise
funds so as to meet the
liability
but
by
not
asserting their rights the
respondents have allowed
time to pass and after a
lapse of couple of years,
they
have
filed
writ
petitions
claiming
the
benefit for two years. That
will definitely require the
Nigam to raise funds which
is going to have serious
financial repercussions on
the financial management
of the Nigam. Why should
the court come to the
rescue of such persons
when they themselves are
guilty
of
waiver
and
acquiescence?"
39.
Before
proceeding further, it is
important
to
clarify
distinction
between
"acquiescence" and "delay
and laches". Doctrine of
acquiescence
is
an
equitable doctrine which
applies
when
a
party
11 All. Hanuman Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
321
having a right stands by
and sees another dealing in
a manner inconsistent with
that right, while the act is
in
progress
and
after
violation
is
completed,
which conduct reflects his
assent
or
accord.
He
cannot
afterwards
complain. [See Prabhakar
v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015)
15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC
(L&S)
149.
Also,
see
Gobinda
Ramanuj
Das
Mohanta v. Ram Charan
Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal
30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In
literal
sense,
the
term
acquiescence means silent
assent,
tacit
consent,
concurrence,
or
acceptance,
[See
Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v.
CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar
331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584]
which denotes conduct that
is evidence of an intention
of a party to abandon an
equitable right and also to
denote conduct from which
another
party
will
be
justified in inferring such
an intention. [See Krishan
Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964
SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR
1964 HP 34] Acquiescence
can be either direct with
full knowledge and express
approbation, or indirect
where a person having the
right to set aside the action
stands by and sees another
dealing
in
a
manner
inconsistent with that right
and
in
spite
of
the
infringement
takes
no
action
mirroring
acceptance.
[See
"Introduction",
U.N.
Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures
- Law of Limitation and
Prescription, Vol. I, 14th
Edn.,
2016.]
However,
acquiescence will not apply
if lapse of time is of no
importance
or
consequence.
40. Laches unlike
limitation
is
flexible.
However, both limitation
and laches destroy the
remedy but not the right.
Laches like acquiescence is
based
upon
equitable
considerations, but laches
unlike
acquiescence
imports
even
simple
passivity. On the other
hand, acquiescence implies
active assent and is based
upon the rule of estoppel in
pais. As a form of estoppel,
it bars a party afterwards
from complaining of the
violation of the right. Even
indirect
acquiescence
implies
almost
active
consent, which is not to be
inferred by mere silence or
inaction which is involved
in laches. Acquiescence in
this manner is quite distinct
from delay. Acquiescence
virtually destroys the right
of
the
person.
[See
Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v.
CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar
331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584]
Given the aforesaid legal
position,
inactive
322 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
acquiescence on the part of
the
respondent
can
be
inferred till the filing of the
appeal, and not for the
period post filing of the
appeal. Nevertheless, this
acquiescence being in the
nature of estoppel bars the
respondent from claiming
violation of the right of fair
representation."
 (emphasis supplied)

8. In light of the above, we do not
find
any
reason
for
the
delay
in
approaching this Court and 11 years is a
sufficiently long length of time for filing
the present writ petition which is highly
time barred and and delayed. Even during
his services after passing of the order of
regularization no grievance was raised by
the petitioner. In any view of the matter, the
petitioner had duly accepted the order of
regularization in 2013 and accordingly he
has
not
challenged
the
order
of
regularization
till
the
date
of
his
superannuation which has clearly fallen out
from the order of 23.11.2013.

9. In the aforesaid facts, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the claim
of the petitioner suffers from unexplained
delay and latches of 11 years, as such, no
interference is required in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution. The writ petition is,
thus, dismissed.
----------
(2024) 11 ILRA 322
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.11.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
Writ -C No. 3944 of 2024

Kapil Misra & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sunil
Kumar
Chaudhary,
Abhishek
Khare,
Rajendra Kumar Dubey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Waseeq Uddin Ahmed

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950 -
Article 300-A - UP Urban Planning and
Development
Act,
1973
-
Planned
development - Public interest versus
Individual's right - Preference to one of
them or strike balance between them -
Court's liability - Held, on one hand is
right of an individual to make the most
profitable use of his property, is a right
which is protected under article 300A of
the Constitution of India, and on the other
hand is the claim of the development
authority for a planned development and
also to prevent a haphazard development
and accordingly the competing rights have
to be interpreted in relation to each other.
The courts must make an endeavour to
strike a balance between public interest
on
one
hand
and
protection
of
constitutional rights of an individual to
hold property on the other. (Para 34)
B. Constitution of India,1950 - Article
300-A - Right to property - Scope - Right
to get map sanctioned - Enforceability -
Held, right to property includes right to
construct on the property owned by a
person
subject
to
the
applicable
regulations made in this regard - To enjoy
property is a right which is protected
under article 300-A of the constitution of
India, and denial of sanction of map, is
depriving an individual of his right of
property, and the same can be done only
with the sanction of law. (Para 37)
C. UP Industrial Area Development Act,
1976 - Section 6(f) - Deed of Exchange -
Nature - Transfer through the deed of