# Har Narain Singh v. Ravi Shanker Nigam

- **Citation:** (2022) 10 ILRA 1162
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-09-29
- **Case number:** Matter under Art. 227 (Civil) No. 6339 of 2021
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/har-narain-singh-v-ravi-shanker-nigam-47680
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Tenancy - Eviction - The
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
(U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) - Sections
20(2)(a) & 20(2)(c); Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 - Section 106.

Requirement of notice - It is well settled
that
the
Rent
Control
Acts
do
not
completely supersede or supplant the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
governing the relationship of landlord and
tenant. Since there is no provision for
determination of tenancy in the Rent Control
Act, one has necessarily to look to the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The
phrase 'after the determination of his
tenancy' occurring in sub-section (2) of
Section 20 refers to the determination of
tenancy in accordance with law, i.e. in the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
This brings in Section 106. (Para 19)

The Revisional Court, therefore, went astray to
look for the duration of notice required to
terminate the tenancy in the provisions of
Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The said period is to
be determined only with reference to the
provisions of S. 106 of the T.P. Act. To that
extent, the findings of the Revisional Court are
wrong. (Para 20)

B. Statutory period of a valid notice - No
doubt, the period of time required to
determine
a
lease
granted
for
a
manufacturing purpose is six months by
notice, but this statutory period is subject
to a contract, local law or usage to the
contrary. In the facts found here, the tenancy,
in the opinion of this Court, was clearly one for
month-to-month. It could be determined by a
month's notice. The notice to quit, therefore,
cannot be questioned on the said ground. (Para
21, 24)

Here, the Court finds that in the notice to quit
dated 26.09.2014, there is a clear assertion that
the tenant holds the demised premises on a
monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. In the rent receipts
also, there is consistent mention of rent at a
monthly rate. From all these circumstances, it is
evident that the lease always was one from
month-to-month. It was not a lease from yearto-year that S.106 of the T.P. Act postulates. A
contract to the contrary, notwithstanding the
lease being for a manufacturing purpose, is
clearly discernible. Therefore, the tenancy was
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1163
validly terminated by a 30 days' notice. (Para
21, 23)

C. Structural Alteration - In section
20(2)(c) the landlord is not required to
prove "material alteration" but he has
to show a "structural alteration" made,
having the effect of disfigurement or
diminishing the value or utility of
rented
building.
The
word
"material
alteration" does not find place in section
20(2) (c). (Para 35)

The issue of structural alteration is essentially a
question of fact in the first instance and the
Trial Court has not written a word worth the
name in returning its finding on the issue, this
Court is of opinion that for the determination of
the said issue, the matter has to go back to the
Trial Court. The other issues, that have been
decided by this judgment, shall no longer be
open to the parties or the Courts of Trial or
Revision to examine. (Para 36)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,092 of 55,209. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39092 for what follows._

1162 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Code. There is no substantial question of
law involved in this appeal, which is
concluded by well considered findings of
fact.

22. Before parting with the matter,
this Court must place on record its
profound appreciation for the very wellconsidered
and
exceptionally
wellstructured judgement written by the learned
Trial Judge Mr. Palash Ganguly. It shows
the finest marshalling of facts and evidence
and understanding of the law, considering
that the Trial Judge is a very junior Judicial
Officer.

23. In this result, this appeal is
dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the
Code.

24. There shall, however, be no order
as to costs.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 1162
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:ALLAHABAD 29.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Matter under Art. 227 (Civil) No. 6339 of 2021

Har Narain Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Ravi Shanker Nigam ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Manoj Kumar Sharma

Counsel for the Respondent:
Ms. Shalini Goel, Mrs. Rama Goel Bansal

A. Civil Law - Tenancy - Eviction - The
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
(U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) - Sections
20(2)(a) & 20(2)(c); Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 - Section 106.

Requirement of notice - It is well settled
that
the
Rent
Control
Acts
do
not
completely supersede or supplant the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
governing the relationship of landlord and
tenant. Since there is no provision for
determination of tenancy in the Rent Control
Act, one has necessarily to look to the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The
phrase 'after the determination of his
tenancy' occurring in sub-section (2) of
Section 20 refers to the determination of
tenancy in accordance with law, i.e. in the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
This brings in Section 106. (Para 19)

The Revisional Court, therefore, went astray to
look for the duration of notice required to
terminate the tenancy in the provisions of
Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The said period is to
be determined only with reference to the
provisions of S. 106 of the T.P. Act. To that
extent, the findings of the Revisional Court are
wrong. (Para 20)

B. Statutory period of a valid notice - No
doubt, the period of time required to
determine
a
lease
granted
for
a
manufacturing purpose is six months by
notice, but this statutory period is subject
to a contract, local law or usage to the
contrary. In the facts found here, the tenancy,
in the opinion of this Court, was clearly one for
month-to-month. It could be determined by a
month's notice. The notice to quit, therefore,
cannot be questioned on the said ground. (Para
21, 24)

Here, the Court finds that in the notice to quit
dated 26.09.2014, there is a clear assertion that
the tenant holds the demised premises on a
monthly rent of Rs. 150/-. In the rent receipts
also, there is consistent mention of rent at a
monthly rate. From all these circumstances, it is
evident that the lease always was one from
month-to-month. It was not a lease from yearto-year that S.106 of the T.P. Act postulates. A
contract to the contrary, notwithstanding the
lease being for a manufacturing purpose, is
clearly discernible. Therefore, the tenancy was
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1163
validly terminated by a 30 days' notice. (Para
21, 23)

C. Structural Alteration - In section
20(2)(c) the landlord is not required to
prove "material alteration" but he has
to show a "structural alteration" made,
having the effect of disfigurement or
diminishing the value or utility of
rented
building.
The
word
"material
alteration" does not find place in section
20(2) (c). (Para 35)

The issue of structural alteration is essentially a
question of fact in the first instance and the
Trial Court has not written a word worth the
name in returning its finding on the issue, this
Court is of opinion that for the determination of
the said issue, the matter has to go back to the
Trial Court. The other issues, that have been
decided by this judgment, shall no longer be
open to the parties or the Courts of Trial or
Revision to examine. (Para 36)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs Yesodai Ammal, (1979)
4 SCC 214 (Para 19)

2. Jagdish Kumar Khanna Vs Shakuntala Devi &
ors., 1980 ARC 535 (Para 19)

3. Smt. Ram Murti Devi Vs Vth A.D.J., Meerut &
ors., 1982 SCC OnLine All 776 (Para 30)

4. Umesh Kumar Vs Arun Kumar & ors., 2012
SCC OnLine All 3987 (Para 35)

Present petition assails judgment and
decree dated 14.01.2021, passed by the
Additional District Judge, Jhansi as well as
the
judgment
and
decree
dated
16.09.2019, passed by the Judge, Small
Cause Court, Jhansi.

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is a tenant's petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution, questioning
the decree of eviction and recovery of
arrears of rent, besides mesne profits,
passed concurrently by the two Courts
below.

2. S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2015 was
instituted by Ravi Shanker Nigam, the
plaintiff-respondent, seeking eviction of the
defendant-petitioner, Har Narain Singh,
from the shop detailed at the foot of the
plaint, giving rise to the suit, besides a
decree for recovery of rent in the sum of
Rs.5035/- and damages for use and
occupation in the sum of Rs.5050/-,
aggregating to a figure of Rs.10085/-. In
addition, the plaintiff has sought a decree
for pendente lite and future damages for
use and occupation at the rate of Rs.50/-
per day, besides costs of the suit. The suit
has been instituted by the plaintiffrespondent (for short, 'the landlord'),
pleading a cause of action that he is the
landlord of the demised shop, wherein the
defendant-petitioner (for short, 'the tenant')
is a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.150/-.
Needless to say that exemption from the
provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of
1972) (for short, 'the Act') has not been
pleaded and it is common ground between
parties that the Act applies. The suit has
been instituted on the ground of actionable
default
under
Section
20(2)(a)
and
structural alteration under Section 20(2)(c)
of the Act.

3. It is the landlord's case that the
tenant was in default of rent since
01.02.1996 and further that he had, without
the permission in writing by the landlord,
made construction as well as structural
alteration in the demised shop, which
tended to diminish its value, utility and
disfigure it. The basis of pleading a case of
structural alteration was the fact that
1164 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
according to the landlord, the tenant,
without his permission, had partitioned the
demised shop into two and caused the tile
worked roof to be removed and replaced by
a different roof, supported by girders and
covered by stone-slabs. In addition, was the
landlord's case that the existing door of the
shop had been removed and replaced by
another. All these changes were said to
constitute structural alteration, that tended
to diminish the utility of the demised shop
and disfigure it.

4. The landlord served the tenant a
notice to quit dated 26.09.2014, asking him
to deliver vacant possession of the demised
shop, upon expiry of 30 days of receipt of
the notice. The notice dated 28.09.2014
was answered by the tenant by a reply
dated
18.10.2014
on
incorrect
facts,
refusing to vacate the shop and denying his
liability to pay arrears of rent, besides
damages for use and occupation demanded.
The notice to quit was one composite under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (for short, ''the T.P. Act') and
Section 20 of the Act. The suit was
instituted by the landlord with the notice to
quit being not complied with by the tenant.
The suit was registered on the file of the
Judge, Small Cause Court, Jhansi as S.C.C.
Suit No. 3 of 2015.

5. The tenant put in a written
statement and contested the suit. It was
pleaded in the written statement that the
demised shop was let out to the tenant's
father between the years 1962-63 by the
then landlord, Laxmi Shankar Nigam at a
monthly rent of Rs.17.20. The tenant's
father, prior to him, was the tenant in the
demised shop. After his death, the tenant
inherited the tenancy on the same terms and
has held the demised shop in the same
right, paying rent to Laxmi Shanker Nigam
at the rate of Rs.17.20 per month. The last
rent, that was paid to Laxmi Shanker
Nigam, was in the month of December,
1995. It is the further case of the tenant that
thereafter the tenant tendered rent by hand
to Laxmi Shanker Nigam and then sent it at
his correct postal address by money order
on 01.01.1996, which he refused to accept.
In consequence, the tenant instituted Misc.
Case No. 110 of 1996, Har Narain Singh
vs. Laxmi Shanker, under Section 30(1) of
the Act before the Court of the Civil Judge
(Jr. Div.), Jhansi with a prayer that he may
be permitted to deposit rent in Court. Misc.
Case No. 110 of 1996 was allowed vide
order dated 03.12.1997 and the tenant has
regularly deposited rent in Court with the
last deposit made in the said Court on
31.12.2014.

6. It is then averred in the written
statement that upon receipt of the notice to
quit dated 26.09.2014 from the landlord
and after answering it, in order to avoid
controversy, the tenant remitted rent to the
landlord from 01.02.1996 to 31.10.2014 at
the rate of Rs.150/- per month by money
order, which the landlord refused to accept.
It is pleaded that the said facts are
mentioned in the tenant's reply dated
18.10.2014, tendered in answer to the
notice to quit. Later on, the tenant has
deposited the entire rent due w.e.f.
01.02.1996 to 28.02.2015, together with
interest and costs of the suit, in compliance
with Section 20(4) of the Act, before the
first date of hearing. The sum of money
deposited in compliance with Section 20(4)
of the Act is pleaded with full particulars in
paragraph No. 27 of the plaint, indicating
the five heads under which deposit of a
total sum of Rs. 40,9345/0 has been made,
calculating rent at the rate of Rs.150/- per
month. On these facts, the case of
actionable default under Section 20(2)(a) of
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1165
the Act was denied and further relief from
eviction was claimed under Section 20(4).

7. So far as the case of structural
alteration leading to the demised shop's
utility being diminished or the shop being
disfigured is concerned, it is pleaded that
the tenant has not done any structural
alteration to the shop and it stays in the
position it was when let out. The pleadings
of the landlord about the structural
alteration prohibited under Section 20(2)(c)
of the Act are denied by paraphrase. It is
said that the pleaded structural changes do
not mention the date, month and year, when
they were made. This is by and enlarge the
pleaded case of the tenant in answer to the
case of structural alteration in the demised
shop leading to diminishment of its utility
and disfigurement.

8. On the pleadings of parties, the
Trial Court framed the following issues
(translated into English from Hindi):

(1) Whether the plaintiff is the
landlord of the demised part of the property
and is there a relationship of landlord and
tenant between parties?

(2) Whether the notice served by
the plaintiff is valid?

(3) Whether the defendant has
done material alteration to the demised
premises without the permission of the
plaintiff?

(4) Whether the defendant has
committed default in the payment of rent?

(5) Whether the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of
the Rent Control Act?

(6) Whether the plaintiff is
entitled to any other relief?

9. The landlord led documentary
evidence and examined himself in support
of his case as PW-1. He tendered in lieu of
his examination-in-chief in the dock, his
evidence on affidavit. He was duly crossexamined.
The
defendant
too
filed
voluminous documentary evidence and
examined
himself
as
DW-1,
besides
another witness, Ram Sewak as DW-2.
Both of them tendered their testimony on
affidavits and faced cross-examined in the
witness-box.
The
details
of
the
documentary evidence are listed in minute
detail in the two judgments of the Courts
below and no useful purpose would be
served by recapitulating that list of
documentary evidence. Needless to say that
the relevant of it shall be referred to during
the course of the judgment.

10. The suit was tried and decreed by
the Judge, Small Cause Court, Jhansi vide
judgment and decree dated 16.09.2019. The
Judge, Small Cause Court accepted the
landlord's case on both grounds, to wit,
actionable default and structural alteration
leading to disfigurement of the demised
shop and diminishment of its utility. The
tenant's case of relief from eviction under
Section 20(4) of the Act was not accepted.

11. The tenant preferred a revision
against the decree passed by the Trial Court
to the District Judge of Jhansi under
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act, 1860. The revision aforesaid
was registered on file of the learned District
Judge as Small Cause Revision No. 26 of
2019. The said revision upon assignment
came up for hearing before the Additional
District Judge, Court No.3, Jhansi. The
learned Additional District Judge dismissed
1166 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the revision and affirmed the decree passed
by the Trial Court, but set aside the finding
on Issue No. 5 alone, that is to say, the
issue about entitlement of the tenant to
relief from eviction under Section 20(4) of
the Act.

12. Heard Mr. Manoj Kumar Sharma,
learned Counsel for the tenant and Mrs.
Rama Goel Bansal along with Ms. Shalini
Goel, learned Counsel for the landlord.

13. It must be remarked here that
there is no issue between parties that the
landlord has inherited his right as the
landlord from the original landlord, Laxmi
Shanker Nigam being his nephew. It is also
to be remarked that the Revisional Court
after holding the tenant in actionable
default under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act
has extended the benefit of Section 20(4),
but upheld the decree on the ground of
structural alteration etc. under Section
20(2)(c) of the Act. The findings recorded
by the Revisional Court relating to the
benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act have not
been assailed on behalf of the landlord.
Therefore, the decree as now stands to be
assailed is one of eviction, founded on the
ground of structural alteration etc. under
Section 20(2)(c) of the Act. It is for this
reason that the Revisional Court has
directed deposits made in whatever Court,
to be adjusted against the decretal amount.

14. Mr. M.K. Sharma, learned
Counsel for the tenant has been at pains to
show that there is no actionable default on
the tenant's part and if there be one at all,
the tenant stands relieved of his liability
from eviction under Section 20(4) of the
Act. The said part of Mr. Sharma's
submission is not required to be gone into,
because the learned Counsel appearing for
the landlord does not assail the finding by
the Revisional Court extending the benefit
of Section 20(4) of the Act. This stand of
the landlord has already been noticed
earlier, but a mention of the same has been
made again in the context of Mr. Sharma's
detailed submissions regarding actionable
default and relief from eviction etc., made
at the hearing.

15. The learned Counsel for the tenant
has assailed the correctness of the findings
returned by the two Courts below regarding
the validity of the notice to quit, on which
the suit is founded. It is his submission that
the tenancy being for a manufacturing
purpose, the lease shall be deemed to be
one from year to year, terminable by six
months' notice and not 30 days under
Section 106 of the T.P. Act. It is
emphasized that the lease here was for a
Flour Mill (Aata Chakki), which is a
manufacturing purpose, entitling the tenant
to six months' notice. However, the notice
to quit is one that terminates the lease at the
end of 30 days. The notice is, therefore,
invalid.

16. The learned Counsel for the
landlord has supported the said finding and
drawn the attention of the Court to the
judgment of the Revisional Court in this
regard. A perusal of the judgment of the
Revisional Court shows that the Judge has
discarded the tenant's submission regarding
the mandatory duration of the notice under
Section 106, T.P. Act, being six months in
the case of a lease for a manufacturing
purpose, relying on the provisions of
Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The relevant
part of Section 20, including the provisions
of sub-Section (2)(a) read:

"20. Bar of suit for eviction of
tenant except on specified grounds- (1)
Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1167
shall be instituted for the eviction of a
tenant from a building, notwithstanding the
determination of his tenancy by efflux of
time or on the expiration of a notice to quit
or in any other manner:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall bar a suit for the eviction of a
tenant on the determination of his tenancy
by efflux of time where the tenancy for a
fixed term was entered into by or in
pursuance of a compromise or adjustment
arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal,
revision or execution proceeding, which is
either recorded in court or otherwise
reduced to writing and signed by the tenant.

(2) A suit for the eviction of a
tenant
from
a
building
after
the
determination of his tenancy may be
instituted on one or more of the following
grounds, namely:

(a) that the tenant is in arrears of
rent for not less than four months, and has
failed to pay the same to the landlord
within one month from the date of service
upon him of a notice of demand:

Provided that in relation to a
tenant who is a member of the armed forces
of the Union and in whose favour the
prescribed authority under the Indian
Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No. IV
of 1925), has issued a certificate that he is
serving under special conditions within the
meaning of Section 3 of that Act or where
he has died by enemy action while so
serving, then in relation to his heirs, the
words four months in this clause shall be
deemed to have been substituted by the
words one year;"

17. The Revisional Court has held
that the provisions of the Act would prevail
over the provisions of Section 106, T.P.
Act, because the Act is a special statute,
whereas the T.P. Act is a general law. The
aforesaid exposition of the law by the
Revisional Court cannot be accepted. The
duration of notice to quit, envisaged under
Section 106, T.P. Act, is altogether
different from the period of notice,
envisaged under Section 20(2)(a) of the
Act. Section 106 of the T.P. Act governs
the period of notice, necessary to determine
a lease of immovable property, unless there
be a contract or local law or usage to the
contrary. Section 20(2)(a) of the Act, on the
other hand, has a completely different
scope and purpose. It has nothing to do
with the period of notice to determine a
lease regarding immovable property.

18. Section 20(2)(a) of the Act is to be
understood in the context of sub-Section (1)
of Section 20, which bars the right of a
landlord to sue the tenant for eviction from a
building, despite the determination of his
tenancy, either by efflux of time or on the
expiration of a notice to quit or in any other
manner, except on the grounds envisaged
under sub-Section (2) of Section 20. Thus,
sub-Section (1) of Section 20 introduces a
general embargo on the right of the landlord
to evict his tenant from a building by serving
him a notice to quit or on the expiration of
lease by efflux of time. The various clauses
of sub-Section (2) envisage grounds, on the
fulfillment whereof, the embargo to sue
would be lifted. Clause (a) of sub-Section (2)
envisages the first of these grounds, where
the bar on the landlord's right to sue his tenant
for eviction would not be there. The terms of
Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) provide that the
tenant, who is in arrears of rent for not less
than four months and has failed to pay rent to
the landlord within one month from the date
of a notice of demand, would entitle the
landlord to bring a suit for eviction against
1168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
him. Thus, sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 20
affords the grounds on which the landlord can
institute a suit for eviction against his tenant
from a building, but by itself does not
envisage a notice to quit determining the
lease, which is governed by Section 106 of
the T.P. Act. The period of 30 days envisaged
under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act is not, in
any manner, the period of time relating to a
notice to the tenant to quit or one determining
his tenancy. It is the period of time to be
stipulated in a notice of demand of arrears of
rent that are due for a period of four months
or more, which if not paid within the period
of 30 days, despite the demand notice, would
entitle the landlord to sue for eviction. Since
in many cases, a notice to quit under Section
106 of the T.P. Act requires a period of 30
days, at the end of which the lease would
stand determined, it has been judicially
approved as a valid notice, where the Act
applies, that a combined notice to quit and
demand for arrears of rent etc. under Section
106, T.P. Act read with Section 20(2)(a) of
the Act may be served on the tenant, who is
in actionable default.

19. In a different context, where the
question was whether in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, it was necessary for a landlord to
serve a notice to quit under Section 106 of the
T.P. Act, after the decision of the Supreme
Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai
Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214, holding that in
proceedings governed by the Rent Control
Act, a notice to quit under Section 106 of the
T.P. Act is not necessary, this Court in
Jagdish Kumar Khanna v. Shakuntala
Devi and others, 1980 ARC 535 remarked:

14. It is well settled that the Rent
Control Acts do not completely supersede
or supplant the provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act governing the relationship
of landlord and tenant. The Rent Control
Act superimposes itself on the relevant and
material provisions of the Transfer of
Property Act. The provisions of the Rent
Control Act override and prevail only in so
far as they go. Since there is no provision
for determination of tenancy in the Rent
Control Act, one has necessarily to look to
the provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act. Section 111 of the Transfer of
Property Act provides for determination of
tenancy. Some of the methods provided
therein are by efflux of time or on the
expiration of notice to quit. This is
provided by Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act. The phrase ''after the
determination of his tenancy' occurring in
sub-section (2) of Section 20 refers to the
determination of tenancy in accordance
with law, i.e. in the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act. This brings in
Section 106.

20. The above exposition of the law,
though made in a different context, is a
universal
principle
governing
the
determination of tenancy in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, so long and so far as the Act applies.
The Revisional Court, therefore, went astray
to look for the duration of notice required to
terminate the tenancy in the provisions of
Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. The said period is
to be determined only with reference to the
provisions of Section 106 of the T.P. Act. To
that extent, the findings of the Revisional
Court are wrong. This brings us face to face
with Mr. Sharma's submission that the notice
to quit is bad in law, because the lease here
was one for establishing and running a flour
mill (Aata Chakki), a manufacturing purpose,
where the statutory period of a valid notice to
quit is six months. The provisions of Section
106 of the T.P. Act read:

106. Duration of certain leases in
absence of written contract or local usage.-
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1169
(1) In the absence of a contract or local law
or usage to the contrary, a lease of
immovable property for agricultural or
manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to
be a lease from year to year, terminable, on
the part of either lessor or lessee, by six
months' notice; and a lease of immovable
property for any other purpose shall be
deemed to be a lease from month-to-month,
terminable on the part of either lessor or
lessee, by fifteen days' notice.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other law for the time
being in force, the period mentioned in subsection (1) shall commence from the date
of receipt of notice.

(3) A notice under sub-section (1)
shall not be deemed to be invalid merely
because the period mentioned therein falls
short of the period specified under that subsection where a suit or proceeding is filed
after the expiry of the period mentioned in
that sub-section.

(4) Every notice under subsection (1) must be in writing, signed by or
on behalf of the person giving it, and either
be sent by post to the party who is intended
to be bound by it or be tendered or
delivered personally to such party, or to
one of his family or servants at his
residence, or (if such tender or delivery is
not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous
part of the property.

21. No doubt, the period of time
required to determine a lease granted for a
manufacturing purpose is six months by
notice, but this statutory period is subject to
a contract, local law or usage to the
contrary. Here, what the Court finds is that
in the notice to quit dated 26.09.2014, there
is a clear assertion that the tenant holds the
demised premises on a monthly rent of
Rs.150/-. In the reply notice, it is
acknowledged by the tenant that his father
was a tenant in the demised premises, let
out by the late Laxmi Shanker Nigam on a
monthly rent of Rs.17.20 and that rent up to
December, 1995 has been paid. Elsewhere,
also in the reply notice, the rent has been
acknowledged at a monthly rate. Likewise,
in Paragraph No. 1 of the plaint, it is
averred to the following effect:

1- यह कक वादी दुकान नम्बर
कजसकी सीमायें नीचे दी जा रही हैं खस्थत अन्दर
सैंयर गेट झाोंसी का माकलक व लैण्डलोडष है और
उक्त दुकान मे प्रकतवादी 150/- प्रकतमाह की दर
से बतौर ककरायेदार आबाद है।

22. In Paragraph No. 22 of the written
statement, it is averred on behalf of the
tenant as follows:

22- यह कक तथ्य यह है कक प्रश्नगत
दुकान प्रकतवादी के कपता ने सन 1962-1963 में
उक्त दुकान के स्वामी व लैण्ड लोडष श्रीमती
लक्ष्मी शोंकर से रू0 17.20 पैसे माहवार की दर
से ककराये पर ली थी तहायात प्रकतवादी के कपता
प्रश्नगत दुकान में बतौर ककरायेदार आबाद रहे।
बाद वफात प्रकतवादी के कपता प्रश्नगत दुकान में
उन्हीों शरायतोों पर उत्तर दाता प्रकतवादी श्री लक्ष्मी
शोंकर कनगम की ओर से बतौर ककरायदार
वशरह रू0 17.20 पैसे माहवार आवाद हुआ व
चला आता रहा व प्रकतवादी न उक्त श्री लक्ष्मी
शोंकर कनगम को माह कदसम्बर सन 1995 तक
का ककराया अदा ककया।

23. In the rent receipts also, that have
been filed before the Trial Court vide a list
of documents, annexed as Annexure No.7
to the writ petition, there is consistent
mention of rent at a monthly rate. In the
cross-examination of the defendant too, the
1170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
case is of the demised shop, being held on a
monthly rent. From all these circumstances,
it is evident that the lease always was one
from month-to-month. It was not a lease
from year-to-year that Section 106 of the
T.P. Act postulates. A contract to the
contrary, notwithstanding the lease being
for a manufacturing purpose, is clearly
discernible. Therefore, in the opinion of
this Court, the tenancy was validly
terminated by a 30 days' notice. The
question
involved
here
fell
for
consideration before this Court in Smt.
Ram Murti Devi v. Vth Additional
District Judge, Meerut and others, 1982
SCC OnLine All 776. Interestingly, the
facts in Smt. Ram Murti Devi (supra) show
that the demised premises, a garage, was let
out to the tenant for the purpose of running
a flour mill (Aata Chakki). It has been
described in report as 'flour machine'.
Amongst
other
things,
the
tenant
questioned the validity of one month's
notice to determine the tenancy on the
ground
that
the
lease
was
for
a
manufacturing purpose and required on the
landlord's part a six month's notice to
terminate the tenancy. Answering the said
issue in Smt. Ram Murti Devi, it was
held:

15. The revisional court also
referred to and relied on a decision in the
case of Binda Din v. Smt. Pran Dei
reported in 1968 All LJ 721. I have
examined this case and I find that the same
fully supports the view taken by the courts
below. In this case, it has been held that
though a tenancy may be for manufacturing
purposes, the parties may agree that the
tenancy would be from month to month
irrespective of the purpose of tenancy. It
was further held that where there was an
admission by the tenant that in regard to a
manufacturing lease monthly rent was
payable, it would be a stronger case for
holding that the tenancy was of monthly
duration. The learned Judge referred to the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra reported
in AIR 1952 SC 23 and held that section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act
embodied a rule of construction for finding
out the duration of the lease and he
observed that if there was no other
evidence and circumstance, the lease would
be deemed to be from year to year
terminable at six months' notice where it is
for manufacturing purpose. However, the
learned Judge observed that if there was an
indication that the tenancy was from month
to month, the lease would be liable to be
terminated on a month's notice even if it
was for manufacturing purposes.

16. I am in respectful agreement
with the view expressed in the aforesaid
case. Learned Counsel however placed
reliance on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Ram Kumar (supra)
and contended that the decision of this
court in the case of Binda Din reported in
1968 All LJ 721 requires reconsideration.
He submitted that according to that
decision, it is the purpose of the lease and
not the mode of payment of rent which is
decisive of the issues.

17. I cannot agree. The Supreme
Court has not ruled that where the lease is
for manufacturing purpose, there cannot be
an enquiry whether there is any indication
that the parties had agreed that the lease
would be from month to month. Nor has
the Supreme Court said that the mode of
payment cannot afford any indication as to
the duration of the lease agreed to between
the parties. The Supreme Court in this
connection observed thus at page 27
(column 1):
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1171

"It has no doubt been recognised:
in several cases that the mode in which a
rent is expressed to be payable affords a
presumption that the tenancy is of a
character
corresponding
thereto.
Consequently, when the rent reserved is an
annual rent, the presumption would arise
that the tenancy was an annual tenancy
unless there is something to rebut the
presumption."

18. The decision of this Court in
the case of Binda Din, 1968 All LJ 721 is
in my opinion in accord with the law laid
down by the Supreme Court.

19. Learned counsel for the
petitioner vehemently contended that the
mode of payment cannot be a ground for
holding that the tenancy was a month to
month tenancy. The submission has no force.
In Ram Kumar's case (AIR 1952 SC 23)
(supra) the Supreme Court has made
observations (quoted above) which do lend
support to the view that mode of payment,
even if not conclusive of the controversy, can
be considered for ascertaining whether
notwithstanding the purpose of the lease there
is no indication that there was a contract to
contrary within the meaning of Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act. In any case,
in the present case, it is the cumulative effect
of various facts and circumstances on the
basis of which the courts below have held
against the petitioner. The mode of payment
was not the sole ground for holding against
the petitioner. In my view, even if the mode
of payment may not per se be decisive of the
issue, it cannot, in my view, be said that the
mode of payment is an altogether irrelevant
circumstance. Far from being irrelevant, the
mode of payment is, in my view, an
important and relevant circumstance for
ascertaining whether there is any contract to
the contrary as to the duration of the lease.

24. In the facts found here, the
tenancy, in the opinion of this Court, was
clearly one for month-to-month. It could be
determined by a month's notice. The notice
to quit, therefore, cannot be questioned on
the said ground.

25. Now, it is submitted by the
learned Counsel for the tenant that the
findings of both the Courts below on the
issue of structural alteration without the
written permission of the landlord, leading
to the building housing the demised
premises suffering a diminishment in its
value or utility and its disfigurement, are
patently flawed. It is argued that it was the
landlord's burden to adduce expert evidence
or take out a commission for local
inspection
to
show
what
structural
alterations have been done, and if done,
how these diminished the value of the
building housing the demised premises or
affected its utility or disfigured it. It is
submitted that the Courts below placed the
burden on the tenant's shoulders to adduce
evidence, negatively oriented to establish
that there was no violation of Section 20(2)
(c) of the Act.

26. A look at the Trial Court's
findings on the issue does not require this
Court to spare a second thought in
accepting the tenant's criticism that the
Trial Court has wrongly placed burden
upon the tenant to prove the case of
structural alteration. The short finding
recorded by the Trial Court on the issue can
be best appreciated by a reproduction
thereof verbatim:

"इस तथ्य को कसद्ध करने का भार
वादी पर था कक प्रश्नगत दुकान में प्रकतवादी ने
मौकलक स्वरूप को पररवकतषत करा कदया गया है।
प्रकतवादी की ओर से जो साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत की गयी
1172 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
है। उसमें प्रकतवादी ने अपनी कजरह के पेज 7 पर
यह कथन ककया गया है कक प्रश्नगत दुकान जब
ककराये पर ली गयी थी उस समय कच्ची खपरैल
थी, मैं नहीों बता सकता, दुकान जैसी थी, वैसी है।
दुकान में आटा चक्की के साथ मेरा बेटा दजी
का काम भी करता है। कजसकी दुकान सी०ए०
टेलसष के नाम से है। वर्ष 1998 से मेरा लड़का
टेलररोंग का कायष कर रहा है। वतषमान में दुकान
पर पत्थर की ित डली है, ित के समय दुकान
में प्लास्टर का कायष कराया था। कजसका खचाष
कपता जी ने कदया था। इस साक्षी ने आगे अपनी
कजरह में यह भी कथन ककया है कक प्रश्नगत
दुकान के माकलक वादी हैं। मैं अपने लड़के को
प्रश्नगत दुकान में दजी का काम करने के कलये
कोई अनुमकत नहीों ली थी। प्रकतवादी द्वारा बहस
के दौरान यह तकष प्रस्तुत ककया गया है कक वादी
द्वारा प्रश्नगत दुकान सोंरचनात्मक पररवतषन के
बावत न तो कोई अमीन आख्या या फोटोग्राफस
प्रस्तुत ककये हैं, न ही पररवतषन व पररवधषन कनयत
कतकथ वादी द्वारा अपने वाद/ साक्ष्य में प्रस्तुत की
है। इस सोंबोंध में पत्रावली के पररशीलन से यह
कवकदत हुआ कक उक्त वादी के कथनोों के सोंबोंध
में प्रकतवादी द्वारा भी न तो अमीन आख्या मोंगाई
गयी न ही कोई फोटोग्राफ्स इस बावत प्रस्तुत
ककया गया। इस प्रकार वादी द्वारा इस तथ्य को
कसद्ध करने में सफल रहे कक प्रकतवादी दवारा
प्रश्नगत दुकान में कनमाषण या सोंरचनात्मक
पररवतषन कजसमें उसका मूल्य या उसकी
उपयोकगता घटने की सोंभावना हो, ककया गया है।
तदनुसार यह कवकनश्चय कबन्दु सों०-3 वादी के पक्ष
में कनणीत ककया जाता है।

(emphasis by Court)

27. A reading of the said finding
clearly shows that the Trial Court has not at
all looked into evidence led on behalf of
the tenant to establish a case of structural
alteration of the kind envisaged under
Section 20(2)(c) of the Act. The Trial Court
has virtually assumed the case to be
proved, as alleged, and then held that for
the reason that the tenant has not applied
for a commission to carry out a local
inspection or produced photographs, the
conclusion ipso facto is that the tenant has
made structural alteration to the demised
shop as is likely to diminish its value or
utility or disfigure it. The finding is
absolutely based on no evidence, and
proceeds as if there were a presumption
about the prohibited structural alteration in
support of the landlord's case. The finding
to that extent is perverse also.

28. The Revisional Court has
examined the matter in some detail. The
findings recorded by the Revisional Court,
with reference to the evidence DWs 1 and 2
on the question of structural alteration, are
to the effect that both the DWs have
acknowledged in their cross-examination
that structural alterations have been done to
the shop, where a plywood partition has
been put in place, and apart from the flour
mill installed, an additional tailor's shop
had been established. In the relevant part of
cross-examination of DW-1, it has been
accepted that the demised shop had a
kachcha tile-worked roof, but now the shop
has a roof fixed with girders and stone
slabs. It has been further said, when the
roof was changed, he did not remember.
The stone-slabbed roof was laid during the
tenancy of the witness's father. Again, DW2 has stated in his cross-examination that
the shop has two doors: in one part, there is
a flour mill and in the other, the tailors
shop exists. The building in question,
according to the witness, had no wall. The
partition wall is made of plywood.

29. From all this evidence, the further
finding recorded by the Revisional Court is
that the testimony of DWs 1 and 2 shows
10 All. Har Narain Singh Vs. Ravi Shanker Nigam
1173
shows that the tenant has done structural
alteration to the demised shop. It is next
remarked that there is no permission
produced for the said structural alteration.
It is observed that on the other hand, the
landlord says, that whatever structural
alteration has been done by the tenant, it
was without his permission. The said
assertion is unrebutted on the tenant's part.

30. The finding on Issue No. 3
recorded by the Revisional Court concludes
with the remarks that the Trial Court's
finding on Issue No. 3 is liable to be
affirmed to the extent that the tenant has,
without the permission of the landlord,
made structural alteration in the demised
shop. The Revisional Court has then said
that the further issue, whether the structural
alteration made is one that is likely to
diminish the value or utility of the shop or
disfigure it, would be answered later on in
the Revisional Court's judgment.

31. The Revisional Court while
answering Issues Nos. 4 and 5, which
quintessentially are about default and relief
from eviction, has recorded findings on the
point, whether the structural alteration is
likely to diminish the value or utility of the
demised shop or disfigure it. The relevant
finding recorded is extracted below: