# Hargovind v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 5 ILRA 233
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-03-29
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 50880 of 2021
- **Bench:** Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hargovind-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48495
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Sections 161 & 164 -
Bail - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section
376-D, 342, 323 & 120B - The Protection
of Children From Sexual Offences Act,
2012 - Section 3/4 -'parity' - the state or
condition being equal or on a level;
equality; equality of rank or status - 'Law
on bail' - 'Reasoned Order' - 'desirability of
consistency'-"cessante ratione legis cessat
ipsa lex" - "reason is the soul of the law,
and when the reason of any particular law
ceases, so does the law itself" - to assign
reasons to an order is not only essential
but is a safeguard that discretion is
exercised in a judicious manner - parity of
an unreasoned order which is against
various judgments, could not an order not
supported by adequate reasons could not
be weighed over an order passed with
certain reasons after considering rival
submissions and considering 'Law on
bail'.(Para -10,11, 13)

Victim going to field along with her animals -
co-accused and present applicant met her and
took her to a room at their tubewell - Applicant
locked room from outside and remained there to
guard - co-accused committed rape inside the
room - asked co-accused to complete act of
rape quickly - After act of rape, applicant and
co-accused left room, locked from outside -
Later on, room was opened by father of
applicant - Specific role of Applicant - First bail
application of applicant (student) rejected - by a
reasoned order on facts as well as on Law -
Second bail . (Para -3, 14)

HELD:-Considering
the
law
on
bail
as
mentioned in the order passed in first bail
application as well as judgments passed by the
Supreme Court in regard to reasoned order as
well as law on parity and desirability of
consistency and also considering specific role of
applicant in commission of the offence and
keeping in view the ingredients of Section
376(D) IPC and offence under Section POCSO
Act, no case for bail is made out to allow second
bail application.(Para -16 )

Bail application rejected. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-
234 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

5 All. Hargovind Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
233
month after normal functioning of the
courts are restored.

2. The party shall file computer
generated copy of such order downloaded
from the official website of High Court
Allahabad.

3. The computer generated copy
of such order shall be self attested by the
counsel of the party concerned.

4.
The
concerned
Court/Authority/Official shall verify the
authenticity of such computerized copy of
the order from the official website of High
Court Allahabad and shall make a
declaration of such verification in writing.

43. However, it is made clear that any
wilful violation of above conditions by the
applicant, shall have serious repercussion
on his/her bail so granted by this Court and
the trial court is at liberty to cancel the bail,
after recording the reasons for doing so, in
the given case of any of the condition
mentioned above.
----------
(2022)05ILR A233
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 50880 of
2021

Hargovind ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri P.K. Singh, Sri Vijay Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.
(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Sections 161 & 164 -
Bail - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section
376-D, 342, 323 & 120B - The Protection
of Children From Sexual Offences Act,
2012 - Section 3/4 -'parity' - the state or
condition being equal or on a level;
equality; equality of rank or status - 'Law
on bail' - 'Reasoned Order' - 'desirability of
consistency'-"cessante ratione legis cessat
ipsa lex" - "reason is the soul of the law,
and when the reason of any particular law
ceases, so does the law itself" - to assign
reasons to an order is not only essential
but is a safeguard that discretion is
exercised in a judicious manner - parity of
an unreasoned order which is against
various judgments, could not an order not
supported by adequate reasons could not
be weighed over an order passed with
certain reasons after considering rival
submissions and considering 'Law on
bail'.(Para -10,11, 13)

Victim going to field along with her animals -
co-accused and present applicant met her and
took her to a room at their tubewell - Applicant
locked room from outside and remained there to
guard - co-accused committed rape inside the
room - asked co-accused to complete act of
rape quickly - After act of rape, applicant and
co-accused left room, locked from outside -
Later on, room was opened by father of
applicant - Specific role of Applicant - First bail
application of applicant (student) rejected - by a
reasoned order on facts as well as on Law -
Second bail . (Para -3, 14)

HELD:-Considering
the
law
on
bail
as
mentioned in the order passed in first bail
application as well as judgments passed by the
Supreme Court in regard to reasoned order as
well as law on parity and desirability of
consistency and also considering specific role of
applicant in commission of the offence and
keeping in view the ingredients of Section
376(D) IPC and offence under Section POCSO
Act, no case for bail is made out to allow second
bail application.(Para -16 )

Bail application rejected. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-
234 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. Nanha s/o Nabhan Khan Vs St. of U.P. , 1992
LawSuit (All) 219

2. Ramesh Bhawan Rathod Vs Vishanbhai
Hirabhai Makwana (Koli) & anr., 2021 6 SCC 230

3. Bhupendra Singh Vs St. of Raj. & anr.
,Criminal Appeal No.1279 of 2021

4. Mahipal Vs Rajesh Kumar, 2020 (2) SCC 118

5. Manoj Kumar Khokhar Vs St. of Raj. & anr. ,
2022 SCC Online 30

6. Sabir Vs Bhoora @ Nadeem & anr. , Criminal
Appeal No.227 of 2022

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam
Shamshery, J.)

1. Heard Shri P.K. Singh, learned
counsel for applicant and Shri Om Prakash,
learned Additional Government Advocate
for State.

2. Applicant - Hargovind has
preferred second bail application, who is
facing trial in connection with Case Crime
No.07 of 2019, under Section 376-D, 342,
323, 120B of Indian Penal Code and
Section 3/4 of POCSO Act, Police Station -
Nibohara, District - Agra.

3. The first bail application was
rejected by a reasoned order on facts as
well as on Law. The operative portion of
order dated 13.7.2021 is reproduced
hereinafter :-

"8. The allegations against the
applicant are consistent in FIR, statement
of victim recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. and 164
Cr.P.C. that during entire occurrence of
rape he remained at
the place of
occurrence. He not only locked the room
from outside but repeatedly told co-accused
to do it fast. Co-accused Veeru also joined
him. Section 376 (D) IPC states that
"Where a woman is raped by one or more
persons constituting a group or acting in
furtherance of a common intention, each of
those persons shall be deemed to have
committed the offence of rape".

9. Considering the gravity of
offence, no case of bail is made out.
Accordingly,
the
bail
application
is
rejected."

4. Shri P.K. Singh, learned counsel for
applicant has vehemently argued that while
considering first bail application, certain
material aspects of the case were not
considered such as similarly situated coaccused Veeru @ Virendra was granted bail
by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.30684
of 2019, vide order dated 7.8.2019, prior to
the order passed in first bail application of
applicant.

5. Learned counsel further submits
that applicant is a student and presently, he
is pursing M.Phil. The allegation that he
has closed the door from outside and
remained there, is not only improbable as
victim has no opportunity to identify from
inside the room. Therefore, applicant is also
entitled for bail on the ground of parity.

6. Learned counsel for applicant also
relied upon a judgment passed by the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Nanha s/o Nabhan Khan vs. State of U.P;
1992 LawSuit (All) 219 wherein, the
Division Bench has decided two questions
referred to the Bench and in support of his
submission, he read out paragraph Nos. 58,
59 and 61, which are mentioned hereinafter
:-

"58. The word 'parity' means the
state or condition being equal or on a
5 All. Hargovind Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
235
level; equality; equality of rank or status
(See Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
1936 Ed.). In other words it means being
placed at the same footing. All the accused
of a case always do not stand on the same
footing. While considering bail of different
accused the court has to find out whether
they stand on the same footing or not. Even
if role assigned to various accused is same
yet they may stand on different footing. The
case of Cap. Jagjeet Singh (supra) is an
illustration wherein the Supreme Court
distinguished the case of Capt. Jagjeet
Singh on the ground that he was in touch
with foreign agency and leaking out
secrets. The Supreme Court in the case of
Gur
Charan
Singh
vs.
Delhi
Administration, AIR 1978 SC 179 : (1978
Cri
LJ
129)
laid
down
that
the
considerations for grant of bail are inter
alia the position and status of the accused
with reference to the victim and the
witnesses; likelihood of the accused;
fleeing from justice; of repeating offence; of
jeopardising his own life, being faced with
grim prospect of possible conviction in the
case; of tampering with witnesses; and the
like. These are additional factors which are
to be judged in the case of individual
accused and it may make the cases of
different accused distinguishable from each
accused. At the same time if there is no real
distinction between the individual case of
accused the principle of parity comes into
play and if bail is granted to one accused it
should also be granted to the other accused
whose case stands on identical footing.

59. None the less the principle of
grant of bail on parity cannot be allowed to
be carried to an absurd or illogical
conclusion so as to put a judge in a tight
and
straight
jacket
to
grant
bail
automatically. There may be case which
may require an exception; where a judge
may not simply take a different view from
the judge who granted bail earlier to a coaccused but where the conscience of the
judge revolts in granting bail. In such a
situation the judge may choose to depart
from the rule recording his reasons.
However, such cases would be very few.

61. My answer to the points
referred to is that if on examination of a
given case it transpires that the case of the
applicant before court is identical, similar
to the accused, on facts and circumstances
who has been bailed out, then the
desirability of consistency will require that
such an accused should also be released on
bail. (Exceptional cases as discussed above
apart). As regards the second part of the
question, answer is that it is not at all
necessary for an accused to state in his bail
application that the bail application of a
co-accused has been rejected previously.

7. Learned Additional Government
Advocate has opposed the submission of bail
and submits that while rejecting first bail
application, this Court has considered all the
relevant factors as well as 'Law on bail' and
while taking into consideration, statements
recorded under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.
and that applicant has actively participated in
offence by locking the room from outside as
well as repeatedly asked the applicant to do
the act of rape quickly. The Court has also
taken note of Section 376(D) of Indian Penal
Code and accordingly, dismissed the first bail
application. He further submits that bail
order, whereby, co-accused Veeru @ Virendra
is granted bail is bereft of reasoning,
therefore, it cannot be relied upon as well as
parity alone is not a ground to grant bail and
there is no subsequent event brought on
record before this Court to allow the second
bail application.

8. Shri P.K. Singh, learned counsel for
applicant
has
argued
the
first
bail
236 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application
as
well
as
present
bail
application. The arguments of learned
counsel
for
applicant
are
noted
in
paragraph no.5 of order dated 13.7.2021,
which are mentioned hereinafter :-

"5. Learned counsels for the
applicant submitted that the age of the victim
is determined to be 16 years as per radiology
medical report. It is further submitted that
during medical examination no injury was
found on private part of the victim. Victim has
narrated a different story in her statement
recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. He further submitted
that there is no allegation of rape on the
applicant. Therefore, applicant is liable to be
released on bail."

9. The arguments of learned counsel for
applicant in support of prayer, made in
second bail application are of two folds.
Firstly, he argued that co-accused Veeru @
Virendra was granted bail by this Court on
7.8.2019 i.e. even before first bail application
of applicant was rejected, however, the same
was not brought on record of first bail
application and secondly, he relied upon
concept of 'desirability of consistency' as held
in Nanha Singh (Supra). In this regard, it is
essential to consider the reasons given by the
co-ordinate Bench, while granting bail to coaccused Veeru @ Virendra that :-

"After
considering
the
rival
submissions noted hereinabove and the
material
brought
on
record,
without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the
case and considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, I am of the
opinion that the applicant is entitled to be
released on bail."

10. The Apex Court in a recent
judgment passed in the case of Manoj
Kumar Khokhar vs. State of Rajasthan
and Another; 2022 SCC Online 30, has
retreated the 'Law on bail' as well as
requirement of 'Reasoned Order' while
rejecting or accepting the bail application.
The
Apex
Court
has
followed
the
judgments passed in Ramesh Bhawan
Rathod
vs.
Vishanbhai
Hirabhai
Makwana (Koli) & Another; 2021 6 SCC
230; Bhupendra Singh vs. State of
Rajasthan
and
Another
(Criminal
Appeal No.1279 of 2021); Mahipal vs.
Rajesh Kumar; 2020 (2) SCC 118; and
held that:-

"18. (l) The most recent judgment
of this Court on the aspect of application of
mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order
granting bail to the accused is in the case
of Brijmani Devi vs. Pappu Kumar and Anr.
- Criminal Appeal No. 1663/2021 disposed
of on 17th December, 2021, wherein a three
Judge Bench of this Court, while setting
aside an unreasoned and casual order of
the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows:

"While we are conscious of the
fact that liberty of an individual is an
invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail Courts
cannot lose sight of the serious nature of
the accusations against an accused and the
facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not
be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature
but are supported by adequate material
brought on record so as to enable a Court
to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for grant of bail
a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after
having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must
be given to facts suggestive of the nature of
crime, the criminal antecedents of the
5 All. Hargovind Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
237
accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction
vis-a-vis the offence/s alleged against an
accused."

19. On the aspect of the duty to
accord reasons for a decision arrived at by
a court, or for that matter, even a quasi
judicial authority, it would be useful to
refer to a judgment of this Court in Kranti
Associates Private Limited & Anr. vs.
Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. - (2010) 9
SCC 496, wherein after referring to a
number
of
judgments
this
Court
summarised at paragraph 47 the law on the
point. The relevant principles for the
purpose of this case are extracted as under:

"(a) Insistence on recording of
reasons is meant to serve the wider
principle of justice that justice must not
only be done it must also appear to be done
as well.

(b) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any
possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and
quasi judicial or even administrative
power.

(c)
Reasons
reassure
that
discretion has been exercised by the
decision maker on relevant grounds and by
disregarding extraneous considerations.

(d)
Reasons
have
virtually
become as indispensable a component of a
decision making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial,
quasi judicial and even by administrative
bodies.

(e) The ongoing judicial trend in
all countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision making justifying the principle
that reason is the soul of justice.

(f) Judicial or even quasi judicial
opinions these days can be as different as
the judges and authorities who deliver
them. All these decisions serve one common
purpose which is to demonstrate by reason
that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important
for sustaining the litigants' faith in the
justice delivery system.

(g) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.

(h) If a judge or a quasi judicial
authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision making process then it is
impossible to know whether the person
deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent
or
to
principles
of
incrementalism.

(i)
Reasons
in
support
of
decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber
stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a
valid decision making process.

(j) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision making not only
makes the judges and decision makers less
prone to errors but also makes them subject
to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100
Harvard Law Review 731- 37)

(k)
In
all
common
law
jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in
setting up precedents for the future.
Therefore,
for
development
of
law,
requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a
part of "due process".

20.
Though
the
aforesaid
judgment was rendered in the context of a
dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic
order by the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, reliance could be
placed on the said judgment on the need to
give reasons while deciding a matter.
238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. The Latin maxim "cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex" meaning
"reason is the soul of the law, and when the
reason of any particular law ceases, so
does the law itself", is also apposite.

22. We have extracted the relevant
portions of the impugned order above. At the
outset, we observe that the extracted portions
are the only portions forming part of the
"reasoning" of the High court while granting
bail. As noted from the aforecited judgments,
it is not necessary for a Court to give
elaborate reasons while granting bail
particularly when the case is at the initial
stage and the allegations of the offences by
the accused would not have been crystalised
as such. There cannot be elaborate details
recorded to give an impression that the case
is one that would result in a conviction or, by
contrast, in an acquittal while passing an
order on an application for grant of bail.
However,
the
Court
deciding
a
bail
application cannot completely divorce its
decision from material aspects of the case
such as the allegations made against the
accused; severity of the punishment if the
allegations are proved beyond reasonable
doubt and would result in a conviction;
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced by the accused; tampering
of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the
prosecution; criminal antecedents of the
accused; and a prima facie satisfaction of the
Court in support of the charge against the
accused.

23.
Ultimately,
the
Court
considering an application for bail has to
exercise discretion in a judicious manner
and in accordance with the settled
principles of law having regard to the
crime alleged to be committed by the
accused on the one hand and ensuring
purity of the trial of the case on the other.

24. Thus, while elaborate reasons
may not be assigned for grant of bail or an
extensive discussion of the merits of the
case may not be undertaken by the court
considering a bail application, an order de
hors reasoning or bereft of the relevant
reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In
such a case the prosecution or the
informant has a right to assail the order
before a higher forum. As noted in
Gurucharan Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.)
1978 CriLJ 129, when bail has been
granted to an accused, the State may, if
new circumstances have arisen following
the grant of such bail, approach the High
Court seeking cancellation of bail under
Section 439 (2) of the Cr.P.C. However, if
no new circumstances have cropped up
since the grant of bail, the State may prefer
an appeal against the order granting bail,
on the ground that the same is perverse or
illegal or has been arrived at by ignoring
material aspects which establish a prima
facie case against the accused."

11. Fall out of above judgments is that
to assign reasons to an order is not only
essential but is a safeguard that discretion is
exercised in a judicious manner.

12. It is also relevant to mention here
a short judgment passed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Sabir vs. Bhoora @
Nadeem and Another; Criminal Appeal
No.227 of 2022, decided on 15.2.2022
wherein similarly worded order as passed
on bail application of co-accused, was set
aside considering it to be an unreasoned
order. For reference, the order is mentioned
hereinafter :-

"On perusal of the impugned
orders, what is noteworthy is that in the
impugned orders passed by the High Court
no reason has been given for grant of bail.
In the case of murder (under Section 302
IPC), it is expected that at least some
5 All. Hargovind Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
239
reason would be given while reversing the
order of the Trial Court, which had rejected
the bail application by a reasoned order.
What we notice is that in the impugned
orders the High Court, while granting bail,
has only stated that "Keeping in view the
nature of offence, evidence, complicity of
the accused, severity of the punishment,
submissions of learned counsel for the
parties and without expressing any opinion
on the merits of the case, this Court is of
the view that the applicant is entitled to be
enlarged on bail during the pendency of the
trial". In the present case, the nature of the
offence is very grave i.e. murder under
Section 302 IPC and if such reasons are to
be accepted for granting bail, then
probably in all cases bail would be
granted.

Since we find that no reasons
have been given in substance and there is
only narration of facts in the orders
impugned, we are of the opinion that the
orders impugned deserve to be set aside. "

13. In the light of above judgments
even considering the "desirability of
consistency" as held in Nanha (Supra), the
parity of an unreasoned order which is
against various judgments, as referred
above, passed by the Apex Court, could not
an order not supported by adequate reasons
could not be weighed over an order passed
with certain reasons after considering rival
submissions and considering 'Law on bail'.
While rejecting the first bail application for
the sake of repeat, reasons given by this
Court are mentioned hereinafter :-

"8. The allegations against the
applicant are consistent in FIR, statement
of victim recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. and 164
Cr.P.C. that during entire occurrence of
rape he remained at the place of
occurrence. He not only locked the room
from outside but repeatedly told co-accused
to do it fast. Co-accused Veeru also joined
him. Section 376 (D) IPC states that
"Where a woman is raped by one or more
persons constituting a group or acting in
furtherance of a common intention, each of
those persons shall be deemed to have
committed the offence of rape".

14. In order to consider the
submissions
of
learned
counsel
for
applicant on merit, I have gone through the
material on record and again perused it
carefully. The role of applicant was
specifically mentioned in the statement of
victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
that on fateful day, when victim was going
to field along with her animals, Jai chand
(co-accused)
and
Hargovind
(present
applicant) met her and took her to a room at
their tubewell. Applicant - Hargovind
locked the room from outside and remained
there to guard. Meanwhile, co-accused - Jai
Chand committed rape inside the room and
specifically asked co-accused to complete
the act of rape quickly. After the act of
rape, applicant and co-accused left the
room, locked from outside. Later on, room
was opened by father of the applicant.

15. From the statements recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the active role of
applicant in commission of offence is
apparent. He not only actively participated
in abduction but remained with co-accused
Jai Chand from starting to conclusion of act
and helped co-accused Jai Chand by
locking the door from outside and remained
there to guard abroad to complete the
offence quickly.

16. Considering the law on bail as
mentioned in the order passed in first bail
application as well as judgments passed by
the Supreme Court (referred above) in
240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
regard to reasoned order as well as law on
parity and desirability of consistency and
also considering specific role of applicant
in commission of the offence and keeping
in view the ingredients of Section 376(D)
IPC and offence under Section POCSO
Act, no case for bail is made out to allow
this second bail application.

17. Accordingly, the present bail
application is rejected.
----------
(2022)05ILR A240
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Criminal Revision No. 97 of 1994

Lalaie @ Chandra Prakash ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Dileep Kumar, Sri Jitendra Kumar, Sri
Purushottam Dixit

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Vinay Saran

Criminal Law- Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973- Section 319- Summoning order- The
impugned order passed by the court below
under Section 319 CrPC was without
considering the material on record. The
Investigating Officer has not found any
material against the revisionist nor his
involvement in the instant case was
proved, therefore his name was dropped
in the charge sheet. This Court further
finds that earlier on the application of the
prosecution, the revisionist was ordered
to be summoned by the court under
Section
319
CrPC
by
order
dated
29.5.1991, but this Court vide order dated
8.10.1991 passed in Criminal Revision
No.1014 of 1991 quashed the said order of
summoning and as such the revisionist
cannot
again
be
summoned
on
the
application of the prosecution. Thereafter,
the opposite party no.2, informant filed an
application 48-Kha under Section 319
CrPC before the learned Sessions Judge,
Etawah, who without going through the
legal provisions contained under Section
319 CrPC summoned the revisionist and
others for facing the trial vide impugned
order dated 22.12.1993. The power under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and
extraordinary power, which should be
sparingly used only in those cases where
the circumstances of the case so warrant
as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

Settled law that the power under section 319 of
the CrPc is to be exercised sparingly and not in
a routine manner and after considering the
material
collected
during
the
course
of
investigation as well as the testimony of the
witnesses during trial. (Para 14)

Criminal Revision allowed. (E-3)

Judgements / Case law relied upon:-

1. Hardeep Singh Vs St. of Punj & ors, (2014) 3
SCC 92

2. Labhuji Amratji Thakor & ors. Vs The St. of
Guj. & anr, 2018 (0) Supreme (SC) 1147

3. Brijendra Singh & ors Vs St. of Raj., (2017) 7
SCC 706

4. Periyasami & ors. Vs S. Nallasamy, (2019) 4
SCC 342

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

1. This criminal revision has been
filed by the revisionist Lalia @ Chandra
Prakash against the judgment and order
dated 22.12.1993 passed by Sessions
Judge, Etawah summoning the revisionist
under Section 319 CrPC for facing the trial
in ST No.435 of 1990 under Section 307