# Haribansh Singh v. Addl. Dist. Judge/F.T.C. No. 3, Raebareli & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 760
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2017-03-03
- **Case number:** Rent Control No. 4819 of 2017
- **Bench:** Rakesh Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/haribansh-singh-v-addl-dist-judge-f-t-c-no-3-raebareli-ors-44314
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law - valid and invalid deposit of
rent
-
The
U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation
of
Letting,
Rent
and
Eviction) Act, 1972: Section 20(2) and
30(1) - Provincial Small Causes Courts
Act, 1887: Section 25

It is settled that in order to avail the
benefits under rent control legislations
the tenants are obliged to strictly comply
with the provisions of the rent statutes.
(Para 16)

The landlord had sent a notice dated
28.02.2007 terminating the tenancy of the
petitioner (tenant) and demanding arrears
of rent. Both the courts below have
concurrently held that the said notice is
deemed to have been served upon the
petitioner. On 03.04.2007, the landlord
filed the suit for arrears of rent and
ejectment against the petitioner. It was
only thereafter that the petitioner, on
20.04.2007, moved an application under
Section 30 of the Act before the Court.
The petitioner was defaulter at the time
when the suit of Section 30 of the Act was
filed. In view of the settled legal position
the
amount
alleged
to
have
been
deposited by the petitioner under Section
30(1) of the Act, after the notice of
demand was served upon him, is not a
valid deposit and as such the petitioner
does not derive any benefit out of said
deposit. In case, the amount alleged to
have been deposited by the petitioner
under Section 30 of the Act is excluded,
the petitioner on his own showing is not
entitled to the benefit of section 20(4) of
the Act. (Para 21)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to interview amounts to final rejection of
the candidature before completion of
process of selection. Regulations 2014
cannot be read in contravention of
provision of an Act and the Constitution.
A harmonious construction has to be
made
reading
the
provisions
of
Regulations,2014, Section 3(6)of U.P.
Act No. 4 of 1994 and Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution of India. The position
that emerges out is that a reserved
category candidate shall not be debarred
from further selection if the candidate has
scored higher marks than cut off marks
fixed for the candidates belonging to
unreserved
category
called
for
the
interview.

43. At later stage, learned counsels
representing the private respondents have
relied upon the Judgment and order dated
10-11-2016 passed by this court in Writ
Petition No. 6083 (S/S) of 2016, Sachhida
Nand Mishra Versus State of U.P. and
Others,
to
say
that
in
such
a
circumstances whole selection need not
be quashed and relief may be confined to
the petitioners of this case who have
approached this court. As a mater of fact
no such plea has been raised to quash the
whole
selection
in
the
present
proceedings. The petitioners in the two
writ petitions in question can well be
granted relief confined to them without
disturbing the whole process of selection
which question was not raised by any
party nor any such relief is sought.

44. It has also been informed by
learned counsel representing all the parties
that in all other 32 subjects, the selection
has been made by following the same
procedure and appointment orders have also
been issued in favour of the successful
candidates
except
for
the
Sociology
Subject.

45. Since, the petitioners can be
granted
relief
without
quashing
the
selection process held so far, it is hereby
directed that the petitioners having higher
marks than the last candidate of unreserved
category called for the interview, the
petitioners, since have approached the
court, shall be allowed in the further process
of selection, against the unreserved seats,
namely in the interview. To avoid any
further delay, a direction is also issued to
opposite parties no. 2 & 3 to complete the
process as early as possible say within a
period of six weeks from the date a certified
copy of this order is served.

46.

With
the
directions
made
hereinabove , both the writ petitions are
hereby allowed.

47. No order as to costs.

48. Let a copy of this order be placed on
the record of Writ Petition 19881 (S/S) of
2019.
----------
(2020)06ILR A760
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.03.2017

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, J.

Rent Control No. 4819 of 2017

Haribansh Singh ...Appellant
Versus
Addl. Dist. Judge/F.T.C. No. 3, Raebareli
& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ajay Sharma
6 All. Haribansh Singh Vs. Addl. Dist. Judge/F.T.C. No. 3, Raebareli & Ors.
761
Counsel for the Respondent:

Civil Law - valid and invalid deposit of
rent
-
The
U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation
of
Letting,
Rent
and
Eviction) Act, 1972: Section 20(2) and
30(1) - Provincial Small Causes Courts
Act, 1887: Section 25

It is settled that in order to avail the
benefits under rent control legislations
the tenants are obliged to strictly comply
with the provisions of the rent statutes.
(Para 16)

The landlord had sent a notice dated
28.02.2007 terminating the tenancy of the
petitioner (tenant) and demanding arrears
of rent. Both the courts below have
concurrently held that the said notice is
deemed to have been served upon the
petitioner. On 03.04.2007, the landlord
filed the suit for arrears of rent and
ejectment against the petitioner. It was
only thereafter that the petitioner, on
20.04.2007, moved an application under
Section 30 of the Act before the Court.
The petitioner was defaulter at the time
when the suit of Section 30 of the Act was
filed. In view of the settled legal position
the
amount
alleged
to
have
been
deposited by the petitioner under Section
30(1) of the Act, after the notice of
demand was served upon him, is not a
valid deposit and as such the petitioner
does not derive any benefit out of said
deposit. In case, the amount alleged to
have been deposited by the petitioner
under Section 30 of the Act is excluded,
the petitioner on his own showing is not
entitled to the benefit of section 20(4) of
the Act. (Para 21)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

1. Harcharan Singh vs Shivrani (1981) 2
SCC 535

2. Mundri Lal vs Sushila Rani (2007) 8
SCC 609
3. Smt. Mridula Dayal vs VIth Addl.
District Judge, Allahabad & Ors. 1986 (2)
ARC 132 (followed)

4. E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (D) & ors.
(2003) 1 SCC 123

5. Gokaran Singh vs 1st Additional District
and Session Judge, Hardoi and others,
2000 (1) ARC 653 (followed)

6. Madhu Mittal (Smt.) vs Additional
District Judge, Ghaziabad and ors 2004
(2) ARC 326 (followed)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rakesh Srivastava, J.)

1. On 03.04.2007, the plaintiffrespondent no. 3 instituted a Small
Causes Case No. 7 of 2007 before the
Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Court No. 14, Raebareli against the
defendant-petitioner,
for
recovery
of
arrears of rent and ejectment. In her
plaint, the plaintiff alleged that she was
the landlady of a shop situated in House
No. 101, Ward No. 3, situated at Mohalla
Nai Bazaar, Lalganj, District Raibareli of
which the defendant was a tenant on a
monthly rent of Rs. 600 per month, plus
taxes and that he had not paid rent for the
period extending from November, 2005 to
February, 2007 in spite of notice of
demand dated 28.02.2007.

2. On 30.05.2008, the petitioner
filed his written statement controverting
the material averments made in the plaint.
The petitioner inter alia pleaded that rent
of the shop was Rs. 600 per month
including taxes; that the alleged notice
dated 28.02.2007 was never served upon
the petitioner; that rent upto December,
2006 was paid; that the landlady refused
to accept the rent for the month of
January, 2007 and as such the same was
sent to her by money order, which she
762 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
refused to accept. It was vaguely alleged
that appropriate proceedings had been
initiated for depositing the rent but no
orders had been passed in the said
proceeding.
Alongwith
his
written
statement, the petitioner also moved an
application under section 151 CPC for
depositing Rs. 9400/- (Rs. 8400 towards
rent for the period extending from
January, 2007 to February, 2008 and Rs.
1000/- towards Court fee and other
expenses).

3. Based upon the pleadings of the
parties, the trial Court framed 5 issues.
The trial Court, after taking into account
the oral and documentary evidence on
record, decreed the suit of the respondent
no.3 by judgment dated 27.03.2015. The
trial Court inter alia held that the notice of
demand had been duly served; that there
was a relationship of landlord and tenant
between the respondent no.3 and the
petitioner; that the petitioner was found to
be a defaulter under Section 20(2) of the
Act. On these findings the suit was
decreed. The aforesaid judgment of the
trial Court has been upheld in Revision
No. 36 of 2015 by the Additional District
Judge, Court No. 3, Raebareli by the
judgment dated 27.10.2016. These two
judgments are under challenge in this
petition.

4. Shri Ajay Sharma, learned
counsel for the petitioner has made two
submissions. Firstly, that the notice of
demand was not served upon the
petitioner and secondly, that the ''first date
of hearing' is the date on which the court
applies its mind and not the date of filing
of written statement as has been held by
the courts below. The counsel submits
that the petitioner had deposited the entire
arrears of rent after excluding the amount
deposited by him under section 30(1) of
the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 (for
short ''the Act') by the ''first date of
hearing' and as such the petitioner was
entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4) of
section 20 of the Act.

5. In so far as the first submission
of the learned counsel for the petitioner
is concerned, both the Courts below, on
the basis of the evidence on record,
have returned a concurrent finding of
fact that the notice of demand dated
28.02.2007, which was sent by the
respondent no. 3 by registered post, was
tendered to the petitioner but was
refused by him as was clear from the
endorsement
made
by
the
postal
authorities and consequently the notice
would
be
deemed
to
have
been
sufficiently served upon the petitioner.
In Harcharan Singh v. Shivrani, (1981)
2 SCC 535 the Apex Court has held that
where a notice was sent by registered
post
and
came
back
with
the
endorsement 'refused' made by the
postal authorities, it would be sufficient
in the eye of law to justify the
presumption of service of the notice on
the addressee. In this view of the matter
there seems to be no error in the finding
recorded by the Courts below that the
notice of demand dated 28.02.2007 was
duly
served
upon
the
petitioner.
Furthermore, the Revisional Court also
cannot be questioned for not interfering
with the findings of fact recorded by the
trial Court.

6. Section 25 of the Provincial
Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 (for
short ''1887 Act') under which the
Revisional Court has exercised its
jurisdiction reads as under:
6 All. Haribansh Singh Vs. Addl. Dist. Judge/F.T.C. No. 3, Raebareli & Ors.
763

"25. Revision of decrees and orders
of Courts of Small Causes.--The High
Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself
that a decree or order made in any case
decided by a Court of Small Causes was
according to law, may call for the case
and pass such order with respect thereto
as it thinks fit."

7. In Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani,
(2007) 8 SCC 609, the Apex Court
reiterated that under Section 25 of the Act
pure finding of fact based on appreciation
of evidence may not be interfered with. It
was held that findings of fact can be
interfered with only when the findings
were perverse or were based on no
material or the findings had been arrived
at upon taking into consideration the
inadmissible evidence or the findings had
been arrived at without consideration of
relevant evidence.

8. In the absence of any patent
perversity, in the light of the above
precedent of the Apex Court, no valid
ground for interference with the finding
of fact recorded by the trial Court with
regard to service of notice, and its
affirmation by the Revisional Court is
made out by the petitioner.

9. In so far as the second submission of
the learned counsel for the petitioner is
concerned, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, it would not be necessary for this
Court to delve deep into the issue regarding
the ''first date of hearing' as the outcome of
this case hinges upon the question as to
whether or not the petitioner had otherwise
made compliance of sub-section (4) of
Section 20 of the Act.

10. To determine this controversy
reference may be made to some of the
provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) of
Section 20 of the Act deals with the grounds
upon the proof of which a tenant can be
evicted from the leased premises. Sub-section
(4) of Section 20 provides that if at the first
hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally
pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in
Court the amount mentioned therein, the
Court may relieve the tenant from the liability
of eviction. Relevant portions of Section
20(1), 20(2)(a) and Section 20(4) provide:

"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant
except on specified grounds.- (1) Save as
provided in Sub-section (2), no suit shall be
instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a
building, notwithstanding the determination
of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the
expiration of a notice to quit or in any other
manner."

proviso (omitted as unnecessary)

(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant
from a building after the determination of
his tenancy may be instituted on one or
more of the following grounds, namely:

(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent
for not less than four months, and has
failed to pay the same to the landlord
within one month from the date of service
upon him of a notice of demand:

proviso (omitted as unnecessary)

(b) to (g) (omitted as unnecessary)

(3) (omitted as unnecessary)

(4) In any suit for eviction on the
ground mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (2), if at the first hearing of the
suit the tenant unconditionally pays or
tenders to the landlord or deposits in
Court the entire amount of rent and
damages for use and occupation of the
building due from him (such damages for
use and occupation being calculated at the
same rate as rent) together with interest
thereon at the rate of nine percent per
annum and the landlord's costs of the suit
764 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in
respect
thereof,
after
deducting
therefrom any amount already deposited
by the tenant under sub-section (1) of
Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of
passing a decree for eviction on that
ground, pass an order relieving the tenant
against his liability for eviction on that
ground: proviso (omitted as unnecessary)
(5) and (6) (omitted as unnecessary)"

11. Section 30 of the Act provides
for deposit of rent in Court in certain
circumstances. Section 30(1) provide:

"30. Deposit of rent in Court in
certain circumstances:-(1) If any person
claiming to be a tenant of a building
tenders any amount as rent in respect of
the building to its alleged landlord and the
alleged landlord refuses to accept the
same then the former may deposit such
amount in the prescribed manner and
continue to deposit any rent which he
alleges to be due for any subsequent
period in respect of such building until
the landlord in the meantime signifies by
notice in writing to the tenant his
willingness to accept it.

(2) & (6) (omitted as unnecessary)."

12. On a conjoint reading of
Sections 20 and 30 of the Act, it is
apparent that under Section 20(2) of the
Act, the landlord gets a cause of action
for evicting the tenant when the tenant is
in arrears of rent for not less than four
months, and has failed to pay the same to
the landlord within one month from the
date of service upon him of a notice of
demand. If, however, the tenant pays the
entire arrears of rent due on or before the
first date of hearing of the suit, the court
may relieve the tenant against eviction
even though he had not complied with
Section 20(2). The tenant can take
advantage of the benefit conferred by
Section 20(4) only when he pays the
entire amount of rent due, as required
under Section 20(4), after deducting any
amount already deposited by the tenant
under Section 30(1) of the Act.

13. According to the petitioner he
had deposited the entire arrears of rent on
the first date of hearing after deducting
the amount deposited by him under
Section 30(1) of the Act.

14. A perusal of sub-section (1) of
Section 30 of the Act shows that the
tender of rent in respect of the building by
the person claiming to be a tenant of the
building to the alleged landlord of the
building, and the landlord's refusal to
accept the rent so tendered by the alleged
landlord of the building are pre-requisites
for making any deposits under subsection (1) of Section 30 of the Act. In
case, the pre-requisites are not fulfilled,
the person claiming to be tenant of the
building is not entitled to make deposits
under sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the
Act. Even if any deposits are made under
Section 30(1) of the Act without fulfilling
the said pre-requisites, such deposits will
be invalid, and the person claiming to be
tenant of the building will not be entitled
to get any benefit of such deposits.

15. In Smt. Mridula Dayal v. VIth
Addl. District Judge, Allahabad & Ors.
1986 (2) ARC 132 a Division Bench of
this Court explained the difference
between a valid deposit and an invalid
deposit and held that the tenant cannot
derive any benefit out of an invalid
deposit by observing as under:

"If the deposit has been made in
circumstances covered by subsection (1)
6 All. Haribansh Singh Vs. Addl. Dist. Judge/F.T.C. No. 3, Raebareli & Ors.
765
of Section 30 and in the prescribed
manner, it would be a valid deposit made
under that provision, and it obviously
would enure towards claiming of benefit
of subsection (4) of Section 20. If, on the
other hand, the deposit has either not been
made in the circumstances contemplated
by sub-section (1) of Section 30 or not in
the prescribed manner, it is not a deposit
under sub-section (1) of Section 30 at all
and no question of taking such deposits
into consideration while considering the
question whether or not the person
claiming to be a tenant is entitled to be
relieved of his liability as laid down in
Section 20(4) of the Act, would arise."

(emphasis supplied)

16. By a catena of decisions of the
Apex Court and also of this Court, it is
now settled that in order to avail the
benefits under rent control legislations the
tenants are obliged to strictly comply with
the provisions of these rent statutes.

17. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy
(D) & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 123, the Apex
Court held as follows:

"5. The rent legislation is normally
intended for the benefit of the tenants. At
the same time, it is well-settled that the
benefits conferred on the tenants through
the relevant statues can be enjoyed only
on the basis of strict compliance of the
statutory
provisions.
Equitable
consideration have no place in such
matters. The statute contains express
provisions. It prescribes various steps
which a tenant is required to take. In
Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be
followed by the tenant is given step by
step. An earlier step is a precondition for
the next step. The tenant has to observe
the procedure as prescribed in the statute.
A strict compliance with the procedure is
necessary. The tenant cannot straight
away jump to the last step i.e. to deposit
rent in court. The last step can come only
after the earlier steps have been taken by
the tenant.

(emphasis supplied)

18. Whether the said pre-requisites
regarding tender of rent to the alleged
landlord of the building and the refusal
thereof by the alleged landlord of the
building, are fulfilled in a case, is to be
established by the person claiming to be
the tenant of the building.

19. A Full Bench of this Court in
Gokaran Singh v. Ist Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and others,
2000 (1) ARC 653 considered the scope
of Section 30 and has held as under;

"32. In Indrasani's case (supra) it has
been held that if the amount of rent at the
correct rate is tendered by the tenant and
the same is refused by the landlord, which
covers to a particular period, tenant can
not be held to be defaulter in respect
thereof. After refusal of the rent by the
landlord, tenant is legally entitled to
deposit the same in the court under
Section 30, but if thereafter, landlord
serves notice of demand again at a higher
rate, tenant need not tender the amount,
which has been deposited under Section
30 again but he will be under obligation
to tender the amount of rent due at the
correct or admitted rate of rent. Without
tendering the said amount, the tenant will
have no right to deposit the same under
Section 30 of the Act."

(emphasis supplied)

20. In Madhu Mittal (Smt.) v.
Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and
766 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
others, 2004 (2) ARC 326 a Division
Bench of this Court following the dictum
of the Full Bench in the case of Gokaran
Singh (supra) held as under:

"4. The tenant started depositing rent
under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of
1972 with effect from 01.07.1993 and
continued to deposit the rent under
Section 30 till 30.06.1995. Defendant
admitted that meanwhile he received two
registered notices from the landlord dated
27/30 January 1994 demanding the rent.
In spite of the said notices, defendant
continued to deposit the rent under
Section 30 of the Act. The defendant did
not deposit any rent in the suit. The suit
was ultimately decreed on 30.01.1996 by
J.S.C.C. Tenant-respondent no. 2 filed a
revision against the judgment and decree
passed by the trial court under Section 25
P.S.C.C. Act being S.C.C. Revision No.
60 of 1996. Vth Addl. District Judge,
Ghaziabad through judgment and decree
dated 19.03.1997, allowed the revision,
set aside the judgment and decree passed
by the trial court and dismissed the suit.
The Revisional Court placing reliance
upon, 1986 All. C.J. 782 (Gyanendra Lal
and another Vs. Vishnu Narain Mishra)
held that even after filing of the suit for
ejectment tenant had two options, one
deposit of rent under Section 30 of the
Act and second; deposit of rent in court
where suit for ejectment was filed. The
writ petition is directed against the
aforesaid
judgment
and
order
of
revisional court.

5. It has been held in Full Bench
Authority of this Court reported in 2000
(1) ARC 653, that deposit of rent under
Section 30 of Act, after receiving notice
of demand, is not permissible and any
such deposit, if made, will not be of any
benefit of the tenant. The tenant will have
to be treated defaulter in payment of rent
for the period subsequent to the receipt of
notice given by landlord intimating his
intention to receive the rent directly.

6. Accordingly, I hold deposit of rent
made by the tenant after receipt of notice
dated 27/30 January 1994 was not
permissible and the said deposit cannot be
said to be payment to the landlord. The
tenant was defaulter when the suit was
filed and the trial court rightly decreed the
suit. In view of the above, I hold that the
judgment passed by the revisional court is
patently erroneous in law."

(emphasis supplied)

21. In the case at hand, the
respondent no. 3 had sent a notice dated
28.02.2007 terminating the tenancy of the
petitioner and demanding arrears of rent.
Both the Courts below have concurrently
held that the said notice is deemed to have
been served upon the petitioner. The said
finding has been upheld by this Court. On
03.04.2007, the petitioner filed the suit
for arrears of rent and ejectment against
the petitioner. It was only thereafter that
the petitioner, on 20.04.2007, moved an
application (registered as Misc. Case No.
21 of 2007) under section 30 of the Act
before the Court of Civil Judge (Junior
Division),
Court
No.
18,
Dalmau,
Raebareli. In view of the settled legal
position the amount alleged to have been
deposited by the petitioner under section
30(1) of the Act, after the notice of
demand was served upon him, is not a
valid deposit and as such the petitioner
does not derive any benefit out of the said
deposit. In case, the amount alleged to
have been deposited by the petitioner
under section 30 of the Act is excluded,
the petitioner on his own showing is not
entitled to the benefit of section 20(4) of
the Act. The petitioner was, thus, a
6 All. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Raghuraj Singh 767
defaulter at the time the suit was filed.
The trial Court has rightly decreed the
suit and the Revisional Court has rightly
upheld the decree.

22. In view of the discussion made
above there is no infirmity or illegality in
the orders passed by the Courts below.

23. The petition is devoid of merit
and is accordingly dismissed.
----------

(2020)06ILR A767
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.04.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Special Appeal No. 75 of 2020

U.P.State Electricity Board, Lucknow &
Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Raghuraj Singh ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Amit Saxena, Sri Abhishek Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Ajit Kumar, Sri Punit Khare, Sri Satish
Tandon

A. Civil Law -U.P. State Electricity Board
(Employees' Retirement) Regulations,
1975 - Regulation 2(c) - Compulsory
Retirement - Opportunity to show cause -
Principle of Natural Justice - An order of
compulsory
retirement
involves
no
civil
consequences and that the government
servant does not lose any of the rights
acquired by him before retirement - The
appropriate authority has an absolute right to
retire a government servant if it is of the
opinion that it is in the public interest to do so
- Accordingly if the authority bona fide forms
that opinion, the correctness of the same
cannot be challenged. (Para 13)
B. Compulsory Retirement - Purpose -
While passing of an order of compulsory
retirement, public interest, is the primary
consideration, the purpose being to retain only
efficient persons in service and to dispense
with the services of the 'dead wood'. (Para 14)
C. Compulsory Retirement - Scope of
Interference - In a matter of compulsory
retirement, the subjective satisfaction of the
reviewing authority was not open to court's
interference
in
absence
of
mala
fides,
perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness
- The object being public interest the
formation of bona fide opinion by the
appropriate authority in this regard could be
challenged only on the grounds of being based
on no evidence or being based on collateral
grounds or being arbitrary but could not be
challenged on merits. (Para 17 and 18)
Special Appeal allowed; Writ Petition
dismissed (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. U.O.I. Vs Col. J.N. Sinha & ors. (1970) 2
SCC 458
2. St. of Guj. & anr. Vs Suryakant Chunilal
Shah (1999) 1 SCC 529
3. U.O.I. Vs M.E. Reddy & anr. (1980) 2 SCC
15
4. Baikuntha Nath Das & anr. Vs Chief Dist.
Medical Officer, Baripada & anr. (1992) 2 SCC
299
5. Posts and Telegraphs Board & ors. Vs
C.S.N. Murthy (1992) 2 SCC 317
6. K. Kandaswamy Vs U.O.I. & anr. (1995) 6
SCC 162
7. Pyare Mohan Lal Vs St.of Jhar. & ors.
(2010) 10 SCC 693
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)