# Harsh Vardhan v. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 520
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-15
- **Case number:** Contempt Application (Civil) No. 2916 of 2025
- **Bench:** Neeraj Tiwari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/harsh-vardhan-v-sri-rahul-pandey-the-district-magistrate-52696
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

enquiry after the writ court, by order dated
12.05.2025, had stayed the attachment order
and
disciplinary
proceedings,
and
the
subsequent lodging of an FIR on 27.05.2025
after disposal of the writ petition on 12.05.2025
resulting in vacation of the interim order,
amounts to wilful disobedience within the
10 All. Harsh Vardhan Vs. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
521
meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971?

HEADNOTE
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Section 2(b) -
Civil contempt - Wilful disobedience - Interim
order of writ court staying attachment order and
disciplinary proceedings - Liberty granted to
competent authority to initiate disciplinary
proceedings - Withdrawal of attachment order
pursuant to interim order - Continuation of
three-member fact-finding enquiry - Enquiry
not
part
of
disciplinary
proceedings
-
Completion of enquiry and recommendation
to lodge FIR - FIR lodged pursuant to
enquiry report - Contention that enquiry and
FIR were in teeth of interim order rejected -
Distinction between disciplinary proceedings
and fact-finding enquiry reiterated - Lodging
of
FIR
not
a
punishment
in
service
jurisprudence - Interim orders merge with
final order upon disposal of writ petition -
Interim order stood vacated on disposal of
writ petition - Application held devoid of
merit.

HELD Civil contempt under Section 2(b) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 means
wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction or order of a Court. From perusal of
the interim order dated 12.05.2025, it is
absolutely clear that the writ court stayed
the
impugned
attachment
order
dated
09.04.2025 as well as the disciplinary
proceedings, while leaving it open for the
competent authority, namely Nagar Palisa
Parishad, Hathras, to initiate disciplinary
proceedings in accordance with law. The
enquiry conducted against the applicant was
a three-member fact-finding enquiry and
cannot be said to be part of the disciplinary
proceedings. Therefore, continuance of such
fact-finding enquiry and the lodging of FIR
on the basis of the enquiry report cannot be
termed to be in violation of the interim order
dated 12.05.2025. Lodging of FIR cannot be
said
to
be
a
punishment
in
service
jurisprudence. It is settled law that once the
writ petition is finally disposed of, all earlier
interim orders merge with the final order and
cease to exist. In the absence of wilful,
deliberate and intentional disobedience, no
case of civil contempt is made out against
the
opposite
party.
Consequently,
the
contempt application lacks merit and is
dismissed. (Paras 8-26)
Contempt application dismissed. (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber
Industries (P) Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443;
Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd., (2010) 12 SCC 770;
Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand,
(2004) 7 SCC 261;
Prem
Chandra
Agarwal
v.
U.P.
Financial
Corporation, (2009) 11 SCC 479;
Cantonment Executive Officer v. Smt. Pushpa
Devi, Contempt Application (Civil) No. 380 of
2001 (All HC);
Anand
Prakash
Agarwal
v.
Cantonment
Executive Officer, Contempt Appeal No. 3 of
2014 (All HC);
Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. v. Alok Tandon, Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 5162 of 2019 (All HC)

List of Acts
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

## Text

520 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
process and they are also public servants.
None of the applicants have any criminal
history. The investigation against all the
applicants stands concluded. Although the
applicants are in jail since March 2025,
even sanction for their prosecution has not
been granted till date during this period of
more than seven months. It cannot be
presumed that sanction will be granted. The
stage of framing of charges will arise only
after cognizance of the offence is taken,
which can only be done after grant of
sanction for prosecution.

81. Although the submissions of the
learned Counsel for the parties have been
mentioned above, no observation has been
made regarding those, leaving it open for
the trial Court to decide the same without
being influenced by any observation of this
Court.

82. The purpose of keeping an under
trial accused person in custody is to ensure
his availability to face the trial. However,
although
the
applicants
have
been
languishing in jail for the past more than
seven months, the trial has not even
commenced and, therefore, the purpose of
keeping the applicants in custody is not
being achieved.

83. From the progress attained till
date, it appears that the trial would take a
very long period to conclude after its
commencement.

84. Keeping in view the aforesaid
facts, I am of the view that the applicants
are also entitled to be enlarged on bail.

85.
Accordingly,
all
the
bail
applications stand allowed.

86. Let the applicants (1) Sushant
Prashar@
Sushant
Parashar
(2)
Ramayan (3) Ajit Kumar Singh (4) Niraj
Kumar Verma (5) Raj Narayan Singh
Yadav @ R.N.S. Yadav (6) Surjeet Singh
(7) Rakesh Kumar (8) Sanjay Kumar
Mishra be released on bail in the
aforementioned case on furnishing personal
bonds and two sureties each in the like
amount
to
the
satisfaction
of
Magistrate/Court concerned, subject to
following conditions:-

(i) the applicants shall not tamper
with the prosecution evidence;

(ii) the applicants shall not
pressurize the prosecution witnesses;

(iii) the applicants shall appear
on each and every date fixed by the trial
Court unless their personal presence is
exempted.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 520
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.10.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.

Contempt Application (Civil) No. 2916 of 2025

Harsh Vardhan ...Applicant
Versus
Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Applicant:
Shreya Gupta, V.R. Tiwari

Counsel for the Opposite Party:

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the continuation of a fact-finding
enquiry after the writ court, by order dated
12.05.2025, had stayed the attachment order
and
disciplinary
proceedings,
and
the
subsequent lodging of an FIR on 27.05.2025
after disposal of the writ petition on 12.05.2025
resulting in vacation of the interim order,
amounts to wilful disobedience within the
10 All. Harsh Vardhan Vs. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
521
meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971?

HEADNOTE
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Section 2(b) -
Civil contempt - Wilful disobedience - Interim
order of writ court staying attachment order and
disciplinary proceedings - Liberty granted to
competent authority to initiate disciplinary
proceedings - Withdrawal of attachment order
pursuant to interim order - Continuation of
three-member fact-finding enquiry - Enquiry
not
part
of
disciplinary
proceedings
-
Completion of enquiry and recommendation
to lodge FIR - FIR lodged pursuant to
enquiry report - Contention that enquiry and
FIR were in teeth of interim order rejected -
Distinction between disciplinary proceedings
and fact-finding enquiry reiterated - Lodging
of
FIR
not
a
punishment
in
service
jurisprudence - Interim orders merge with
final order upon disposal of writ petition -
Interim order stood vacated on disposal of
writ petition - Application held devoid of
merit.

HELD Civil contempt under Section 2(b) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 means
wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction or order of a Court. From perusal of
the interim order dated 12.05.2025, it is
absolutely clear that the writ court stayed
the
impugned
attachment
order
dated
09.04.2025 as well as the disciplinary
proceedings, while leaving it open for the
competent authority, namely Nagar Palisa
Parishad, Hathras, to initiate disciplinary
proceedings in accordance with law. The
enquiry conducted against the applicant was
a three-member fact-finding enquiry and
cannot be said to be part of the disciplinary
proceedings. Therefore, continuance of such
fact-finding enquiry and the lodging of FIR
on the basis of the enquiry report cannot be
termed to be in violation of the interim order
dated 12.05.2025. Lodging of FIR cannot be
said
to
be
a
punishment
in
service
jurisprudence. It is settled law that once the
writ petition is finally disposed of, all earlier
interim orders merge with the final order and
cease to exist. In the absence of wilful,
deliberate and intentional disobedience, no
case of civil contempt is made out against
the
opposite
party.
Consequently,
the
contempt application lacks merit and is
dismissed. (Paras 8-26)
Contempt application dismissed. (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber
Industries (P) Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443;
Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd., (2010) 12 SCC 770;
Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand,
(2004) 7 SCC 261;
Prem
Chandra
Agarwal
v.
U.P.
Financial
Corporation, (2009) 11 SCC 479;
Cantonment Executive Officer v. Smt. Pushpa
Devi, Contempt Application (Civil) No. 380 of
2001 (All HC);
Anand
Prakash
Agarwal
v.
Cantonment
Executive Officer, Contempt Appeal No. 3 of
2014 (All HC);
Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. v. Alok Tandon, Contempt
Application (Civil) No. 5162 of 2019 (All HC)

List of Acts
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

21. List of Keywords
Civil contempt - Wilful disobedience - Interim
order - Fact-finding enquiry - Disciplinary
proceedings - Lodging of FIR - Service
jurisprudence - Merger of interim order

22. CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 12.05.2025 passed in Writ-A No.
6389 of 2025

23. Appearances for Parties
Advs For
Petitioner: Shreya
Gupta;
V.R.
Tiwari
Advs For
Respondents: M.C.
Chaturvedi,
Senior Advocate / Additional Advocate General;
Brijesh Kumar, Standing Counsel

(Delivered by Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned
counsel for the applicant and Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi,
learned
Senior
Counsel/Additional
Advocate
General
along with Sri Brijesh Kumar, learned
Standing Counsel for the opposite party.
522 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. Present contempt application has
been filed to punish the opposite party for
violation of order of Writ Court dated
12.05.2025 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
6389 of 2024.

3. Brief facts of the case are that
against the applicant, opposite party-
District Magistrate, Hathras vide order
dated 9.4.2025 has attached the applicant
with District Head Quarter/ Collectorate,
Hathras. The said order was challenged
before this Court and Court has stayed the
order dated 9.4.2025 as well as disciplinary
proceeding with a finding that it is open for
competent authority, namely, Nagar Palika
Parishad, Hathras to initiate disciplinary
proceeding against the applicant as per law.
In compliance of order of Writ Court dated
12.05.2025,
attachment
order
was
withdrawn vide order dated 10.06.2025.
Against the petitioner, a three member
enquiry was also going on, which was not
stayed on the ground that there is no stay
upon enquiry proceeding. The enquiry was
completed holding the applicant guilty and
recommendation was made to lodge FIR
upon which under the order of opposite
party dated 27.05.2025, FIR has been
lodged. Later on, Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No. 6389 of 2024 was disposed of vide
order
dated
12.05.2025
with
certain
observations and Court has also vacated the
interim order earlier so granted.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant
submitted that once the Court has stayed
the attachment order as well as disciplinary
proceeding, there is no occasion for three
member committee to continue with the
enquiry so earlier started and further,
opposite party should never pass the order
of lodging of FIR based upon said enquiry
as it was in teeth of interim order of Writ
Court dated 12.05.2025. Therefore, such
conduct of opposite party is a case of wilful
disobedience of interim order of Writ Court
dated 12.05.2025. She also submitted that
though the petition was disposed of, but in
light of law laid down by the Apex Court in
the matter of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla
& another Vs. Hind Rubber Industries
Pvt. Ltd. Etc.; 1997 0 Supreme (SC) 299
as well as of this Court in the matter of
Cantonment Exec. Officer, Cantonment
Board, Meerut and another Vs. Smt.
Puspa
Devi
and
others
passed
in
Contempt Application (Civil) No. 380 of
2001 dated 29.01.2014, act of contempt
shall be considered on the date of passing
of order and mere disposal of petition may
not exempt the opposite party contemnor
from the contempt proceeding. Therefore,
this Court may summon the opposite party
and punish under the provisions of
Contempt of Court Act, 1971.

5. Per contra, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi,
learned Senior Counsel has opposed the
submissions and submitted that it is not a
case of wilful disobedience. Immediately
after interim order of Writ Court dated
12.05.2025,
attachment
order
was
withdrawn and so far as enquiry is
concerned that is not arising out of
disciplinary proceeding rather it was only a
fact finding enquiry upon which there was
no stay order of Writ Court and in the said
enquiry, applicant was found guilty,
therefore, direction was issued to lodge
FIR. Lodging of FIR is not the part of
disciplinary proceeding. He next submitted
that after order of Writ Court, Director,
Urban Local Bodies Directorate, Lucknow
has issued an office letter dated 28.07.2025
nominating the Chief Engineer, Urban
Local Bodies Directorate, Lucknow as
Inquiry Officer to conduct the departmental
proceeding against the applicant, which is
still going on. Therefore, act of opposite
10 All. Harsh Vardhan Vs. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
523
party does not come within the purview of
wilful disobedience as provided in Section
2 (b) of the Contempt Act.

6. He further submitted that it is
settled principle of law that once the final
order has been passed in writ petition, all
earlier interim orders merge into the final
order and interim orders cease to exist and
consequently, any direction given in
interim order is also ceased to exist. Under
such circumstances of the case, contempt
application is liable to be dismissed. In
support of his contention, he has placed
reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court
in the matters of Dinesh Kumar Gupta
Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. And
others; (2010) 12 SCC 770, judgments of
this Court in the matters of Anand
Prakash
Agarwal
Vs.
Cantonment
Executive Officer, Cantonment Road
and 4 others in Contempt Appeal No. 3 of
2014 dated 1.3.2016 and Mayur Farm
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Alok Tandon and others
passed in Contempt Application (Civil) no.
5162 of 2019 dated 17.01.2020. He has
also relied upon the judgments of Apex
Court in the matters of Prithawi Nath
Ram Vs. State of Jharkhan and others;
(2004) 7 SCC 261 and Prem Chandra
Agarwal and others Vs. U.P. Financial
Corp. and others; (2009)11 SCC479.

7. I have considered the submissions
raised by learned counsel for the parties
and perused the records, judgments relied
upon as well as Act.

8. I have also perused the interim
order dated 12.05.2025, which stayed the
impugned order dated 9.4.2025 and also
stayed the disciplinary proceeding with
liberty to Nagar Palika Parishad, Hathras to
initiate disciplinary proceeding against the
petitioner as per law. Thereafter, opposite
party has withdrawn the impugned order
dated
9.4.2025
vide
order
dated
10.06.2025.

9. Now, coming to the question is as to
whether the enquiry is the part of
disciplinary proceeding or not and in case
of stay of disciplinary proceeding, same
may continue or not. As per service
jurisprudence, disciplinary proceeding is
having self contained procedure to conduct
disciplinary proceeding and conclude the
same. First of all, disciplinary authority
shall appoint an Inquiry Officer and either
he himself or Inquiry Officer shall issue a
charge sheet to concern employee for
submission of reply. After receiving the
reply,
enquiry
proceeding
shall
be
completed and enquiry report shall be
submitted before the disciplinary authority.
Disciplinary authority shall provide the
copy of enquiry report to employee
concerned for his objection and after
considering the same, he shall pass
appropriate
order
either
awarding
punishment or exonerate from the charges.
So far as present case is concerned, upon
complaint received against the applicant, a
three member committee was appointed to
submit
fact
finding
enquiry
report,
therefore, this cannot be said that vide
interim order dated 12.05.2025, fact finding
enquiry has also been stayed. Based upon
which, FIR has been lodged. Another
question is whether lodging of FIR is any
punishment or not pursuant to disciplinary
proceeding. Certainly, in light of service
jurisprudence, lodging of FIR cannot said
to be punishment, therefore, that would
also not be the violation of interim order
dated 12.05.2025.

10. Apart this to proceed with to
punish for civil contempt it has to be seen
as to whether it is wilful disobedience or
524 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not. Section 2 (b) of the Contempt Act
provides the definition of civil contempt.
The same is reproduce herein below;

"2. Definitions. - In this Act,
unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a).......

(b). "civil contempt" means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree,

direction, order, writ or other process
of a court or wilful breach of an

undertaking given to a court;

(c). ....

(i). xxxxx

(ii). Xxxxx

(iii). Xxxxx

(d). ......."

11. From the perusal of same, it is
clear that civil contempt means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a
court or wilful breach of an undertaking
given to a court. From perusal of interim
order, it is absolutely clear that it was an
order to stay the attachment order as well
as disciplinary proceeding with liberty to
Nagar Palika Parishad, Hathras to proceed
disciplinary
proceeding,
therefore,
continuance of fact finding enquiry and
lodging of FIR cannot be termed a wilful
act of disobedience.

12. I have also perused the judgement
relied by learned counsel for the petitioner
in
the
matter
of
Tayabbhai
M.
Bagasarwalla
(supra).
Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted below;

"16. The learned counsel for the
Defendants 1 and 2 submitted that this is
not a proceeding for contempt but a
proceeding under Rule 2-A of Order 39 of
the Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel
submitted that proceedings under Order 39
Rule 2-A are a part of the coercive process
to secure obedience to its injunction and
that once it is found that the Court has no
jurisdiction, question of securing obedience
to its orders any further does not arise.
Learned counsel also submitted that
enforcing the interim order after it is found
that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the
said suit would not only be unjust and
illegal but would also reflect adversely
upon the dignity and authority of the Court.
It is also suggested that the plaintiff had
instituted the present suit in the Civil Court
knowing full well that it had no jurisdiction
to try it . It is not possible to agree with any
of these submission not only on principle
but also in the light of the specific
provision contained in Section 9-A of Code
of
Civil
Procedure
(Maharashtra
Amendment). In the light of the said
provision, it would not be right to say that
the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass
interim order or interim injunction, as the
case may be, pending decision on the
question of jurisdiction. The orders made
were within the jurisdiction of the Court
and once this is so, they have to be obeyed
and implemented. It is not as if the
defendants are being sought to be punished
for violations committed after the decision
of the High Court on the question of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Here the
defendants are sought to be punished for
the disobedience and violation of the order
of injunction committed before the decision
of the High Court in Vishanji Virji Mepani.
According to Section 9-A, the Civil Court-
and the High Court - did have the power to
pass interim orders until that decision. If
they had that power they must also have the
power to enforce them. In the light of the
said provision, it cannot also be held that
those orders could be enforced only till the
said decision but not thereafter. The said
decision does not render them (the interim
10 All. Harsh Vardhan Vs. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
525
orders passed meanwhile) either non-est or
without
jurisdiction.
Punishing
the
defendants for violation of the said order
committed
before
the
said
decision
(Vishanji Virji Mepani) does not amount, in
any event, to enforcing them after the said
decision. Only the orders are being passed
now. The violations are those committed
before the said decision.

17.
The
correct
principle,
therefore, is the one recognised and
reiterated in Section 9-A - to wit, where an
objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is
raised to entertain a suit and to pass any
interim orders therein, the Court should
decide the question of jurisdiction in the
first instance but that does not mean that
pending the decision on the question of
jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction
to pass interim orders as may be called for
in the facts and circumstances of the case.
A mere objection to jurisdiction does not
instantly disable the court from passing any
interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate
orders. At the same time, it should also
decide the question of jurisdiction at the
earliest possible time. the interim orders so
passed are orders within jurisdiction when
passed and effective till the court decides
that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. These interim orders undoubtedly
come to an end with the decision that this
Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the
court to modify these orders while holding
that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit.
Indeed, in certain situation, it would be its
duty to modify such orders or make
appropriate directions. For example, take a
case, where a party has been dispossessed
from the suit property by appointing a
receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the
court should, while holding that it has no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put
back the party in the position he was on the
date of suit. But this power or obligation
has nothing to do with the proposition that
while in foce, these orders have to be
obeyed and their violation can be punished
even after the question of jurisdiction is
decided against the plaintiff provided the
violation is committed before the decision
of
the
court
on
the
question
of
Jurisdiction."

13. From perusal of paragraphs 16 &
17, it is clear that facts of the case are
entirely different and in that matter while
Court has passed the order, having no
jurisdiction and later, it was found and
accordingly, interim orders came to an end.
The issue was as to whether when the
interim order was in operation, it has to be
complied with or not and for that contempt
proceeding may be initiated or not.
Certainly, if it is not held that Court is
having lack of jurisdiction and interim
order was operative, it has to be complied
with and for that contempt proceeding may
be initiated, but in present case, only this
aspect was considered and issue of wilful
disobedience as well as disposal of writ
petition has not been considered. Therefore,
ratio of law laid down in that Court would
not be useful in the present case.

14. I have also perused the judgement
of this Court relied by learned counsel for
the petitioner in the matter of Cantonment
Exec.
Officer
(supra).
Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted below;

"The above argument has no legs
to stand. An interim order passed in a case
is valid, existing and operative so long as
the case is pending until and unless such
order is vacated/ withdrawn/ modified/
discharged/ not extended by specific order
or the case itself is finally decided. In the
present
case
none
of
the
above
eventualities took place. Mere filing of an
526 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application to dismiss the appeal cannot be
take away the effect of the interim order
dated 13.04.1995. In fact it was part of the
sinister design of the appellants (opposite
parties) to file the application for dismissal
on the one hand and to keep the appeal
pending on the other hand as would be
clear from the following facts.

There is one more aspect which
may be recorded. It has been held by the
Apex Court in the case of Tayabbhai M.
Bagasarwall and anothers Versus Hind
Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. And others
reported in (1997) 3 Supreme Court Cases
443 that where interim order had been
passed by the Court while the decision on
the question of jurisdiction was pending
and ultimately it was held that Court had
no jurisdiction, violation of such interim
order would still be punishable. Further a
learned Single Judge of this Court in the
case of Rakesh Singhal and another Vs. Vth
A.D.J., Bullandshahar and others reported
in (1989)2 AWC 1360 has also taken a
similar view. Thus, in the present case even
if
the
appeal
had
been
dismissed
subsequently but during pendency of the
appeal and existence of the interim order
the opposite parties had violated the same,
they would still be liable to be tried in the
contempt proceedings."

15. From perusal of said judgment, it
is clear that Court itself is saying that
unless interim order passed in a case is
valid, existing and operative so long as the
case is pending until and unless such order
is
vacated/
withdrawn/
modified/
discharged/ not extended by specific order
or the case itself is finally decided. In the
present case, there is no doubt that along
with disposal of writ petition, interim order
was also vacated. Therefore, in light of
such facts, no case of contempt is made
out.

16. Conduct of wilful disobedience
has also came before Apex Court and this
Court on many occasions. Apex Court in
the matter of Dinesh Kumar Gupta
(Supra) has considered the same. Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted below;

"18. Besides this, it would also
not be correct to overlook or ignore an
important statutory ingredient of contempt
of a civil nature given out u/s 2 (b) of the
Contempt of Courts Act 1971 that the
disobedience
to
the
order
alleging
contempt has to satisfy the test that it is a
wilful disobedience to the order. Bearing
this important factor in mind, it is relevant
to note that a proceeding for civil contempt
would not lie if the order alleged to have
been disobeyed itself provides scope for
reasonable or rational interpretation of an
order or circumstance which is the factual
position in the instant matter. It would
equally not be correct to infer that a party
although acting due to misapprehension of
the correct legal position and in good faith
without any motive to defeat or defy the
order of the Court, should be viewed as a
serious ground so as to give rise to a
contempt proceeding.

19. To reinforce the aforesaid
legal position further, it would be relevant
and appropriate to take into consideration
the settled legal position as reflected in the
judgment and order delivered in the matter
of Ahmad Ali Vs. Supdt., District Jail, AIR
1987 SC 1491 : Supp. SCC 556 that mere
unintentional disobedience is not enough to
hold anyone guilty of contempt and
although, disobedience might have been
established, absence of wilful disobedience
on the part of the contemnor, will not hold
him guilty unless the contempt involves a
degree of fault or misconduct. Thus,
accidental or unintentional disobedience is
not sufficient to justify one for holding
10 All. Harsh Vardhan Vs. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
527
guilty of contempt. It is further relevant to
bear in mind the settled law on the law of
contempt that casual or accidental or
unintentional acts of disobedience under
the circumstances which negate any
suggestion of contumacy, would amount to
a contempt in theory only and does not
render the contemnor liable to punishment
and this was the view expressed also in
cases reported in AIR 1954 Patna 513,
State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari
and AIR 1957 Patna 528, N. Bakshi Vs.
O.K. Ghosh."

17. Division Bench of this Court in the
matter of Anand Prakash Agarwal
(Supra) has also considered the issue of
wilful disobedience. Relevant paragraphs
are being quoted below;

"The Court has been further
informed today that Original Suit No. 581
of 1994 filed by appellant giving rise to the
First Appeal From Order referred to
above, was ultimately got dismissed as
withdrawn on 30.11.2000 i.e. the date on
which the first appeal filed by Union of
India arising out of Suit No. 581 of 1994
was dismissed. The result of dismissal of
the Suit No. 581 of 1994 is that the interim
order passed therein including the order
passed in First Appeal would merge in the
final judgment and, therefore, it can be
safely recorded that there ceases to be any
injunction operative in the eye of law at
any point of time (Ref: Shree Chamundi
Mopeds Ltd. vs Church Or South India
Trust Assn., 1992 AIR 1439).

We have no hesitation to record
that the temporary injunction proceedings
cannot
continue
beyond
the
suit
proceedings itself. The matter however
does not end there because the contemnorappellant before us has taken benefit of the
interim
injunction
order,
which
he
obtained. He has also breached the same
injunction orders in so far it directed status
quo to be maintained and constructions
being not raised. Therefore, we proceed to
examine the appeals on merits.

.............

........

We approve the reasons recorded
in the order of the learned Judge and see
no reason to take any different view in the
matter.

In view of what has been
recorded above, we find no merit in the
present appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
Interim order, if any, stands discharged."

18. The issue of wilful disobedience
was again subject matter by this Court in
the matter of Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd.
(Supra). Relevant paragraphs are being
quoted below;

"13. The contempt jurisdiction is
limited to punish the contemnor, not for
disobedience of the order, but upon
returning a finding that the disobedience is
wilful. Mere disobedience is not sufficient
unless it is shown and proved that the
disobedience is wilful, deliberate and
intentional.

14. In Ashok Paper Kamgar
Union vs. Dharam Dhoda and others4,
Supreme Court while explaining the
expression ''wilful' and Section 2 of the
Contempt Act, held, that it means an act or
omission done voluntarily and intentionally
with the specific intent not to do something
that the law requires to be done. In order to
constitute contempt, the order of the court
must be of such nature which is capable of
execution in normal circumstances.

"17. ...... "Wilful" means an act or
omission which is done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to
do something the law forbids or with the
528 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
specific intent to fail to do something the
law requires to be done, that is to say, with
bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate
action done with evil intent or with a bad
motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to
constitute contempt the order of the court
must be of such a nature which is capable
of execution by the person charged in
normal circumstances. It should not
require any extraordinary effort nor should
be dependent, either wholly or in part,
upon any act or omission of a third party
for its compliance. This has to be judged
having
regard
to
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case..."

15. The Court must not only be
satisfied about the disobedience, but should
also be satisfied that such disobedience
was wilful and intentional. If from the
circumstances of a particular case, the
Court is satisfied that although there has
been a disobedience but the disobedience is
the
result
of
some
compelling
circumstances under which it is not
possible for the contemnor to comply the
order, the court would not punish the
alleged contemnor.

16. Supreme Court in Dinesh
Kumar Gupta vs. United India Insurance
Company Ltd.5, while analysing the scope
of Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act
observed as under:

"17. This now leads us to the next
question and a more relevant one, as to
whether
a
proceeding
for
contempt
initiated against the appellant can be held
to be sustainable merely on speculation,
assumption and inference drawn from facts
and circumstances of the instant case. In
our considered opinion, the answer clearly
has to be in the negative in view of the
well- settled legal position reflected in a
catena of decisions of this Court that
contempt of a civil nature can be held to
have been made out only if there has been a
wilful disobedience of the order and even
though there may be disobedience, yet if
the same does not reflect that it has been a
conscious and wilful disobedience, a case
for contempt cannot be held to have been
made out. In fact, if an order is capable of
more than one interpretation giving rise to
variety of consequences, non-compliance
with the same cannot be held to be wilful
disobedience of the order so as to make out
a case of contempt entailing the serious
consequence
including
imposition
of
punishment. However, when the courts are
confronted with a question as to whether a
given situation could be treated to be a
case of wilful disobedience, or a case of
alame excuse, in order to subvert its
compliance, howsoever articulate it may
be, will obviously depend on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case; but
while deciding so, it would not be legally
correct to be too speculative based on
assumption as the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 clearly postulates and emphasises
that the ingredient of wilful disobedience
must be there before anyone can be hauled
up for the charge of contempt of a civil
nature."

17. It thus follows that the Court
would not overlook or ignore the statutory
ingredients of contempt of a civil nature
under Section 2(b), that the disobedience to
the order alleging contempt has to satisfy
the test that it is a wilful disobedience. In
other words Section 2(b) could be invoked
only when there is wilful disobedience and
the Section provides scope for reasonable
or rational interpretation of an order or the
facts and circumstances arising therein.
Mere unintentional disobedience is not
enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt
although disobedience might have been
established. Absence of wilful disobedience
on part of the contemnor will not hold
10 All. Harsh Vardhan Vs. Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
529
guilty unless contempt involves a degree of
fault or misconduct. Thus, the unintentional
disobedience is not sufficient to justify for
holding one guilty of contempt.

18. It is settled law that casual,
accidental
or
unintentional
acts
of
disobedience under the circumstances
which
negate
any
suggestions
of
contumacy, may amount to a contempt in
theory only but that does not render the
contemnor liable to punishment. To hold
somebody guilty of contempt of Court, the
concerned person must have wilfully
disobeyed judgment, decree etc. or should
have wilfully committed breach of an
undertaking given to a Court. (Refer: B.K.
Kar vs. High Court of Orissa6; State of
Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari7 and N.
Baksi vs. O.K. Ghosh8, the principle was
reiterated in Jiwani Kumari Parikh vs.
Satyabrata
Chakravorty9
and
Gyani
Chandra vs. State of Andhra Pradesh10).

19. In Niaz Mohammad and
others vs. State of Haryana and others11,
wherein, the contemnors had not obeyed
the judgment and released the salary,
disobedience was held, in the given facts
not wilful so as to tantamount to civil
contempt. The Supreme Court drew a
distinction between a court executing an
order and punishing for contempt. Reliance
was placed on Dushyant Somal vs. Sushma
Somal12, to hold that where the contemnor
is able to place before the court sufficient
material to conclude that it is impossible to
obey the order, the court will not be
justified
in
punishing
the
alleged
contemnor.

......

..........

24. The contempt proceedings
being
quasi-criminal
in
nature,
the
standard of proof required is the same as in
other
criminal
cases.
The
alleged
contemnor is entitled to the protection of
all safeguards/rights which are provided in
Criminal Jurisprudence, including, the
benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut
case of obstruction of administration of
justice by a party intentionally to bring the
matter within the ambit of the said
provision. The case should not rest only on
surmises and conjectures. In Debabrata
Bandopadhyay and others vs. The State of
West Bengal and another19, Supreme
Court observed as under:

"A question whether there is
contempt of court or not is a serious one.
The court is both the accuser as well as the
judge of the accusation. It behoves the
court to act with as great circumspection as
possible making all allowances for errors
of judgment and difficulties arising from
inveterate practices in courts and tribunals.
It is
only
when
a clear
case of
contumacious conduct not explainable
otherwise, arises that the contemnor must
be punished......... Punishment under the
law of Contempt is called for when the
lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's
duty and in defiance of authority. To take
action in an unclear case is to make the law
of contempt do duty for other measures and
is not to be encouraged."

19. From the perusal of judgements, it
is apparently clear that while punishing the
opposite party-contemnor, it has to be seen
as
to
whether
conduct
of
wilful
disobedience is made out or not and in
case, it is found that it is not wilful
disobedience, he may not be punished.

20. So far as present case is concerned,
undisputedly, the Court has only stayed the
impugned order as well as disciplinary
proceeding with liberty to Nagar Palika
Parishad, Hathras to proceed with the
enquiry. Earlier enquiry so initiated was a
three member fact finding enquiry that
530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cannot
be
termed
as
disciplinary
proceeding, therefore, in continuance of the
same and consequences thereof, lodging of
FIR does not come within the purview of
disciplinary proceeding resulting into the
wilful disobedience. Therefore, in light of
law laid down by the Courts as well as facts
of the case, no case of wilful disobedience
is made out against the opposite party.

21. Another issue was what would the
consequence of contempt proceeding in
case interim order is vacated or relief in the
main proceeding is not granted. This was
considered by the Apex Court in the matter
of Prithawi Nath Ram (Supra). Relevant
paragraph is being quoted below;

"In a given case, even if
ultimately the interim order is vacated or
relief in the main proceeding is not granted
to a party, the other side cannot take that
as a ground for disobedience of any interim
order passed by the Court."

22. This issue was again before the
Apex Court in the matter of Prem
Chandra Agarwal (Supra). Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted below;

"4. It is a well-settled principle
that once a final order is passed, all earlier
interim orders merge into the final order,
and the interim orders cease to exist.

.......

7. In view of the aforesaid
decision, Contempt Petition is dismissed."

23. Apex Court in both the matters
have taken the specific view that once,
interim order is vacated or relief in the
main proceeding is not granted, at this
stage, other side cannot take ground for
disobedience of any interim order passed
by the Court. Court has further held that
once, final order is passed, all earlier
interim orders merge into the final order
and the interim orders cease to exist.

24. So far as present case is concerned,
there is no dispute on the point that vide
order dated 12.05.2025, petition was
disposed of and interim order stands
vacated, therefore, in light of law laid down
by the Apex Court, no case of contempt is
made out against the opposite party.

25. Therefore, in light of facts of the
case as well as law discussed herein above,
no case of contempt is made out.

26. Accordingly, application lacks
merit and is dismissed.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 530
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: 08.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR PACHORI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 1986

Mahesh Chandra & Anr. ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:

Counsel for the Respondent:

Issue for consideration
The appellant no. 1 died, while appellant no. 2
challenged the conviction for the offense of
dacoity Section 395/397 of the IPC.

Headnotes
Criminal law-Indian Penal Code,1860 -
Sections 395 r/w 397-Criminal Procedure
Code,1973-Section 374(2)-Challenge toConviction-unexplained
delay
in
FIRMaterial contradictions between the PW-