# Hawaldar Yadav v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 132
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-20
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 13413 of 2024
- **Bench:** Siddharth Nandan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hawaldar-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52747
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

provided u/s 65 of the U.P. Revenue Code,2006
for delivering possession to the allottee is
limited only to the initial stage (at the time of
allottment) or if it remains effective for
subsequent
dispossessions
during
the
subsistence of the lease.
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
133
Headnotes
A. Civil matter-Constitution of India,1950Article 226-U.P. Revenue Code, 2006Section 65, 134-The court held that if an
allottee is disposessed at any subsequent
stage while the lease subsists, the SDO
has an " onerous duty" to restore
possession under section 65-A person
with
a
residential
lease
does
not
immediately acquire "bhumidhari" rights
therefore, a regular suit for ejectment u/s
134 of the Code is not an efficacious
remedy to such allottees-The court ruled
that relegating marginalized allottees to
lengthy litigation would defeat the Code's
purpose as well as right to shelter under
Article 19(1)(e)-Writ petition allowed. (E6)

Held
The court ruled that the phrase "any person
other than an allottee" in section 65(1) must be
interpreted to include those who occupy the
land illegally after the initial delivery of
possession. Restricting this to the initial stage
would render these words redundant and defeat
the legislative intent. The court directed the
petitioner to file a fresh application under
section 65 within three weeks and ordered the
SDO to decide the matter within six weeks.(Para
7 to 45)

Case law Cited
Sumitra Versus State of U.P., Daya Shankar vs.
State of U.P. and others, Grasim Industries
Limited vs. Collector of Customs, Olga Tellis &
Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 (3)
SCC 545 Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, 1996 (2) SCC 549, Vivek Narayan
Sharma & Ors. (Demonetisation Case-5J.) v.
Union of India & Ors. Franklin Templeton
Trustee Services Private Limited & Anr. v.
Amruta Garg & Ors. Commissioner of Income
Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers M/s Aphali
Pharmaceuticals
Limited
vs.
State
of
Maharashtra, O.N.G.C. Limited vs. Afcons
Gunanusa JV Assistant Commissioner of Income
Tax (International Taxation) and others vs. Shelf
Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. etc. , Kalpana Mehta
and Others v. Union of India and Others , Jaishri
Laxmanrao Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, State
of West Bengal vs. Union of India Tata Power
Company Limited vs. Reliance Energy Limited
and others East India Hotel Limited vs. Union of
India and others, Darshan Singh Balwant Singh
vs. State of Punjab, State of Maharashtra vs.
Marwanjee F. Desai, Employees Provident Fund
Commissioner vs. Official Liquidator of Esskay
Pharmaceuticals Limited, Ram Narain vs. State
of
U.P.
State
of
Bombay
vs.
R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala,
Indore
Development
Authority vs. Manohar Lal , Income Tax Madhya
Pradesh and Bhopal vs. Smt. Sodra Devi, Eera
vs. State (NCT of Delhi) Newspaper Limited vs.
State Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh and
others

List of Acts
U.P. Revenue Code,2006, Constitution of India
1950

List of Keywords
Delivery of possession , Marginalized sections ,
right to shelter, harmonious construction , Sub
divisional officer (SDO), Allottee, Allotment of
abadi sites.

Case Arising From
CIVIL JURISDICTION: Writ C No. 13413 of 2024
From the judgment and order dated 20.11.2025
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Jitendra Kumar Upadhyay

Advs. for the Respondents:
Bhupendra Kumar Tripathi, C.S.C., Paras Nath
Bind, Sabhajeet

## Text

_Characters 0–39,954 of 52,809. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39954 for what follows._

132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this case and the provision which is
applicable herein is different.

19. Another judgement cited by the
appellant was rendered by a Bench of the
Jharkhand High Court in the case of Smt.
Pallavi vs. Shri Raj Kamal : AIR 2008
JHAR 79. We have gone through the said
judgement. There also the issue was as to
whether the judgement of the learned
Single Judge which was impugned in
appeal was under Article 226 or 227 of the
Constitution of India and in that context,
the observations were made. We have
already stated that this is not the issue
involved herein. Here the provision under
which the appeal is maintainable is very
different from the provision which may be
applicable in the Bombay High Court or the
Jharkhand High Court.

20. For all these reasons, we are of the
opinion that none of the decisions relied
upon by the appellant are applicable nor to
make this appeal maintainable before us.

21. We may also mention that there is
another judgement reported in 2015 (9)
SCC 1 : Jogendrasinhgji Vijaysinhji vs.
State Of Gujarat and others, wherein
considering the relevant Rules of the
Gujarat High Court and after perusing the
authoritative pronouncements on subject,
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an order
passed by the Civil Court can only be
assailed
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution of India and the parameters of
challenge have been clearly laid down by
the Supreme Court in series of decisions
which have been referred to by ThreeJudge Bench in Radhey Shyam &
Another vs. Chhabi Nath and others :
2015 (5) SCC 423, which is a binding
precedent. Needless to emphasize that once
it is exclusively assailable under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, no intra
court appeal is maintainable. Now this
again is a judgement based on the Rules
applicable in the Gujarat High Court. We
have mentioned it only in the context of
rulings cited by the appellant, otherwise the
provision as applicable in the Allahabad
High Court is different, as quoted hereinabove.

22. For all the aforesaid reasons, this
special appeal is not maintainable. The
appellant is at liberty to pursue other
remedies unaffected by dismissal of this
appeal
as
not
maintainable.
It
is,
accordingly,
dismissed
as
not
maintainable.
----------
(2025) 11 ILRA 132
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J.

Writ C No. 13413 of 2024

Hawaldar Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Jitendra Kumar Upadhyay

Counsel for the Respondents:
Bhupendra Kumar Tripathi, C.S.C., Paras
Nath Bind, Sabhajeet

Issue for consideration
The key issue was whether the mechanism
provided u/s 65 of the U.P. Revenue Code,2006
for delivering possession to the allottee is
limited only to the initial stage (at the time of
allottment) or if it remains effective for
subsequent
dispossessions
during
the
subsistence of the lease.
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
133
Headnotes
A. Civil matter-Constitution of India,1950Article 226-U.P. Revenue Code, 2006Section 65, 134-The court held that if an
allottee is disposessed at any subsequent
stage while the lease subsists, the SDO
has an " onerous duty" to restore
possession under section 65-A person
with
a
residential
lease
does
not
immediately acquire "bhumidhari" rights
therefore, a regular suit for ejectment u/s
134 of the Code is not an efficacious
remedy to such allottees-The court ruled
that relegating marginalized allottees to
lengthy litigation would defeat the Code's
purpose as well as right to shelter under
Article 19(1)(e)-Writ petition allowed. (E6)

Held
The court ruled that the phrase "any person
other than an allottee" in section 65(1) must be
interpreted to include those who occupy the
land illegally after the initial delivery of
possession. Restricting this to the initial stage
would render these words redundant and defeat
the legislative intent. The court directed the
petitioner to file a fresh application under
section 65 within three weeks and ordered the
SDO to decide the matter within six weeks.(Para
7 to 45)

Case law Cited
Sumitra Versus State of U.P., Daya Shankar vs.
State of U.P. and others, Grasim Industries
Limited vs. Collector of Customs, Olga Tellis &
Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 (3)
SCC 545 Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, 1996 (2) SCC 549, Vivek Narayan
Sharma & Ors. (Demonetisation Case-5J.) v.
Union of India & Ors. Franklin Templeton
Trustee Services Private Limited & Anr. v.
Amruta Garg & Ors. Commissioner of Income
Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers M/s Aphali
Pharmaceuticals
Limited
vs.
State
of
Maharashtra, O.N.G.C. Limited vs. Afcons
Gunanusa JV Assistant Commissioner of Income
Tax (International Taxation) and others vs. Shelf
Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. etc. , Kalpana Mehta
and Others v. Union of India and Others , Jaishri
Laxmanrao Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, State
of West Bengal vs. Union of India Tata Power
Company Limited vs. Reliance Energy Limited
and others East India Hotel Limited vs. Union of
India and others, Darshan Singh Balwant Singh
vs. State of Punjab, State of Maharashtra vs.
Marwanjee F. Desai, Employees Provident Fund
Commissioner vs. Official Liquidator of Esskay
Pharmaceuticals Limited, Ram Narain vs. State
of
U.P.
State
of
Bombay
vs.
R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala,
Indore
Development
Authority vs. Manohar Lal , Income Tax Madhya
Pradesh and Bhopal vs. Smt. Sodra Devi, Eera
vs. State (NCT of Delhi) Newspaper Limited vs.
State Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh and
others

List of Acts
U.P. Revenue Code,2006, Constitution of India
1950

List of Keywords
Delivery of possession , Marginalized sections ,
right to shelter, harmonious construction , Sub
divisional officer (SDO), Allottee, Allotment of
abadi sites.

Case Arising From
CIVIL JURISDICTION: Writ C No. 13413 of 2024
From the judgment and order dated 20.11.2025
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Jitendra Kumar Upadhyay

Advs. for the Respondents:
Bhupendra Kumar Tripathi, C.S.C., Paras Nath
Bind, Sabhajeet

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddharth Nandan, J.)

1.
Heard
Sri
Jitendra
Kumar
Upadhyay,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner, Sri Awadhesh Kumar Patel,
learned
Standing
Counsel
for
the
respondent nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the revised
list.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has contended that the petitioner was
granted a residential lease and was
134 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
delivered possession in terms of Section 65
of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006
(herein after referred to as 'Code, 2006'),
whereafter he was also put in possession.
Subsequently, he has been dispossessed
from a part of the plot allotted to him by
respondent nos. 6 to 9; and in spite of the
various application moved by him before
the concerned authorities, including the
application dated 18.01.2024 before the
respondent no. 3, no action has been taken.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further
contends that the petitioner may be
protected in terms of section 65 of the
Code, 2006. For ready reference, Section
65 of the Code, 2006 is being quoted herein
below:

"65. Delivery of possession to
allottee.- (1) Where any land referred to in
section 63 has been allotted for building a
house under section 64, and any person
other than an allottee is in occupation of
such
land
in
contravention
of
the
provisions of this Code, the Sub-Divisional
Officer may, of his own motion and shall,
on the application of the allottee, put the
allottee in possession of such land, and
may, for that purpose, use or cause to be
used such force as he may consider
necessary.

(2) Where any person, after being
evicted under this section, reoccupies the
land or any part thereof, without lawful
authority, he shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend
to two years but which shall not be less
than three months and also with fine which
may extend to three thousand rupees:

Provided
that
the
Court
convicting the accused may, while passing
the sentence, direct that the whole or such
portion of the fine that may be recovered as
the court considers proper be paid to the
allottee
as
damages
for
use
and
occupation.

(3) Where in any proceeding
under sub-section (2), the Court, at any
stage after cognizance of the case has been
taken, is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise
that-

(a) the accused is in occupation
of the land to which such proceeding
relates, in contravention of the provisions
of this Code, and

(b) the allottee is entitled to the
possession of such land, the Court may,
summarily, evict the accused from such
land pending the final determination of the
case, and may put the allottee in possession
of such land.

(4) Where in any proceeding
under sub-section (2), the accused is
convicted, the interim order passed under
sub-section (3) shall be confirmed by the
Court.

(5) Where, in any proceeding
under sub-section (2), the accused is
acquitted or discharged and the Court is
satisfied that the person so acquitted or
discharged is entitled to be put back in
possession over such land, the Court shall,
on the application of such person, direct
that delivery of possession be made to him.

(6)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, an offence under subsection (2) may be tried summarily.

(7) For the purpose of speedy
trial of offences under this section, the
State Government may, in consultation with
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
135
the High Court, by notification constitute
special Courts each consisting of an officer
not below the rank of Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, who shall, subject to the
provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,1973, exercise in relation to
such offence, the powers of the Judicial
Magistrate of the First Class.

(8)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Act No.2 of 1974), every
offence punishable under sub-section (2)
shall be cognizable and non-bailable."

3. The petitioner has contended that
from the reading of Section 65 of the Code
2006, once an allotment is made and there
is an illegal occupation, the Sub-Divisional
Officer either on his motion or on the
application of the allottee, is required to put
the allottee in possession of such land, and
may, for that purpose, use or cause to be
used such force as he may consider
necessary.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon section 65(2) to (8) of the
Code, 2006, to contend that even if there is
a subsequent encroachment, the SubDivisional Officer has been empowered to
give reoccupation to the allottee.

5.
Per
contra,
learned
Standing
Counsel submits that the intent of Section
65 is to bring the allottee into occupation
once he has been granted an allotment for
abadi sites for the purposes of residence;
however, once the allottee is put in
occupation, it cannot be construed from the
reading of section 65 of Code, 2006, that
any subsequent dispossession, also creates
a liability on the Sub-Divisional Officer to
again put the allottee in possession. He has
further submitted that if any 'one person'
who was evicted from land allotted and
thereafter he reoccupies the land, without
any lawful authority, then he may be
punished as per provision of section 65
read with section 129 of the U.P. Revenue
Code, 2006, (which is for the purpose of
allotment of an agricultural land). He has
relied on the judgment of Sumitra Versus
State of U.P.1.

6. The question for consideration
which arises in the facts stated herein above
and the controversy involved is, as to
whether, the mechanism provided under
Section 65 of the Code, 2006 for delivery
of possession to allottee, is confined to the
delivery of possession at the inception
stage, when the allotment of building or
house under Section 64 is made or the
mechanism can be said to be effective,
even subsequently?

7. From the perusal of Section 65(1), it
becomes necessary to look into the import
of the words 'and any person other than
an allottee'; for the said words used in
Section 65 connotes the existence of a
cause of action for an allottee to seek a
redressal before the Sub Divisional Officer,
who
is
empowered
to
'deliver
the
possession' either on his own motion or on
the application of the allottee.

8. In order to get the true import of the
provision in question, it becomes necessary
to view the enactment in retrospect i.e. the
reason for enacting it, the evils it was to
end and the object it was to subserve.

9. The Apex Court in the case of
Newspaper Limited vs. State Industrial
Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh and others2
(Para-13 and 14), while interpreting an
enactment, had held that the Act is to be
viewed as a whole and its intention
136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
determined
by
construing
all
the
constituents parts of the Act together and
not by taking detached sections or to take
one word here and another there.

10. The exposition 'Ex visceribus
actus' which translates to 'statute must be
read as a whole in its context', is applicable
and further another Latin maxim 'incivile
est, nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua
particula eius proposita, iudicare vel
respondere' which translates to 'it is not
proper to give judgment upon a single
clause unless the whole law has been
examined', assumes importance in the
present context.

11. Since the question here pertains
particularly to the interpretation of a
section of the Code, 2006, therefore, it may
be necessary to primarily examine the main
object of the Code, 2006.

12. The main object of the Code,
2006, apart from the fact it consolidates
and simplify land tenure and revenue laws
into a single statute, it also strengthens the
land revenue adjudication and appellate
process through dedicated revenue courts.
In the process it aims to protect the rights
of land owners and tenants.

13. A Five Judges Bench of the Apex
Court in the case of State of Bombay vs.
R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala3,
while
applying the 'doctrine of pith and
substance'
considered
the
objectives
behind the legislation i.e. retrospecting the
change in law, which the enactment seeks
to bring. The said doctrine of pith and
substance has subsequently been relied upon in
Indore Development Authority vs. Manohar
Lal4, for ascertaining the clear intention of the
legislation as expressed in statute and concurred
that a statute should be read as a whole
considering its nature scope and effect. (Also
see Commissioner of Income Tax Madhya
Pradesh and Bhopal vs. Smt. Sodra Devi5,
also considered in Eera vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) 6; and accordingly I proceed to examine
the enactment with a holistic view.

14. At this juncture it may be relevant to
take note of Section 63 of the Code, 2006 and
for the ease of reference, the same is reproduced
below:

63. Land which may be allotted for
abadi sites. "(1) The Sub-Divisional Officer
may of his own motion or on the resolution of
the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti earmark the
following classes of land for the provision of
abadi sites for allotment to persons specified in
Section 64 :-

(a) all lands entrusted or deemed to
be entrusted to a [Gram Panchayat] under
clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 59;

(b) all lands coming into possession
of [Gram Panchayat] under any other
provision of this Code;

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other provision of this Code or
in the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, the Bhumi
Prabandhak Samiti may, with the previous
approval of the Sub-Divisional Officer, allot the
following classes of land for the purposes of
building houses : -

(a) [any vacant land referred to in
sub-section (1)]

(b) any land earmarked for abadi
sites
under
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953;

[(c) any land acquired under the
provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
137
(Act no. 1 of 1894) and the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act No. 30 of
2013).]"

15. Firstly, from Section 63, we note
that three categories of lands can be allotted
for Abadi sites. Firstly, "any vacant land
referred to in sub-section (1)"; secondly, any
land earmarked for Abadi under UPCH Act,
1953; and lastly, an acquired land. If I
examine the aforesaid three nature of lands, it
contemplates a vacant land, an abadi land and
a land which has been acquired. In all three
circumstances either the land is vacant or
being acquired. There is no quarrel regarding
a vacant land and as far as a process of
acquisition
is
concerned,
which
itself
contemplates a vacant possession. Then the
question arises, if the vacant land is
contemplated, to be allotted then what was
the intent, to provide for Section 65. So, from
this prospective Section 63 has to be
harmonized with other sections.

16. Now I proceed to examine Section
64 of Code, 2006, which is quoted below:

64. Allotment of abadi sites. "(1)
The following order of preference shall be
observed in making allotment of land
referred to Section 63 :-

(a) an agricultural labourer or a
village artisan residing in the [Gram
Panchayat] and belonging to a scheduled
caste or scheduled tribe or other Backward
Classes or a person of general category
living below poverty line as determined by
the State Government.

(b)
any
other
agricultural
labourer or a village artisan residing in the
[Gram Panchayat].

(c) any other person residing in
the [Gram Panchayat] and belonging to a
scheduled caste or scheduled tribe or other
Backward Classes or a person of general
category living below poverty line as
determined by the State Government:

Provided that preference will be
given to widow and physically handicapped
person within same category.

Explanation. - For the purposes
of this sub-section -

(1) "other backward class" means
the backward class of citizens specified
scheduled-I of the Uttar Pradesh Public
Services
(Reservation
for
Scheduled
Castes,
Scheduled
Tribes
and
other
Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (U.P. Act,
No. 4 of 1994);

(2) "person of general category
living below poverty line" means such
persons as may be determined from time to
time by the State Government.

(2) In making an allotment under
this section, preference shall be given to a
person who either holds no house or has
insufficient accommodation considering the
requirement of his family.

(3) Every land allotted under this
section shall be held by the allottee on such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed:

[Provided that if the allottee is a
married man and his wife is alive, she shall
be co-allottee of equal share in the land so
allotted.]"

17. From the plain reading of the
aforesaid section, it flows that the allotment
of land as provided under Section 64 is
138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
essentially for the weaker section of the
society and with preference being given to
widow and physically handicapped persons
within the categories enumerated therein;
and where a person of general category is
to be considered falling in one of the
category, the explanation to the section
clearly provides that the said category of
persons would mean such person, who is
living
below
poverty
line
i.e.
a
marginalized section of the society, who is
neither able to cater to his fundamental
needs nor can protect itself, is sought to be
benefited.

18. It is in this context, Section 65 of
the Code, 2006, is to be read; which
provides that where any land which is
referable to Section 63, has been allotted
for building a house under Section 64 of
the Code, 2006, and 'any person other
than an allottee' is in occupation, the Sub
Divisional Officer is entrusted with a duty
to put the allottee in possession of such
land. It is no doubt that under Section 134
of the Code, 2006 for a mechanism for
'ejectment of persons occupying land
without title' has been provided; and for
ease of reference the same is quoted below:

"134. - Ejectment of persons
occupying land without title. - (1) Where a
person takes or retains possession of any
land forming part of the holding of any
bhumidhar or asami otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of the law
for the time being in force and without the
consent of such bhumidhar or asami, such
person shall be liable to ejectment on the
suit
of
the
bhumidhar
or
asami
concerned,and shall also be liable to pay
damages at the rate prescribed.

(2) To every suit relating to any
land referred to in sub-section (1), the State
Government and Gram Panchayat shall be
impleaded as necessary parties."

19. However, what is to be seen is that
the said mechanism is for the persons with
land forming part of the holding as
'bhumidhari or asami'. It is trite in law
that the person with residential patta does
not get a "bhumidhar", as patta is a lease or
grant
that
can,
only
under
certain
conditions evolve into a bhumidhari right
i.e. under the scheme of Act, a person, who
is admitted as a sirdar or a bhumidhar with
non-transferable right under the Act, after a
certain period, such as ten years of
possession, the holder may be granted
bhumidhari rights; whereas an 'asami' is a
tenant
with
a
non-permanent,
nontransferable but heritable right to land; and
has a right to use the land for agriculture,
horticulture & animal husbandry etc. In
view of the aforesaid Section 134 cannot be
said to be an efficacious remedy to an
allottee under Section 64 of Code, 2006, as
in a residential lease, Bhumidhari rights
does not accrue.

20. In the case of Ram Narain vs.
State of U.P. 7, the court observed that the
expression used in an Act must take colour
from the context in which they appear and
this Court also takes assistance from the
judgment in the case of East India Hotel
Limited vs. Union of India and others8,
to emphasise that the Act is to be read as a
whole, the different provisions have to be
harmonized and the effect is to be given to
all of them; and it is not proper to give a
judgment upon a single clause unless the
whole law has been examined. (Reference :
Darshan Singh Balwant Singh vs. State
of Punjab9, State of Maharashtra vs.
Marwanjee F. Desai10). Interpretation
must depend on the text and the context.
(Also refer to Employees Provident Fund
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
139
Commissioner vs. Official Liquidator of
Esskay Pharmaceuticals Limited11.

21. At this juncture in order to
understand the contour of the intent, I may
also refer to Section 129 of the Code, 2006;
for the ease of reference the same is
reproduced below:

"129. Restoration of possession
to allottee or the Government lessee.- (1)
Where any person is admitted to any land
in accordance with section 125, or where
any land is let out to any person by the
State Government, and any person, other
than the allottee or lessee, is in occupation
of such land in contravention of the
provisions of this Code, the Assistant
Collector may, of his own motion, and
shall, on the application of the allottee or
the lessee, as the case may be, put him in
possession of such land, and may for that
purpose use or cause to be used such force
as he considers necessary.

(2) The provisions of sub-section
(2) to (8) of section 65 shall mutatis
mutandis apply in relation to reoccupation
of any land or part thereof after possession
has been delivered under sub-section (1)"

22. It is noteworthy that in the
aforesaid section which deals with the
agricultural land, also uses the words 'any
person, other than the allottee or lessee'.
From the wholesome reading in the
background of the objective of the
enactment I find that the word "other than
the allottee" has been emphasized not only
in Section 65 but also in Section 129.

23. What is further noteworthy are the
headings of both the sections. Section 65 is
followed by the heading 'delivery of
possession to allottee' and section 129 is
qualified by the heading 'restoration of
possession to allottee or a government
lessee'. The Apex Court in the case of Tata
Power Company Limited vs. Reliance
Energy Limited and others12, while taking
recourse to the "doctrine of harmonious
constructions" and reading the statute as a
whole, observed that the interpretation of a
section indisputably must be premised on the
scheme of the statute. For the purpose of
construction of a statute and in particular for
ascertaining the purpose thereof, the entire act
has to be read as a whole and then chapter by
chapter, section by section and word by word.
For ready reference para-99, 100 and 101 is
quoted below:

"99. To assign the same meaning
to the word "supply" in Section 23 of the Act,
as is assigned in the interpretation section, it
is, in our opinion, necessary to take recourse
to the doctrine of harmonious construction
and
read
the
statute
as
a
whole.
Interpretation of Section indisputably must
be premised on the scheme of the statute.
For the purpose of construction of a statute
and in particular for ascertaining the
purpose thereof, the entire Act has to be
read as a whole and then chapter by
chapter, section by section and word by
word. (See : Reserve Bank of India, v.
Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd, (1987) 1 SCC 424; Peerless
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v.
Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 2 SCC 343
and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran
Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297.

100. Thus, in a case where
interpretation of a Section vis-`-vis the
scheme of the Act, the purport and object of
the legislation, particularly having regard o
the mischief it seeks to remedy; the chapter
heading as also the marginal note, in our
opinion, are relevant.
140 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

101. Legislation has an aim, it
seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply
an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy,
to formulate a plan of government. That
aim, that policy is not drawn like nitrogen,
out of air ; it is evidenced in the language
of the statute, as read in the light of other
external manifestations of purpose. [See
Justice Frankfurtir, Some Reflextions on
the reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia LR
527, at page 538 (1947); Union of India vs.
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., (2008) 7 SCC
502 and D. Purushotama Reddy vs. K.
Sateesh, (2008 8 SCC 505)"

24. I find that the usage of words
'restoration of possession to allottee' and
the usage of the words 'delivery of
possession
to
allottee'
has
to
be
harmonized by the qualifying words used
identically in both the sections i.e. 'any
person other than the allottee is in
occupation'.

25. The words 'other than allottee'
clearly emphasizes that when an allotment
is made and any person other than allottee
is in occupation, whether it be for the
purpose of residential or an agricultural
land, it is incumbent upon the Sub
Divisional Officer to put the allottee in
possession.
Now
restricting
the
said
statutory obligation only at the inception
i.e. when the allotment is made, the said
interpretation may lead to the futility of the
very objective of the allotment under
Section 64 of the Code, 2006 to a
marginalized and economically weaker
segment of the society.

26. Had that be the intention of the
legislature, considering that the land which
is being considered for allotment, is in the
nature of a 'vacant land', as evident from
the reading of Section 63 of the Code,
2006, there would have been no occasion to
insert Section 65(1), while Clause (2) to
(8), would have sufficed. Therefore the
words used in Section 65(1), assumes
greater importance.

27. If the argument of the respondents
are to be accepted that it is only at the time
of delivery of possession to the allottee, the
intent of the legislatures were to remove the
illegal occupation, the same in itself will
lead to absurdity or the very incorporation
of Section 65(1) of the Code, 2006. It
cannot be interpreted harmoniously that
though the scheme of enactment envisages
redelivery of possession by virtue of Clause
2 to 8 of Section 65; but the said redelivery
or the recovery of the possession from the
illegal occupation subsequently, is only
when the person evicted under sub clause
(1), reoccupies the land or any part thereof
without any lawful authority.

28. On harmonious construction of the
words 'delivery and restoration' used as
headings of Section 65 and Section 129
respectively,
can
lead
to
only
one
interpretation that considering the nature of
allotment i.e. to a marginalized section of
the society and the category of land
envisaged under Section 65, instead of
relegating
the
allottee
to
a
regular
proceedings as contemplated under laws,
the Sub Divisional Officer, has been
entrusted with the onerous duty that in case
the said marginalized member of the
society, is dispossessed, his possession has
to be restored, in exercise of powers under
Section 65 of the Code, 2006.

29. The aforesaid interpretation also
finds support from the judgment of Apex
Court in State of West Bengal vs. Union
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
141
of India13. In a similar context while
repelling the argument that the rule that the
State is not bound, unless it is expressly
named or by necessary implication in the
statute, the Supreme Court considering the
applicability "by necessary implication";
and laid down a ratio that in considering
the true meaning of words or expression
used by the legislature, the court must have
regard to the aim, object and scope of the
statute to be read in its entirity. The Court
must
ascertain
the
intention
of
the
legislature by directing its attention 'not
merely to the clauses to be construed but
to the entire statute; it must compare the
clause with the other part of the law, and
the setting in which the clause to be
interpreted occurs.' The said ratio has
been relied in the case of Kalpana Mehta
and Others v. Union of India and
Others14
and
also
followed
Jaishri
Laxmanrao
Patil
vs.
State
of
Maharashtra15.

30. The usage of the words 'any
person other than an allottee is in
occupation' also is indicative of the fact
that if the proposed interpretation by the
State that the intent of Section 65 of the
Code, 2006 is to give possession once the
allotment is made and if subsequently after
the said possession, if for whatever reasons
a person is dispossessed, the recourse to
Section
65
cannot
be
taken
for
repossession, is accepted it would only lead
to redundancy of the usage of the words
'other than an allottee'. It is obvious that
once an allotment is made vis-a-vis the land
as contemplated under Section 63 of the
Code, 2006, then only an allottee will come
into the occupation and if the intent of the
legislature
was
to
only
deliver
the
possession once i.e. immediately after the
allotment, it would have simply used the
words
'and
deliver
the
possession
consequent to the allotment'. The mere
fact that it has used the word that the
'person
other
than
allottee
is
in
occupation' it means that as and when i.e.
after the delivery of possession at the first
instance, if 'any person other than the
allottee'
is
in
occupation,
the
Sub
Divisional Officer, shall take recourse to
law and put the allottee in possession, as
long as the lease subsists and Revenue
Courts have jurisdiction. In the said context
the ratio in the case of M/s Aphali
Pharmaceuticals Limited vs. State of
Maharashtra16 may also be referred to
which has been affirmed in O.N.G.C.
Limited vs. Afcons Gunanusa JV17; and
which has laid down the context of the
"Principles
of
Harmonious
Interpretation" of words, that provisions
should be so construed in the context of the
Act, that no word of the statute is rendered
redundant, superfluous or meaningless.

31. The aforesaid interpretation finds
support from the recent judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
(International Taxation) and others vs.
Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. etc.
18. For ready reference, the relevant para-9
is quoted below:

"Principles
of
Statutory
Interpretation:

9. Before proceeding further, it
would be useful to discuss the relevant
principles of statutory interpretation from
authoritative sources.

9.1 A statute or any enacting
provision therein must be so construed as
to make it effective and operative. Thus,
courts should lean against construction
which reduces a provision to a futility. It
142 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
has been observed by Lord Dunedin of the
House of Lords that "A statute is designed
to be workable, and the interpretation
thereof by a court should be to secure that
object, unless crucial omission or clear
direction makes that end unattainable."
vide
Whitney
vs.
Inland
Revenue
Commissioner, (1926) A.C. 37 ("Whitney").
Therefore, any construction which would
defeat the plain intention of the Legislature
must be rejected by the courts. Hence,
courts should avoid a construction which
would reduce the provision to futility and
rather accept a construction based on the
view that Parliament or any Legislature
would legislate only for the purpose of
bringing about an effective result. It is in
that context that purposive construction by
court is gaining acceptance rather than
holding that there is absurdity in the
statute.
The
doctrine
of
purposive
interpretation may be taken recourse to for
the purpose of giving full effect to the
statutory provisions and the courts must
state what meaning the statue should bear
rather than rendering the statute a nullity.

9.2 Another principle of statutory
interpretation is that when the words of a
statute are clear, plain or unambiguous,
i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only
one meaning, courts are bound to give
effect to that meaning irrespective of
consequences.
The
results
of
the
construction are then not a matter for the
court, even though they may be strange or
surprising, unreasonable or unjust or
oppressive. Gajendragadkar, J. in Kanailal
Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, AIR 1957
SC 907 opined thus:

"If the words used are capable
for one construction only then it would not
be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground
that such hypothetical construction is more
consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act."

S.R. Das, J. in CIT, Agri vs.
Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950 SC
265 observed thus:

"Hardship
or
inconvenience
cannot alter the meaning of the language
employed by the Legislature if such
meaning is clear on the face of the statute
or the rules."

He further observed that:

"The spirit of the law may well be
an elusive and unsafe guide and the
supposed spirit can certainly not be given
effect to in opposition to the plain language
of the sections of the Act". Vide Rananjaya
Singh vs. Baijnath Singh, AIR 1954 SC
749,"

9.3 Similarly, Subba Rao, J.
observed that in interpretation of a statute,
the primary test is the language employed
in the Act and when the words are clear
and plain, the court is bound to accept the
expressed intention of the Legislature, vide
MV Joshi vs. MU Shimpi, AIR 1961 SC
1494.

9.4
This
means
that
mere
hardship cannot be a ground for not giving
effective and grammatical meaning to every
word of the provisions of a statute if the
language used therein is unequivocal.
Thus, an unambiguous and plain statute
must be given its full interpretation. It has
been observed that unambiguous means
"unambiguous in context". The expression
"context" in this connection is used in a
wide sense as including not only other
enacting provisions of the same statute, but
11 All. Hawaldar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
143
its preamble, the existing state of the law,
other statutes in pari materia and the
mischief
which
by
those
and other
legitimate means can be discerned that the
statute was intended to remedy. In this
context, it would be useful to recall the
words of Grover, J. in VO Tractoroexport
vs. Tarapore and Co., AIR 1971 SC 1,
which are as follows:-

"We are aware of no rule of
interpretation by which rank ambiguity can
be first introduced by giving certain
expressions a particular meaning and then
an attempt can be made to emerge out of
semantic confusion and obscurity by having
resort to presumed intention of the
Legislature to give effect to international
obligations."

9.5 On the other hand, plain
meaning rule applies at the stage when the
words have been construed in their context
and the conclusion has been reached that
they are susceptible to only one meaning.
In that event, the meaning so derived is to
be
given
effect
to
irrespective
of
consequences.

9.6 Further, while interpreting a
statute it must be read as a whole and one
provision of the Act should be construed
with reference to other provisions in the
same Act so as to make out a consistent
enactment of the whole statutes. Such a
construction has a merit of avoiding any
inconsistency or repugnancy either within a
Section or between a Section and other
parts of the statutes. It is the duty of the
courts to avoid a clash between two
Sections of the same Act and "whenever it
is possible to do so, to construe provisions
which appear to conflict so that they
harmonise". While doing so the edges have
to be ironed out so as to read the
provisions of an Act in consonance with the
object of the Act. Thus, the provisions of
one Section of a statute cannot be used to
defeat another section of the same statute.
The same rule applies to a sub-section of a
Section. In Venkataramana Devaru vs.
State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC 255,
Venkatarama Aiyar, J. said that "the rule of
construction is well settled that when there
are in an enactment two provisions which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, if possible,
effect should be given to both. This is what
is known as the rule of harmonious
construction."

9.7 Therefore, effect should be
given
to
both
provisions.
Thus,
a
construction which reduces one of the
provisions to a "useless lumber" or 'dead
letter' is to be avoided. One of the ways in
dealing with such a situation is to find out
which of the two apparently conflicting
provisions is more general and which is
more specific and to construe the same
accordingly.
However,
if
a
specific
provision has to be read within the
mandate of a general provision then the
same has to be accordingly construed so as
to give effect to the mandate of the general
provision. However, if a situation arises
where two Sections of the Act cannot be
reconciled, as there is an absolute
contradiction between them, it is often said
that the latter must prevail. Another way of
looking at such a situation is to ascertain
which is the leading provision and which is
the subordinate provision and which must
give way to the other, but only if a
harmonious construction of two apparently
contradictory provisions is possible which
will not lead to any absurdity or give rise to
practical inconvenience or make wellestablished provision of existing law
nugatory, then the same should be resorted
144 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to. In other words, an interpretation which
would dilute the intention of the Parliament
or give rise to an absurdity or lead to any
provision of law being rendered nugatory
has to be eschewed.

(Source: GP Singh - Principles of
Statutory
Interpretation,
15th
Ed.
LexisNexis)."

32. The Supreme Court of India in the
case of Commissioner of Income Tax v.
Hindustan Bulk Carriers19, has held as
under:-

"14.
A
construction
which
reduces the statute to a futility has to be
avoided.