# Heera Lal Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 7 ILRA 607
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-06-30
- **Case number:** Misc. Bench No. 13252 of 2021
- **Bench:** Ramesh Sinha, Vikas Kunvar Srivastav
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/heera-lal-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47236
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Constitution of India - Art.226 - Criminal
Procedure Code,1973 - Section 154 -
Indian Penal Code,1860 - Sections 471,
468, 467, 420 & 120B - Quashing of First
Information Report - specific allegation
against the petitioner in the F.I.R. with
regard to making educational qualification
contrary to rules - this fact came into light
after thorough inquiry conducted in the
matter by the Special Investigation Team
- it cannot be said that prima facie, the
petitioner cannot be involved in the
instant case - FIR, not liable to be
quashed. (Para 22, 25)

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs St. of
Mah. (Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided
on 13.04.2021)

## Text

_Characters 0–39,947 of 43,538. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39947 for what follows._

7 All. Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
607
Rule or order of relevant inactment. Present
case is at the stage of enquiry/investigation
of fact that whether the offence has been
committed by the petitioners-firm or not.
By discussing many judgments, Hon'ble
Supreme Court held in the case of Niharika
Furniture Vs. State of Maharashtra,
MANU/SC/0272/2021, that the Court will
not normally interfere with an investigation
into the case and will permit investigation
into the offence, alleged to be completed.
The intention of law is always that the
investigating agency may be permitted to
complete the investigation. Therefore, it
will not be justified that the until
investigation/enquiry is completed the FIR
in question be nipped into bud by quashing
same at the early stage of proceedings.

52. In view of the above discussion,
the court is not inclined to quash the
notice/summons issued against petitioners
in both the writ petitions as well as the FIR
as prayed in Writ Petition (Misc.Bench)
No.11190/2021 (Hemant Kumar Saini Vs.
Union of India & others). The Court finds
that present writ petitions are misconceived
and are liable to be dismissed.

53. Accordingly, both the writ
petitions are dismissed.

54. Let a copy of the judgment be
placed on the record of Writ Petition (Misc.
Bench) No.11396 of 2021 (Yogita Nand
Yadav Vs. Union of India & others).
----------
(2021)07ILR A607
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.06.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE VIKAS KUNVAR SRIVASTAV, J.

Misc. Bench No. 13252 of 2021

Heera Lal Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Meenakshi Singh Parihar

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A..

Constitution of India - Art.226 - Criminal
Procedure Code,1973 - Section 154 -
Indian Penal Code,1860 - Sections 471,
468, 467, 420 & 120B - Quashing of First
Information Report - specific allegation
against the petitioner in the F.I.R. with
regard to making educational qualification
contrary to rules - this fact came into light
after thorough inquiry conducted in the
matter by the Special Investigation Team
- it cannot be said that prima facie, the
petitioner cannot be involved in the
instant case - FIR, not liable to be
quashed. (Para 22, 25)

Dismissed. (E-4)

List of Cases cited :

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs St. of
Mah. (Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided
on 13.04.2021)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.)

(1) The Court has convened through
Video Conferencing.

(2) Heard Sri H.G.S. Parihar, learned
Senior
Advocate,
assisted
by
Mrs.
Meenakshi Singh Parihar, learned Counsel
for the petitioner and Ms. Meera Tripathi,
608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
learned Additional Government Advocate
for the State/respondents no. 1 and 2.

(3) The instant writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been filed by the petitioner, Heera Lal
Yadav, challenging the First Information
Report dated 27.10.2020 to the extent of
petitioner registered as Case Crime No.
0013 of 2020, under Sections 120-B, 471,
468, 467 and 420 I.P.C., Police Station
S.I.T., Lucknow.

(4) Learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioner has submitted
that earlier the petitioner has challenged the
impugned F.I.R. before this Court at
Allahabad by filing Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 12605 of 2020 : Heera Lal
Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and 2 others,
wherein, initially, a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court at Allahabad, vide order dated
14.12.2020, restrained the respondents
from taking any coercive action against the
petitioner in connection with the impugned
F.I.R. and the same was continued from
time to time, however, when the case was
listed before another Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court at Allahabad on 24.03.2021, the
same was dismissed on the ground that this
Court at Allahabad has no jurisdiction to
hear the matter as the impugned F.I.R. has
been registered at Police Station S.I.T.,
Lucknow and liberty was granted to the
petitioner to approach the appropriate
forum/court, if so advised. Thereafter, the
petitioner has filed the instant writ petition,
challenging the impugned F.I.R.

(5) It has been argued by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner that the impugned F.I.R. has been
lodged against eight persons including the
petitioner. He argued that the petitioner has
falsely been implicated in the impugned
F.I.R.
as
the
entire
process
of
selection/recruitment were completed on
the basis of the resolution of the Board of
Directors of the Managing Committee/U.P.
Co-operative Bank Ltd. Lucknow on
07.07.2015 and at that time, the petitioner
was not working in the office of U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd., Lucknow from
20.10.2014 to 22.04.2015.

(6) Learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioner further argued
that at present, the petitioner is holding
Class-I post and working on the post of
Additional Commissioner-cum-Additional
Registrar,
Co-operative
Society,
U.P.,
Lucknow.
On
20.10.2014,
the
State
Government has appointed the petitioner on
the post of Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative
Bank
Ltd.,
Lucknow.
On
12.03.2013,
the
Commissioner-cumRegistrar Co-operative Societies, U.P.,
Lucknow wrote a letter to the Managing
Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd.,
Lucknow for the direct recruitment on
different post of Assistant Manager and
Assistant
Manager
(Computer).
On
7.5.2014, the Principal Secretary (Karmik),
State of U.P., Lucknow wrote a letter to the
Principal Secretary, Co-operative, U.P.,
Lucknow for the recruitment of the
employee in the Co-operative department
on the different post. On 05.12.2014,, the
Commissioner-cum-Registrar,
Uttar
Pradesh, wrote a letter to the Principal
Secretary, Co-operative Uttar Pradesh,
Lucknow. On 30.01.2015, the petitioner
being the then Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd, Lucknow, sent a
requisition for the recruitment/selection on
the post of Assistant Manager/ Assistant
Manager (Computer) before the Secretary,
U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service
Board,
Lucknow.
Thereafter,
on
21.03.2015, the petitioner has proposed the
7 All. Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
609
educational
qualification
for
the
recruitment on the post in question, which
was sent before the Commissioner-cumRegistrar Co-operative Societies, Uttar
Pradesh,
Lucknow
for
its
approval.
Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred
from the post of Managing Director, U.P.
Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lucknow on
22.04.2015 and in his place, on the same
day i.e. 22.04.2015, co-accused Rabikant
Singh, Additional Registrar, Co-operative
Society took the charge of the post of
Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Bank
Ltd., Lucknow. He argued that after the
transfer and posted as Additional Registrar,
Co-operative and Additional Commissioner
in the office of the Registrar, Co-operative
Societies, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, the
petitioner has got no concern with the
further development/recruitment/selection/
appointment on the post of Assistant
Manager
and
Assistant
Manager
(Computer) in U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd.,
Lucknow.

(7) Learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the petitioner submitted that coaccused, namely, Rabi Kant Singh, Ram
Jatan Yadav and Santosh Kumar and
Rakesh Kumar Mishra, have approached
this Court by filing writ petition Nos.
21793 of 2020 (M/B), 22257 of 2020
(M/B), 2561 of 2021 (M/B) and 3373 of
2021 (M/B), wherein interim protection has
been granted to them. Therefore, the
petitioner is also entitled to get similar
protection as has been granted to the coaccused.

(8) Learned Additional Government
Advocate, on the other hand, opposed the
prayer for quashing the impugned F.I.R. and
argued that interim protection has been
granted to co-accused, namely, Rabi Kant
Singh, Ram Jatan Yadav and Santosh Kumar
and Rakesh Kumar Mishra, only on the
ground that interim order dated 14.12.2020
has been granted in Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 12605 of 2020, which has been
filed by the petitioner before this Court at
Allahabad. Thereafter, as the impugned F.I.R.
has been registered at police station S.I.T.,
Lucknow, therefore, Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court at Allahabad, vide order dated
24.03.2021, dismissed the writ petition and
granted liberty to the writ petitioner to
approach the appropriate forum/Court, if so
desire. He argued that while dismissing the
writ petition filed by the present writ petition,
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Allahabad
has not extended or directed to continue the
interim order dated 14.12.2020, meaning
thereby after dismissal of the writ petition,
the interim order dated 14.12.2020 has
become redundant as it merges into final
order.

(9) It has further been argued by the
learned Additional Government Advocate
that on the basis of the interim order dated
14.12.2020 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 12605 of 2020, which has been
filed by the present writ petitioner, coaccused has sought interim protection, which
was granted to them. Now, after dismissal of
the aforesaid writ petition wherein interim
order dated 14.12.2020 was not enforced as it
merges into final order, the petitioner has
come before this Court seeking relief to grant
him the benefit of the interim order as has
been granted to co-accused, which cannot be
granted to the present writ petitioner.

(10) On merits, learned Additional
Government Advocate has argued that in
respect of the irregularities committed in
610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
selection held in the year 2015, number of
complaints for corruption in the said
selection was received in the office of
Hon'ble the Chief Minister and other office
of the State Department, whereupon an
inquiry was entrusted to the S.I.T, who,
after thorough enquiry, has found that the
petitioner, who was the then Managing
Director of U.P. Co-operative Bank, is
responsible
for
making
educational
qualification for ten posts contrary to rules.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the
petitioner has no concern with the aforesaid
selection. He argued that from the perusal
of the FIR, prima facie, it cannot be said
that no cognizable offence is made out,
hence, no ground exists for quashing of the
F.I.R. or staying the arrest of the petitioner.

(11) Having heard the submissions
advanced by the learned Counsel for the
parties and gone through the record, we
find that initially, the petitioner has filed
Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12605 of
2020, wherein vide order dated 14.12.2020,
following interim order has been passed :-

"As prayed, list in the additional
cause list on 15.1.2021.

Till then no coercive action shall
be
taken
against
the
petitioner
in
connection with FIR dated 27.10.2020 in
Case Crime No. 0013 of 2020, under
section 120-B, 471, 468, 467 and 420 IPC,
Police Station S.I.R., District Lucknow."

(12) The aforesaid interim order dated
14.12.2020 was extended from time to time
as is evident from Annexure Nos. 2 to 4 to
the writ petition. Thereafter, co-accused
Rabi Kant Singh has approached this Court
by filing Misc. Bench No. 21793 of 2020 :
Rabi Kant Singh Vs. State of U.P. and
others, wherein following interim order
dated 12.01.2021 has been passed :

"Heard
Mr.
H.G.S.
Parihar,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.
Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for
the petitioner as well as learned A.G.A. on
behalf of the State.

Learned A.G.A. was granted time
vide order dated 9.12.2020 'to submit
progress report of the investigation done so
far and the evidence, if any collected
against
the
petitioner
regarding
his
involvement in the alleged crime'.

Learned A.G.A. has filed short
counter affidavit. However, in the short
counter affidavit no specific statement
regarding
progress
report
of
the
investigation done so far and the evidence,
if any, collected against the petitioner
regarding his involvement in the alleged
crime. This fact has been noted by the court
vide order dated 16.12.2020. The court
thereafter had again granted time to
learned A.G.A. to file counter affidavit.

Learned A.G.A. submits that the
investigation is still pending and the
averments made in the short counter
affidavit are the only material available
with the investigating authority regarding
the investigation done so far.

Learned counsel for the petitioner
has also submitted that co-accused Heera
Lal Yadav has been granted protection by
this court at Allahabad vide order dated
14.12.2020, passed in Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No.12605 of 2020, copy of the
order dated 14.12.2020 has been placed
before the court, same is taken on record.

We
have
considered
the
submissions made by parties' counsel and
gone through the records.

Let detailed counter affidavit be
filed by the opposite parties within three
weeks.

List thereafter.

Till filing of counter affidavit or
till filing of report under Section 173 (2)
7 All. Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
611
Cr.P.C. whichever is earlier no coercive
action shall be taken against the petitioner
in
pursuance
of
impugned
First
Information
Report
dated 27.10.2020,
registered as FIR/Case Crime No.0013 of
2020,
under
Sections
12-B/471/
468/467/420 of IPC at Police Station SIT,
District Lucknow. However, the petitioner
will co-operate with the investigation."

(13) Subsequently, co-accused Ram
Jatan Yadav has filed Misc. Bench No. 22257
of 2020, in which also following interim
order dated 12.01.2021 has been passed :-

"Heard Mr. Balram Yadav, learned
counsel for the petitioner as well as learned
A.G.A. on behalf of the State.

Learned A.G.A. was granted time
vide order dated 9.12.2020 'to submit
progress report of the investigation done so
far and the evidence, if any collected against
the petitioner regarding his involvement in
the alleged crime'.

Learned A.G.A. has filed short
counter affidavit. However, in the short
counter affidavit no specific statement
regarding progress report of the investigation
done so far and the evidence, if any, collected
against
the
petitioner
regarding
his
involvement in the alleged crime. This fact
has been noted by the court vide order dated
16.12.2020. The court thereafter had again
granted time to learned A.G.A. to file counter
affidavit.

Learned A.G.A. submits that the
investigation is still pending and the
averments made in the short counter affidavit
are the only material available with the
investigating
authority
regarding
the
investigation done so far.

Learned counsel for the petitioner
has also submitted that co-accused Heera
Lal Yadav has been granted protection
by this court at Allahabad vide order dated
14.12.2020, passed in Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No.12605 of 2020, copy of the
order dated 14.12.2020 has been placed
before the court, same is taken on record.

We
have
considered
the
submissions made by parties' counsel and
gone through the records.

Let detailed counter affidavit be
filed by the opposite parties within three
weeks.

List thereafter.

Till filing of counter affidavit or
till filing of report under Section 173 (2)
Cr.P.C. whichever is earlier no coercive
action shall be taken against the petitioner
in
pursuance
of
impugned
First
Information
Report
dated 27.10.2020,
registered as FIR/Case Crime No.0013 of
2020, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
and 120-B of IPC at Police Station SIT,
District Lucknow. However, the petitioner
will co-operate with the investigation."

(14) Thereafter, co-accused Santosh
Kumar has filed Misc. Bench No. 2561 of
2021, in which following interim order
dated 29.1.2021 has been passed :

"Heard
Mr.
H.G.S.
Parihar,
learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr.
Saharsh, learned Counsel for the petitioner,
learned AGA for the State/respondents and
perused the record.

The present writ petition has been
filed by the petitioner, namely, Santosh
Kumar,
seeking
to
quash
the
First
Information
Report
dated
27.10.2020
registered as Crime No./F.I.R. No. 0013 of
2020, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471
and 120B I.P.C., police station Special
Investigation Team, District Lucknow with
612 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
a further prayer to stay the arrest during
the pendency of the investigation of the said
case.

It has been argued by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner that the impugned
F.I.R. has been lodged against the
petitioner with an oblique motive and just
to harass the petitioner. He submits that
co-accused, namely, Rabi Kant Singh and
Ram Jatan Yadav have also approached
this Court by filing writ petition no.
21793 (M/B) of 2020 : Rabi Kant Singh
Vs. State of U.P. and others and writ
petition No. 22257 of 2020 : Ram Jatan
Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others,
respectively and a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court, vide order dated 12.01.2021
has granted interim protection to coaccused, Rabi Kant Singh and Ram Jatan
Yadav, a copy of which has been annexed
as Annexure nos. 10 and 11 to the writ
petition,
respectively.
Similarly,
coaccused Heera Lal Yadav has also been
granted protection by this Court at
Allahabad vide order dated 14.12.2020,
passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition
No.12605 of 2020, copy of the order
dated 14.12.2020 has been annexed as
Annexure no. 9 to the writ petition. He
also submits that the role of the present
writ petitioner in the impugned F.I.R. is
similar to that of co-accused. Therefore,
the petitioner is also entitled to get
similar protection as has been granted to
the co-accused.

Considering the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case, prima
facie, a case of interim relief is made out.

Learned AGA has accepted
notice on behalf of the respondents.

Let counter affidavit be filed
within four weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any,
may be filed within two weeks thereafter.

Connect with Writ Petition No.
22257 of 2020 (M/B) and 21793 of 2020
(M/B) and list thereafter.

Till filing of counter affidavit or
till filing of report under Section 173 (2)
Cr.P.C., whichever is earlier, no coercive
action shall be taken against the petitioner
in
pursuance
of
impugned
First
Information
Report.
However,
the
petitioner
will
co-operate
with
the
investigation."

(15) Thereafter, Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 12605 of 2020 was dismissed
vide order dated 24.03.2021, which reads
as under :

"Heard Sri O.P. Singh, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Indra Jit
Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Sri Amit Sinha, learned counsel for the
State and perused the record.

The present writ petition has been
filed with following prayers:-

"1. Issue a writ of certiorari
calling for record of the case and quashing
the impugned first information report dated
27.10.2020 registered as Case Crime
No.0013 of 2020, under section 120-B, 471,
467 and 420 I.P.C., Police Station S.I.T.,
District Lucknow. (Annexure No.1) in
respect of the petitioner.

2. Issue a writ, of mandamus
commanding the respondent no to arrest
the petitioner in pursuance to the impugned
first information report dated 27.10.2020
registered as Case Crime No.0013 of 2020,
under section 120-B, 471, 467 and 420
I.P.C.,
Police
Station
S.I.T.,
District
Lucknow.

3. Issue any other suitable writ,
order or direction which this Hon'ble Court
may deem, fit and proper under the facts
and circumstances of the case.
7 All. Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
613

4. Award cost to the writ petition
in favour of the petitioner."

At the very outset, learned
counsel for the State raised a preliminary
objection regarding maintainability of the
present writ petition at Allahabad. It is
argued that the impugned first information
report has been registered at District
Lucknow for offence which was committed
at Lucknow and as such this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the present writ
petition and hear it. It is argued that on the
own
showing
of
the
petitioner,
the
impugned first information report, the copy
of which is annexed as Annexure-1 to the
writ petition was registered at Police
Station S.I.T., District Lucknow and as such
this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and
entertain the present writ petition which
should be dismissed.

Learned
Senior
Advocate
appearing for the petitioner argued that the
present writ petition may be transferred to
the Lucknow Bench of this Court in view of
the judgement of Sri Nasiruddin Vs. State
Transport Appellate Tribunal: (1975) 2
SCC 671. It is argued that since the first
information report has been registered at
Lucknow, this Court has powers to do so
under Clause 14 of the United Provinces
High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948
and as such the same be transferred to
Lucknow for its hearing.

Before proceeding to examine the
matter on merits, we propose and consider
it appropriate to deal with the preliminary
objection raised by Sri Amit Sinha, learned
counsel for the State.

The Apex Court in the case of Sri
Nasiruddin
(supra)
has
noted
in
paragraphs 12 and 13 as follows:-

"12. It is in this context that the
following five questions were referred for
decision to the Full Bench :

(1) Can a case falling within
the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench of
this Court be presented at Allahabad ?

(2) Can the Judges sitting at
Allahabad summarily dismiss a case
presented at Allahabad pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench ?

(3) Can a case pertaining to the
jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench, presented
and entertained at Allahabad, be decided
finally by the Judges sitting at Allahabad,
without
there
being
an
order
as
contemplated by the second proviso to
Article 14 of the U.P. High Court
(Amalgamation) Order, 1948 ?

(4) What is the meaning of the
expression "in respect of cases arising in
such areas in Oudh" used in first proviso to
Article
14
of
the
High
Court
(Amalgamation) order, 1948 ? Has this
expression reference to the place where the
case originated or to the place of the sitting
of the last Court of authority whose decree
or order is being challenged in the
proceedings before the High Court ?

(5) Whether this writ petition can
be entertained, heard and decided by the
Judges sitting at Lucknow?

13. The majority view of the Full
Bench gave the following answers:-

(1) A case falling within the
jurisdiction of Judges at Lucknow should
be presented at Lucknow and not at
Allahabad.

(2) However, if such a case is
presented at Allahabad, the Judges at
Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only
for that reason. The case should be
returned for filing before the Judges at
Lucknow and where the case has been
mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at
Allahabad, a direction should be made to
the High Court office to transmit the papers
of the case to Lucknow.
614 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(3) A case pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the Judges at Lucknow and
presented before the Judges at Allahabad
cannot be decided by the Judges at
Allahabad in the absence of an order
contemplated by the second proviso to
Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order,
1948.

(4) The expression "in respect of
cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used
in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High
Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, refers
to legal proceedings, including civil cases,
criminal cases, petitions under Articles
226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution and
petitions under Articles 132, 133 and 134
of the Constitution instituted before the
Judges sitting at Lucknow and having their
origin, in the sense explained in the
majority judgment in such areas in Oudh as
the
Chief
Justice
may
direct.
The
expression "arising in such areas in Oudh"
refers to the place where the case
originated in the sense explained in the
majority judgment and not to the place
sitting of the last court or authority whose
decree or order is being challenged in the
proceeding before the High Court.

(5) The Lucknow Bench have no
jurisdiction to hear writ petition No. 750 of
1964 which gave rise to writ petition No.
3294 of 1970."

While, dealing with the said
questions and the answers as given therein,
the conclusions as drawn by the Apex
Court are in paragraph 38 of the said
judgement which are as follows:-

"38. To sum up. Our conclusions
are as follows. First, there is no permanent
seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The
seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be
changed in accordance with the provisions
of the order. Second, the Chief Justice of
the High Court has no power to increase or
decrease the areas in Oudh from time to
time. The areas in Oudh have been
determined once by the Chief Justice and,
therefore, there is no scope for changing
the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has
power under the second proviso to
paragraph 14 of the order to direct in his
discretion that any case or class of cases
arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at
Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are
those which are instituted at Lucknow. The
interpretation given by the High Court that
the word "heard" confers powers on the
Chief Justice to order that any case or class
of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be
instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of
Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard"
means that cases which have already been
instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the
discretion of the Chief Justice under the
second proviso to paragraph 14 of the
order he directed to be heard at Allahabad.
Fourth, the expression "cause of action"
with regard to a civil matter means that it
should be left to the litigant to institute
cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad
Bench according to the cause of action
arising wholly or in part within either of
the areas. If the cause of action arises
wholly within Oudh areas then the
Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction.
Similarly, if the cause of action arises
wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh
then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the
cause of action in part arises in the
specified Oudh areas and part of the cause
of action arises outside the specified areas,
it will be open to the litigant to frame the
case
appropriately
to
attract
the
jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at
Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises
where the offence has been committed or
otherwise as provided in the Criminal
Procedure Code. That will attract the
jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or
Lucknow. In some cases depending on the
7 All. Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
615
facts
and
the
provision
regarding
jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."

The controversy as has been
raised in the present case has been
answered by the Apex Court in its
conclusion which has been dealt with as the
third conclusion therein. The same is at the
cost of repetition being again extracted
herein below:-

"38. ........................ Third, the Chief
Justice has power under the second proviso
to paragraph 14 of the order to direct in his
discretion that any case or class of cases
arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at
Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are
those which are instituted at Lucknow. The
interpretation given by the High Court that
the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief
Justice to order that any case or class of
cases arising in Oudh areas shall be
instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of
Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means
that cases which have already been instituted
or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of
the Chief Justice under the second proviso to
paragraph 14 of the Order be directed to be
heard at Allahabad."

A perusal of the third conclusion of
the Apex Court in the case of Sri Nasiruddin
(supra) leaves no doubt that a case which has
already been instituted or filed at Lucknow
may in the discretion of the Chief Justice
under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of
the Amalgamation Order be directed to be
heard at Allahabad but not vice-versa. This
leaves with no doubt that a case filed or
instituted at Lucknow can be directed to be
heard at Allahabad but a case filed or
instituted at Allahabad cannot be directed to
be heard at Lucknow. The legal proposition is
quite clear and specific.

Looking to the position of law as
stated above and the facts of the present
case, this Court comes to a conclusion that
the preliminary objection regarding
maintainability of the present writ petition
at Allahabad as raised by the learned
counsel for the State, has substance. The
argument of learned Senior Advocate that
the present case be transferred to Lucknow
as per the dictum laid down in the case of
Sri Nasiruddin (supra) is fallacious.

The present writ petition is
dismissed on the ground that this court has
no jurisdiction to hear the same.

However, the petitioner is at
liberty to approach the appropriate forum /
Court, if so advised.

The party shall file computer
generated copy of order downloaded from
the
official
website
of
High
Court
Allahabad, self attested by it alongwith a
self attested identity proof of the said
person(s)
(preferably
Aadhar
Card)
mentioning the mobile number(s) to which
the said Aadhar Card is linked.

The
concerned
Court/Authority/Official shall verify the
authenticity of such computerized copy of
the order from the official website of High
Court Allahabad and shall make a
declaration of such verification in writing".

(16) It transpires from perusal of the
aforesaid orders that co-accused has been
granted the parity of the interim order dated
14.12.2020 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 12605 of 2020. Now, the
situation is that the said interim order dated
14.12.2020 has not become enforced as it
merges into final order dated 24.03.2021
passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.
12605 of 2020, whereby this Court at
Allahabad, while dismissing the writ
petition filed by the petitioner, granted
liberty
to
approach
the
appropriate
forum/court, if so advised. Thereafter, the
petitioner has filed the instant writ petition,
616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
claiming the interim orders granted to coaccused.

(17) On due consideration, we are of
the view that the petitioner cannot be
granted the parity of interim order passed in
the case of co-accused for the reason that
the basis for passing the interim order in
the
case
of
co-accused,
as
quoted
hereinabove, was the interim order dated
14.12.2020 passed in writ petition filed by
the writ petitioner himself before this Court
at Allahabad, which is in fact not enforced
after dismissal of the said writ petition.
Thus, the plea of the petitioner in this
regard has no force and is rejected.

(18) However, on merit, it has been
argued by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner that
the petitioner has no concern with the
further
development/recruitment/
selection/appointment on the post of
Assistant Manager & Assistant Manager
(Computer) in U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd.,
Lucknow
as
he
was
transferred
to
elsewhere
at
that
time,
which
was
vehemently opposed by the learned AGA
by saying that the petitioner was involved
in making educational qualification for the
selection contrary to rules, therefore, it
cannot be said that the petitioner has no
concern with the said irregularities in the
selection.

(19) We have minutely examined the
contentions of the learned Counsel for the
parties and gone through the impugned
F.I.R.

(20) The legal position on the issue of
quashing of FIR or criminal proceedings is
well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a
complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be
exercised sparingly and only in exceptional
cases. The Courts should not ordinarily
interfere
with
the
investigations
of
cognizable offences. However, where the
allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint even if taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused, the FIR or the
charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of
powers under Article 226 or inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

(21)

Recently,
in
Neeharika
Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State
of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No.
330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021), a
three-judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court considered the powers of the High
Court while adjudicating a petition for
quashing of the FIR under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and under Section
482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
In
Neeharika
Infrastructure
Private
Limited (supra), the appellants challenged
an interim order issued by the Bombay
High Court, in a quashing petition filed
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226
of the Constitution. The Bombay High
Court issued an interim order directing that
"no coercive measures shall be adopted
against the petitioners in respect of the said
FIR". While examining the correctness of
the said interim order, Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in para-23 has held as under :

"23. In view of the above and for
the
reasons
stated
above,
our
final
conclusions on the principal/core issue,
whether the High Court would be justified
in passing an interim order of stay of
investigation and/or "no coercive steps to
be adopted", during the pendency of the
quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and in what circumstances and
7 All. Heera Lal Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
617
whether the High Court would be justified
in passing the order of not to arrest the
accused or "no coercive steps to be
adopted" during the investigation or till the
final report/chargesheet is filed under
Section
173
Cr.P.C.,
while
dismissing/disposing
of/not
entertaining/not quashing the criminal
proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, our final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right
and duty under the relevant provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure contained
in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate
into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any
investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no
cognizable offence or offence of any kind is
disclosed in the first information report that
the Court will not permit an investigation to
go on;

iv) The power of quashing should
be exercised sparingly with circumspection,
as it has been observed, in the ''rarest of
rare cases (not to be confused with the
formation in the context of death penalty).

v)
While
examining
an
FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness
or otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought
not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR
should be an exception rather than an
ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are
barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the
police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activities
and one ought not to tread over the
other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary
and the police are complementary, not
overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases
where non-interference would result in
miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent
powers of the Court do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is
not an encyclopaedia which must disclose
all facts and details relating to the offence
reported. Therefore, when the investigation
by the police is in progress, the court
should not go into the merits of the
allegations in the FIR. Police must be
permitted to complete the investigation. It
would be premature to pronounce the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the
complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of
process of law. After investigation, if the
investigating officer finds that there is no
substance in the application made by the
complainant, the investigating officer may
file an appropriate report/summary before
the learned Magistrate which may be
considered by the learned Magistrate in
accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of
wide power requires the court to be more
cautious. It casts an onerous and more
diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time,
the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to
the parameters of quashing and the selfrestraint imposed by law, more particularly
the parameters laid down by this Court in
618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan
Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash
the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing
the FIR is made by the alleged accused and
the court when it exercises the power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider
whether the allegations in the FIR disclose
commission of a cognizable offence or not.
The court is not required to consider on
merits whether or not the merits of the
allegations make out a cognizable offence
and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations
in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters
would be applicable and/or the aforesaid
aspects are required to be considered by the
High Court while passing an interim order
in a quashing petition in exercise of powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
However, an interim order of stay of
investigation during the pendency of the
quashing petition can be passed with
circumspection. Such an interim order
should not require to be passed routinely,
casually and/or mechanically. Normally,
when the investigation is in progress and
the
facts
are
hazy
and
the
entire
evidence/material is not before the High
Court, the High Court should restrain itself
from passing the interim order of not to
arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted"
and the accused should be relegated to
apply for anticipatory bail under Section
438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The
High Court shall not and as such is not
justified in passing the order of not to arrest
and/or "no coercive steps" either during the
investigation or till the investigation is
completed
and/or
till
the
final
report/chargesheet is filed under Section
173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of
the quashing petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case
where the High Court is prima facie of the
opinion that an exceptional case is made
out for grant of interim stay of further
investigation, after considering the broad
parameters while exercising the powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
referred to hereinabove, the High Court has
to give brief reasons why such an interim
order is warranted and/or is required to be
passed so that it can demonstrate the
application of mind by the Court and the
higher forum can consider what was
weighed with the High Court while passing
such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order
is passed by the High Court of "no coercive
steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid
parameters, the High Court must clarify
what does it mean by "no coercive steps to
be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps
to be adopted" can be said to be too vague
and/or broad which can be misunderstood
and/or misapplied."

(22) Keeping in mind the aforesaid
dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we
find that in the instant case, it transpires
from the impugned F.I.R. that specific
allegation has been levelled against the
petitioner in the F.I.R.