# Hem Chandra v. State of U.P. & Ors. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 2359
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-20
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 12796 of 2024
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta, Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hem-chandra-v-state-of-u-p-ors-opp-parties-52075
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

C.S.C., Nipun Singh

Right
to
Fair
Compensation
and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
-
U.P.
Avas
Evam
Vikash
Parishad
Adhiniyam, 1965 - Petitioner was bhumidhar
with transferable rights -by virtue of section 55
of the Adhiniyam-provision of Land Acquisition
Act subject to modifications provided under the
schedule alone would apply-repeal of LA Act
would not affect any right, privilege, obligation
or liability acquired, incurred under the said
enactment-present case acquisition proceedings
were not finalized before 01.01.2014 as no
award was declared by parishad at that timeaward declared in 2024-compensation should be
determined as per the provisions of the new Act,
2013 by treating the reference date of 20214date of enforcement of the New Act-impugned
award quashed.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,897 of 45,228. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39897 for what follows._

5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2359
extinguished. Section 194 of the U.P.Z.A.
& L.R. Act, 1950 is reproduced here
under:-

"194.
Land
Management
Committee to take over land after
extinction of interest therein.
-
The
[Land
Management
Committee] [Substituted by U.P. Act No. 37
of 1958.] shall be entitled to take
possession of land comprised in a holding
or part thereof if-
(a) [ the land was held by a
bhumidhar, and his interest in such land is
extinguished under Clause (a) or Clause
(aa) of Section 189 or Clause (a), Clause
(b), Clause (c), Clause (cc) or Clause (e) of
Section 190;] [Substituted by U.P. Act No.
8 of 1977 (w.e.f. 28.01.1977).]
(b) [* * *] [Omitted by U.P. Act No.
8 of 1977 (w.e.f. 28.01.1977).]
(c) the land being land falling in
any of the classes mentioned in Section 132,
was held by an asami and the asami has
been ejected or his interest therein have
otherwise
extinguished
under
the
provisions of this Act."

14. Thus the Land Management
Committee/Gaon
Sabha
concerned
is
within its powers to take possession of the
land after interest of Aasami in any land
gets extinguished.

15. In view of the above, this Court
is not inclined to interfere in the orders
impugned. Consequently, the writ petition
is dismissed. However, there will be no
order as to costs,.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 2359
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.05.2024

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ-C No. 12796 of 2024

Hem Chandra ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sanjay Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
C.S.C., Nipun Singh

Right
to
Fair
Compensation
and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
-
U.P.
Avas
Evam
Vikash
Parishad
Adhiniyam, 1965 - Petitioner was bhumidhar
with transferable rights -by virtue of section 55
of the Adhiniyam-provision of Land Acquisition
Act subject to modifications provided under the
schedule alone would apply-repeal of LA Act
would not affect any right, privilege, obligation
or liability acquired, incurred under the said
enactment-present case acquisition proceedings
were not finalized before 01.01.2014 as no
award was declared by parishad at that timeaward declared in 2024-compensation should be
determined as per the provisions of the new Act,
2013 by treating the reference date of 20214date of enforcement of the New Act-impugned
award quashed.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs Chandra
Shekhar & ors. , (2024) 3 SCR 585

2. Atul Sharma & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2017
(10) ADJ 308

3. Gauri Shankar Gaur Vs St. of U.P., (1994) 1
SCC 92

4. U.P. Avas Ewam Vikas Parishad Vs Jainul Islam
& anr., (1998) 2 SCC 467

5. Nagpur Improvement Trust, AIR 1962 SC 955
2360 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
6. St. of M.P. Vs G.C. Mandawar, AIR 1954 SC
493

7. Union of India & ors. Vs Tarsem Singh & ors.,
(2019) 9 SCC 304

8.
Executive
Engineer,
Gosikhurd
Project
Ambadi,
Bhandara,
Maharashtra
Vidarbha
Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh &
ors., (2022) 2 SCC 772

9. Hori Lal Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2019 SCC OnLine
SC 129

10. Pyare Lal & ors. Vs U.O.I. & ors., 2024 (153)
ALR 771

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shiv Kant Mishra,
holding brief of Sri Sanjay Kumar Mishra,
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rajiv
Gupta, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for the State-respondents and Sri
Nipun
Singh,
learned
counsel
for
respondent no.4.

2. The petitioner has prayed for
quashing of the award dated 27.02.2024
passed by Additional District Magistrate
(Land Acquisition), Agra in respect of
Khasra Nos. 109/1, area 0.2910 hectare,
109/2, area 0.6450 hectare, 70M, area
0.0890 hectare, 72, area 0.2150 hectare, 74,
area 0.1900 hectare, 67, area 0.1900
hectare, 68, area 0.0510 hectare, 69, area
0.4170 hectare, 70M, area 0.5560 hectare,
71, area 0.3920 hectare situated at Village
Bhood, Tehsil and District Bulandshahr and
for a further direction to the said authority
to prepare a fresh award treating 'relevant
date' with reference to which market value
is to be determined as 01.01.2014, i.e. the
date of enforcement of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the New
Act, 2013').

3. The petitioner, indisputably, was
bhumidhar with transferable rights of the
aforesaid plots. A notification under
Section 28 of U.P. Avas Evam Vikash
Parish
Adhiniyam,
1965
(hereinafter
referred to as 'the Adhiniyam') was issued
on 11.08.1979. It was followed by
notification under Section 32 of the
Adhiniyam
dated
07.07.1982.
The
petitioner filed Writ Petition No.6695 of
1983 for putting a restraint on the
respondents
from
enforcing
Grihstha
Yojana No.1 Scheme in pursuance of the
aforesaid notifications and to declare
Sections 55(1) and 32(2) of the Adhiniyam
as ultra vires of the Constitution. The writ
petition was dismissed in default on
15.03.2000 and, thereafter, the restoration
application
was
also
dismissed
on
19.07.2002. Possession of the land was
taken by the Parishad on 28.06.2002,
however, award of the subject land was not
made until 27.02.2024.

4. In the impugned award dated
27.02.2024,
the
reference
date
for
calculating compensation for the acquired
land has been taken to be the date of
notification
under
Section
28
dated
11.08.1979 treating it to be at par with
notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the LA
Act'). Accordingly, the exemplar sale deeds
of the period three months prior to
notification
under
Section
28
dated
11.08.1979 alone have been considered in
determining compensation for the subject
land. Market value of the acquired land has
been determined by applying the principle
of betting system. For the land situated upto
a distance of 100 feet from the road,
compensation determined is at the rate of
5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2361
Rs.31.42 per sqr. yard, for the land upto 600
feet at the rate of Rs.21.05 per sqr yard and
beyond it, at the rate of Rs.15.71 per sqr
yard, apart from other statutory benefits.

5. The sole contention of learned
counsel for the petitioner is that after
coming into force of New Act of 2013, the
compensation has to be determined with
reference to the date of enforcement of the
said Act, i.e. 01.01.2014. In support of his
contention, he places reliance on Section
24(1) of the New Act, 2013 and the recent
judgment of Supreme Court in U.P. Avas
Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Chandra
Shekhar and others (Civil Appeal
No.3855 of 2024 arising out of SLP (C)
No.779 of 2016, decided on 05.03.2024)1.

6. On the other hand, Sri Nipun
Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of Parishad, submits that by virtue of
Section 55 of the Adhiniyam, the provisions
of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applies,
subject to modifications specified in the
Schedule. There has been no amendment in
the said provision so as to make applicable
the provisions of the New Act, 2013,
therefore, the claim of the petitioner is
unsustainable.
In
support
of
his
submissions, he places reliance on a
Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Atul Sharma and another Vs. State of
U.P. and others2.

7. We have considered the rival
submissions and perused the material on
record.

8. It is noteworthy that by virtue
of Section 55 of the Adhiniyam read with
the Schedule, the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended in the
State of Uttar Pradesh, subject to
modifications specified in the Schedule,
have been made applicable. Section 55 of
the Adhiniyam is as follows:

"55. Power to acquire land.-(1)
Any land or any interest therein required
by the Board for any of the purposes of
this Act, may be acquired under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), as amended in
its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for
this purpose shall be subject to the
modification specified in the Schedule to
this Act.
(2) If any land in respect of which
betterment fee has been levied under this
Act is subsequently required for any of
the purposes of this Act, such levy shall
not be deemed to prevent the acquisition
of the land under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894)."

9. By Act No. 68 of 1984, drastic
amendments were made in the LA Act.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons -
emphasizes the need to balance individual
interest with larger interest of the
community. Two main features of the
Amending Act, 1984 was to provide (i)
timelines in initiating and concluding
various stages of the proceedings so as to
avoid delay of long periods which
'renders
unrealistic
the
scale
of
compensation offered to the affected
persons' and (ii) to provide adequate
measures to compensate for the delay. To
meet these concerns, main proposals for
amendments, inter alia, are as follows:

"(iii) A time-limit of one year is
proposed to be provided for completion of
all formalities between the issue of the
preliminary notification under Section 4(1)
of the Act and the declaration for
acquisition of specified land under Section
6(1) of the Act.
2362 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(v) It is proposed to provide for a
period of two years from the date of
publication of the declaration under Section
6 of the Act within which the Collector
should make his award under the Act. If no
award is made within that period, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land
would lapse. He has also been empowered
to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes
in the award within a certain period from
the date of the award.
(viii) Solatium now payable at the
rate of fifteen per centum of the market
value of the land acquired in consideration
of the compulsory nature of the acquisition,
is proposed to be increased to thirty per
centum. Similarly, the rate of interest
payable on the excess compensation
awarded by the Court and on the
compensation in cases where possession of
land
is
taken
before
payment
of
compensation, are also proposed to be
increased substantially.
(ix) Considering that the right of
reference to the civil court under Section 18
of the Act is not usually taken advantage of
by inarticulate and poor people and is
usually
exercised
only
by
the
comparatively affluent landowners and that
this causes considerable inequality in the
payment of compensation for the same or
similar quality of land to different
interested parties, it is proposed to provide
an opportunity to all aggrieved parties
whose land is covered under the same
notification to seek re-determination of
compensation, once any one of them has
obtained orders for payment of higher
compensation from the reference court
under Section 18 of the Act.
(x) As a large number of cases for
the acquisition of land are pending before
various authorities for a very long time and
payment of the market value of the land
obtaining on the date of the preliminary
notification under Section 4 of the Act in
respect of such land is likely to be
unrealistic and iniquitous, it is proposed to
provide for payment of simple interest at
ten per centum per annum on the amount of
compensation for the period commencing
from the date of issue of the notification
under Section 4 of the Act to the date of
tender
of
payment
or
deposit
of
compensation awarded by the Collector in
respect of all pending proceedings on the
30th April, 1982, the date when the earlier
Bill for the amendment of the Act was
introduced in the House of the People."

10. After amendments in LA Act,
question arose before the Supreme Court in
Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P.3
whether the provisions of LA Act as
amended by Amending Act, 1984 stood
incorporated in the Adhiniyam by virtue of
Section 55 read with the Schedule. There
was difference of opinion in the Two Judges
Bench and the matter was referred to Larger
Bench of Three Judges. The issue came to
be decided by Three Judges Bench in U.P.
Avas Ewam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul
Islam and Another.4 In paragraph 13 of
the judgment, the point of difference
between the Two Judges was noted as
follows:

"13. Ramaswamy,J. was of the
view that Section 55 of the Adhiniyam read
with the Schedule made an express
incorporation of the provisions of Section
4(1) and Section 6 as modified and
incorporated in the Schedule and that the
Schedule effected necessary structural
amendments to Sections 4, 5, 17 and 23
incorporating therein the procedure and
principles with necessary modifications
and that it is a complete code in itself. He,
therefore, held that Section 55 and the
Schedule adopted only by incorporation
5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2363
Sections 4(1) and 6(1) and the subsequent
amendments to Section 6 did not become
part of the Adhiniyam and they have no
effect on the operation of the provisions of
the Adhiniyam. Sahai,J. however, took a
contrary view. He was of the opinion that
whether a legislation was by way of
incorporation or by way of reference is
more a matter of construction by the courts
keeping in view the language employed by
the enactment, the purpose of referring or
incorporating provisions of an existing Act
and the effect of it on the day-to-day
working. According to the learned Judge
such legislation by incorporating is subject
to exceptions and that one such situation
where legislation by incorporation is
excluded is if it creates difficulty in day-today working. The learned Judge was of the
view that in our constitutional set-up the
exception can be extended further and the
courts should lean against a construction
which may result in discrimination. He,
therefore, held that the amendments
introduced in the LA Act by the 1984 Act
would be applicable to acquisition of land
for the purpose of the Adhiniyam and
restriction of three years added by the first
proviso to Section 6 of the LA Act was
applicable to acquisition for the purposes of
the Adhiniyam also. The learned Judge,
however, took note of the fact that the
Parishad had entered into possession and
had constructed housing colonies as there
was no interim order in favour of the
landowners during pendency of the writ
petitions in the High Court and observed
that larger social interest requires this Court
to mould the relief in such a manner that
justice may not suffer. He, therefore, held
that even though publication of declarations
under the Act were beyond the period of
three years it was not in the interest of
justice to quash the proceedings but the
landowners should be paid compensation of
the land acquired on market value prevalent
in the year in which the declaration
analogous to Section 6 of the earlier Act
was
published/issued
by
fictionally
assuming that fresh notification under the
Act analogous to Section 4 was issued in
that year."

11. The Supreme Court considered
the plea of the Parishad that by virtue of
Section 55 of the Adhiniyam, the provisions
of the LA Act, subject to modifications
provided under the Schedule alone would
apply as it is legislation by incorporation.
On behalf of the land owners, it was
contended that the provisions of the
Amending Act at least to the extent the
same relates to award of additional
statutory benefits if not applied would
offend Article 14 of the Constitution and
would render Section 55 of the Adhiniyam
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court relied
on its previous judgment in Nagpur
Improvement Trust5 decided by a Special
Bench of Seven Judges. Therein, Section 61
of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936, which is identical to Section 55 of the
Adhiniyam, was under consideration and it
was ruled that -

"Article 14 confers an individual
right and in order to justify a classification
there should be something which justifies a
different treatment to this individual right.
It seems to us that ordinarily a classification
based on the public purpose is not
permissible under Article 14 for the
purpose of determining compensation. The
position is different when the owner of the
land himself is the recipient of benefits
from an improvement scheme, and the
benefit to him is taken into consideration in
fixing compensation. Can classification be
made on the basis of the authority acquiring
the land? In other words can different
2364 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
principles of compensation be laid if the
land is acquired for or by an Improvement
Trust or Municipal Corporation or the
Government? It seems to us that the answer
is in the negative because as far as the
owner is concerned it does not matter to
him whether the land is acquired by one
authority or the other.
* * *
It is equally immaterial whether it
is
one Acquisition Act
or
another
Acquisition Act under which the land is
acquired. If the existence of two Acts
enables the State to give one owner
different treatment from another equally
situated the owner who is discriminated
against, can claim the protection of Article
14."

12. The contention that when
acquisition
is
under
two
different
Legislations, Article 14 cannot be invoked,
was repelled relying on State of M.P. v.
G.C. Mandawar6 by observing as follows
-

"28. The principle laid down by this
Court in State of M.P. v. G.C. Mandawar
that Article 14 cannot be invoked when the
alleged discrimination is on account of laws
made by two different legislatures has no
application in the present case because
under the LA Act as well as under the
provisions of the Adhiniyam the acquisition
is to be made by the same authority, viz.,
the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, and
discrimination arises on account of action
taken by the same authority."

13. The Supreme Court after
considering the rival contentions held that
the provisions of the Amending Act in so
far as it relates to determination of
compensation, if not applied to acquisitions
made
under
the
Adhiniyam,
"the
consequence would be that the provisions
of the LA Act, as applicable under the
Adhiniyam, would suffer from the vice of
arbitrary and hostile discrimination". Such
a consequence could be avoided if the
provisions of the Adhiniyam are construed
to mean that the provisions of the LA Act,
as amended by the 1984, Act, relating to
determination of compensation would
apply to acquisitions of land for the
purposes of the Adhiniyam. The relevant
discussion is in paragraphs no.31 and 32
and the same is extracted below:-

"31.
Since
the
present
case
involves acquisition of land under the
provisions of the L.A. Act as applicable
under the Adhiniyam, it is fully covered by
the law laid down by this Court in Nagpur
Improvement Trust Vs. Vithal Rao: (1973)
1 SCC 500. Keeping in view the principles
laid down in the said decision of this Court,
it has to be held that if the provisions of the
Adhiniyam are so construed as to mean that
the provisions of the L.A. Act, as they stood
on the date of enactment of the Adhiniyam,
would be applicable to acquisition or land
for the purpose of the Adhiniyam and that
the amendments introduced in the L.A. Act
by the 1984 Act relating to determination
and payment of compensation are not
applicable, the consequence would be that
the provisions of the L.A. Act, as applicable
under the Adiniyam, would suffer from the
vice of arbitrary and hostile discrimination.
Such a consequence would be avoided if
the provisions of the Adhiniyam are
construed to mean that the provisions of the
L.A. Act, as amended by the 1984 Act,
relating to determination and payment of
compensation would apply to acquisition of
land for the purposes of the Adhiniyam.
There is nothing in the Adhiniyam which
precludes adopting the latter construction.
On the other hand, the provisions of the
5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2365
Adhiniyam show that the intention of the
Legislature, while enacting the Adhiniyam,
was to confer the benefit of solatium @
15% by modifying Section 23(2) in the
Schedule, which benefit was not available
under the provisions of the L.A. Act as it
was applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh
at the time of enactment of the Adhiniyam.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the
intention of the Legislature, in enacting the
Adhiniyam, was to deny to the landowners
the benefits relating to determination and
payment of compensation which would be
available to them under any amendment
made in the L.A. Act after the enactment of
the Adhiniyam. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that on a proper construction of
Section 55 of the Adhiniyam it must be held
that while incorporating the provisions of
the L.A. Act in the Adhiniyam the intention
of the legislature was that amendments in
the L.A. Act relating to determination and
payment of compensation would be
applicable to acquisition of lands for the
purposes of the Adhiniyam. This means that
the amendments introduced in the L.A. Act
by the 1984 Act relating to determination
and payment of compensation, viz, Section
23(1-A) and Section 23(2) and 28 as
amended by the 1984 Act would be
applicable to acquisitions for the purpose of
the Adhiniyam under Section 55 of the
Adhiniyam.
32. In view of the construction
placed by us on the provisions of Section 55
of the Adhiniyam that the provisions of the
L.A. Act, as amended by the 1984 Act
relating to determination and payment of
compensation, would be applicable to
acquisition of land for the purposes of the
Adhiniyam, it is not necessary to deal with
the submission that if the provisions of the
1984 Act are held to be not applicable in the
matter of acquisition of land for the
purposes of the Adhiniyam the provisions
of the L.A. Act, as applicable under the
Adhiniyam, would be void on the ground of
repugnance under Article 254 of the
Constitution."
(emphasis supplied)

14. The effect of aforesaid
enunciation of law is that even though
Section 11-A of the Act of 1894, which
stipulated that the acquisitions would lapse
in case award is not declared within two
years, would not have the effect of
acquisitions made under the Adhiniyam
getting lapsed but the beneficial provisions
relating to determination of compensation
would apply.

15. In Union of India and others
Vs. Tarsem Singh and others7 the
Supreme Court considered the vires of
Section 3-J of the National Highways Act,
1956 as amended by National Highways
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997. It excluded
the applicability of Land Acquisition Act,
1894 to acquisitions made under the said
Act. It was held that the said provisions
resulting in non-grant of solatium and
interest in respect of lands acquired under
National Highways Act, which were
available if lands were acquired under Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The
plea based on Article 31-C read with Article
39(b) of the Constitution was held to be not
tenable.
The
classification
between
landowners, whose land were acquired for
National Highways under the National
Highways Act, 1956 and landowners whose
land was acquired for other public purposes
was held to have no rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved by the
National Highways Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1997. Again the fundamental principle
reiterated in the said case was that the State
cannot accord different treatment to
2366 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
affected persons based on legislation under
which acquisition is made. In arriving at the
said conclusion, once again reliance was
placed on Nagpur Improvement Trust
(supra). The beneficial provisions of LA
Act relating to solatium and interest were
held to be applicable to acquisitions made
under the National Highways Act, 1956.
The relevant conclusion contained in para52 of the Law Report is as follows:

"We therefore declare that the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
relating to solatium and interest contained
in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest
payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will
apply to acquisitions made under the
National Highways Act. Consequently, the
provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent,
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India and, therefore, declared to be
unconstitutional."

16. Here, it is worthwhile to note
the relevant provisions of the New Act,
2013. Section 24 of the Act contemplates
lapsing of certain acquisition proceedings
and also determination of compensation as
per provisions of the New Act in cases
where no award had been made under
Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. For ready reference, Section 24 is
extracted below:-

"24. Land acquisition process
under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to
have
lapsed
in
certain
cases.(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, in any case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section
11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has
been made, then, all provisions of this Act
relating
to
the
determination
of
compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said
section 11 has been made, then such
proceedings shall continue under the
provisions of the said Land Acquisition
Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), in case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),
where an award under the said section 11
has been made five years or more prior to
the commencement of this Act but the
physical possession of the land has not been
taken or the compensation has not been
paid the said proceedings shall be deemed
to have lapsed and the appropriate
Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate
the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of
this Act:
Provided that where an award has
been made and compensation in respect of
a majority of land holdings has not been
deposited
in
the
account
of
the
beneficiaries,
then,
all
beneficiaries
specified in the notification for acquisition
under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition
Act, shall be entitled to compensation in
accordance with the provisions of this Act."

17. Section 114 repeals the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 but, at the same time,
saves the action taken under the said Act by
applying Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897. Section 114 is extracted below:-

"(1) The Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in
this Act the repeal under sub-section(1)
shall not be held to prejudice or affect the
general application of section 6 of the
5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2367
General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897)
with regard to the effect of repeals."

18. In this regard, we may also take
note of Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, which is as follows:-

"6. Effect of repeal. Where this Act,
or any [Central Act] or Regulation made
after the commencement of this Act, repeals
any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to
be made, then, unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or
existing at the time at which the repeal takes
effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of
any enactment so repealed or anything duly
done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege,
obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under any enactment so repealed;
or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or
punishment incurred in respect of any
offence committed against any enactment
so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy in respect of any
such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment as
aforesaid,

and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be instituted,
continued or enforced, and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be
imposed as if the repealing Act or
Regulation had not been passed."
(emphasis supplied)

19. A combined reading of Section
114 of the New Act along with Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act 1897 would
establish beyond doubt that the repeal of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would not
affect any right, privilege, obligation or
liability acquired, accrued or incurred
under the said enactment, consequent to its
repeal. Thus, the acquisition made by U.P.
Avas Evam Vikas Parishad in the instant
case would not lapse but, at the same time,
the right of the petitioner to receive
compensation also gets saved.

20.

Under
the
New Act,
undoubtedly, the rate of compensation is
much higher as compared to LA Act. Thus,
while repealing LA Act, the New Act, by
virtue of Section 24(1)(a) mandates
determination of compensation in cases
where no award has been made, as per the
provisions of the New Act. Obviously, it is
a balancing act of the legislature. While it
saves acquisitions under the LA Act in
larger interest of the community, it protects
the interest of the affected persons by
providing them with compensation as per
the principles enshrined under the New Act.

21. In Executive Engineer,
Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara,
Maharashtra
Vidarbha
Irrigation
Development Corporation v. Mahesh
and others8, the Supreme Court considered
the issue as to whether limitation of two
years prescribed under Section 11-A for
making award under LA Act, 1894 would
apply even after repeal of the said Act, or
the twelve months period specified in
Section 25 of the New Act, 2013 will apply
for award made under clause (a) of Section
24(1) of LA Act, 1894? Giving a purposive
interpretation, the Supreme Court ruled that
in such cases, the limitation of twelve
months prescribed under Section 25 of the
New Act, 2013 would apply. In so holding,
the Supreme Court held that notification
under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894 is to be
treated at par with notification under
2368 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 19 of the Act. Consequently, the
award is to be made in such cases within
twelve months from 01.01.2014, the date of
commencement of New Act, 2013 if the
limitation had not expired as per Section
11-A of the LA Act. We may usefully refer
to the relevant extract from the said
judgment -

"30. A rational approach so as to
further the object and purpose of Sections
24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required.
We are conscious that Section 25 refers to
publication of a notification under Section
19 as the starting point of limitation. In the
context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the
2013 Act there would be no notification
under Section 19, but declaration under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the
declarations under Section 6 are valid as on
1-1-2014, it is necessary to give effect to
the legislative intention and reckon the
starting point. In the context of Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different
and serve the same purpose as the
declarations under Section 19 of the 2013
Act.
31. Consequently, we hold that in
cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1)
of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for
passing/making of an award under Section
25 of the 2013 Act would commence from
1-1-2014, that is, the date when the 2013
Act came into force. Awards passed under
clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid
if made within twelve months from 1-12014. This dictum is subject to the caveat
stated in paras 20 to 23* (supra) that a
declaration which has lapsed in terms of
Section 11-A of the 1894 Act before or on
31-12-2013 would not get revived."

22. Where the award is declared
under the saving clause embodied in
Section 24(1)(a) of the New Act, 2013, it
has been held in several judgments of
Coordinate Benches that the reference date
for making the award would be 01.01.2014,
the date of commencement of New Act.
While coming to the said conclusion,
reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Supreme Court in Hori Lal vs. State of
U.P. & others9 and D.O. letter of the State
Government dated 26.10.2015 clarifying
that the reference date in such cases would
be 01.01.2014. In Pyare Lal and 24 others
vs. Union of India and 4 others10, we have
taken the same view. The relevant
paragraphs from the said judgment are
extracted below:

"10. In Smt. Sabita Sharma
(supra), a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court,
after examining various earlier Division
Bench judgements of this Court and most
of which were upheld with the dismissal of
special leave petitions filed before the
Supreme Court and in one case, namely,
Hori Lal vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others
with dismissal of Civil Appeal No.1462
of 2019, held that the relevant date would
be
01.01.2014
i.e.,
the
date
of
commencement of the new Act, 2013.
The judgement takes notice of Section
113 of the new Act, 2013, which
empowers the Central Government to
make such provisions or give such
directions not inconsistent with the
provisions of the new Act, 2013, as may
appear to it to be necessary or expedient
for removal of the difficulty. It has been
held that in exercise of said power, the
Central Government had issued a D.O.
No.13013/01/2014-LRD(Pt)
dated
26.10.2015 wherein the issue at hand was
specifically answered in reference to a
query raised by the Government of
Maharashtra. The relevant part of the said
D.O. is extracted below:
5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2369
S.
N
o.
Issues
raised
by
the
Governmen
t
of
Maharashtr
a
Opinion of
the
DoLR
1.
While
determining
the
amount
of
compensatio
n
under
Section 27 of
the
RFCTLAR&
R Act, 2013
of
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court's
orders
are
followed or
cost of assets
have to be
separately
computed in
addition
to
cost of land?
Under Section 26
of
the
RFCTLAR&R
Act, 2013 market
value of land is
determined
while
under section 27,
value of all assets
attached to the land
is added to the
market value to
determine
the
amount
of
compensation.
Thus, it is not
contradictory to the
Supreme
Court's
orders quoted in
the
letter
of
Maharashtra
Government.
2.
Under
Section
24(1),
the
reference
date
for
calculating
12% interest
should
be
date
of
preliminary
notification
under Land
Acquisition
Act, 1894.
Under
section
24(1), the reference
date for calculating
12%
interest
should be date of
preliminary
notification under
Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894.
Department
of
Land
Resources
agrees to this, as
there is no other
reference date, that
can be treated as
equivalent to date
of SIA notification
under
the
RFCTLAR&R
Act, 2013.
3.
For
calculation
of
market
value, under
Section
24(1)(a),
reference
date should
be
01.01.2014
(commence
ment
of
RFCTLAR&
R Act, 2013)
or date of
issuing
preliminary
notification
under Land
Acquisition
Act, 1894?
The reference date
for calculation of
market
value,
under
Section
24(1)(a) should be
01.01.2014
(commencement of
RFCTLAR&R
Act, 2013), as the
Section reads "in
any case of land
acquisition
proceedings
initiated under the
Land
Acquisition
Act, 1894, where
no award under
section 11 of the
said
Land
Acquisition Act has
been made, then,
all provisions of
this Act relating to
the determination
of
compensation
shall apply. Under
section
26
reference date is
date of preliminary
notification,
but
section 24 is a
special
case
of
application of the
Act in retrospective
cases, and a later
date
of
determination
of
market
value
is
suggested
(i.e.,
01.01.2014) with a
view to ensure that
the
land
2370 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
owners/farmers/aff
ected families get
enhanced
compensation
under
the
provisions of the
RFCTLAR&R
Act, 2013 (as also
recommended
by
Standing
Committee in its
31st report).

11. The Division Bench, thereafter,
concluded as follows:

"From a perusal of the D.O. letter
dated 26th October, 2015, issued by the
concerned
Ministry
of
the
Central
Government forwarded to the Principal
Secretary of the State of U.P., for
information and necessary action, it is
evident that the said direction was made in
order to remove difficulty arose in giving
effect to the provisions of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013, in the matter of calculation of
market value under Section 24(1)(a), in the
land acquisition proceedings initiated under
the Act, 1894. The said directions issued by
the Central Government being in exercise
of the power under Section 113 of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013 have statutory force
and are binding on all the State Government
being in view of the power conferred on the
Central
Government
to
make
such
provision or give such directions which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, for removal of any
difficulty arising in giving effect to the
provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013."

12. It is noteworthy that when
same view was taken by an earlier Division
Bench in Hori Lal (supra), the matter
travelled to Supreme Court and the Civil
Appeal No.1462 of 2019 (Hori Lal vs.
State of U.P. and Others) was dismissed
by the Supreme Court repelling the
contention that the relevant date would be
the date on which the award was made. The
view taken by the Division Bench of this
Court that relevant date would be 1st of
January, 2014 was thereby upheld. The
relevant extract from the said judgement of
the Supreme Court is as follows:

"20. We, therefore, find no good
ground to accept the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant when he
contended that the date for determining the
compensation should be the date on which
the Land Acquisition Officer passed the
award. This argument does not have any
basis and is, therefore, not acceptable for
the simple reason that such date is not
provided either in the old Act, 1894 or in
the Act, 2013.
21. Indeed, how the compensation
is required to be determined and with
reference to what date, is provided under
the Act and admittedly the date suggested
by the learned counsel is not the date
prescribed either in the old Act or the new
Act. This submission has, therefore, no
merit and deserves to be rejected. It is
accordingly rejected.
22. We, therefore, find no good
ground to take a different view than what
was taken by the High Court in the
impugned order"

13. In view of the above
discussion, we are of the opinion that the
issue is no more res integra. The relevant
date for determining the compensation in
respect of acquisition initiated under the old
Act but where award could not be made by
the time the new Act, 2013 came into force,
would be 1st of January, 2014 i.e., the date
of commencement of the new Act, 2013. "
5 All. Hem Chandra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
2371
23. In the instant case, admittedly,
the notification under Section 32 of the
Adhiniyam, which is at par with Section 6
notification under LA Act, was made on
07.07.1982. However, award was not made
for almost 42 years. This became possible
because the timelines under the Amending
Act are held to be inapplicable. Now,
should the Parishad continue to delay the
awards
taking
benefit
of
the
nonapplicability of the timelines and at the
same time, also not pay compensation
according to the New Act?

24. This controversy has now been
settled by the Supreme Court in Chandra
Shekhar (supra). The said case also arose
out of the acquisition made under the
Adhiniyam. The notification under Section
28 was issued on 17.07.2004. It also
appears that the subsequent action of the
Parishad was subjected to challenge and it
was held that the same was not valid as
proper opportunity, as contemplated under
Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
1894, was not given. The Supreme Court
upheld the judgment of the High Court
quashing the subsequent action of Parishad
on the ground of non compliance of the
procedure.