# Hemant Kumar Garg v. Pulkit Garg

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 2214
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-16
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 3816 of 2026
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hemant-kumar-garg-v-pulkit-garg-54907
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

2214 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and wife and, therefore, the mutual rights of inheritance in each other?s property on the death of
either of them get extinguished. The Hon?ble Supreme Court has also discussed the effect of
Section 305 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 observing that an executor or administrator has the
same power to sue in respect of all causes of action that survive the deceased and may exercise the
same power for recovery of debts as the deceased had when living.

21. In V. Tulasamma and others Vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs.: (1977) 3 SCC 99, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in light of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, has
held that sub-section (1) of Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition
of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and she would become
full owner of the same.

22. In Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan Vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair: (1986) 1
SCC 118, the Hon?ble Supreme Court, after dealing with the provisions of Section 306 of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925, has held that rights of action of or against deceased survive to and
against executor or administrator and the position must necessarily prevail in the case of legal
representative and what applies to the executors and administrators, will also apply to a legal
representative.

CONCLUSION

23. In view of the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the
petitioner is entitled to receive the amount of Rs. 16 lakh lying in the Family Court as a legal
representative of her deceased divorced wife and as the only living successor left by her.

24. The petition is allowed and the Principal Judge, Family Court, Banda is directed to
release the amount of Rs. 16 lakh in favour of the petitioner in furtherance of the decree drawn in
Suit No. 103 of 2023, within a period of two weeks from the date a certified copy of this order
alongwith a fresh application is filed before him.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 2214
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 3816 of 2026

Hemant Kumar Garg ...Petitioner
Versus
Pulkit Garg ...Respondent

Issues for Consideration
4 All. Hemant Kumar Garg Vs. Pulkit Garg
2215
(i) Whether the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 requiring
deposit of fifty per cent of the entire amount payable under the impugned order is confined to the amount
due on the date of filing of the appeal or extends to recurring liabilities accruing during the pendency of the
appeal?
(ii) Whether the Rent Tribunal is competent to direct continued deposit of fifty per cent of the revised monthly
rent during pendency of the appeal as a condition for grant of interim protection?
(iii) Whether such a direction amounts to execution of the impugned order or constitutes an additional
condition not contemplated under Section 35(1) of the Act?
(iv) Whether interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is warranted against such an interlocutory
order passed by the Rent Tribunal?

Headnotes
U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 - Section 35(1) proviso - Appeal - Predeposit - Condition precedent - Nature of requirement.

HELD: The proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 engrafts a
mandatory condition precedent for maintainability of an appeal. The right of appeal being a statutory right,
the legislature is competent to regulate its exercise by prescribing a condition of pre-deposit. The expression
"no appeal shall lie unless" employed in the proviso leaves no discretion with the appellate authority to
dispense with the statutory requirement.

U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 - Section 35(1) proviso - "Entire amount
payable under the impugned order" - Meaning - Recurring liability of revised rent.

HELD: The expression "entire amount payable under the impugned order" is of wide amplitude and cannot be
confined to the amount quantified as on the date of institution of the appeal. Where the impugned order
revises rent, thereby creating a recurring monthly liability, the statutory requirement of deposit necessarily
extends to liabilities accruing during the pendency of the appeal. Restricting the deposit to the amount due on
the date of filing would render the expression "entire amount payable" otiose and defeat the legislative intent
underlying the proviso.

U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 - Section 35(1) proviso - Continuing predeposit - Direction for periodic deposit - Validity.

HELD: In cases where the impugned order gives rise to a continuing or recurring liability, the obligation of predeposit is not exhausted by the initial deposit made at the time of filing of the appeal. The Rent Tribunal is
competent to issue directions requiring periodic deposit of fifty per cent of the recurring liability during
pendency of the appeal so as to effectuate the statutory mandate embodied in the proviso. Such a direction is
incidental to enforcement of the statutory condition and does not amount to imposition of any additional
requirement.

U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 - Section 35(1) proviso - Periodic deposit
- Interim protection - Execution of impugned order.

HELD: A direction requiring deposit of fifty per cent of the revised rent during pendency of the appeal neither
amounts to execution of the impugned order nor compels compliance with the entire liability determined
thereunder. Such direction merely enforces the statutory requirement of partial deposit and constitutes a
balanced arrangement safeguarding the interests of both parties while interim protection continues to
operate.
Constitution of India - Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction - Interference with interlocutory
order of Rent Tribunal.
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HELD: Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is confined to cases involving patent illegality, perversity or
jurisdictional error. Where the Rent Tribunal adopts a purposive interpretation of the proviso to Section 35(1)
of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 and directs continued deposit of fifty per cent of
the recurring revised rent during pendency of the appeal, no ground for interference under Article 227 is
made out.

Petition dismissed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 2 SCC 175 - relied on; Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v.
Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, (1988) 4 SCC 402 - relied on; Gujarat Agro
Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, (1999) 4 SCC 468 - relied
on; Har Devi Asnani v. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2011) 14 SCC 160 - relied on; M/s
Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Others, (2021) 12 SCC 477 - relied on; Prathama U.P.
Gramin Bank v. Union of India and Others, 2019 SCC OnLine All 3833 - relied on; S. Sundaram
Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591 - relied on; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and
Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 60 - relied on.

List of Acts / Statutes
Constitution of India; U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021.

List of Keywords
Rent Appeal; Pre-deposit; Condition precedent; Revised rent; Recurring liability; Continuing deposit; Interim
protection; Rent Tribunal; Maintainability of appeal.

Case Arising From
Order dated 02.01.2026 passed by the Rent Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 26, Agra in Rent
Appeal No. 07 of 2026, directing the appellant-tenant to continue depositing fifty per cent of the revised
monthly rent during pendency of the appeal against the order dated 24.11.2025 passed by the Rent Authority,
Agra in Case No. 1196 of 2024 under Section 10(1) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act,
2021.

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellants: Sri Rishabh Agarwal and Sri Shashank Singh.
For the Respondents: None appeared.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

Heard Sri Rishabh Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. The present petition has been filed seeking to assail the order dated 02.01.2026 passed
by the Rent Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.26, Agra in Rent Appeal No. 07 of 2026.

3. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondent filed an
application under Section 10 of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 seeking
determination and enhancement of rent, asserting that the tenanted premises had been purchased by
him and that the petitioner, being a tenant under the previous owner, had defaulted in payment of
rent. The petitioner, upon appearance, disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant as well as the
respondents title and raised objections regarding maintainability.
4 All. Hemant Kumar Garg Vs. Pulkit Garg
2217
4. The Rent Authority, Agra, by order dated 24.11.2025, passed in Case No. 1196 of 2024
under Section 10(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021, revised the rent payable by the tenant.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Rent Appeal No. 07 of 2026. While entertaining the
appeal, the Rent Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 02.01.2026, took note of the Munsarims
report indicating that 50 percent of the amount due under the impugned order had been deposited.
The Tribunal thereafter directed the appellant-tenant to continue depositing 50 percent of the
revised rent, i.e., Rs. 22,500/- per month (out of Rs. 45,000/-), by the 7th of each succeeding
month, and granted interim protection.

5. Assailing the said direction, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon
the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 to contend that the requirement of
deposit stands satisfied once 50 percent of the amount due as on the date of filing of the appeal is
deposited, and that no further direction for continuous deposit during pendency of the appeal could
have been imposed. It is urged that the direction in effect enforces the impugned order and renders
the appeal illusory.

6. The core question that arises for consideration is whether the requirement of pre-deposit
under the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 is confined to a one-time deposit
calculated up to the date of filing of the appeal, or whether it extends to a continuing obligation
covering recurring liabilities accruing during the pendency of the appeal.

7. The submission necessitates consideration of the scope and import of Section 35 of the
U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021. Section 35(1) provides for a statutory appeal against an order passed by
the Rent Authority. It reads as follows:

 "35. Appeal."

 (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Authority may prefer an appeal
along with a certified copy of such order to the Rent Tribunal within the local limits of which the
premises is situated, within a period of thirty days from the date of that order:

 Provided that no appeal shall lie unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent of the
entire payable amount under the impugned order of the rent authority."

8. The proviso, thus, engrafts a clear and mandatory condition precedent for the
maintainability of an appeal. The legislative intent is explicitan appellant seeking to avail the
statutory remedy must first comply with the requirement of depositing 50 percent of the entire
amount payable under the impugned order.

9. The language employed in the proviso is clear and peremptory, making the requirement
of pre-deposit a condition precedent to the very maintainability of an appeal. The right of appeal
being a creature of statute, it is well within the legislative competence to condition its exercise, and
such conditions are required to be strictly complied with.
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10. It is, by now, well settled that the right of appeal is not an inherent right but a statutory
creation, and it is always open to the legislature, while conferring such a right, to impose conditions
for its exercise. The requirement of pre-deposit, as a condition precedent for the maintainability of
an appeal, has consistently been upheld as a valid legislative device to regulate the exercise of the
appellate remedy. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat1, it was authoritatively held that
such a condition does not take away the right of appeal but merely regulates its exercise so as to
balance the right of the appellant with the interest of the successful party. This principle has been
reiterated in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs2, wherein it was observed that the
right of appeal is neither an absolute right nor an essential ingredient of natural justice, and being
statutory in nature, it can be circumscribed by conditions in its grant. The consistent judicial view,
as reflected in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad3
and Har Devi Asnani v. State of Rajasthan4, is that such conditions are mandatory, and noncompliance renders the appeal not maintainable. In M/s Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab5,
the Court further emphasized that pre-deposit requirements, particularly in fiscal statutes, are
designed to safeguard the interests of the successful party and cannot be diluted through
interpretative processes.

11. Thus, the requirement of pre-deposit operates as a threshold bar to the very
maintainability of an appeal and ensures that the appellate remedy is not invoked merely to obstruct
or delay the enforcement of lawful orders.

12. A similar exposition of the law is to be found in Prathama U.P. Gramin Bank v.
Union of India6, wherein, upon a comprehensive survey of precedents, it was held that the right to
appeal being a creature of statute can be qualified by imposing a condition of pre-deposit, and
where such requirement is couched in mandatory terms, the appellate authority is left with no
discretion to entertain an appeal in the absence of compliance. It was further held that such a
condition does not render the remedy illusory but merely regulates its exercise and ensures that the
statutory right is not abused to the prejudice of the party in whose favour the order has been passed.

13. The nature and effect of a proviso in a statutory provision is also well settled.
Ordinarily, a proviso is engrafted to qualify, carve out an exception to, or impose a condition upon
the main enactment, which but for the proviso would have operated in a wider field. As explained
in authoritative precedents including S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman7 and Shah
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha8, a proviso may, depending upon
its language, either qualify the main provision or, in certain cases, assume the character of a
substantive enactment imposing an independent condition. Where a proviso is couched in
mandatory terms, particularly employing expressions such as no appeal shall lie unless, it
operates as a substantive restriction on the right conferred under the main provision and must be
strictly complied with. The proviso to Section 35(1), therefore, is not merely procedural in nature
but constitutes a legislative mandate conditioning the very maintainability of the appeal, and must
be construed in a manner that furthers its object rather than dilutes its effect.

14. The expression entire amount payable under the impugned order is of wide
amplitude and admits of no artificial truncation. It cannot be read in a constricted manner so as to
confine it merely to the amount quantified up to the date of filing of the appeal. The phrase is to be
4 All. Hemant Kumar Garg Vs. Pulkit Garg
2219
interpreted contextually and must take its colour from the nature of the liability created by the
impugned order.

15. In the present case, the order impugned before the appellate authority is one revising
rent, which gives rise to a recurring and continuous liability accruing month after month. Therefore,
the amount payable under the impugned order would not be a static figure but a dynamic and
ongoing obligation.

16. The crucial expression occurring in the proviso is entire amount payable under the
impugned order. The word entire cannot be rendered otiose or confined by an artificial
limitation. The expression must be construed in a manner that accords with the nature of the
liability created by the impugned order. Where the order gives rise to a one-time liability, the
computation may not present difficulty; however, where the liability is inherently recurring, as in
the case of revised rent payable month to month, the amount payable cannot be frozen at a
particular point of time, namely the date of filing of the appeal. It represents a continuing obligation
which accrues periodically.

17. The interpretation suggested by the petitioner, if accepted, would result in freezing the
statutory obligation at the stage of filing of the appeal, thereby enabling the appellant to avoid
compliance with the recurring liability during pendency of the appeal. It would result in the
landlord being deprived of even 50 percent of the revised rent during pendency of appeal, despite a
lawful adjudication in his favour. Such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the
proviso and render the expression entire amount payable redundant in the context of continuing
liabilities.

18. The legislative intent underlying the provision is not only to ensure that the appeal is
pursued with seriousness but also to safeguard the interest of the party in whose favour the order
has been passed, pending adjudication. The rationale underlying such provisions has been
emphasized by the Supreme Court in M/s Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd., wherein it has been observed that
conditions of pre-deposit are intended to strike a balance between the right of appeal and the need
to protect the successful party.

19. At this juncture, it would be apposite to note that provisions requiring pre-deposit as a
condition for maintaining an appeal are not unknown to statutory jurisprudence. Similar
stipulations are found in fiscal statutes as well as rent control legislations. The consistent judicial
approach in interpreting such provisions has been that they are mandatory in nature and are
intended to balance the right of appeal with the need to secure the decretal or adjudicated amount.

20. In the context of fiscal statutes, courts have repeatedly held that pre-deposit
requirements are conditions attached to the statutory right of appeal and must be strictly complied
with. Such provisions are intended to discourage frivolous challenges and to protect the interest of
the successful party pending adjudication. Likewise, under rent control legislations, provisions
requiring deposit of rent during pendency of proceedings have been interpreted to impose a
continuing obligation upon the tenant, particularly where the liability is recurring. The rationale
underlying such interpretation is that a tenant, while availing the benefit of stay or pendency of
2220 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings, cannot be permitted to withhold payment of rent, thereby causing undue prejudice to
the landlord.

21. Viewed in this backdrop, the proviso to Section 35(1) must be construed in a manner
that advances the legislative intent and preserves the balance between the rights of the parties. The
condition of pre-deposit, though coming into operation at the stage of filing of the appeal,
necessarily extends to ensuring continued compliance in respect of liabilities that accrue during
pendency of the appeal. The statutory requirement of pre-deposit is not exhausted upon a one-time
deposit made at the time of filing but subsists so long as the liability under the impugned order
continues to operate. Any other interpretation would not only defeat the statutory mandate but
would also lead to manifest inequity.

22. Rent law jurisprudence consistently recognizes that rent is a recurring obligation, and a
tenant cannot retain possession while withholding payment. The principle that a litigant cannot
enjoy the benefit of pendency of proceedings while avoiding corresponding obligations is well
entrenched.

23. From the foregoing discussion, the following principles emerge:

 23.1 Pre-deposit under the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 is
mandatory in nature and operates as a condition precedent to the very maintainability of an appeal;
the right of appeal being statutory, its exercise remains subject to strict compliance with such
condition.

 23.2 The expression entire amount payable under the impugned order is of wide
amplitude and must receive a purposive construction; it is not to be confined to the amount
quantified as on the date of institution of the appeal, but extends to the whole liability arising from
the impugned order in its true character.

 23.3 Where the impugned order gives rise to a recurring or continuing liability, including
but not limited to payment of revised rent on a monthly or periodic basis, the statutory requirement
of deposit necessarily takes within its fold such continuing accruals, and cannot be restricted to a
one-time computation.

 23.4 The obligation of pre-deposit under the proviso, in cases involving recurring or
continuing liability, is not exhausted by the initial deposit made at the time of filing of the appeal; it
remains a subsisting and dynamic requirement that endures so long as the liability under the
impugned order continues to accrue during the pendency of the appeal.

 23.5 Any interpretation, in the context of such recurring liability, which confines the
deposit to the amount due as on the date of filing would render the expression entire amount
payable otiose and defeat the legislative intent of securing the beneficiary of the impugned order
against non-payment during the pendency of appellate proceedings.
4 All. Hemant Kumar Garg Vs. Pulkit Garg
2221
 23.6 The object underlying the proviso is twofold, namely, to ensure that the remedy of
appeal is invoked with due seriousness and to safeguard the interest of the party in whose favour
the order has been passed; the provision, therefore, embodies a legislative balance between the
right of appeal and the obligation to secure compliance.

 23.7 The appellate authority, while entertaining an appeal, is empowered to issue
appropriate directions to ensure continued compliance with the statutory requirement of deposit,
including directions for periodic deposit in cases of recurring liability, so as to effectuate the
mandate of the proviso.

 23.8 A direction requiring deposit of fifty percent of the recurring liability during
pendency of the appeal is neither extraneous to the statutory scheme nor an imposition of an
additional condition, but is in furtherance of and incidental to the enforcement of the statutory
requirement itself.

 23.9 Such a direction does not amount to execution of the impugned order, inasmuch as it
does not compel full compliance therewith, but only mandates partial deposit in terms of the
statute, and operates as a regulatory measure governing the continuation of the appeal and the grant
of interim protection.

 23.10 The grant of interim protection in appeal is inherently conditional and can be
validly made subject to compliance with the requirement of continued deposit, the same
constituting a balanced and equitable arrangement between the parties.

 23.11 Non-compliance with the requirement of continued deposit, in cases of recurring
liability, would disentitle the appellant from claiming equitable relief and may legitimately invite
consequences, including vacating of interim protection or dismissal of the appeal in accordance
with law.

 23.12 The proviso to Section 35(1) must be construed in a manner that advances the
object of the enactment, prevents abuse of the appellate process, and ensures that a litigant does not
retain the benefit of possession or pendency of proceedings without discharging the corresponding
statutory obligation, even if to a limited extent.

 23.13. The statutory mandate of pre-deposit under Section 35(1), in its application to
recurring liabilities, is continuous in operation and enforceable throughout the pendency of the
appeal, and any direction issued by the appellate authority to secure such compliance is legally
sustainable and within jurisdiction.

24. The direction issued by the Rent Tribunal requiring the appellant to deposit 50 percent
of the revised rent on a monthly basis is, therefore, not an additional or extraneous condition, but a
logical extension of the statutory mandate contained in the proviso to Section 35(1). It is in
consonance with the statutory scheme and an operational mechanism to ensure continued
compliance with the condition precedent embodied in the proviso to Section 35(1).
2222 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
25. The contention that such a direction amounts to execution of the impugned order is
misconceived. The Tribunal has not directed payment of the entire revised rent but only 50 percent
thereof, strictly in conformity with the statutory requirement. The grant of interim protection is
conditional upon such compliance and is in the nature of an equitable arrangement to balance
competing interests.

26. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
is confined to cases of patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. The impugned order does
not suffer from any such infirmity. On the contrary, it reflects a correct and purposive construction
of the statutory provision and a balanced exercise of jurisdiction.

27. The petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 2222
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 6089 of 2025
Connected With
Matters Under Article 227 No. 5333 of 2025

M/S U.P. Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam, Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
M/S Adani Enterprises Ltd. Ahmedabad & Anr. ...Respondents

Issues for Consideration
(i) Whether an arbitral award passed against a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) can be executed against its
constituent shareholders who were neither signatories to the arbitration agreement nor parties to the arbitral
proceedings?
(ii) Whether, in execution proceedings under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with
Order XXI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the executing Court is competent to implead persons
other than the judgment-debtor and enforce the arbitral award against them?
(iii) Whether the expression "persons claiming under them" occurring in Section 35 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 permits enforcement of an arbitral award against non-signatories by invoking the
doctrines of alter ego, lifting of the corporate veil or group of companies?
(iv) Whether, in the facts of the case, the constituent companies of the SPV could be treated as persons
claiming under the award-debtor so as to render them liable for satisfaction of the arbitral awards?

Headnotes
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 35 and 36 - Execution of arbitral award -
Enforcement against non-signatories - Scope of expression "persons claiming under them".

HELD: Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 gives finality and binding effect to an arbitral
award not only against the parties to the arbitration agreement but also against persons claiming under them.
The expression is of wider import than the expression "party" defined under Section 2(h) of the Act and