# High School, Bareilly & Others 1997 AWC (Supp.) 422, Brahma Dayal Mehta v. Senior Personnel Executive, Indian Drugs, 1990

- **Citation:** (2021) 3 ILRA 834
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-03-22
- **Case number:** Consolidation No. 56 of 1994
- **Bench:** Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/high-school-bareilly-others-1997-awc-supp-422-brahma-dayal-mehta-v-senior-46967
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - Validity of sale
deed - The sale deed cannot be treated as
invalid only on the plea that it was for
inadequate consideration - The application of
opposite party no. 2 could not have been rejected
on the ground that total sale consideration was not
paid because firstly it was not the case of the
petitioner and secondly if it was not paid the same
could have been claimed by the petitioner in
accordance with law. (Para 11)

The remaining amount Rs. 2,000/-, which is
being said not to have been paid to the
petitioner, though it does not seem to be the
case of the petitioner, the learned revisional
court has rightly provided that the petitioner can
claim the same by filing a suit. (Para 17)

B. Petitioner was not a minor at the time
execution of sale deed, therefore the sale
deed cannot be said to be illegal or void
on this ground - The mother of the petitioner
had submitted in her statement that the
petitioner was two years younger to Mahadev
and the age of Mahadev has been shown twenty
years in the objection. In this way also the age
of the petitioner comes to eighteen years
therefore the sale deed cannot be said to be
illegal or void on this ground. (Para 11)

After considering the evidence the learned
Consolidation Officer has recorded a finding that
the age of the petitioner has been shown as
thirteen years in Khatauni of 1376 Fasli to 1378
Fasli and the sale deed was executed on
21.04.1976 i.e. 1383 Fasli as such at the time of
execution of sale deed he was twenty years of
age and was not minor. (Para 10)

It has been recorded that the petitioner had not
appeared before Consolidation Officer for his
evidence and cross-examination, whereas the
statement of petitioner was recorded by the
Assistant Consolidation Officer in which he had
admitted his age as twenty one years. He never
gave any evidence that the sale deed was
executed by giving any allurement or forcefully.
The petitioner has also not shown his age while
filing objection in the revisional court. There is
no provision that the Sub-registrar is obliged to
record the majority or minority of the executant.
This Court finds that none of the Courts below
has recorded any finding that the petitioner was
not major at the time of execution of sale deed.
Therefore, the concurrent view of the Courts
below is that the petitioner was major at the
time of execution of sale deed. (Para 17, 18)

C.
Task
of
comparing
signatures
/writings/thumb impressions - Where the
court finds that the disputed finger impression
and admitted thumb impression are clear and
where the court is in position to identify the
characteristic of finge

## Text

834 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Cantonment Board would be governed by
the Rules, 1978 and therefore the benefit of
Rule 14 would be available to the teachers
of such an Institution. Similarly, the
judgements of this Court in Triloki Nath
Saxena
Vs.
Rookee's
High
School,
Bareilly & Others 1997 AWC (Supp.) 422,
Brahma
Dayal
Mehta
Vs.
Senior
Personnel Executive, Indian Drugs, 1990
(2)
AWC
1121,
Shailendra
Kumar
Srivastava
&
Another
Vs.
District
Inspector
of
Schools,
Chandauli
&
Others, 2013 (2) ESC 1016 and Shyam
Lal and Another Vs. State of U.P. &
Others, 2011 (3) ADJ 640, relate to
applicability of Section 16G of the Act,
1921 and benefit of Regulations 21 to the
teachers
employed
in
recognized
Institutions as defined in the Act, 1921. In
Ramesh Chandra Tiwari (Supra) the issue
was regarding the benefit of Rule 29 of the
Rules, 1981. It is apparent from paragraph
1 of the reports that the case related to
Head Master of Schools conducted and
managed by the Uttar Pradesh Basic
Education Board and it was not disputed
that the teachers in the Institutions in
question were governed by Rules, 1981
and, therefore, the benefit of Rule 29 was
available
to
the
said
teachers.
The
judgement does not consider the case of
teachers of Basic Schools, whose service
conditions are not governed by Rules, 1981
and is, thus not a precedent for the present
case. Thus, the judgements referred above
do not help the case of the petitioner and
are not applicable in the present case.

32. It is the prerogative of the
employer
to
prescribe
the
service
conditions of its employees. The said
prerogative can be superseded by statutory
rules which may prescribe the service
conditions of the employees. There are no
statutory Rules prescribing the retirement
age or granting session benefit to a teacher
of a Primary School which does not belong
to or is not maintained by the Board or a
local body as defined in Section 2(e) of the
Act, 1972. In view of the aforesaid, the
retirement age of the petitioner as well as
her claim for session benefit can be decided
only in terms of the C.F.S. Rules. It is the
admitted case of the petitioner that the
C.F.S. Rules do not grant session benefit to
a teacher who retires in the mid of the
academic session.

33. It is clarified that I have not
expressed any opinion on the argument of
the counsel for the respondents regarding
Article 254 and the power of the Board or
the State Government to enact rules
governing the service conditions of the
teachers of Schools managed by the
Cantonment Boards but recognized by the
respective Education Boards as they were
not necessary to decide the present case.

34. For the reasons stated above, the
petitioner is not entitled to the relief
claimed by her.

35. The writ petition is accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2021)03ILR A834
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Consolidation No. 56 of 1994

Jagram ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
3 All. Jagram Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
835
M. Afzal, Mohiuddin Khan, Nagendra B. Singh,
Nagendra Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Prabhakar Vardhan Chaudha

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - Validity of sale
deed - The sale deed cannot be treated as
invalid only on the plea that it was for
inadequate consideration - The application of
opposite party no. 2 could not have been rejected
on the ground that total sale consideration was not
paid because firstly it was not the case of the
petitioner and secondly if it was not paid the same
could have been claimed by the petitioner in
accordance with law. (Para 11)

The remaining amount Rs. 2,000/-, which is
being said not to have been paid to the
petitioner, though it does not seem to be the
case of the petitioner, the learned revisional
court has rightly provided that the petitioner can
claim the same by filing a suit. (Para 17)

B. Petitioner was not a minor at the time
execution of sale deed, therefore the sale
deed cannot be said to be illegal or void
on this ground - The mother of the petitioner
had submitted in her statement that the
petitioner was two years younger to Mahadev
and the age of Mahadev has been shown twenty
years in the objection. In this way also the age
of the petitioner comes to eighteen years
therefore the sale deed cannot be said to be
illegal or void on this ground. (Para 11)

After considering the evidence the learned
Consolidation Officer has recorded a finding that
the age of the petitioner has been shown as
thirteen years in Khatauni of 1376 Fasli to 1378
Fasli and the sale deed was executed on
21.04.1976 i.e. 1383 Fasli as such at the time of
execution of sale deed he was twenty years of
age and was not minor. (Para 10)

It has been recorded that the petitioner had not
appeared before Consolidation Officer for his
evidence and cross-examination, whereas the
statement of petitioner was recorded by the
Assistant Consolidation Officer in which he had
admitted his age as twenty one years. He never
gave any evidence that the sale deed was
executed by giving any allurement or forcefully.
The petitioner has also not shown his age while
filing objection in the revisional court. There is
no provision that the Sub-registrar is obliged to
record the majority or minority of the executant.
This Court finds that none of the Courts below
has recorded any finding that the petitioner was
not major at the time of execution of sale deed.
Therefore, the concurrent view of the Courts
below is that the petitioner was major at the
time of execution of sale deed. (Para 17, 18)

C.
Task
of
comparing
signatures
/writings/thumb impressions - Where the
court finds that the disputed finger impression
and admitted thumb impression are clear and
where the court is in position to identify the
characteristic of finger prints, the court may
record a finding on comparison, even in absence
of an expert opinion. But where the disputed
thumb impression is smuggy, vague or very
light the court should not hazard a guess by
casual perusal. But no such finding has also
been recorded while comparing the thumb
impression. (Para 13, 14)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

1. Smt. Kilhati Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation
(II) Basti & anr., 1975 RD 280 (Para 8, 13)

2. Thiruvendgada Pillai Vs Navaneethammal,
AIR 2008 SC 1541 (Para 8, 13)

3. Ram Shakal & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 1987
(5) LCD 261 (Para 8, 14)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Mohori Bibee & anr. Vs Dharmodas Ghose,
(1903) ILR 30 P.C. 539 (Para 5, 18)

2. Vishwambhar & ors. Vs Laxminarayan (Dead),
Appeal (Civil) 554 of 1998, judgment and order
dated 20.07.2001 (Para 5, 15)

3. Rangammal Vs Kuppuswami & anr., Civil
Appeal no. 562 of 2003 (Para 5, 16)

Present petition challenges order dated
19.10.1993, passed by Deputy Director of
Consolidation.
836 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard, Shri Mohiuddin Khan,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri
P.V. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the
opposite party no.2. The opposite party
no.1 is the court concerned.

2. This writ petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 19.10.1993
passed by the opposite party no.1 by means
of which the revision filed by the opposite
party no.2 has been allowed.

3. The brief facts of the case are that
the petitioner was a Sirdar of the land in
dispute i.e. Gata No.25 having area of 70
Biswa.
The
petitioner
applied
for
Bhumidari
rights.
On
the
basis
of
bhumidhari rights, the petitioner executed
the sale deed in favour of the opposite party
no.2 on 21.04.1976. On the basis of the
said sale deed the opposite party no.2
applied
for
mutation
before
the
Consolidation Officer. The objection on
behalf of the petitioner was filed by his
mother Smt. Indra Devi on the ground that
her son i.e. the petitioner was minor at the
time of execution of sale deed and the sale
deed was got executed by fraud and no
consideration was paid. The Consolidation
Officer rejected the objection of the
opposite party no.2 vide order dated
29.01.1978 / 30.01.1978. The opposite
party no.2 preferred an appeal before the
Settlement Officer Consolidation, which
too
was
rejected
vide
order
dated
17.02.1979. Thereafter the revision was
preferred by the opposite party no.2 which
has been allowed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation i.e. opposite party no.1 on
19.10.1993, hence the present writ petition.

4. Submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner was that the petitioner was
minor at the time of execution of sale deed
and it should have been recorded by the
Sub-Registrar but it was not recorded. He
further submitted that the petitioner has
been shown as minor and Sirdar in 1376
Fasli but the revisional court has failed to
consider it. He had also submitted that the
evidence of the mother of the petitioner is
of great evidentiary value, who had stated
that the petitioner was minor at the time of
execution of sale deed but it has not been
considered. It is a settled proposition of law
that the sale deed executed by a minor is
void-ab-initio. The
concurrent
finding
recorded by the Consolidation Officer and
the Appellate Authority could not have
been
interfered
by
the
Revisional
Authority. Accordingly learned counsel for
the petitioner submitted that the impugned
order is not sustainable and is liable to be
quashed and the writ petition is liable to be
allowed.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied on Mohori Bibee and Another
vs.
Dharmodas
Ghose;
(1903)
ILR
30P.C.539, Vishwambhar and Others Vs.
Laxminarayan (Dead); Appeal (Civil) 554
of 1998 (judgment and order dated
20.07.2001)
and
Rangammal
Vs.
Kuppuswami and Another; Civil Appeal
No.562 of 2003 ( judgment and order dated
13.05.2019).

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the
opposite party no.2 had submitted that the
new number of plot in question is plot
no.80 / 0-17-0. The petitioner was major
and he was twenty years of age on
21.04.1976 i.e. the date of execution of sale
deed. There is no provision for recording
minority or majority of the executant by the
Sub-Registrar. The Revisional Court has
rightly considered the case on the basis of
material available on record and the
3 All. Jagram Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
837
evidence. He had also submitted that there
was
no
concurrent
finding
by
the
Consolidation Officer and the Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation.
The
Consolidation Officer had also found that
the petitioner was eighteen years of age at
the time of execution of sale deed but the
application was rejected on the ground that
the application for mutation can not be
allowed unless the total amount of
consideration is paid and Rs.2,000/- is
remained to be paid, whereas non-payment
of total sale consideration, though it was
paid, cannot be a ground for rejection of
mutation application. This point was also
neither specifically raised before the
Consolidation Officer nor argued but the
learned Consolidation Officer had rejected
the application on the ground that total sale
consideration has not been paid. However,
he also submitted that inadequacy of sale
consideration does not make the sale itself
invalid and it has rightly been considered
by the revisional court.

7. He had further submitted that
before the Appellate Authority also neither
the doubt regarding the thumb impression
of the petitioner was raised nor any expert
evidence was called but the Appellate
Authority on his own, after comparing the
thumb impression dismissed the appeal
which could not have been done. He had
submitted that in fact a compromise was
also made between the parties before the
Deputy Director of Consolidation in terms
of which the petitioner had accepted the
execution of sale deed on which the
revision was allowed. But subsequently a
recall
application
was
moved.
The
petitioner denied his signature on recall
application,
the
affidavit
and
'Vakalatnama'.
Accordingly
learned
counsel for the opposite party no.2
submitted that the revision has rightly been
decided by the opposite party no.2 in
accordance with law after considering the
pleadings and records therefore the writ
petition is misconceived and is liable to be
dismissed.

8. Learned counsel for the opposite
party has relied on Smt. Kilhati Vs. Deputy
Director of Consolidation (II) Basti and
Another; 1975 RD 280, Thiruvendgada
Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal; AIR 2008 SC
1541 and Ram Shakal and Another Vs.
State of U.P. and Others; 1987 (5) LCD
261.

9. I have considered the submissions
of learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.

10. The petitioner had executed a sale
deed of the land in dispute in favour of the
opposite
party
no.2
on
21.04.1976.
Thereafter the opposite party no.2 moved
an application for mutation on the basis of
sale deed on 22.04.1976. It appears that the
petitioner gave an affidavit, in which he
admitted the execution of sale-deed as per
his requirement and it was identified by an
advocate on 28.06.1976. This compromise
was entered into on 28.05.1976. However
an objection was filed by the mother of the
petitioner Smt. Indra Devi on 05.07.1976,
on the ground that the petitioner was minor
at the time of execution of sale deed and
the opposite party no.2 has got executed the
sale deed in his favour forcibly giving him
allurement. Since there was an objection
therefore
the
Assistant
Consolidation
Officer directed to adduce the evidence.
The evidence of the mother of the
petitioner was recorded in which she
supported her objection. The petitioner was
examined
by
Assistant
Consolidation
Officer in which he stated his age 21 years.
After considering the evidence and material
838 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
on
record
the
Consolidation
Officer
rejected the application of the opposite
party no.2 on the ground that the sale
consideration has been shown as Rs.4,000/-
in the sale deed and the opposite party no.2
has accepted that he had purchased the land
in Rs.4,000/- but payment of Rs.2,000/- has
only been shown in the sale deed and the
remaining Rs.2,000/- has not been paid and
rejected the application on this ground.
However after considering the evidence the
learned Consolidation Officer has recorded
a finding that the age of the petitioner has
been shown as thirteen years in Khatauni of
1376 Fasli to 1378 Fasli and the sale deed
was executed on 21.04.1976 i.e. 1383 Fasli
as such at the time of execution of sale
deed he was twenty years of age and was
not minor.

11. The mother of the petitioner had
submitted in her statement that the
petitioner was two years elder than
Mahadev and the age of Mahadev has been
shown twenty years in the objection. In this
way also the age of the petitioner comes to
eighteen years therefore the sale deed can
not be said to be illegal or void on this
ground. The application of opposite party
no.2 could not have been rejected on the
ground that total sale consideration was not
paid because firstly it was not the case of
the petitioner and secondly if it was not
paid the same could have been claimed by
the petitioner in accordance with law. This
Court in the case of Smt. Kilhati Vs.
Deputy Director of Consolidation (II)
Basti and Another (supra) has held that the
sale deed can not be treated as invalid only
on the plea that it was for inadequate
consideration.

12. The opposite party no.2 had filed
the appeal against the order passed by the
Consolidation
Officer
rejecting
his
application on 30.01.1978. The Settlement
Officer Consolidation had rejected the appeal
by means of the order dated 17.02.1979 on
the ground that the thumb impression of the
petitioner does not tally with the thumb
impression of the petitioner at the time of
registration rather it tallies more or less with
the thumb impression of the opposite party
no.2 and also considered the ground on which
the Consolidation Officer had rejected the
application. It has been recorded that some
other person was presented at the time of
registration and thumb impression was
obtained without any evidence or expert
opinion in regard to the thumb impression. It
could not have been done by the Court itself
on his own without any expert opinion or
assistance of any evidence. It was also not
required because there was no dispute that the
sale deed has not been executed by the
petitioner. The mother of the petitioner has
also admitted that the sale deed has been got
executed from the petitioner. The dispute was
only regarding age of petitioner at the time of
execution of sale deed.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case
of
Thiruvendgada
Pillai
Vs.
Navaneethammal (Supra) has held that
where the court finds that the disputed
finger impression and admitted thumb
impression are clear and where the court is
in position to identify the characteristic of
finger prints, the court may record a finding
on comparison, even in absence of an
expert opinion. But where the disputed
thumb impression is smuggy, vague or very
light the court should not hazard a guess by
casual perusal. But no such finding has also
been recorded while comparing the thumb
impression. The relevant paragraph-15 is
extracted below:-

"15. While there is no doubt that court
can compare the disputed handwriting
3 All. Jagram Vs. D.D.C. & Ors.
839
/signature/finger
impression
with
the
admitted
handwriting/
signature/finger
impression, such comparison by court
without the assistance of any expert, has
always been considered to be hazardous
and risky. When it is said that there is no
bar to a court to compare the disputed
finger impression with the admitted finger
impression, it goes without saying that it
can record an opinion or finding on such
comparison, only after an analysis of the
characteristics of the admitted finger
impression and after verifying whether the
same characteristics are found in the
disputed
finger
impression.
The
comparison of the two thumb impressions
cannot be casual or by a mere glance.
Further, a finding in the judgment that
there appeared to be no marked differences
between the admitted thumb impression
and disputed thumb impression, without
anything more, cannot be accepted as a
valid finding that the disputed signature is
of the person who has put the admitted
thumb impression. Where the Court finds
that the disputed finger impression and
admitted thumb impression are clear and
where the court is in a position to identify
the characteristics of finger prints, the
court may record a finding on comparison,
even in the absence of an expert's opinion.
But where the disputed thumb impression is
smudgy, vague or very light, the court
should not hazard a guess by a casual
perusal. The decision in Muralilal (supra)
and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be
construed as laying a proposition that the
court is bound to compare the disputed and
admitted finger impressions and record a
finding
thereon,
irrespective
of
the
condition of the disputed finger impression.
When there is a positive denial by the
person who is said to have affixed his
finger impression and where the finger
impression in the disputed document is
vague or smudgy or not clear, making it
difficult for comparison, the court should
hesitate to venture a decision based on its
own comparison of the disputed and
admitted finger impressions. Further even
in cases where the court is constrained to
take up such comparison, it should make a
thorough study, if necessary with the
assistance of counsel, to ascertain the
characteristics,
similarities
and
dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment
should contain the reasons for any
conclusion based on comparison of the
thumb impression, if it chooses to record a
finding thereon. The court should avoid
reaching conclusions based on a mere
casual or routine glance or perusal."

14. This Court in the case of Ram
Shakal and Another Vs. State of U.P. and
Others (Supra) has held that the court
should not take upon himself the task of
comparing signatures in order to find out
whether the two signatures or writings
agree with each other or not. The relevant
paragraph-9 is extracted below:-

"9. Thus, where an expert opinion is
given, the court must see for itself and with
the assistance of the expert's opinion come
to its own conclusion whether it can safely
be held that the two writings are by the
same person, or the signatures appearing
on record are of the same person for whom
it is said that they put the signatures on the
document in question. This would not
amount to the court playing role of an
expert. The court may accept or reject the
expert opinion on the point and record his
finding taking into consideration all facts
and circumstances of the case. The court
would, however, not resort to play role of
an expert. The court should not take upon
himself the task of comparing signatures in
order to find out whether the two
840 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
signatures or writings agree with each
other or not. The prudent course as
observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ram
(Supra), is to obtain opinion and assistance
of an expert."

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Vishwambhar and Others Vs.
Laxminarayan (Dead); Appeal (Civil) 554
of 1998 vide judgment and order dated
20.07.2001 has considered the period of
limitation in filing a suit for cancellation of
sale deed in the case of a minor after
attaining the age of majority therefore this
case is of no assistance to the case of
petitioner.

16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami and
Another; Civil Appeal No.562 of 2003 has
considered the question of law "whether the
sale deed executed by defacto guardian on
behalf of the minor without the permission
of the Court could be held to be valid ?"
and as to whether the Court can shift the
burden of proof on the defendant-appellant
regarding the validity of the sale deed
which was executed when the appellant
was minor contrary to the pleadings of the
plaint filed in a suit for partition and the
question of limitation therefore this case is
also of no assistance to the case of the
petitioner.

17. The revision was filed by the
opposite party no.2. It appears that the
revision was decided on the basis of
compromise through advocates entered into
between the petitioner and the opposite
party no.2 on 16.10.1979. Subsequently an
application was moved by the petitioner
alleging that the petitioner and his mother
had not entered into any compromise.
Considering the same the order dated
16.10.1979 was recalled. The said order
was challenged in Writ Petition No.474 of
1985 which was decided on 05.09.1990 and
thereafter the revision was decided. The
revisional court considered the evidence
and record and found that the mother of the
petitioner had accepted in her objection that
the sale deed was executed by the petitioner
but since the petitioner was minor at the
time of execution of sale deed, therefore
the opposite party no.2 had got the sale
deed
executed
forcibly
by
giving
allurement to the petitioner. The age of the
petitioner was recorded thirteen years in
Khatauni of 1376 Fasli to 1378 Fasli
therefore the petitioner was major on the
date of execution of sale deed on
21.04.1976 i.e. in 1383 Fasli. It has been
recorded that the petitioner had not
appeared before Consolidation Officer for
his
evidence
and
cross-examination,
whereas the statement of petitioner was
recorded by the Assistant Consolidation
Officer in which he had admitted his age as
twenty one years. He never gave any
evidence that the sale deed was executed by
giving any allurement or forcefully. The
petitioner has also not shown his age while
filing objection in the revisional court. The
revisional court also recorded that there is
contradiction in the evidence of the mother
of the petitioner and his only other witness
Anant Ram. The revisional court after
considering the evidence given by the
mother of the petitioner in regard to his
marriage and the birth of his elder brother
Mahadev and difference of age between his
elder brother and the petitioner and death of
husband of the mother of the petitioner the
revisional court came to the conclusion that
the petitioner was definitely major at the
time of execution of sale deed, which was
also accepted by the Consolidation Officer
and not interfered by the Settlement Officer
Consolidation. Therefore the evidence of
3 All. Hari Nam Singh & Ors. Vs. D.D.C., Unnao & Ors.
841
the mother of the petitioner is not trust
worthy and there is no provision that the
Sub-registrar is obliged to record the
majority or minority of the executant. This
Court is in agreement with the findings
recorded by the revisional court and does
not find any illegality or error in it. As such
the sale deed was not void and the mutation
can not be denied. So far as the remaining
amount Rs.2,000/- is concerned which is
being said not to have been paid to the
petitioner, though it does not seem to be the
case of the petitioner, the learned revisional
court
has
rightly
provided
that
the
petitioner can claim the same by filing a
suit.

18. So far as the question of alleged
concurrent
finding
recorded
by
the
Consolidation Officer and the Settlement
Officer Consolidation is concerned this
court is of the view that there is no
concurrent
finding
because
the
Consolidation Officer had accepted that the
petitioner was major at the time of
execution of sale deed but rejected the
application merely on the ground that the
total sale consideration has not been paid
whereas
the
Settlement
Officer
Consolidation, without dealing the issue of
the age of the petitioner at the time of
execution of sale deed, recorded a finding
of execution of sale deed by presenting
some other person on the basis of tallying
the thumb impression taken before him
without any expert opinion and also
considering the ground of mentioning of
lesser cost of property, while it was not the
case of petitioner. The mother of the
petitioner had also not taken this objection.
On the the other hand this Court finds that
none of the Court's below has recorded any
finding that the petitioner was not major at
the time of execution of sale deed.
Therefore in fact the concurrent view of the
Court's below is that the petitoner was
major at the time of executon of sale deed.
This court is also in agreement with this
view. Therefore the case of Mohori Bibee
and Another vs. Dharmodas Ghose; (1903)
ILR 30P.C.539, relied by learned counsel
for the petitioner is of no assistance to him
because it has been held that the contract
made by a minor would be void whereas
the petitioner was major on the date of
execution of sale deed.

19. In view of above this court is of
the considered opinion that the learned
Revisional court has rightly considered and
passed
the
impugned
order
dated
19.10.1993 in accordance with law by a
reasoned and speaking order. There is no
illegality or error in it. Hence this writ
petition is misconceived and devoid of any
merit and liable to be dismissed.

20. The writ petition is, accordingly,
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2021)03ILR A841
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Consolidation Nos. 543 of 2006 & 862 of 2006

Hari Nam Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
D.D.C., Unnao & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Nirankar Nath Jaiswal, Prashant Jaiswal

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., R.N. Gupta, Ramesh Kumar Srivastava

A. Civil Law - Consolidation - U.P.
Tenancy
Act
-
Section
205
-
U.P.