# Holy Cross School Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others

- **Citation:** (2006) 1 ILRA 234
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006-01-05
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1163 of 2001
- **Bench:** A.K. Yog, Prakash Krishna
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/holy-cross-school-allahabad-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-others-40651
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Motor vehicle Act-S-66 (3) h-Holy cross
school-an
educational
institutionvehicle
in
question
owned
by
the
1 All] Holy Cross School Allahabad V. State of U.P. and others
235
security-used exclusively for carrying
the students from their residence to the
school-held-petitioner held entitled for
exemption.

Held Para 8

The objection raised by the petitioner
regarding maintainability of the writ
petition has no substance at this stage
inasmuch as there are no disputed facts.
Secondly,
in
view
of
the
specific
provisions contained in Section 66 (3)(h)
(as quoted above) and the undisputed
fact that petitioner is a registered
Society
which
runs
Educational
Institution and the vehicle in question is
being
used
exclusively
for
carrying
children to and fro from their residence
to the school, we find no good reason to
dismiss
the
writ
petition
as
not
maintainable at this stage particularly
when respondents have already filed
counter affidavit and have filed to
disprove the facts stated in the writ
petition.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
statutory provision contained in Section
66 (3) (h) (quoted above) we find that
the contention of the petitioner deserves
to be accepted as laid down by this Court
in the case of Catholic Diocese of
Gorakhpur Education Society and others
(supra), a copy of which has been filed
as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The
writ petition deserves to be allowed.
Case law discussed:
W.P. No. 3688 of 2001
Decided on 7.2.2001

## Text

234 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
on the ground of being inconsistent with
the provisions of Chapter IX of the
Constitution . The contentions of the
petitioner were not accepted and it was
held that the provisions of Municipalities
Act as well as U.P. Panchayat Raj Act
were not violative of Chapter IX of the
constitution. The Hon'ble Apex Court
upheld
the
validity
of
Gujrat
Municipalities
act
while
interpreting
Section 40 in the case of Bipin Chandra
Purshottam Das Patel vs. State of Gujrat
and others (supra).

40. It is well settled that when vires
of an enactment is challenged the every
attempt should be made to interpret
various provisions by putting a liberal
construction upon a relevant legislative
entry and effort should be made to extend
the meaning of the relevant words to their
reasonable connotation to preserve the
power of legislature. In the circumstances,
we come to a conclusion that the
legislature has the power to legislate and
provisions of section 27-A (1) (b) of the
U.P.
Kshetriya
Panchayat
and Zila
Panchayats Adhinium is not in any way
violative of any fundamental rights. The
member
are
governed
by
various
provision
of
stature.
The
maxim
'expressio unisest exclusio alterius' is not
applicable to the facts of the present case.
The language of the statute is plain,
simple and meaning is very clear. The
enactment of section 27- A (1) (b) of the
Act is not ultra vires of the Constitution.
We are of the view that the provisions of
the Act are consistent with policy and
object of the Constitution. Any other
interpretation will only amount to shifting
the State legislature from its power to
legislate.

41.

For
the
reasons already
discussed, we hold that Section 27- A
(1)(b)
is
not
ultra
viures
of
the
Constitution. It is enactment and cannot
be struck down .The enactment is neither
violative of the fundamental rights or part
IX of the Constitution, we hold that the
provisions of Section 27-A (1)(b) is
enacted in exercise of power given to the
State by virtue of Articles 245 and 246
read with Entry 5 List II as well as Article
243-C (3) of the Constitution of India.
The petitioner has no rights to hold the
office of the Adhyaksh of Zila Panchayat
after his election to the office, as a M.L.A.
after
the
result
was
declared
and
published in the official gazette.

42. In the result, the write petition
fails and is , accordingly , dismissed .
There shall, however, be no order as to
costs

 Petition dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.01.2006.

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE A.K. YOG, J.
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH KRISHNA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1163 of 2001

Holy Cross School Allahabad ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri G.K. Malviya

Counsel for the Respondent:
S.C.

Motor vehicle Act-S-66 (3) h-Holy cross
school-an
educational
institutionvehicle
in
question
owned
by
the
1 All] Holy Cross School Allahabad V. State of U.P. and others
235
security-used exclusively for carrying
the students from their residence to the
school-held-petitioner held entitled for
exemption.

Held Para 8

The objection raised by the petitioner
regarding maintainability of the writ
petition has no substance at this stage
inasmuch as there are no disputed facts.
Secondly,
in
view
of
the
specific
provisions contained in Section 66 (3)(h)
(as quoted above) and the undisputed
fact that petitioner is a registered
Society
which
runs
Educational
Institution and the vehicle in question is
being
used
exclusively
for
carrying
children to and fro from their residence
to the school, we find no good reason to
dismiss
the
writ
petition
as
not
maintainable at this stage particularly
when respondents have already filed
counter affidavit and have filed to
disprove the facts stated in the writ
petition.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
statutory provision contained in Section
66 (3) (h) (quoted above) we find that
the contention of the petitioner deserves
to be accepted as laid down by this Court
in the case of Catholic Diocese of
Gorakhpur Education Society and others
(supra), a copy of which has been filed
as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The
writ petition deserves to be allowed.
Case law discussed:
W.P. No. 3688 of 2001
Decided on 7.2.2001

(Delivered by Hon'ble A.K. Yog, J.)

1. Petition before us, Holy Cross
School has approached this Court by
filing present writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India praying
for following reliefs :

"(i) issue of writ, order or direction in
the
nature
of
CERTIORARI

quashing
the
impugned
order/notice dated 3.9.2001 passed
by respondent no. 3 (Ann. 2 to the
writ petition);

(ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the
nature of MANDAMUS, commanding
the respondents not to detain the bus
of the petitioner till the disposal of
the writ petition;

(iii) issue a writ, order or direction which
this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper
under
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case;
(ii) and to award the cost of the petition
in favour of the petitioner."

2. The aforementioned reliefs have
been claimed on the basis of the pleadings
in the petition to the effect that the
petitioner is an Educational School which
is known as Holy Cross School which is
being owned by a Society registered
under the Societies Registration Act (as
amended by U.P. Act). The said Society is
known by the name of Holy Cross
Society, Khusroobagh Raod, Allahabad.
A copy of the Registration Certificate
issued by the Registrar of Society, U.P.
Allahabad is annexed as Annexure-1. As
per the said certificate, Society was duly
registered up to May 15, 2003. The
Society, which runs Educational School,
owns a vehicle bearing registration No.
UP70/E-9846. The said vehicle is being
used for carrying children to and fro to
their respective places to the school. The
respondents authorities, in their purported
jurisdiction
to
statutory
provisions
including Motor Vehicles Act issued the
impugned notice dated 3.9.2001 (copy of
which is annexed as Annexure-2 to the
writ petition). By means of the said
impugned notice a demand was made
against the petitioner to deposit a sum of
236 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
Rs. 3,338/- as road tax for the period
1.11.1998 to 31.12.2001/Annexure 2 to
the writ petition.

3. According to the petitioner, there
is no liability to pay road tax with respect
to the aforementioned vehicle which is
being used exclusively for carrying
children to and fro their residence of the
school and also complying with other
terms and conditions of the permit. The
petitioner contends that School Bus was
never run on a particular defined road as it
is used for carrying children as enrolled in
the
School
from
their
respective
residences which are invariably changed
and are situate in different localities. The
petitioner has claimed exemption and has
placed reliance on Section 66(3)(h) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, which is relevant
section, reads as follows:
"The provisions of Sub-section (1)
shall not apply (a) to (g) ....
(h) To any transport vehicle owned by,
and used solely for the purpose of any
educational
institution
which
is
rexognized by the Central or State
Government
or
whose
Managing
Committee is a s Society registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1960 (21 of
1980) or under any law corresponding to
that Act in force in any part of India.

4. In support of the stand taken by
the petitioner. reference is being made to
the decision of this Court in the case of
Catholic
Diocese
of
Gorakhpur
Education Society and others Vs. State
of U.P. and others decided by the
Division Bench of this Court vide order
dated 7.2.2001 in Civil Misc. Writ
Petition no. 3686 of 2001. A copy of the
said judgment is annexed as Annexure-3
to the writ petition. The relevant extract
of the said judgment is being reproduced :
"In the instant writ petition the
petitioner claims that it is a recognized
educational institution and as such the
provision for permit under section 66(1)
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short
the 'Act') is not applicable in the case of
the petitioners. Section 66 (3) (h) of the
Act specifically mentions the category of
the transport vehicle for which permit
shall not be required. Section 66(1) and
66 (3) (h) of the Act provides as under :

"66. Necessity for permit (1) No
owner of a Motor Vehicle shall use or
permit the use or permit the use of the
vehicle as a Transport vehicle in any
public place whether or not such vehicle
is actually carrying any passengers or
goods save in accordance with the
conditions of a permit granted or
counter-signed by a Regional or State
Transport Authority authorizing him the
use of the vehicle in that place in the
manner in which the vehicle is being
used :

Provided that a stage carriage
permit shall, subject to any conditions
that may be specified in the permit,
authorize the use of the vehicle as a
contract carriage.

Provided
further
that
a
stage
carriage permit may subject to any
condition that may be specified in the
permit authorize the use of the vehicle as
a goods carriage. Either when carrying
passengers or not :

Provided also that a goods carriage
permit shall, subject to any conditions
that may be specified in the permit
authorize the holder of use of vehicle for
the carriage of goods for or in
connection with a trade or business
carried on by him.

(3) The provisions of sum-section
(1) shall not apply -
1 All] Holy Cross School Allahabad V. State of U.P. and others
237

(h) to any transport vehicle owned
by, and used solely for the purpose of,
any educational institution which is
recognized by the Central or State
Government
or
whose
Managing
committee is a society registered Under
the Societies Registration Act,1960 (21 of
1860) or under any law corresponding to
that Act in force in any part of India."

5. Admittedly, the petitioner is the
owner of the vehicle and the petitioner is
a recognized educational institution and it
has produced the relevant documents
showing the affiliation under the I.C.S.E.
Board. Under such circumstances, we are
of the view that the respondent no. 2 was
not justified in insisting on permit under
Section 66 (1) of the Act from the writ
petitioner.

6. The writ petition succeeds and is,
accordingly, allowed. The impugned
order
dated
9.1.2001
passed
by
respondent no. 2 accordingly stands
quashed."

7. The respondents have filed a
counter affidavit sworn by one Shri R.K.
Trivedi, the Then Regional Transport
Officer (Administration), Allahabad. The
relevant
pleadings,
containing
aforementioned facts have not been
disputed or denied in the said counter
affidavit. The only abjection appears to
have been taken in the counter affidavit is
contained in para 7 of the counter
affidavit wherein it is mentioned that "
............... since the petitioner has
rushed to this Hon'ble Court against the
show cause notice dated 3.9.2001 in
which tax of Rs.3388/- was demanded
from
the
period
of
1.11.1998
to
31.12.2001 and the petitioner has not
approached the respondent authorities by
filing the show cause in response to the
notice dated 3.9.2001 and, therefore, the
instant writ petition as framed and filed
by the petitioner is totally misconceived
and the same is liable to be dismissed
with costs and the interim stay order
dated 28.1.2002 passed by this Hon'ble
Court may kindly be vacated."

8. The objection raised by the
petitioner regarding maintainability of the
writ petition has no substance at this stage
inasmuch as there are no disputed facts.
Secondly, in view of the specific
provisions contained in Section 66 (3)(h)
(as quoted above) and the undisputed fact
that petitioner is a registered Society
which runs Educational Institution and the
vehicle
in
question
is
being
used
exclusively for carrying children to and
fro from their residence to the school, we
find no good reason to dismiss the writ
petition as not maintainable at this stage
particularly
when
respondents
have
already filed counter affidavit and have
filed to disprove the facts stated in the
writ petition. In view of the aforesaid
statutory provision contained in Section
66 (3) (h) (quoted above) we find that the
contention of the petitioner deserves to be
accepted as laid down by this Court in the
case of Catholic Diocese of Gorakhpur
Education Society and others (supra), a
copy of which has been filed as
Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The writ
petition deserves to be allowed.

9. In the result, the writ petition is
allowed. The impugned notice dated
September 3,2001 (Annexure-2 to the writ
petition) is hereby quashed.

There shall, however, be no order as
to costs.

 Petition Allowed.
---------
238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.01.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.N. SRIVASTAVA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4045 of 2006

Jafar

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri R.P.S. Chauhan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ayub Khan
S.C.

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act-1960section
48-Check
allotment-private
respondent were allotted check on their
original holding D.D.C. without recording
any reason-without application of mindreversed
the
order
passed
by
the
subordinate consolidation authoritiesorder can not sustain-direction issued to
decide
the
matter
after
giving
opportunity to both the parties.

Held : Para 7

As the order passed by the Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
does
not
contain any reason for reversal of the
orders of the subordinate consolidation
authorities and grievance of the parties
was not considered, this Court is of the
view
that
the
order
dated
17th
December, 2005 is unsustainable in law.
Case law discussed:
2005 (2) SCC-235

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.N. Srivastava, J.)

1. Learned counsel for CaveatorOpp. Parties states that the writ petition be
heard and decided at the admission stage
and he does not propose to file any
counter affidavit.

Heard
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
and
learned
counsel
for
Caveator-Opp. Parties.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner
urged that the impugned order dated 17th
December, 2005, passed by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Moradabad
suffers from error of law apparent on the
face of record in view of the fact that the
grievance of petitioner was not considered
at all by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation. He further urged that
contesting Opp. Parties were allotted
Chaks on Plot nos. 135, 136, 169 and 170
which are their original holdings. By the
impugned order, no reasons have been
assigned by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation while reversing the order of
subordinate consolidation Authorities. He
prayed that the impugned order may be
quashed.

3. In reply to the same, Sri Ayub
Khan, learned counsel for contesting Opp.
Parties, urged that the order of Settlement
Officer, Consolidation was also passed
without assigning any reasons by which
Chaks allotted to contesting Opp. Parties
at the stage of Consolidation Officer were
altered. He does not dispute the fact that
in the order of the Deputy Director of
Consolidation, there is no application so
far as grievance of the petitioner is
concerned.

4. Considered arguments of learned
counsel for the parties and materials on
record.

5. Without going into the merits of
the case as the Deputy Director of