# Hori Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 3 ILRA 626
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-03-16
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 30241 of 2016
- **Bench:** Dinesh Kumar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/hori-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48221
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Removal from service -
Disciplinary
enquiry
-
Charge
of
committing
gross
irregularities
in
sourcing, disbursement etc. against the
bank's
employee
-
Right
of
cross
examination, when accrues - Held, right
of
cross-examination
accrues
in
disciplinary proceedings if the statement
of a person, who has testified, is in
dispute. If there is no dispute regarding
the documents and the facts, in such a
case there is no requirement for crossexamination. (Para 29)
B. Service Law - Departmental enquiry -
Standard
of
proof
-
Evidence
Act,
application thereof - Basic difference
between
departmental
enquiry
and
criminal trial, discussed - Held, charges in
a disciplinary proceedings are not required
to be proved like a criminal trial i.e.
beyond all reasonable doubt. Though the
inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial
function, but he is not required to observe
the
strict
adherence
of
the
Indian
Evidence Act - In the departmental
inquiry standard of proof is not that of a
criminal
case
i.e.
beyond
reasonable
doubt. In departmental proceedings, the
proof is merely the preponderance of
probabilities. (Para 31 and 33)
C. Service Law - Departmental proceeding
- Judicial review - Scope - Held, the
scope of judicial review in departmental
proceedings is very limited. This Court can
interfere only if the inquiry was deficient
either procedurally or otherwise - Court
3 All. Hori Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
627
must be slow in interfering with the
finding of fact recorded by a departmental
authority on the basis of evidence. If the
findings are supported by evidence and
are reasonable, the Courts are not to
interfere with the disciplinary inquiry.
(Para 35 and 36)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-

## Text

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626 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
correctly
and
in
proper
perspective,
whereas in the case in hand, the screening
committee has formed the opinion on the
subjective satisfaction on appreciation of
entire record of the petitioner. It is worth
notice
that
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner could not demonstrate that the
report of the screening committee is per-se
illegal or based upon no material on record.
Accordingly, the judgment of Brijesh
Kumar (supra) also does not come to the
aid of the petitioner.

24. So far the judgment of this Court
in the case of Rizwan Ahmad Vs. State of
U.P. ad others (Special Appeal Defective
No.24 of 2018) is concerned, the same has
also been rendered in the different factual
backdrop since in the said case, the Court
found that the entire service record was not
placed before the screening committee who
formed an opinion on the basis of the
incomplete service record of the petitioner
to
compulsory
retire
the
petitioner.
Accordingly, this Court held that the order
of compulsory retirement is not sustainable.
The judgment in the said case has been
rendered by this Court in different factual
backdrop and therefore, reliance placed by
the learned counsel for the petitioner on the
said judgment is also misconceived.

25. For the reasons given above, this
Court finds that there is no infirmity in the
order
of
compulsory
retirement.
Accordingly, the writ petition lacks merit
and is dismissed without there being any
order as to cost.
----------

(2022)03ILR A626
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.03.2022

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, J.

Writ A No. 30241 of 2016

Hori Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sameer Kalia

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sudeep Seth, Jitendra Narain Mishra

A. Service Law - Removal from service -
Disciplinary
enquiry
-
Charge
of
committing
gross
irregularities
in
sourcing, disbursement etc. against the
bank's
employee
-
Right
of
cross
examination, when accrues - Held, right
of
cross-examination
accrues
in
disciplinary proceedings if the statement
of a person, who has testified, is in
dispute. If there is no dispute regarding
the documents and the facts, in such a
case there is no requirement for crossexamination. (Para 29)
B. Service Law - Departmental enquiry -
Standard
of
proof
-
Evidence
Act,
application thereof - Basic difference
between
departmental
enquiry
and
criminal trial, discussed - Held, charges in
a disciplinary proceedings are not required
to be proved like a criminal trial i.e.
beyond all reasonable doubt. Though the
inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial
function, but he is not required to observe
the
strict
adherence
of
the
Indian
Evidence Act - In the departmental
inquiry standard of proof is not that of a
criminal
case
i.e.
beyond
reasonable
doubt. In departmental proceedings, the
proof is merely the preponderance of
probabilities. (Para 31 and 33)
C. Service Law - Departmental proceeding
- Judicial review - Scope - Held, the
scope of judicial review in departmental
proceedings is very limited. This Court can
interfere only if the inquiry was deficient
either procedurally or otherwise - Court
3 All. Hori Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
627
must be slow in interfering with the
finding of fact recorded by a departmental
authority on the basis of evidence. If the
findings are supported by evidence and
are reasonable, the Courts are not to
interfere with the disciplinary inquiry.
(Para 35 and 36)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited :-
1. Roop Singh Negi Vs P.N.B. & ors.; (2009) 2
SCC 570
2. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs Saroj Kumar Sinha;
(2010) 2 SCC 772: AIR 2010 SC 3131
3. St. of Har. & anr. Vs Rattan Singh; (1977) 2
SCC 491
4. K.L. Tripathi Vs S.B.I. & ors.; (1984) 1 SCC
43
5. M.V. Bijlani Vs U.O.I. & ors.; (2006) 5 SCC
88
6. General Manager (Operations), S.B.I. & anr.
Vs R. Periyasamy; (2015) 3 SCC
7. Allahabad Bank & ors. Vs Krishna Narayan
Tewari; (2017) 2 SCC 308
8. St. of Bihar & ors. Vs Phulpari Kumari; (2020)
2 SCC 130
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar
Siingh, J. )

1. The present writ petition has been
filed seeking quashing of the orders dated
5.6.2015,
16.12.2015
and
29.7.2016
(Annexure Nos.1, 2 and 3 to the writ
petition)
passed
by
the
disciplinary
authority, appellate authority and the
reviewing authority.

2. The disciplinary authority on
conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner, imposed penalty of
removal from service and the said order of
removal from service was affirmed in
appeal as well as in review.

3. The disciplinary proceedings were
instituted against the petitioner for alleged
acts of omission and commissions of serous
irregularities committed by him during his
tenure as Branch Manager, Derapur Branch
between 2.1.2012 to 27.4.2013. Sum and
substance of the charge against the
petitioner
was
gross
irregularities
in
sourcing, disbursement and follow up of
credit facilities sanctioned to 8 borrowing
units and 20 Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna
and the Chief Minister Rojgar Yojna Loans
and thus, exposing bank to substantial loss
of Rs.2,95,45,786/- plus interest.

4. The disciplinary inquiry was held
under the provisions of the State Bank of
India Officers Service Rules, 1992 (for
short ''Rules, 1992'). Charge sheet contains
26 allegations against the petitioner. The
inquiry officer found 22 allegations proved,
3 were not proved and 1 was partly proved.
After submissions of the charge sheet, the
petitioner was afforded opportunity to
submit his response to the charge sheet.
The
disciplinary
authority
afforded
opportunity of personal hearing to the
petitioner and, thereafter, passed the
impugned punishment order dated 5.6.2015
of removal from serviced.

5. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
departmental appeal on 1.8.2015. The
appellate
authority
gave
a
detailed
consideration to the submissions made by
the petitioner and affirmed the punishment
order of removal from service vide order
dated 16.12.2015. Petitioner, thereafter,
filed a review petition on 1.2.2016 against
the
appellate
order.
The
reviewing
committee consisting of three officers,
dismissed
the
review
petition
vide
impugned order dated 29.7.2016. The
reviewing committee also held that the
penalty imposed on the petitioner was
628 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
commensurate with the gravity of the
lapses committed by the petitioner and
there was no scope to modify the
punishment order.

6. Sri Sameer Kalia, learned counsel
for the petitioner has submitted that as per
Rule 68(2) of Rules, 1992, the presenting
officer was reacquired to prove the charges
against the petitioner. The presenting
officer did not prove the charges during the
course of inquiry. The documents relied
upon in the departmental inquiry, were not
proved by examining the witnesses in
support of them. He has, therefore,
submitted that when the documents were
not proved, which were relied upon in
support of the charges, whole inquiry got
vitiated.

7. It has been further submitted that
besides the petitioner, other employees
were also charge-sheeted in respect of the
same
allegations.
However,
other
employees of the bank were let off with
minor penalty. It has also been submitted
that one Sri S.L. Nathan was
the
sanctioning authority of the loans, but he
was let off with minor penalty. He has
relied upon Rule 68(6) of Rules, 1992 to
submit that when there were allegations
against the two officers, joint inquiry
should have been conducted, but in this
case separate inquiries were held for the
petitioner as well as for S.L. Nathan.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has also submitted that there was no
financial loss caused to the bank with
respect to the defaulter borrowers and,
therefore, the charge of causing financial
losses to the tune of Rs.2,95,45,786/- is
wholly untenable and the punishment of
removal from service awarded to the
petitioner is highly disproportionate to
the
alleged
misconduct
against
the
petitioner.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has further submitted that nature of
departmental inquiry is a quasi judicial
proceeding.
Mere
production
of
documents is not enough, but the contents
of the documentary evidence has to be
proved by examining the witnesses. It is
further submitted that
even if the
petitioner did not deny the documents
produced during the course of the
departmental inquiry, it was the duty of
the bank/presenting officer to prove the
documents by examining the witnesses.
In the present case, the documents were
not proved independently by examining
the witnesses and, therefore, admission of
the petitioner would not amount that
documents were proved as required and,
therefore, the punishment order passed by
the disciplinary authority considering the
charges proved against the petitioner, is
wholly untenable and the impugned
orders are liable to be set aside.

10. In support of his contention,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court rendered in the cases of Roop
Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank
and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 and State
of U.P. and others Vs. Saroj Kumar
Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772: AIR 2010 SC
3131.

11. On the other hand, Sri Jitendra
Narain Mishra, learned counsel for the
bank has submitted that petitioner was the
Branch Manager of Derapur Branch and
during his tenure, loans were disbursed in
gross violation of the banking practices and
procedure. Due diligence was not observed.
The bank interest was compromised and
3 All. Hori Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
629
that
resulted
into
the
losses
of
Rs.2,95,45,786/-.

12. He has further submitted that
under Rule 50(4) of Rules, 1992, every
officer is required to take at all times all
possible steps to ensure and protect the
interests of the bank and he should
discharge his duties with utmost integrity,
honesty, devotion and diligence. He should
not do anything, which is unbecoming of
an officer. He has also submitted that Rule
67 of Rules, 1992 prescribes the major
penalties, which include, inter alia, removal
from
service
besides
dismissal
and
compulsory retirement.

13. The manner in which the
departmental inquiry is to be conducted, is
provided under Rule 68(2) of Rules, 1992,
which reads as under :-

"68. (2) .............................

(xiii) On the date fixed for the
inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence
by which the articles of charge are
proposed to be proved shall be produced by
or on behalf of the Bank. The witnesses
produced by the Presenting Officer shall be
examined by the Presenting Officer and
may be cross-examined by or on behalf of
the officer. The Presenting Officer shall be
entitled to re-examine his witnesses on any
points on which they have been crossexamined, but not on a new matter without
the leave of the Inquiring Authority. The
Inquiring Authority may also put such
questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit.

(xiv) Before the close of the case
in support of the charges, the Inquiring
Authority may, in its discretion, allow the
Presenting Officer to produce evidence not
included in the charge-sheetor may itself
call for new evidence or recall or reexamine any witness. In such case, the
officer shall be given opportunity to inspect
the documentary evidence before it is taken
on record,or to cross-examine a witness
who has been so summoned. The Inquiring
Authority may also allow the officer to
produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion
that the production of such evidence is
necessary in the interest of justice.

(xv) W hen the case in support of
the charges is closed, the officer may be
required to state his defence, orally or in
writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is
made orally, it shall be recorded and the
officer shall be required to sign the record.
In either case, a copy of the statement of
defence shall be given to the Presenting
Officer.

(xvi) The evidence on behalf of
the officer may then be produced. The
officer may examine himself as a witness in
his own behalf, if he so prefers. The
witnesses, if any, produced by the officer
shall then be examined by the officer and
may be cross-examined by the Presenting
Officer. The officer shall be entitled to reexamine any of his witnesses on any points
on which they have been cross-examined,
but not on any new matter without the leave
of the Inquiring Authority.

(xvii) The Inquiring Authority
may,
after
the
officer
closes
his
evidence, and shall if the officer has not
got himself examined, generally question
him on the circumstances appearing
against him in the evidence for the
purpose of enabling the officer to
explain any circumstances appearing in
the evidence against him.

...................................."
630 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. Learned counsel for the Bank has
further submitted that the departmental
inquiry
was
conducted
strictly
in
accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Rules, 1992 with complete
compliance of the principles of natural
justice.
It
is
further
submitted
that
petitioner never disputed the documentary
evidence produced by the presenting officer
in support of the charges. The petitioner
accepted the genuineness and authenticity
of the documents at the commencement of
the inquiry. The petitioner did not lead any
evidence to controvert the contents of the
documents and neither he disputed the
contents of the documents relied on by the
presenting officer in support of the charges.
He has also submitted that once the
documents were not denied, there was no
requirement for examining the witnesses to
prove the contents of the documents
inasmuch as admitted facts need not be
proved by examining the witnesses. It is,
therefore, submitted that the inquiry officer
had not committed any illegality as alleged
or otherwise.

15. It has further been submitted that
there is no weight in the argument of learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
that
listed
prosecution documents were required to be
proved by oral evidence though their
authenticity and genuineness had not been
disputed or denied by the petitioner. It is the
discretion of the presenting officer to produce
oral and documentary evidence to prove the
charges, but if the documents filed in support
of the charges remain un-rebutted and in fact
accepted, then submission of learned counsel
for the petitioner that even admitted
documents were required to be proved by
leading oral evidence, is belied of any legal
basis. It is also submitted that whole charges
were based on the documentary evidence and
those documents were not denied and rather
admitted by the petitioner and, therefore,
there was no requirement for the presenting
officer to lead oral evidence in support of the
charges/allegations.

16. It is also important to note here that
if the presenting officer in support of the
charges, is relying on the documentary
evidence, then authenticity/genuineness or
their denial/rebuttal is to be done by the
delinquent officer at the commencement of
the inquiry. It is again reiterated that
petitioner had not disputed the documents or
the contents thereof. The petitioner was given
full opportunity to examining the witnesses,
who brought the documents, however, It was
denied by him. Therefore, challenge of the
admitted documents later on by the petitioner,
can not be sustained in the eyes of law.

17. Learned counsel for the bank has
further
submitted
that
each
of
the
allegations/charges against the petitioner got
proved
on
the
basis
of
the
unrebuttal/admitted documents. The inquiry
officer prepared the inquiry report after
carefully examining the listed documents,
prosecution and defence exhibits, written
brief/arguments of the presenting officer,
reply as well as the defence documents
produced by the petitioner during the course
of the inquiry. The defence representative
was given full opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses produced during the course of
the inquiry as per the Rules, 1992, which was
denied by him. Therefore, contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the
documents relied upon by the inquiry officer,
were not proved, has no basis and is liable to
be rejected.

18. The disciplinary authority after
considering the inquiry report, response of
the petitioner and after giving him
opportunity of hearing, had recorded his
3 All. Hori Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
631
independent finding against each of the
allegations in his order dated 5.6.2015. The
disciplinary
authority
has
carefully
examined the entire record of the case and
applied
his
independent
mind.
The
disciplinary authority under Rule 68(3)(ii)
of Rules, 1992 is required to give reason
for his finding, only if he disagrees with the
finding of the inquiry officer. In the present
case, the disciplinary authority had agreed
with the finding recorded by the inquiry
officer and, therefore, there was no
requirement to give reasons. Rule 68(3)(ii)
of Rules, 1992 reads as under :-

"68. (3) (i) x x x x

(ii) The Disciplinary Authority
shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the
Inquiring Authority on any article of
charge, record its reasons for such
disagreement and record its own findings
on such charge; if the evidence on record is
sufficient for the purpose."

19. Learned counsel for the bank has
further submitted that there was complete
compliance of the principles of natural justice
during the course of departmental inquiry and
before passing the punishment order dated
5.6.2015.
The
petitioner's
departmental
appeal was duly considered and after detail
consideration, the appellate authority found
no merits in the appeal. The appellate
authority applied his independent mind on
passing the appellate order dated 16.12.2015.
It is also submitted that there is no substance
in the submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner that the bank did not suffer any loss
because of the misdeeds and acts of omission
and commission of the petitioner during his
tenure as Branch Manager, Derapur Branch.

20. Learned counsel for the bank has
further submitted that after settlement of
claims from the Credit Guarantee Fund
Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises
(CGTMSE) to the tune of Rs.109.04 Lakhs,
the bank was still exposed to a substantial
loss of 186.42 Lakhs. The decree issued by
the Debt Recovery Tribunal in favour of
the bank was not a guarantee for full
recovery of the loss to which the bank was
exposed. The petitioner did not conduct any
pre-sanction survey as it was required
before sanctioning the loan and this fact got
proved before the inquiry officer by
inspection register relating to various
accounts, which finds mention at serial
no.29 of the minutes of the inquiry
proceedings
dated
19.9.2014.
The
petitioner had completed the pre-sanction
survey reports without visiting the work
places/residence of the borrowers and he
prepared bogus survey reports. It is further
submitted that the quantum of punishment
of removal from service awarded to the
petitioner, is just and proper and no
interference is called for from this Court
with the quantum of punishment.

21. It has also been submitted that the
reviewing committee in detail order, had
upheld the order of the appellate authority.
The
reviewing
committee
had
also
examined all the records and did not find
any error committed by the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority and
thus, upheld the order of punishment of
removal from service.

22. Learned counsel for the bank has
also submitted that there is no substance in
the submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner that petitioner was subjected to
any discrimination inasmuch as the charges
levelled against S.L. Nathan were different
from the charges levelled against the
petitioner. Nature of duties of the petitioner
and S.L. Nathan were also different. The
632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner can not draw similarity with the
case of S.L. Nathan as S.L. Nathan was
charged
with
different
charges.
The
petitioner
was
charge-sheeted
for
committing
serous
irregularities
of
sourcing, disbursement and follow up of
credit facilities sanctioned to 8 borrowing
units and 20 Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna
and the Chief Minister Rojgar Yojna Loans
and causing financial loss to the bank,
while S.L. Nathan was charged with
separate
charges.
He
has,
therefore,
submitted that writ petition is without any
merit and substance and is liable to be
dismissed.

23. I have considered the submissions
advanced on behalf of the learned counsel
for the petitioner as well as by the learned
counsel for the bank and perused the record
of the writ petition.

24. The only argument which has
been advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, is that even if the petitioner
did not deny the documents submitted in
support of the charges by the presenting
officer, it was the duty of the presenting
officer to prove the contents of the
documents by examining the witnesses
and since the witnesses have not been
examined to prove the contents of the
documents,
the
charges
against
the
petitioner
did
not
get
proved
and,
therefore, the punishment order, appellate
order and the order passed in review are
liable to be quashed.

25. In support of his contention,
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi
(supra). In paragraph 14 of the aforesaid
judgment, the Supreme Court held as
under:-

"14. Indisputably, a departmental
proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding.
The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi
judicial function. The charges leveled
against the delinquent officer must be
found to have been proved. The enquiry
officer has a duty to arrive at a finding
upon
taking
into
consideration
the
materials brought on record by the parties.
The purported evidence collected during
investigation by the Investigating Officer
against all the accused by itself could not
be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding. No witness was examined to
prove the said documents. The management
witnesses merely tendered the documents
and did not prove the contents thereof.
Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the
Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not
have been treated as evidence."

26. In the present case, it is not a
confession of the petitioner made before
the police officer, which was relied on by
the inquiry officer or the evidence collected
during the course of investigation by the
police officer against him. Here in the
present case, the presenting officer brought
documentary evidence in support of the
charges, which were admitted by the
petitioner and, therefore, the judgment
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner in the case of Roop Singh Negi
(supra) has no relevance to the facts of the
case.

27. It is well settled that in a domestic
inquiry strict and sophisticated rules of
evidence under the Indian Evidence Act are
not applicable. The evidence which has
probative value of reasonable nexus and
credibility, can be placed reliance in
support of the allegations. Section 56 of the
Indian Evidence Act provides that admitted
facts need not be proved.
3 All. Hori Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
633

28. Supreme Court in the case of
State of Haryana and another Vs. Rattan
Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 in paragraph 4 of
the judgement while dealing with standard
of proof and evidence applicable in the
domestic inquiry, held as under :-

"4. It is well settled that in a
domestic
enquiry
the
strict
and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the
Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail
materials which are logically probative for
a prudent mind are permissible. There is no
allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true
that
departmental
authorities
and
administrative tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not
glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not
relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.
For this proposition it is not necessary to
cite decisions nor text books, although we
have been taken through case law and
other authorities by counsel on both sides.
The essence of a judicial approach is
objectivity,
exclusion
of
extraneous
materials
or
considerations
and
observance of rules of natural justice. Of
course, fair play is the basis and if
perversity
or
arbitrariness,
bias
or
surrender of independence of judgment
vitiate the conclusions reached, such
finding,even though of a domestic tribunal,
cannot be held good. However, the courts
below mis-directed themselves, perhaps, in
insisting that passengers who had come in
and gone out should be chased and brought
before the tribunal before a valid finding
could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to
which counsel for the respondent referred,
based upon certain passengers from
American jurisprudence does not go to that
extent nor does the passage from Halsbury
insist on such rigid requirement. The
simple point is, was there some evidence or
was there no evidence not in the sense of
the technical rules governing regular court
proceedings but in a fair common-sense
way as men of understanding and wordly
wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way,
sufficiency of evidence in proof of the
finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond
scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in
support of a ending is certainty available
for the court to look into because it
amounts to an error of law apparent on the
record. We find, in this case, that the
evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the
flying squad, is some evidence which has
relevance to the charge leveled against the
respondent. Therefore, we are unable to
hold that the order is invalid on that
ground."

29. The right of cross-examination
accrues in disciplinary proceedings if the
statement of a person, who has testified, is
in dispute. If there is no dispute regarding
the documents and the facts, in such a case
there
is
no
requirement
for
crossexamination. When on the question of facts
there was no dispute, no real prejudice
would be caused to a party aggrieved by an
order,
by
absence
of
any
formal
opportunity of cross -examination per se
does not invalidate or vitiate the decision
arrived at fairly.

30. Supreme Court in the case of K.L.
Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India and
others, (1984) 1 SCC 43 in paragraph 32
held as under:-

"32. The basic concept is fair
play in action administrative, judicial or
quasi-judicial. The concept fair play in
action must depend upon the particular lis,
if there be any, between the parties. If the
credibility of a person who has testified or
given some information is in doubt, or if the
634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
version or the statement of the person who
has testified, is, in dispute, right of crossexamination must inevitably form part of
fair play in action but where there is no lis
regarding the facts but certain explanation
of
the
circumstances
there
is
no
requirement of cross-examination to be
fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When
on the question of facts there was no
dispute, no real prejudice has been caused
to a party aggrieved by an order, by
absence of any formal opportunity of crossexamination per se does not invalidate or
vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is
more so when the party against whom an
order has been passed does not dispute the
facts and does not demand to test the
veracity of the version or the credibility of
the statement."

31. It is also not in dispute that
charges in a disciplinary proceedings are
not required to be proved like a criminal
trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt.
Though the inquiry officer performs a
quasi-judicial function, but he is not
required to observe the strict adherence of
the Indian Evidence Act. The inquiry
officer requires to arrive at a conclusion
upon analysing the documents/evidence
before him regarding preponderance of
probability to prove the charges on the
basis of materials on record.

32. Supreme Court in the case of
M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and
others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 in paragraph 25 of
the judgment held as under :-

"25. It is true that the jurisdiction
of the court in judicial review is limited.
Disciplinary proceedings, however, being
quasi-criminal in nature, there should be
some evidences to prove the charge.
Although the charges in a departmental
proceedings are not required to be proved
like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all
reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of
the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a
quasi-judicial
function,
who
upon
analysing the documents must arrive at a
conclusion
that
there
had
been
a
preponderance of probability to prove the
charges on the basis of materials on
record. While doing so, he cannot take into
consideration any irrelevant fact. He
cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts.
He cannot shift the burden of proof. He
cannot reject the relevant testimony of the
witnesses only on the basis of surmises and
conjectures. He cannot enquire into the
allegations with which the delinquent
officer had not been charged with."

33. The bank employee/bank officer
must perform his duty with absolute
devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty,
so
that
the
confidence
of
the
public/depositors is not impaired in the
bank. The banking system is backbone of
the
Indian
economy
and
financial
establishment of the country. An officer
who is found to have been involved in
financial irregularities while preforming his
function as bank officer, can not be let off
even if there is minor infarction in the
inquiry report. In the departmental inquiry
standard of proof is not that of a criminal
case i.e. beyond reasonable doubt. In
departmental proceedings, the proof is
merely the preponderance of probabilities.
It
is
well
settled
that
departmental
proceeding can proceed even though a
person is acquitted when the acquittal is
other than honourable.

34. Supreme Court in the case of
General Manager (Operations), State
Bank of India and another Vs. R.
Periyasamy
(2015)
3
SCC
101
in
3 All. Hori Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
635
paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 17 held as
under:-

"11. It is interesting to note that
the learned Single Judge went to the extent
of
observing
that
the
concept
of
preponderance of probabilities is alien to
domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is
well known that the standard of proof that
must be employed in domestic enquiries is
in fact that of the preponderance of
probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar
Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 this Court held
that a disciplinary proceeding is not a
criminal trial and thus, the standard of
proof required is that of preponderance of
probabilities
and
not
proof
beyond
reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by
this Court in State Bank of India & ors. Vs.
Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212.
More recently, in State Bank of India Vs.
Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 SCC
740, this Court observed that a disciplinary
authority is expected to prove the charges
leveled against a bank-officer on the
preponderance of probabilities and not on
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

12. Further, in Union Bank of
India Vs. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC
310, this Court was confronted with a case
which was similar to the present one. The
respondent therein was also a bank
employee, who was unable to demonstrate
to the Court as to how prejudice had been
caused to him due to non-supply of the
inquiry authorities report/findings in his
case. This Court held that in the banking
business
absolute
devotion,
diligence,
integrity and honesty needs to be preserved
by every bank employee and in particular
the bank officer. If this were not to be
observed,
the
Court
held
that
the
confidence of the public/depositors would
be impaired. Thus in that case the Court
set-aside the order of the High Court and
upheld the dismissal of the bank employee,
rejecting the ground that any prejudice had
been caused to him on account of nonfurnishing of the inquiry report/findings to
him.

13. While dealing with the
question as to whether a person with
doubtful integrity ought to be allowed to
work in a Government Department, this
Court in Commissioner of Police New
Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7
SCC 685, held that while the standard of
proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all
reasonable
doubt,
the
proof
in
a
departmental proceeding is merely the
preponderance of probabilities. The Court
observed that quite often criminal cases
end in acquittal because witnesses turn
hostile and therefore, such acquittals are
not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based
on benefit of doubt would not stand on par
with a clean acquittal on merit after a fullfledged trial, where there is no indication
of the witnesses being won over. The long
standing view on this subject was settled by
this Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of
India, AIR 1964 SC 787, whereby it was
held that a departmental proceeding can
proceed even though a person is acquitted
when
the
acquittal
is
other
than
honourable. We are in agreement with this
view.

17. We also find it difficult to understand
the justification offered by the Division
Bench that there was no failure on the part
of the respondent to observe utmost
devotion to duty because the case was not
one of misappropriation but only of a
shortage of money. The Division Bench has
itself stated the main reason why its order
cannot be upheld in the following words,
"on reappreciation of the entire material
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
placed on record, we do not find any
reason to interfere with the well considered
and merited order passed by the learned
Single Judge."

35. The scope of judicial review in
departmental proceedings is very limited.
This Court can interfere only if the inquiry
was
deficient
either
procedurally
or
otherwise.

36. It is also well settled that the
Court must be slow in interfering with the
finding of fact recorded by a departmental
authority on the basis of evidence. If the
findings are supported by evidence and are
reasonable, the Courts are not to interfere
with the disciplinary inquiry.

37. Supreme Court in the case of
Allahabad Bank and others Vs. Krishna
Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 in
paragraph seven of the judgment held as
under:-

"7. We have given our anxious
consideration to the submissions at the bar.
It is true that a writ court is very slow in
interfering with the findings of facts
recorded by a Departmental Authority on
the basis of evidence available on record.
But it is equally true that in a case where
the Disciplinary Authority records a
finding that is unsupported by any evidence
whatsoever
or
a
finding
which
no
reasonable person could have arrived at,
the writ court would be justified if not duty
bound to examine the matter and grant
relief in appropriate cases. The writ court
will certainly interfere with disciplinary
enquiry or the resultant orders passed by
the competent authority on that basis if the
enquiry itself was vitiated on account of
violation of principles of natural justice, as
is alleged to be the position in the present
case. Non-application of mind by the
Enquiry
Officer
or
the
Disciplinary
Authority, non-recording of reasons in
support of the conclusion arrived at by
them are also grounds on which the writ
courts are justified in interfering with the
orders of punishment. The High Court has,
in the case at hand, found all these
infirmities in the order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority. The respondent's case that the
enquiry was conducted without giving a
fair and reasonable opportunity for leading
evidence in defense has not been effectively
rebutted
by
the
appellant.
More
importantly the Disciplinary Authority does
not appear to have properly appreciated
the evidence nor recorded reasons in
support of his conclusion. To add insult to
injury the Appellate Authority instead of
recording
its
own
reasons
and
independently appreciating the material on
record, simply reproduced the findings of
the Disciplinary Authority. All told the
Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority
and the Appellate Authority have faltered
in the discharge of their duties resulting in
miscarriage of justice. The High Court was
in that view right in interfering with the
orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority
and the Appellate Authority."

38. While dealing with the scope of
the Court to interfere with the finding of
fact recorded in a departmental inquiry on
the basis of the evidence available on
record, similar view has been reiterated by
the Supreme Court in the case of State of
Bihar and others Vs. Phulpari Kumari,
(2020) 2 SCC 130 in paragraph 6 of the
judgement, which reads as under:-

"6. The criminal trial against the
Respondent is still pending consideration by a
competent criminal Court. The order of
3 All. Chandra Prakash Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
637
dismissal from service of the Respondent was
pursuant to a departmental inquiry held
against her. The Inquiry Officer examined the
evidence and concluded that the charge of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
by the Respondent was proved. The learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the
High
Court
committed
an
error
in
reappreciating the evidence and coming to a
conclusion that the evidence on record was
not sufficient to point to the guilt of the
Respondent.

6.1 It is settled law that interference
with the orders passed pursuant to a
departmental inquiry can be only in case of
''no evidence'. Sufficiency of evidence is not
within the realm of judicial review. The
standard of proof as required in a criminal
trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry.
Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by
the criminal Court where the guilt of the
accused has to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of
probabilities is the test adopted in finding the
delinquent guilty of the charge.

6.2 The High Court ought not to
have interfered with the order of dismissal of
the Respondent by re-examining the evidence
and taking a view different from that of the
disciplinary authority which was based on the
findings of the Inquiry Officer."

39. In the light of the aforesaid
discussion, I do not find that the disciplinary
authority, appellate authority or the reviewing
committee had committed any error while
awarding the punishment of removal from
service to the petitioner. This Court holds that
the disciplinary inquiry was conducted strictly
in accordance with law and there was no
requirement to prove the documents, which
were admitted by the petitioner, by examining
the witnesses. Further, when the petitioner has
himself denied to cross-examine the witnesses,
there was no further requirement to lead the
evidence by the presenting officer.

40. This Court does not find that there
has been any procedural infarction or violation
of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the disciplinary inquiry against the
petitioner. Banking business is of faith and
trust of the general public. The bank officials
and employees discharge very important
function in dealing with the public money.
They have fiduciary duty towards the
customers. The bank officials/employees are
required to perform duties with utmost
devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty. If
an official discharges his function with
dishonesty, acting in a manner of unbecoming
a bank officer, this Court should not interfere
in the punishment of dismissal from service of
such an official.

41.