# Huzaifa Khan & Anr v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 1059
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-19
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 8327 of 2025
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/huzaifa-khan-anr-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-54758
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

provisions of the RTE Act and their obligations
in terms of the Act, is confined only to the
prescriptions contained under section 12 of the
Act and whether the private unaided schools are
liable to the mandate of Section 16 or not?

Head Notes
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009-Section 12 & 16, The
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 21-A -
No prescription has been issued in terms
of the mandate of Section 16(3) in the
State of U.P. - Clear violation of rights of
the children flowing from Section 16 (2) of
the Act. The action of the respondent
school in expelling the students is also
violative of Section 16 (4) of the Act -
Guidelines of the affiliating Board will
have to yield to the mandate of the Act
and cannot be given precedence over the
Act - Writ petition allowed. (E-15)

Held- All the provisions of the Act including
Section 16 of the RTE Act are applicable to the
respondent school.
(Para 12,13 & 14)

Case Law Cited
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan
vs. Union of India and another; (2012) 6 SCC 1;

List of Acts
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009, The Constitution of India1950

List of Keywords
Prescriptions contained in the RTE; Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act,
2009; Detention contrary; Article 21-A; Unaided
private school amenable to all the provisions of
the RTE; Guidelines of the affiliating Board will
have to yield to the mandate of the Act

Case Arising From
The present petition has been filed by the
petitioners, who are two in number through
their father and natural guardian, stating that
the petitioner no.1aged about 11 years is
studying at the respondent no.4 school, in Class
V and the petitioner no.2 who is aged about 14
years is studying in Class IX. It is stated that
both the children are outstanding sportsman
and besides pursuing their studies with the
respondent no.4 are also pursuing the skills in
cricket and they have joined a Cricket Academy
at Lucknow. It is stated that, although the
petitioners have never been detained in past,
have now been detained in the examination
held for the session 2024-2025, in respect of the
petitioner no.1 and vide progress report of the
petitioner no.2 for the examination 2024-2025.
1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s): Manish Jauhari,
Ambuj Kumar Bajpai
Counsel for Respondent(s): C.S.C., P K Sinha

## Text

9 All. Huzaifa Khan & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
1059
shall proceed and decide the matter
afresh
after
adequate
evidence
and
conclude the proceedings, expeditiously,
say within a period of three months from
date of production of a certified copy of
this order.

34. The parties are directed to
cooperate in the proceeding.

35. Accordingly, I do not find any
infirmity in the impugned order dated
27.06.2025. The writ petition being devoid
of merits is hereby dismissed.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1059
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Writ - C No. 8327 of 2025

Huzaifa Khan & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Manish Jauhari, Ambuj Kumar Bajpai

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., P.K. Sinha

Issue for Consideration
Whether, the respondents, being unaided
private school, are not amenable to all the
provisions of the RTE Act and their obligations
in terms of the Act, is confined only to the
prescriptions contained under section 12 of the
Act and whether the private unaided schools are
liable to the mandate of Section 16 or not?

Head Notes
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009-Section 12 & 16, The
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 21-A -
No prescription has been issued in terms
of the mandate of Section 16(3) in the
State of U.P. - Clear violation of rights of
the children flowing from Section 16 (2) of
the Act. The action of the respondent
school in expelling the students is also
violative of Section 16 (4) of the Act -
Guidelines of the affiliating Board will
have to yield to the mandate of the Act
and cannot be given precedence over the
Act - Writ petition allowed. (E-15)

Held- All the provisions of the Act including
Section 16 of the RTE Act are applicable to the
respondent school.
(Para 12,13 & 14)

Case Law Cited
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan
vs. Union of India and another; (2012) 6 SCC 1;

List of Acts
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009, The Constitution of India1950

List of Keywords
Prescriptions contained in the RTE; Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act,
2009; Detention contrary; Article 21-A; Unaided
private school amenable to all the provisions of
the RTE; Guidelines of the affiliating Board will
have to yield to the mandate of the Act

Case Arising From
The present petition has been filed by the
petitioners, who are two in number through
their father and natural guardian, stating that
the petitioner no.1aged about 11 years is
studying at the respondent no.4 school, in Class
V and the petitioner no.2 who is aged about 14
years is studying in Class IX. It is stated that
both the children are outstanding sportsman
and besides pursuing their studies with the
respondent no.4 are also pursuing the skills in
cricket and they have joined a Cricket Academy
at Lucknow. It is stated that, although the
petitioners have never been detained in past,
have now been detained in the examination
held for the session 2024-2025, in respect of the
petitioner no.1 and vide progress report of the
petitioner no.2 for the examination 2024-2025.
1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s): Manish Jauhari,
Ambuj Kumar Bajpai
Counsel for Respondent(s): C.S.C., P K Sinha

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard the counsel for the petitioner,
learned Standing Counsel and Sri P. K.
Sinha the counsel for the respondents no. 3
and 4.

2. The present petition has been
filed by the petitioners, who are two in
number through their father and natural
guardian,
stating
that
the
petitioner
no.1aged about 11 years is studying at the
respondent no.4 school, in Class V and the
petitioner no.2 who is aged about 14 years
is studying in Class IX. It is stated that both
the children are outstanding sportsman and
besides pursuing their studies with the
respondent no.4 are also pursuing the skills
in cricket and they have joined a Cricket
Academy at Lucknow. It is stated that,
although the petitioners have never been
detained in past, have now been detained in
the examination held for the session 20242025, in respect of the petitioner no.1 and
vide progress report of the petitioner no.2
for the examination 2024-2025.

3. The contention of the counsel for
the petitioner is that in terms of the
prescriptions contained in the Right of
Children
to
Free
and
Compulsory
Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred
as 'RTE Act'), the detention of the
petitioner no.1 as well as the petitioner no.2
is contrary to the prescriptions contained in
the RTE Act and also violates their rights
under Article 21-A of the Constitution of
India. It is stated that the respondents
authorities
were
unhappy
with
the
petitioners as, they were pursuing their
hobby in Cricket and on account of the said
grievance, they are not being permitted to
undergo examination afresh, even if the
respondent no.4 was of the view that, the
petitioners needed improvement in their
academic performance they ought to have
been given a chance to appear in re-
examination. It is further argued that the
detention of the petitioners was contrary to
the prescriptions contained in the RTE Act.

4. The respondent no 4 school has
filed counter affidavit stating that although
the petitioners have a right of free and
compulsory
education,
guaranteed
by
Article 21-A read with the Act, however, it
is emphasized that both the students were
not having the requisite attendance and also
did not qualify the examination and not
detaining,
students
similar
to
the
petitioners, affects the academic schedule
and reputation of the school in question. It
is further argued that, in terms of the
prescriptions contained under the Act in
question, the respondents, being unaided
private school, are not amenable to all the
provisions of the RTE Act and their
obligations in terms of the Act, is confined
only to the prescriptions contained under
section 12 of the Act. It is further argued
that Section 16 of the Act cannot be
interpreted to apply to the general students
in the same fashion as to the students who
get benefits of Section 12(1)(c) so as to
reduce their competence and excellence by
giving them freedom of not to work
towards excellence, not to learn, become
ruffians of the school so as to disturb the
entire atmosphere of the school in question.
It is further argued that if, the school is not
allowed to fail/detain students, the teachers
would also stop paying attention to the
children and in that case, even the teachers
cannot be evaluated by the Management
appropriately. In the light of the said, it is
argued that both the petitioners, do not
9 All. Huzaifa Khan & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
1061
have the necessary minimum attendance
also.

5. With regard to the petitioner
no.1, it is stated that he had secured only
41.67% marks and the student's attendance
was 57.8% and despite being made aware
that 75% attendance is compulsory, he did
not take any steps for avoiding the shortage
of attendance while the student was in
Class III and despite the same, he was
promoted. In the academic session 20232024, his attendance percentage was down
to 36% and attendance to 55.24% which is
less than 75% attendance, which is made
compulsory by the ICSE Rules, to which
the respondent no.4 institution is affiliated.
Similarly with regard to petitioner no.2, it
is stated that his performance was below
par and the attendance was also less. It is
stated that in terms of the 'Discipline Rules'
of school, minimum attendance is required
90%, failing which, the child is not
permitted to undergo the examination.

6. It is also stated that the petitioner
no.2 was given warning which was signed
by the father of the petitioner no.2 himself.
It is also stated that the father of the
petitioner no.2 gave in writing that the
petitioner no.2 would not be in a position to
attend the remedial classes and the result
will be his responsibility. It is also stated
that the result of the petitioner no.2 has
already been sent to the ICSE Board. In the
light of the said, it is stated that the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. Reliance is placed upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Society for Unaided Private Schools of
Rajasthan vs. Union of India and
another; (2012) 6 SCC 1 with emphasis on
paragraphs 37 to 48 as well as paragraph
64, which are quoted herein below:
 "37. Thus, from the scheme of
Article 21-A and the 2009 Act, it is clear
that the primary obligation is of the State to
provide for free and compulsory education
to children between the age 6 to 14 years
and, particularly, to children who are likely
to be prevented from pursuing and
completing the elementary education due to
inability to afford fees or
charges.
Correspondingly, every citizen has a right
to establish and administer educational
institution under Article 19(1)(g) so long as
the activity remains charitable. Such an
activity
undertaken
by
the
private
institutions
supplements
the
primary
obligation of the State. Thus, the State can
regulate by law the activities of the private
institutions
by
imposing
reasonable
restrictions under Article 19(6).

 38. The 2009 Act not only
encompasses the aspects of right of
children to free and compulsory education
but to carry out the provisions of the 2009
Act, it also deals with the matters
pertaining to establishment of school(s) as
also grant of recognition (see Section 18).
Thus, after the commencement of the 2009
Act, the private management intending to
establish the school has to make an
application to the appropriate authority
and till the certificate is granted by that
authority, it cannot establish or run the
school. The matters relevant for the grant
of recognition are also provided for in
Sections 19, 25 read with the Schedule to
the Act. Thus, after the commencement of
the 2009 Act, by virtue of Section
12(1)(c) read with Section 2(n)(iv), the
State, while granting recognition to the
private unaided non-minority school, may
specify permissible percentage of the
seats to be earmarked for children who
may not be in a position to pay their fees
or charges.
1062 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 39. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation
[(2002) 8 SCC 481] , this Court vide para
53 has observed that the State while
prescribing qualifications for admission in
a private unaided institution may provide
for condition of giving admission to small
percentage of students belonging to weaker
sections of the society by giving them
freeships,
if
not
granted
by
the
Government. Applying the said law, such a
condition in Section 12(1)(c) imposed while
granting recognition to the private unaided
non-minority school cannot be termed as
unreasonable. Such a condition would
come
within
the
principle
of
reasonableness in Article 19(6).

 40. Indeed, by virtue of Section
12(2) read with Section 2(n)(iv), a private
unaided school would be entitled to be
reimbursed with the expenditure incurred
by it in providing free and compulsory
education to children belonging to the
above category to the extent of per child
expenditure incurred by the State in a
school specified in Section 2(n)(i) or the
actual amount charged from the child,
whichever is less. Such a restriction is in
the interest of the general public. It is also
a reasonable restriction. Such measures
address two aspects viz. upholding the
fundamental
right
of
the
private
management to establish an unaided
educational institution of their choice and,
at the same time, securing the interests of
the children in the locality, in particular,
those who may not be able to pursue
education due to inability to pay fees or
charges of the private unaided schools.

 41. We also do not see any merit
in the contention that Section 12(1)(c)
violates Article 14. As stated, Section
12(1)(c) inter alia provides for admission
to Class I, to the extent of 25% of the
strength of the class, of the children
belonging
to
weaker
sections
and
disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood
and
provide
free
and
compulsory
elementary education to them till its
completion. The emphasis is on free and
compulsory education. Earmarking of
seats for children belonging to a specified
category who face financial barrier in the
matter of accessing education satisfies the
test of classification in Article 14. Further,
Section 12(1)(c) provides for a level
playing field in the matter of right to
education to children who are prevented
from accessing education because they do
not have the means or their parents do not
have the means to pay for their fees.

 42. As stated above, education is
an activity in which we have several
participants.
There
are
number
of
stakeholders including those who want to
establish
and
administer
educational
institutions
as
these
supplement
the
primary obligation of the State to provide
for free and compulsory education to the
specified category of children. Hence,
Section 12(1)(c) also satisfies the test of
reasonableness, apart from the test of
classification in Article 14.

 43. The last question which we
have to answer under this head is whether
Section 12(1)(c) runs counter to the
judgments of this Court in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481] and P.A.
Inamdar [(2005) 6 SCC 537] or principles
laid down therein?

 44. According to the petitioners,
T.M.A. Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]
defines various rights and has held vide
para 50 that right to establish and
administer educational institutions broadly
comprises the following: (i) right to admit
9 All. Huzaifa Khan & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
1063
students, (ii) right to set up a reasonable
fee structure, etc. (the rest are not
important for discussion under this head).
That, T.M.A. Pai Foundation [(2002) 8
SCC 481] lays down the essence and
structure of rights in Article 19(1)(g)
insofar as they relate to educational
institutions in compliance with (a) the
charity
principle,
(b)
the
autonomy
principle, (c) the voluntariness principle,
(d) anti-nationalisation, (e) co-optation
principle. In support, reliance is placed by
the petitioners on a number of paragraphs
from the above two judgments.

 45. At the outset, we may
reiterate
that
Article
21-A
of
the
Constitution provides that the State shall
provide free and compulsory education to
all children of the specified age in such
manner as the State may, by law,
determine. Thus, the primary obligation to
provide free and compulsory education to
all children of the specified age is on the
State. However, the manner in which this
obligation will be discharged by the State
has been left to the State to determine by
law. The State may do so through its own
schools or through aided schools or
through private schools, so long as the law
made in this regard does not transgress any
other constitutional limitation. This is
because Article 21-A vests the power in the
State to decide the manner in which it will
provide free and compulsory education to
the specified category of children. As
stated, the 2009 Act has been enacted
pursuant to Article 21-A.

 46. In this case, we are concerned
with the interplay of Article 21, Article 21A, on the one hand, and the right to
establish
and
administer
educational
institution under Article 19(1)(g) read with
Article 19(6). That was not the issue in
T.M.A. Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]
nor in P.A. Inamdar [(2005) 6 SCC 537] .
In this case, we are concerned with the
validity of Section 12(1)(c) of the 2009 Act.
Hence, we are concerned with the validity
of the law enacted pursuant to Article 21-A
placing restrictions on the right to establish
and administer educational institutions
(including schools) and not the validity of
the scheme evolved in Unni Krishnan, J.P.
v. State of A.P.[(1993) 1 SCC 645]

 47. The above judgments in
T.M.A. Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]
and P.A. Inamdar [(2005) 6 SCC 537]
were not concerned with interpretation of
Article 21-A and the 2009 Act. It is true
that the above two judgments have held
that all citizens have a right to establish
and administer educational institutions
under Article 19(1)(g), however, the
question as to whether the provisions of the
2009 Act constituted a restriction on that
right and if so whether that restriction was
a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6)
was not in issue.

 48. Moreover, the controversy in
T.M.A. Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481]
arose in the light of the scheme framed
inUnni Krishnan case [(1993) 1 SCC 645]
and the judgment in P.A. Inamdar[(2005) 6
SCC 537] was almost a sequel to the
directions in Islamic Academy of Education
v. State of Karnataka [(2003) 6 SCC 697]
in which the entire focus was institutioncentric and not child-centric and that too in
the context of higher education and
professional education where the level of
merit and excellence have to be given a
different weightage than the one we have to
give in the case of Universal Elementary
Education for strengthening social fabric of
democracy through the provision of equal
opportunities to all and for children of
1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
weaker sections and disadvantaged group
who seek admission not to higher education
or professional courses but to Class I.

 64. Accordingly, we hold that the
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009 is constitutionally
valid and shall apply to the following:

 (i) a school established, owned or
controlled by the appropriate Government
or a local authority;

 (ii) an aided school including
aided minority school(s) receiving aid or
grants to meet whole or part of its expenses
from the appropriate Government or the
local authority;

 (iii)
a
school
belonging
to
specified category; and

 (iv) an unaided non-minority
school not receiving any kind of aid or
grants to meet its expenses from the
appropriate Government or the local
authority."

8. The counsel for the respondents
has argued that, paragraph 64 of the
judgment cannot be read in isolation and
the directions given by the Supreme Court
are only in respect of the obligations cast
upon the private schools and recorded in
para 37 onwards. Thus, it is said to be
argued that the entire RTE Act is not
applicable to an unaided non-minority
schools not receiving any kind of aid or
grants to meet its expenses.

9. In the light of the said, it is
essential to notice the mandate of the Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2009. The RTE Act in question was
framed in pursuance to, the Right of
Education included in the Constitution by
virtue of Article 21-A. The RTE Act, was
enacted to provide for free and compulsory
education to all the children. Section 2(n) of
the Act defines 'school' as under :

 "2. Definitions- In this Act, unless
the context otherwise requires, -

 (n)
school
means
any
recognised school imparting elementary
education and includes

 (i) a school established, owned or
controlled by the appropriate Government or
a local authority;

 (ii) an aided school receiving aid
or grants to meet whole or part of its
expenses from the appropriate Government
or the local authority;

 (iii) a school belonging to specified
category; and

 (iv)
an
unaided
school
not
receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet its
expenses from the appropriate Government
or the local authority;"

 Section 3 is the salutary promise
flowing from the Act of ensuring free and
compulsory education to every child of the
age of six to fourteen years. Section 12
provides for responsibilities of the schools
and
teachers
for
providing
free
and
compulsory education, which is as under :

 "12.
Extent
of
school's
responsibility for free and compulsory
education. - (1) For the purposes of this
Act, a school,

 (a) specified in sub-clause (i) of
clause (n) of Section 2 shall provide free
9 All. Huzaifa Khan & Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
1065
and compulsory elementary education to
all children admitted therein;

 (b) specified in sub-clause (ii) of
clause (n) of Section 2 shall provide free
and compulsory elementary education to
such proportion of children admitted
therein as its annual recurring aid or
grants so received bears to its annual
recurring expenses, subject to a minimum
of twenty-five per cent;

 (c) specified in sub-clauses (iii)
and (iv) of clause (n) of Section 2 shall
admit in Class I, to the extent of at least
twenty-five per cent of the strength of that
class, children belonging to weaker section
and
disadvantaged
group
in
the
neighbourhood and provide free and
compulsory elementary education till its
completion:

 Provided further that where a
school specified in clause (n) of Section 2
imparts
pre-school
education,
the
provisions of clauses (a) to (c) shall apply
for admission to such pre-school education.

 (2) The school specified in subclause (iv) of clause (n) of Section 2
providing free and compulsory elementary
education as specified in clause (c) of subsection (1) shall be reimbursed expenditure
so incurred by it to the extent of per-childexpenditure incurred by the State, or the
actual amount charged from the child,
whichever is less, in such manner as may
be prescribed:

 Provided
that
such
reimbursement shall not exceed perchild-expenditure incurred by a school
specified in sub-clause (i) of clause (n) of
Section 2:

 Provided further that where such
school is already under obligation to
provide free education to a specified
number of children on account of it having
received any land, building, equipment or
other facilities, either free of cost or at a
concessional rate, such school shall not be
entitled for reimbursement to the extent of
such obligation.

 (3) Every school shall provide
such information as may be required by the
appropriate Government or the local
authority, as the case may be."

 Section 16 of the Act, which is
the bone of contention of interpretation in
the present case, provides for examination
and holding back of the students in certain
cases, which is as under :

 "16. Examination and holding
back in certain cases - (1) There shall be a
regular examination in the fifth class and in
the eighth class at the end of every
academic year.

 (2) If a child fails in the
examination referred to in sub-section (1),
he shall be given additional instruction and
granted opportunity for re-examination
within a period of two months from the date
of declaration of the result.

 (3) The appropriate Government
may allow schools to hold back a child in
the fifth class or in the eighth class or in
both classes, in such manner and subject to
such conditions as may be prescribed, if he
fails in the re-examination referred to in
sub-section (2):

 Provided that the appropriate
Government may decide not to hold back a
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
child in any class till the completion of
elementary education.

 (4) No child shall be expelled
from a school till the completion of
elementary education."

10. In the present case, the
petitioner no.1 was declared as failed and is
aged about 11 years whereas the petitioner
no.2 was declared as failed and is aged
about 14 years. The said two students were
detained on account of their poor academic
performance as well as they not achieving
the requisite attendance.

11. In the present case, the first
issue to be decided is whether, the private
unaided schools are liable to the mandate of
Section 16 or not. Paragraph 64 of the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Society for Unaided Private
Schools of Rajasthan (supra) is clear that
the Act in whole, is applicable to all the
schools as defined under section 2(n) of the
RTE Act. The distinction as sought to be
interpreted
by
the
counsel
for
the
respondents that the private unaided school,
are only to follow the mandate of Section
12 and not the other provisions, merits
rejection
solely
on
the
ground
of
interpretation
of
the
Act
and
its
applicability to the private aided schools by
virtue of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Society for Unaided
Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra).

12. The argument of the counsel
for the respondents, based upon the
provisions of para 37 onwards of the said
judgment, also merits rejection as the
Supreme Court although was dealing with
the validity of Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE
Act has categorically held in para 64, as
recorded above, and it is not open for this
Court, to adopt any other interpretation, as
is being argued by the counsel for the
respondents. Thus, it is categorically held
that all the provisions of the Act including
Section 16 of the RTE Act are applicable to
the respondents school also. In the present
case, there is a clear violation of the
mandate of Section 16(2) of the RTE Act.

13. It is also necessary to refer that,
no prescription has been issued in terms of
the mandate of Section 16(3) in the State of
U.P. Thus, there being a clear violation of
rights of the children flowing from Section
16 (2) of the Act. The action of the
respondents
school
in
expelling
the
students is also violative of Section 16 (4)
of the Act.

14. It is also essential to notice that
the action against the two students is
founded
on
the
internal
discipline
guidelines of the school as well as
guidelines of minimum attendance issued
by the affiliating board that is ICSE,
however as the appropriate Government ,in
the present case the State of UP, has not
issued any prescriptions under Section 16
of the RTE Act the said internal guidelines
and guidelines of the affiliating Board will
have to yield to the mandate of the Act and
cannot be given precedence over the Act.

15. Thus, for all the reasons
recorded above, the writ petition is liable to
be
allowed
with
directions
to
the
respondents to readmit the petitioner no.1
and permit him to pursue the studies in
Class
VIth
after
granting
him
an
opportunity of re-examination within a
period of two months. Similarly the
petitioner no.2 shall also be readmitted to
Class IXth as the requisite records of
students passing Class IXth have already
been uploaded on the website of ICSE and
9 All. Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1067
it may not be possible for the
petitioner no.2 to take examination in Class
Xth for this academic year and keeping in
view his performance on the academic side,
the respondent no.4 shall permit the
petitioner no.2 to undergo the studies for
Class IXth.

16.
The
writ
petition
stands
allowed in terms of the said directions.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 1067
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHNADRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ - C No. 21150 of 2014

Rishi Kumar Jain & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Ram Prakash Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C., Ravi Anand Agarwal

Issue for Consideration
A) Whether the provisions of Section 24 (2) of
the Act, 2013 would apply to the acquisition
made under the Adhiniyam, 1965?
B) Whether under the facts and circumstances,
the benefit under Section 24 (2) of the Act,
2013 would be applicable?
C) Whether the proceeding is barred by delay
and laches?

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article
226; The Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965-Sections 28, 32
; The Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section
17; Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency
in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement
Act,
2013- Section 24 - Petitioners have
chosen multiple forums and instituted
several cases, which resulted in delay of
the proceedings - Against the acquisition
the
petitioners'
father
had
already
approached to the Supreme Court but the
same had been negated by the Supreme
Court and the acquisition was upheld. The
petitioners'
father
as
well
as
the
petitioners had also knocked the doors of
various authorities/ courts but eventually
they
failed
to
get
any
relief
from
anywhere. The possession of the land had
been taken by the authorities and the
same had been transferred to the Trust.
On the said land institution had also been
built, which is also imparting education to
students. We find that once the land
vested in the State, the same is free from
all encumbrances, it cannot be divested or
revested- The stale and dead claims
cannot be permitted to be canvassed on
the pretext of enactment of Section 24 -
Petition dismissed.

Held-
A) The contention relating to lapsing of
acquisition under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013
when the land was acquired under the
provisions of the Act, 1894 would, therefore, not
come to the aid of the petitioner.
B) The proceeding had been challenged in
different forums and initially interim injunction
was also obtained but it is apparent that the
acquisition had been upheld upto Supreme
Court. Once the award has been made, it was
not open for the petitioner to challenge the
notification under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam,
1965.
C) At this belated stage the petitioner cannot be
permitted to revive the dead and stale claims.
(E-15)
(Para 30,33,46 & 47)

Case Law Cited
Atul Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors L. A.
No. 159 of 2014; Jagbeer Singh & Ors. v. State
of U.P. & Ors 2018 (2) AWC 1639; Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors SLP
(C) Nos. 9036 - 9038 of 2016 dt. 6.3.2020;
Urban Development Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal