# Imtyaz Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1067
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-09-15
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 3029 of 2010
- **Bench:** Mrs. Ranjana Pandya
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/imtyaz-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-opp-parties-43077
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Cr.P.C. Section 401-Criminal RevisionScope of interference by Revisional Courtexplained-conviction u/s 326/452 IPCinjuries corroborated by prosecution story
contained as in FIR-no inconsistency
found-no interference called for-dismissed.

Held: Para-9 & 24

## Text

3 All]. Imtyaz Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1067
clear that appellant was not dependent
upon her husband as she was living
separately which is established from filing
of the suit. It may also be pointed out here
that
in
a
case
of
compassionate
appointment
ground
of
indigent
conditions of the family must be taken
into account and the dependants of the
deceased government servant have no
legal right to claim appointment on
compassionate ground as a matter of
right, rather such an appointment is an
exception to normal mode of recruitment.
She was neither dependent upon the
income of her husband nor living in
indigent circumstances. In our opinion,
there is no illegality or infirmity in the
impugned judgment and compassionate
appointment cannot be granted merely
because the appellant was married to
Navratan Kumar (since deceased) without
proving her indigency and dependency
upon him. Hence no interference is called
for.

8. For all the reasons stated above,
appeal is dismissed.
--------
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.09.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. RANJANA PANDYA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 3029 of 2010

Imtyaz ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties.

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Sanjay Tripathi, Sri R.R. Kushwaha, Sri
S.M.A. Abdy

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
A.G.A.
Cr.P.C. Section 401-Criminal RevisionScope of interference by Revisional Courtexplained-conviction u/s 326/452 IPCinjuries corroborated by prosecution story
contained as in FIR-no inconsistency
found-no interference called for-dismissed.

Held: Para-9 & 24
9. It is settled principle of law that the
revisional jurisdiction is not as wide as
the appellate jurisdiction and under the
former jurisdiction, the High Court is
required to exercise its powers where
there is material irregularity or manifest
error of law or procedure, or there is
misconception or misreading of evidence
or where the court below has failed to
exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has
exercised the jurisdiction wrongly and
perversely or where the facts admitted
or proved do not disclose any offence. As
a broad proposition, the interference of
revisional court may be justified in cases
(i)
where
the
decision
is
grossly
erroneous
(ii)
where
there
is
no
compliance with the provision of law (iii)
where the finding of fact affecting the
decision is not based on evidence on
record (iv) where the material evidence
of parties has not been considered (v)
where the court below has misread or
mis-appreciated the evidence on record
(vi) where the judicial discretion has
been exercised arbitrarily or perversely.

24. I have carefully examined the
medical reports of all the injured which
have been duly proved by Dr. Arya PW-3.
I need not burden this judgment by
reproducing the injury reports, as they
have been noted by the Courts below in
their respective judgments. The injuries
found on the person of the injured fully
corroborate the prosecution story as
contained
in
the
FIR
and
in
the
statements of witnesses of fact namely
PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6. Thus the direct
evidence
of
the
crime
is
fully
corroborated by the medical evidence
and there is no inconsistency therein,
rather they compliment each other.

Case Law discussed:
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
A.I.R. 1999 SC 981; A.I.R. 2002 SC 2229;
A.I.R. 2002 SC 107; A.I.R. 1993 SC 1126;
(2004) 12 SCC 521; 2003(47) ACC 7 (SC);
2012 (77) ACC 125; 2008(62) ACC 40; (2009)
7 SCC 254; (2012) 8 SCC 734; JT 2013 (3) SC
444.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Ranjana Pandya. J.)

This revision has been preferred against
the Judgment and order dated 11.5.2010
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Court No.1, Mahoba in Criminal Appeal No.
9 of 2010, Imtyaz Vs. State of U.P. and
others, confirming the Judgment and order
dated 22.3.2010 passed by the C.J.M.
Mahoba in Criminal Case No. 2094 of 2008,
State Vs. Imtyaz, under Sections 326, 452
I.P.C., Police Station Kotwali, District
Mahoba whereby the revisionist as convicted
under Section 326/452 I.P.C. and sentenced
to
undergo
seven
years'
rigorous
imprisonment
and
to
pay
fine
of
Rs.1,00,000/- and four years' rigorous
imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.20,000/-
respectively with default stipulation. Out of
the amount of fine, compensation was also
awarded to three victims.

2. The prosecution case in brief is that
the accused Imtyaz is son-in-law of
complainant Rehana and Rosy is daughter
of the complainant. Rosy was married to
Imtyaz. On 3.8.2008 when the complainant
Rehana, her daughter Rosy, niece Nikki and
Rosy's daughter Alshifa along with other
members of the family were sleeping, all of
a sudden at about 12 a.m., accused Imtyaz
entered the house of the complainant and
threw acid on the daughter of the
complainant Rosy, her niece Nikki and
Rosy's daughter Alshifa and on their hue
and cry the accused fled away from the
house. As regards the motive for the offence
is concerned, it has been mentioned in the
first information report that a case under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. was pending between
Rosy and the accused and the accused had
threatened Rosy that if she would not
compromise in the petition under Section
125 Cr.P.C., he would not spare her.

3. After lodging of the F.I.R.
investigation ensued and culminated into
charge sheet under sections 452, 326
I.P.C. against the accused. Charges were
framed against the accused under Sections
452, 326 I.P.C. who pleaded not guilty
and claimed trial.

4. The prosecution had examined
complainant Rehana (P.W.1), her injured
daughter Rosy (P.W.2), Dr. R.B. Arya
(P.W.3), Retired S.I. Har Narain (P.W. 4),
Constable Ajay Singh ( P.W. 5) and
injured Nikki (P.W. 6).

5. The accused was examined under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. who denied all the
incriminating circumstances appearing
against him in the prosecution evidence
and
pleaded false
implication. The
accused examined D.W. 1 Kallu in
defence.

6. The trial court, after hearing both
the sides as also assessment of the oral
and
documentary
evidence,
vide
Judgment dated 22.3.2010, convicted and
sentenced the revisionist as noted in para1 of the judgment above.

7. Aggrieved the accused filed
Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 2010, which
was dismissed on 11.5.2010 and its
judgment is under challenge in the present
revision before this Court.

8. I have heard the learned counsel
for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. and
perused the record.
3 All]. Imtyaz Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1069

9. It is settled principle of law that
the revisional jurisdiction is not as wide
as the appellate jurisdiction and under the
former jurisdiction, the High Court is
required to exercise its powers where
there is material irregularity or manifest
error of law or procedure, or there is
misconception or misreading of evidence
or where the court below has failed to
exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has
exercised the jurisdiction wrongly and
perversely or where the facts admitted or
proved do not disclose any offence. As a
broad proposition, the interference of
revisional court may be justified in cases
(i) where the decision is grossly erroneous
(ii) where there is no compliance with the
provision of law (iii) where the finding of
fact affecting the decision is not based on
evidence on record (iv) where the material
evidence
of
parties
has
not
been
considered (v) where the court below has
misread or mis-appreciated the evidence
on
record
(vi)
where
the
judicial
discretion has been exercised arbitrarily
or perversely.

10. In exercise of revisional
jurisdiction the court may not exercise
jurisdiction to reassess the evidence and
reappraise the evidence. The Hon'ble the
Apex Court in A.I.R. 1999 SC 981 State
of
Kerela
Vs.
Putthumana
Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri has held that "the
High Court while hearing revision does
not work as an appellate court and will
not re-appreciate the evidence, unless
some glaring mistake is pointed out to
show that injustice has been done".

11. In the case of Jagannath
Chaudhary Vs. Ramayan Singh A.I.R.
2002 SC 2229, Hon'ble Apex Court has
held that "revisional jurisdiction is
normally
to
be
exercised
only
in
exceptional cases where there is a glaring
defect in the procedure or there is a
manifest error on point of law resulting in
miscarriage of justice". Similarly in
Munni Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan and
others A.I.R. 2002 SC 107 it was held by
the Apex Court that "while exercising the
revisional power the High Court has no
authority to re-appreciate the evidence in
the manner as the trial court and appellate
courts are required to do".

12. In another case of State of
Karnataka Vs. Appa Balu Ingale and
others, A.I.R. 1993 SC 1126 it has been
held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that "
generally speaking, concurrent findings of
fact arrived at by two courts below are not
to be interfered with by the High Court in
absence of any special circumstances or
unless there is any perversity."

13. As far as the F.I.R. is concerned,
a perusal of the lower court record shows
that the occurrence took place on 3.8.2008
at 12 O'clock in the night whereas the
report was lodged on 4.8.2008 at .30 a.m.,
the distance of the police station from the
place of occurrence being 1 km. It will
not be out of place to mention here that
there were three persons, who had
sustained acid burns. Thus, the crime was
promptly reported to the police which
rules out chances of embellishment or
concoction.

14. As regards motive, it is well
settled principle of law that if there is
direct evidence of the crime, motive
looses its value. It is not possible to
measure the extent of feelings, sentiments
and reactions of someone, as may be, who
under frustration or on mere possibility
may take decision to commit crime. It all
depends as to how a person reacts in a
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
give circumstance. The Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Ranganayaki vs.
State, (2004) 12 SCC 521, has held as
under:

" The motive for committing a
criminal act is generally a difficult area
for the prosecution. One cannot normally
see into the mind of anther. Motive is in
the mind which impels a man to do a
particular act. Such impulsion need not
necessarily be proportionally grave to do
grave crimes. Many murders have been
committed
without
any
known
or
prominent motive. It is quite possible that
the aforesaid imputing factor would
remain undiscovered."

15. In this connection, following
observations of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court given in the case of Thaman Kumar
vs.
State
of
Union
Territory
of
Chandigarh 2003 (47) ACC 7 (SC) are
also relevant:

"There is no principle or rule of law
that where the prosecution fails to prove
the motive for commission of the crime, it
must necessarily result in acquittal of the
accused. Where the ocular evidence is
found to be trust-worthy and reliable and
finds corroboration from the medical
evidence, finding of guilt can safely be
recorded even if the motive for the
commission of the crime has not been
proved."

16. Referring to the case of Nanhoon
and others vs State of U.P.2012 (77) ACC
125, learned counsel for the revisionist
has argued that if the motive for crime is
not established or the motive is very week
it may be of no importance. However the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Mangaru and
others vs. State of U.P., 2008 (62) ACC
40, has laid down that motive may be of
importance in the cases of circumstantial
evidence and it is well settled principle of
law that in the case of direct evidence,
motive looses its value.

17. In the instant case right from the
inception of the F.IR. the complainant has
specifically stated that an application
under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was filed by
her daughter Rosy, which was pending
against the accused Imtyaz in which he
had asked her for compromise else he
would throw acid on Rosy. Coming to the
oral evidence on this point, Rehana
(P.W.1) has specifically stated that the
accused had threatened Rosy either to
compromise in the case she had filed for
maintenance otherwise he would throw
acid on her. In cross-examination, fishing
inquiries have been made but the
statement of this witness with regard to
the real incident is consistent, cogent,
clear and reliable.

18. The motive for the crime has
been duly proved by P.W.-2 Rosy, who
being the wife of the accused was his
main target and was badly injured in the
incident. She has specifically stated that
the accused had threatened her to
compromise in the petition under Section
125 Cr.P.C. otherwise he would throw
acid on her. Thus, the motive set forth in
the F.I.R. has been proved by the
prosecution.

19. It has been argued on behalf of the
revisionist that all the witnesses are related
and interested witnesses, therefore, their
evidence cannot be relied upon. It is not the
law that the testimony of related or interested
witness should be thrown out of board, rather
they would be the last person to screen the
real offender and falsely rope in an innocent
3 All]. Imtyaz Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1071
person in the case. In the instance case the
witnesses of fact including the complainant
are not only interse related with each other
but each of them is equally closely related
with the accused-revisionist. The prosecution
has examined two injured witnesses out of
the three, namely Rosy PW-2 (wife of the
revisionist) and Nikki PW-6 (niece of the
complainant
i.e.
sister-in-law
of
the
revisionist). Thus, they had apparently no
animus to falsely depose against the
revisionist. However, it is trite law that
testimony of related and interested witness
should be closely scrutinized with care and
caution.

20. The concept of interested witness
essentially must carry with it the element of
unfairness and undue intention to falsely
implicate the accused. It is only when these
elements are present, and statement of the
witness is unworthy of credence that the
Court would examine the possibility of
discarding such statements. But where the
presence of the eye-witnesses is proved to
be natural and their statements are nothing
but truthful disclosure of actual facts
leading
to
the
occurrence
and
the
occurrence itself, it is not permissible for the
Court to discard the statements of such
related or friendly witnesses.

21. Law on the subject is thus, clear
that in reference to appreciation of
evidence of interested witnesses, version
of interested witness cannot be thrown out
but the same has to be examined carefully
before accepting the same.

22. Keeping the above principles in
mind, the statement of witnesses are being
examined.

23. The injured witnesses, namely,
Rosy, Nikki, and eye witness Rehana
have categorically stated that the accused
poured acid on all the three injured, i.e.,
Rosy, Nikki, Alshifa. As far as the
evidence of P.W.1 Rehana, P.W. 2 Rosy
and P.W. 3 Nikki are concerned, their
evidence cannot be disbelieved because
considering the time and place of the
incident, in fact they are natural witnesses
as their presence inside the house cannot
be doubted and the presence of any
outsider at the dead hour of night is totally
ruled out. Besides this, being the injured
witness, presence of of Rosy PW-2 and
Nikki PW-6 cannot be questioned. All the
three lady injured namely Nikki, Rosy
and Alshifa were medically examined by
the doctor, who had unequivocally opined
that they have suffered acid burn injuries.

24. I have carefully examined the
medical reports of all the injured which
have been duly proved by Dr. Arya PW-3.
I need not burden this judgment by
reproducing the injury reports, as they
have been noted by the Courts below in
their respective judgments. The injuries
found on the person of the injured fully
corroborate the prosecution story as
contained in the FIR and in the statements
of witnesses of fact namely PW-1, PW-2
and PW-6. Thus the direct evidence of the
crime is fully corroborated by the medical
evidence and there is no inconsistency
therein, rather they compliment each
other.

25. On close scrutiny of testimony
of both the witnesses, namely Rosy PW-2
and Nikki PW-6, it transpires that there
are no material contradictions therein.
They are victims of acid attack and they
including the complainant had ample
opportunity to identify the revisionist,
who was not a stranger to them. Thus, in
the absence of any adverse circumstance
1072 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
or material contradiction in the testimony
of witnesses of fact, the courts below have
not at all erred in placing reliance on their
testimony.

26. The counsel for the revisionist
has placed reliance upon evidence of
D.W.1 Kallu Khan, who has tried to give
negative evidence. In my opinion such
evidence is of little value as compared to
the positive evidence of Rosy, Rehana
and Nikki. In cross-examination D.W.1
Kallu has admitted that he came to know
from the neighbours that Imtyaz had
thrown acid on Rosy but, in the next
breadth trying to mend himself, he stated
that Imtyaz must have thrown acid on
Rosy. He had also deposed that he had
heard that Rosy was burnt due to acid.
Thus, this witness has virtually supported
the prosecution case.

27. Lastly the learned counsel for
the revisionist has argued that the accused
is in jail since the time of his arrest in the
trial Court and has served major part of
the sentence, so he may be released on
sentence already undergone by him. I
have seriously taken into consideration
the submissions made by learned counsel
for the revisionist in this behalf. +

28. As far as reduction of sentence is
concerned, the imposition of appropriate
punishment is the manner in which the
Court responds to the society's call for
justice against the criminal. Justice
demands that the Courts should impose
punishment befitting the crime so that the
Courts reflect public abhorrence of the
crime. The Court must not only keep in
view the rights of the criminal but also the
rights of the victim of the crime and the
society at large while considering the
imposition of appropriate punishment. In
the
case
of
Ahmed
Hussein
Vali
Mohammed Saiyed and another Vs. State
of Gujarat (2009) 7 SCC 254, a threeJudge Bench of the Apex Court has
observed as follows:

"99....The
object
of
awarding
appropriate sentence should be to protect
the society and to deter the criminal from
achieving the avowed object to law by
imposing appropriate sentence. It is
expected that the courts would operate the
sentencing system so as to impose such
sentence, which reflects the conscience of
the society and the sentencing process has
to be stern where it should be. Any liberal
attitude by imposing meager sentences or
taking too sympathetic view merely on
account of lapse of time in respect of such
offences will be result-wise counter
productive in the long run and against the
interest of society which needs to be cared
for and strengthened by string of
deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing
system.

100. Justice demands that courts
should impose punishment befitting the
crime so that the courts reflect public
abhorrence of the crime. The court must not
only keep in view the rights of the victim of
the crime and the society at large while
considering the imposition of appropriate
punishment. The court will be failing in its
duty if appropriate punishment is not
awarded for a crime which has been
committed not only against the individual
victim but also against the society to which
both the criminal and the victim belong."

In this case, the court further goes to
state that meager sentence imposed solely
on account of lapse of time without
considering the degree of the offence will
be counter productive in the long run and
against
the
interest
of
society.
3 All]. Surendra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1073

29. In Guru Basavaraj @ Benne
Settapa vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8
SCC 734, while discussing the concept of
appropriate sentence, this Court expressed
that:

"It is the duty of the court to see that
appropriate sentence is imposed regard
being had to the commission of the crime
and its impact on the social order. The
cry of the collective for justice, which
includes adequate punishment cannot be
lightly ignored."

30. Recently, the Apex Court in the
case of Gopal Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand
JT 2013 (3) SC 444 held as under:-

"18. Just punishment is the collective
cry of the society. While the collective cry
has to be kept uppermost in the mind,
simultaneously
the
principle
of
proportionality between the crime and
punishment cannot be totally brushed
aside. The principle of just punishment is
the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a
criminal offence............"

31. Reverting back to the medical
reports of Nikki, Rosy and Alshifa, it would
be very important to note that Nikki was a
fifteen year old young girl at the time of
incident and she had sustained acid injury on
the neck, right arm & forearm and right
thigh. Rosy, the wife of the accused had
suffered acid burn injuries on her face, scalp,
left side of neck to right side chest, left arm
& forearm and right arm & forearm, back
and right thigh. Innocent Alshifa, who was
only eleven months old at the time of
incident, was the infant daughter of the
accused and Rosy. What was her fault that
the accused did not spare her also in as much
as her face, chest, lower limbs and multiple
places over the left and right limbs anterior
aspect were also burnt by acid. The conduct
of the accused and the way in which the
offence was committed in predetermined
manner disentitles the accused-revisionist for
any sympathy or leniency from the court.
The learned Magistrate has directed that out
of the fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, injured Rosy
was to be paid Rs.60,000/- while Alshifa and
Nikki were to get Rs.10,000/- (each). Thus,
there is absolutely no ground to reduce the
sentence of imprisonment or the fine
imposed on the accused.

32. Thus, in view of what has been
stated above, there is no ground to
interfere with the impugned judgment and
orders passed by both the Courts below
and this revision is liable to be dismissed.

33. Accordingly, the revision is hereby
dismissed. The revisionist is in jail, as he has
not been enlarged on bail during the
pendency of the revision by this Court. He
will serve out the remaining part of his
sentence of imprisonment and would also
pay fine as directed by the trial Court.

34. Let certified copy of the
Judgment be sent to the trial court for
ensuring compliance which should be
reported to the court within eight weeks.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.09.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3057 of 2007

Surendra ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.K. Mishra