# In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The City of Lucknow v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2020) 7 ILRA 137
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-03-09
- **Case number:** Public Interest Litigation No. 532 of 2020
- **Bench:** Govind Mathur, C.J. Ramesh Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/in-re-banners-placed-on-roadside-in-the-city-of-lucknow-v-state-of-u-p-45854
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Constitutional Law - Right to Privacy -
The Constitution of India: Article 21 - No
Law is in existence permitting the State
to place the banners with personal data
of the accused from whom compensation
is to be charged. (Para 22)

The Court examined the legitimacy of the
display of photographs, name and address of
certain persons by the district administration
and police administration of the city of
Lucknow
through
banners
seeking
compensation and further to confiscate their
property, if they failed to pay compensation.
(Para 3)

List of cases cited:-
138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

7 All. In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The City of Lucknow Vs. State of U.P.
137
and as an agent of the other co-owners.
The consent of other co- owners is assumed
as taken unless it is shown that the other
co-owners were not agreeable to eject the
tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their
disagreement. In the present case, the suit
was filed by both the co-owners. One of the
co-owners cannot withdraw his consent
midway the suit so as to prejudice the other
co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of
the parties stand crystallised on the date of
the suit and the entitlement of the co-
owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged
by reference to the date of institution of the
suit; the only exception being when by
virtue of a subsequent event the entitlement
of the body of co-owners to eject the tenant
comes to an end by act of parties or by
operation of law."

36. According to Section 111 (d), a lease
of immoveable property determines in a case
where the interests of the lessee and that of the
lessor in the whole of the property become
vested in the tenant. Thus, two conditions are
mandatory to attract Section 111 (d); that it is
only the tenant who should acquire the property
of the landlord; second, the tenant should
purchase assignment of the rights of the
landlord in the property in its entirety.

37. In the instant case, the petitioner
admits that she is not the tenant of the disputed
premises and has purchased 1/3rd share of Sri
Ram and not the entire ownership interest in the
disputed
premises,
therefore,
the
twin
conditions of applicability of the doctrine of
merger of the tenancy are lacking. Accordingly,
this court finds substance in the argument of the
respondent that the doctrine of merger of
tenancy is not attracted in the present case.

38. Since this Court has held the
possession of the petitioner over the disputed
premises is illegal, therefore, the submission of
counsel for the petitioner that petitioner is ready
to part with 2/3rd share of the disputed premises
and handover the same to respondent nos.1 & 2
is devoid of merit.

39. Thus, for the reasons given above, the
writ petition under Article 227 of Constitution
of India lacks merit and is accordingly,
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
----------
(2020)07ILR A137
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.03.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE GOVIND MATHUR, C.J.
THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.

Public Interest Litigation No. 532 of 2020

In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The
City of Lucknow ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Suo motto

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitutional Law - Right to Privacy -
The Constitution of India: Article 21 - No
Law is in existence permitting the State
to place the banners with personal data
of the accused from whom compensation
is to be charged. (Para 22)

The Court examined the legitimacy of the
display of photographs, name and address of
certain persons by the district administration
and police administration of the city of
Lucknow
through
banners
seeking
compensation and further to confiscate their
property, if they failed to pay compensation.
(Para 3)

List of cases cited:-
138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. State of Uttaranchal Vs Balwant Singh
Chaufal
.
&
ors.
(2010)
3
SCC
402
(distinguished)

2. Re:- Destruction of Public & Private Properties
(2009) 5 SCC 212

3. Malak Singh and others Vs State of Punjab
and Haryana . & ors. AIR 1981 SC 760

4. K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & anr. Vs U.O.I.
and ors. (2015) 8 SCC 735

5. K.P. Puttaswamy and ors Vs U.O.I. & ors. AIR
2017 SC 4161

6. People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs
U.O.I. (1997) 1 SCC 301

(Delivered by Hon'ble Govind Mathur, C.J.
&
Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J)

1. Heard Sri Raghvendra Singh,
learned Advocate General assisted by Sri
Neeraj
Tripathi,
learned
Additional
Advocate General, Sri Shashank Shekhar
Singh, Additional Chief Standing Counsel
and
Smt.
Archana
Singh,
learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the
State-respondents.

2. Privacy is a fundamental human
right recognized in the United Nations
Declaration
of
Human
Rights,
the
international
convenant
on
civil
and
political rights and many other international
and regional treaties. The privacy underpins
human dignity and key values of a
democracy. Nearly every country in the
world recognizes a right of privacy
explicitly in their constitution. In our
country, where privacy is not explicitly
recognized as fundamental right in the
constitution, the Courts have found such
right protected as an intrinsic part of life
and personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. This fundamental
right provides lungs to the edifice of our
entire constitutional system. A slightest
injury to it is impermissible as that may be
fatal for our values designed and depicted
in the preamble of the constitution.

3. In this public interest writ
proceedings, undertaken by the Court at its
own, the simple question is the legitimacy
of the display of photographs, name and
address of certain persons by the district
administration and police administration of
the city of Lucknow through banners. The
banners came up at a major road side with
personal details of more than 50 persons
those accused of vandalism during protest
in the month of December, 2019. The
poster is seeking compensation from the
accused persons and further to confiscate
their property, if they failed to pay
compensation.

4. The installation of banners was
reported in several newspapers, television
and internet channels on 6th and 7th of
March, 2020. Noticing injury to the right of
privacy, the Chief Justice of this Court
directed the Registry to register a petition
for writ in public interest and list that
before the Bench nominated. By an
advance notice, the Commissioner of
Police, Lucknow and District Magistrate,
Lucknow were called upon to explain the
provisions under which the banners were
placed on road side. An explanation was
also sought about the provisions relating to
placement of any banner on road side that
causes interference in movement of traffic
in
crowded
areas.
Accordingly,
the
Commissioner of Police and District
Magistrate, Lucknow are before us through
the Advocate General of the State.

5. Learned Advocate General while
accepting absence of any statute permitting
7 All. In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The City of Lucknow Vs. State of U.P.
139
executive authorities to put such banners,
opposed the petition with all vehemence
with following submissions:-

(i) The Court erred in invoking
public interest jurisdiction in the instant
matter, that being available to under
privileged section of the society only. The
persons whose personal details are given in
the banners are capable enough to agitate
their grievance, if any, at their own.

(ii) The cause in the instant
matter, if any, that arose at Lucknow,
therefore, the petition at Allahabad lacks
territorial jurisdiction.

(iii) The cognizance of any issue
that is to be adjudicated in public interest
litigation jurisdiction could have been taken
by a Division Bench and not by a single
Bench as taken in the instant matter.

(iv) The object of displaying
personal details of the individuals is to
deter the mischief mongers from causing
damage to public and private property.
Such bonafide action taken by the State
must not be interfered by the Court in its
public interest litigation jurisdiction.

6. To substantiate the first submission,
learned Advocate General heavily relied
upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant
Singh Chaufal and others, 2010 (3) SCC
402 laying down guidelines for Courts to
streamline PIL jurisdiction. The Apex
Court while doing so issued following
directions:-

"(1) The courts must encourage
genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively
discourage and curb the PIL filed for
extraneous considerations.

(2) Instead of every individual
judge devising his own procedure for
dealing with the public interest litigation, it
would be appropriate for each High Court
to properly formulate rules for encouraging
the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL
filed with oblique motives. Consequently,
we request that the High Courts who have
not yet framed the rules, should frame the
rules within three months. The Registrar
General of each High Court is directed to
ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by
the High Court is sent to the Secretary
General
of
this
court
immediately
thereafter.

(3) The courts should prima facie
verify the credentials of the petitioner
before entertaining a P.I.L.

(4) The court should be prima
facie satisfied regarding the correctness of
the
contents
of
the
petition
before
entertaining a PIL.

(5) The court should be fully
satisfied that substantial public interest is
involved before entertaining the petition.

(6) The court should ensure that
the petition which involves larger public
interest, gravity and urgency must be given
priority over other petitions.

(7) The courts before entertaining
the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed
at redressal of genuine public harm or
public injury. The court should also ensure
that there is no personal gain, private
motive or oblique motive behind filing the
public interest litigation.(8) The court
should also ensure that the petitions filed
by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior
motives must be discouraged by imposing
exemplary costs or by adopting similar
140 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
novel methods to curb frivolous petitions
and the petitions filed for extraneous
considerations."

7. Learned Advocate General while
referring para 32, 34, 35 and 36 of the
judgment aforesaid emphasized that the
public interest litigation jurisdiction is
evolved by the Courts to get access to
justice to a large section of society that is
otherwise not getting any benefit from
judicial system.

8. So far as this argument is
concerned, suffice to state that the most of
the directions issued under para 181 of the
judgment
aforesaid
would
have
no
application in the instant matter being
arising out of a suo motu action taken by
the
Court.
However,
it
would
be
appropriate to state that the Court while
calling upon the respondents duly applied
its mind to ensure that the PIL is aimed at
redressal of genuine public harm or public
injury.
In
our
constitutional
scheme
executive, legislature and judiciary are
given distinct and separate powers and
generally each branch is not allowed to
encroach the powers of other. All the three
wings of governance being face of the
State, check and balance each other. The
judiciary usually takes action once a case or
cause is brought before it by a party and
that is mostly in adverse litigation. But,
where there is gross negligence on part of
public authorities and government, where
the law is disobeyed and the public is put to
suffering and where the precious values of
the constitution are subjected to injuries, a
constitutional court can very well take
notice of that at its own. The Court in such
matters is not required to wait necessarily
for a person to come before it to ring the
bell of justice. The Courts are meant to
impart justice and no court can shut its eyes
if a public unjust is happening just before
it. The concept of "standing" has acquired a
new shape in our justice delivery system. A
well meaning citizen or body certainly
possess a locus to stand before the Court of
law for a well meaning cause. In the case in
hand, a valid apprehension of causing
serious injury to the rights protected under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India
exists which demands adequate treatment
by the Court at its own. The economic
status of the persons directly affected in
such matters is not material. The prime
consideration before the Court is to prevent
the
assault
on
fundamental
rights,
especially the rights protected under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. As already
stated, in the instant matter the act of the
district
and
police
administration
of
Lucknow is alleged to be in conflict with
the right of life and liberty. Hence, the suo
motu action by the Court is justified.

9. The second objection raised by
learned Advocate General is that the entire
cause of action in the instant matter arose at
Lucknow, hence, this Court at Allahabad
lacks territorial jurisdiction. Cause of
action means the whole of the material
facts that is necessary for a plaintiff to
allege and prove. The cause of action
consists of a bundle of facts that gives
cause to enforce the legal injury for redress
in a a Court of law.

10. In the present case, the cause is
not about personal injury caused to the
persons whose personal details are given in
the banner but the injury caused to the
precious
constitutional
value
and
its
shameless depiction by the administration.
The cause as such is undemocratic
functioning of government agencies which
are supposed to treat all members of public
with respect and courtesy and at all time
7 All. In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The City of Lucknow Vs. State of U.P.
141
should behave in manner that upholds
constitutional and democratic values. It
would also be appropriate to state that the
United Nations also under its Resolution
No.58/4 dated 31st October, 2003 desired
such
conduct
from
public
officials.
Pertinent to note that the government
agencies in the State of Uttar Pradesh have
proposed to install the banners of accused
persons in other cities also where the
protest took place and compensation is
claimed against alleged damage to public
property. The proposed installation of
banners in the city of Meerut is reported in
newspapers of today only. Looking to the
state wide nature of impugned action, it
cannot be said that this Court at Allahabad
is not having territorial jurisdiction to
adjudicate the cause involved.

11. It is also stated by learned
Advocate General that no cognizance of an
issue could have been taken in public
interest litigation jurisdiction by a single
Bench may that be by the Chief Justice of
this Court, as the jurisdiction to do so is
available to a Division Bench. According to
learned Advocate General, the reference of
the issue for adjudication as a public
interest litigation is incompetent. We do not
find any merit in this argument. The Chief
Justice has only noticed a wrong and
directed the Registry to place before a
nominated
Division
Bench
for
its
adjudication. It is in accordance with
settled norms to entertain a PIL suo motu.

12. The next submission of learned
Advocate General is that the persons whose
photographs have been placed in the
banners with their identity have already
challenged the notice issued to them for
payment of compensation for causing
damage to public property. Hence, no
useful purpose shall be served by this
public interest litigation, which essentially
pertains to recovery of compensation from
such persons.

13. In our considered opinion, this
limb of objection too is bereft of merit. In
the instant matter, the issue is not the
compensation that is to be recovered from
any body but depiction of personal data of
persons on a road side, which may amount
unwarranted interference in privacy of a
person.

14. In last, it is submitted by learned
Advocate General that the object of
installing the banners with identity of
certain persons is only to deter citizens
from participation in illegal activities. The
placement of banners with details of the
accused persons at conspicuous place is in
a larger public interest and, therefore, the
Court must not interfere with the same.

15. No doubt the state can always take
necessary steps to ensure maintenance of
law and order but that cannot be by
violating fundamental rights of people.

16. Now coming to the main issue
about the unwarranted interference in
privacy of people, it would be appropriate
to state that admittedly no statutory
provisions in this regard are available with
the State. The State has initiated the
proceedings to charge compensation from
the accused of vandalism during protest in
the month of December, 2019, on the basis
of a government order that is said to be in
tune of the directions given by Supreme
Court in "Re:-Destruction of Public and
Private Properties" reported in 2009 (5)
SCC 212. The government order referred
by learned Advocate General certainly
provides
a
procedure
to
charge
compensation from the persons causing
142 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
damage to the public property but that does
not permit the State to encroach privacy of
a person. As already stated, we are not
concerned
with
validity
of
the
compensation fastened but to the act about
disclosure of personal details of the
accused persons.

17. Under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the power is available to
a Court to publish a written proclamation
requiring appearance of a persons against
whom a warrant has been issued and such
person is concealing himself to avoid
execution of warrant. No other power is
available in the Code to police or the
Executive to display personal records of a
person to public at large. There are
certain
provisions
empowering
the
investigating
agencies
or
other
Executives to take picture of accused for
the purpose of their identification and
record but that too is not open for
publication.
The
only
time
these
photographs be published is to have
assistance in the apprehension of a
fugitive from justice.

18. The Supreme Court in Malak
Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab
and Haryana and others reported in AIR
1981 SC 760 held that even for history
sheeters who have the necessary criminal
history the information about the history
sheet and the surveillance has to be kept
discreet and confidential that cannot be
shared with public and there is no
question of posting the photographs of
history sheeters even at police stations.

19. The Supreme Court in People's
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs.
Union of India and another reported in
1997 (1) SCC 301 examined the issue
with
regard
to
availability
of
a
fundamental right of privacy. The Apex
Court discussed the concept and held as
under:-

"12.Both sides have relied upon
the seven-Judge Bench judgment of this
Court in Kharak Singh Vs. State of U.P.
The question for consideration before this
Court was whether "surveillance" under
Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations
constituted an infringement of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III
of the Constitution. Regulation 236(b)
which
permitted
surveillance
by
"domiciliary visits at night" was held to be
violative of Article 21 on the ground that
there was no "law" under which the said
regulation could be justified.

13. The word "life" and the
expression "personal liberty" in Article 21
were elaborately considered by this Court
in Kharak Singh's case. The majority read
"right to privacy" as part of the right to life
under Article 21 of the Constitution on the
following reasoning:

"We have already extracted a
passage from the judgment of Field, J. in
Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U.S. 113, 142,
where the learned Judge Pointed out that
"life" in the 5th and 14th Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution corresponding to
Article 21, means not merely the right to
the continuance of a person's animal
existence, but a right to the possession of
each of his organs-his arms and legs etc.
We do not entertain any doubt that the word
"life" in Article 21 bears the same
signification. Is then the word "personal
liberty" to be construed as excluding from
its purview an invasion on the part of the
police of the sanctity of a man's home and
an intrusion into his personal security and
his right to sleep which is the normal
7 All. In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The City of Lucknow Vs. State of U.P.
143
comfort and a dire necessity for human
existence even as an animal? It might not
be inappropriate to refer here to the words
of the preamble to the Constitution that it is
designed to "assure the dignity of the
individual" and therefore of those cherished
human value as the means of ensuring his
full development and evolution. We are
referring to these objectives of the trainers
merely to draw attention to the concepts
underlying the Constitution which would
point to such vital words as "personal
liberty" having to be construed in a
reasonable manner and to be attributed
that sense which would promote and
achieve those objectives and by no means
to stretch the meaning of the phrase to
square with any preconceived notions or
doctrinaire
constitutional
theories.
Frankfurter,
J.
observed
in
Wolfs.
Colorado:

'The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause. The knock at the door,
whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a
search without authority of law but solely on
the authority of the police, did not need the
commentary
of
recent
history
to
be
condemned
as
inconsistent
with
the
conception of human rights enshrined in the
history
and
the
basic
constitutional
documents of English-speaking peoples We
have no hesitation in saying that were a State
affirmatively
to
sanction
such
police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to
the guaranty of the fourteenth Amendment.'

Murphy, J. considered that such
invasion was against "the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty.

It is true that in the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court from which we have
made these extracts, the Court had to
consider also the impact of a violation of the
Fourth Amendment which reads :

'The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.'

and that our Constitution does
not in terms confer any like constitutional
guarantee. Nevertheless, these extracts
would show that an unauthorised intrusion
into a person's home and the disturbance
caused to him thereby, is as it were the
violation of a common law right of a manan ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if
not of the very concept of civilisation. An
English Common Law maxim asserts that
"every man's house is his castle" and in
Semayne's case (1604) 5 Coke 91, where
this was applied, it was stated that "the
house of everyone is to him as his castle
and fortress as well as for his defence
against injury and violence as for his
repose". We are not unmindful of the fact
that Semayne's case was concerned with
the law relating to executions in England,
but the passage extracted has a validity
quite apart from the context of the
particular
decision.
It
embodies
an
abiding principle which transcends mere
protection of property rights and expounds
a concept of "personal liberty" which does
not rest on any element of feudalism or on
any theory of freedom which has ceased to
be of value.
144 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

In our view Clause (b) of
Regulation 236 is plainly violative of
Article 21 and as there is no "law" on
which the same could be justified it must
be struck down as unconstitutional."

14. Subba Rao J. (as the learned
Judge then was) in his minority opinion
also came to the conclusion that right to
privacy was a part of Article 21 of the
Constitution but went a step further and
struck down Regulation 236 as a whole on
the following reasoning:

"Further, the right to personal
liberty takes in not only a right to be free
from restrictions placed on his movements,
but also free from encroachments on his
private life. It is true our Constitution does
not expressly declare a right to privacy as a
fundamental right, but the said right is an
essential ingredient of personal liberty.
Every
democratic
country
sanctifies
domestic life; it is expected to give him rest,
physical happiness, peace of mind and
security. In the last resort, a person's
house, where he lives with his family, is his
"castle":
it
is
his
rampart
against
encroachment on his personal liberty. The
pregnant words of that famous Judge,
Frankfurter J., in Wolfv. Colorado, (1949)
338 US 25, pointing out the importance of
the security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police, could
have no less application to an Indian home
as to an American one. If physical
restraints on a person's movements affect
his
personal
liberty,
physical
encroachments on his private life would
affect it in a larger degree. Indeed, nothing
is more deleterious to a man's physical
happiness and health than a calculated
interference with his privacy. We would,
therefore, define the right of personal
liberty in Article 21 as a right of an
individual to be free from restriction or
encroachments on his person, whether
those restriction or encroachments are
directly imposed or indirectly brought
about by calculated measures. If so
understood, all the acts of surveillance
under
Regulation
236
infringe
the
fundamental right of the petitioner under
Article 21 of the Constitution."

15. Article 21 of the Constitution
has, therefore, been interpreted by all the
seven learned Judges in Kharak Singh's
case (majority and the minority opinions)
to include that "right to privacy" is a part
of the right to "protection of life and
personal liberty" guaranteed under the said
Article.

16. In Gobind Vs. State of U.P., a
three-Judge Bench of this Court considered
the constitutional validity of Regulations
855 and 856 of the Madhya Pradesh Police
Regulations which provided surveillance by
way of several measures indicated in the
said regulations. This Court upheld the
validity of the regulations by holding that
Article 21 was not violated because the
impugned regulations were "procedure
established by law" in terms of the said
Article.

17. In R. Rajagopal alias R.R.
Gopal and another v. State of Tamil Nadu ,
Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for the Court
observed that in recent times right to
privacy has acquired constitutional status.
The learned Judge referred to Kharak's
case, Govind's case and considered a large
number of American and English cases and
finally came to the conclusion that "the
right to privacy is implicit in the right to
life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of
this country by Article 21. It is a "right to
be let alone". A citizen has a right "to
7 All. In Re: Banners placed on roadside In The City of Lucknow Vs. State of U.P.
145
safeguard the privacy of his own, his
family, marriage, procreation, motherhood,
child-bearing and education among other
matters".

8.
We
have,
therefore,
no
hesitation in holding that right to privacy is
a part of the right to "life" and "personal
liberty" enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Once the facts in a given case
constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is
attracted. The said right cannot be
curtailed "except according to procedure
established by law".

20. The issue again came up before a
three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.)
and another Vs. Union of India and
others, 2015 (8) SCC 735, the Bench
referred the issue for its crystallization by a
larger Bench. Accordingly, a Bench of nine
Judges examined the entire issue.

21. The Supreme Court in its
historical
judgment
in
Justice
K.P.
Puttaswamy and others Vs. Union of India
and others reported in AIR 2017 SC 4161
affirmed the constitutional right to privacy.
It declared privacy an intrinsic component
of Part III of Constitution of India that lays
down our fundamental rights relating to
equality, freedom of speech and expression,
freedom of movement and protection of life
and personal liberty. These fundamental
rights cannot be given or taken away by
law and laws. All the executive actions
must abide by them. The Supreme Court
has however, clarified that like most other
fundamental rights the right to privacy is
not "absolute right". A persons privacy
interests
can
be
overridden
by
compounding state and individual interests
subject to satisfaction to certain tests and
bench marks. The nine Judges Bench
noticed certain tests and bench marks,
which
are
liability,
legitimate
goal,
proportionately and procedural guarantees.

22. We have examined the action of
the State under consideration in the instant
matter by the touch stones aforesaid. So far
as legality part is concerned, suffice to state
that no law is in existence permitting the
State to place the banners with personal
data
of
the
accused
from
whom
compensation is to be charged. The
legitimate goal as held by the Supreme
Court in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy
(supra) the proposed action must be
necessary for a democratic society for a
legitimate aim. On scaling, the act of the
State in the instant matter, we do not find
any necessity for a democratic society for a
legitimate aim to have publication of
personal data and identity. The accused
persons are the accused from whom some
compensation is to be recovered and in no
manner
they
are
fugitive.
Learned
Advocate General also failed to satisfy us
as to why placement of the banners is
necessary for a democratic society for a
legitimate aim.

23. The third test is that there should
be rational nexus between the object and
means adopted to achieve them and further
that how the extent of interference is
proportionate to its need. The object as
disclosed to us is only to deter the people
from participating in illegal activities. On
asking, learned Advocate General failed to
satisfy us as to why the personal data of
few persons have been placed on banners
though in the State of Uttar Pradesh there
are lakhs of accused persons who are facing
serious
allegations
pertaining
to
commission of crimes whose personal
details have not been subjected to publicity.
As a matter of fact, the placement of
146 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
personal data of selected persons reflects
colorable exercise of powers by the
Executive.

24. In entirety, we are having no
doubt that the action of the State which is
subject matter of this public interest
litigation is nothing but an unwarranted
interference in privacy of people. The same
hence, is in violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.

25.

Accordingly,
the
District
Magistrate,
Lucknow
and
the
Commissioner
of
Police,
Lucknow
Commissionerate, Lucknow are directed to
remove the banners from the road side
forthwith. The State of Uttar Pradesh is
directed not to place such banners on road
side containing personal data of individuals
without having authority of law.

26.

A
report
of
satisfactory
compliance is required to be submitted by
the District Magistrate, Lucknow to the
Registrar General of this Court on or before
16th March, 2020. On receiving such
compliance report, the proceedings of this
petition shall stand closed.
----------
(2020)07ILR A146
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 23.07.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIRENDRA KUMAR-II, J.

Second Appeal No. 7 of 2008

Krishna Chandra & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Sarju Dei (died) & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
D.C. Mukerjee, Mohammad Aslam Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.K. Mehrotra, Anurag Srivastava, I.D.
Shukla, Ishwar Dutt Shukla, Santosh Kumar
Mehrotra

Civil
Law
-
Adverse
Possession
-
Possession of defendants on disputed
portion 227-A and 227-C is "permissive
possession"
based
on
"implied
permission/license" given by plaintiff.
Hence defendants have not perfected their
title on the basis of alleged adverse
possession. (Para 141(ix))

D.W. 3 has also accepted that plaintiff, Durga
Prasad, is receiving rent from tenants of
aforesaid house. He never received rent from
tenants of aforesaid house. It is pertinent to
mention here that the entry/access of plaintiffs
in
disputed
house
was
never
restricted/prohibited in disputed house was
never
restricted/prohibited
from
common
portions of disputed house. Defendants are
unable to prove and plead specifically that when
and at which time possession of defendants of
disputed portions of house became adverse to
title of plaintiffs. (Para 141 (x))

(a) Substantial question of law cannot be
formulated only to appreciate and analyze
a
piece
of
evidence/documentary
evidence. (Para 140)

(b) Period of Limitation - Limitation Act,
1908: Articles 104, 136 137, 138, 140,
141, 142, 144 and 47 - Limitation Act,
1963: Articles 64, 65 - Provisions of
Article 142 and 144 of Old Act and Article
65 of New Act. Article 142 and 144 of Old
Act and Article 65 of New Act prescribe
period of limitation 12 years from the
period/ the date of the dispossession or
discontinuance and when the possession
of the defendant becomes adverse to the
plaintiff. (Para 127)

Since
the
respondents/plaintiffs
were
not
dispossess
by
the
appellants,
and
the
defendants/appellants
are
only
claiming
themselves as co-sharers of the disputed house,