# Indal Kumar Kushwaha and another v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others

- **Citation:** (2007) 3 ILRA 637
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2007-09-07
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 20 of 1996
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/indal-kumar-kushwaha-and-another-v-rajesh-kumar-gupta-and-others-41027
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure section 100-
second appeal- scope for interference-
concurrent
findings
of
fact-
wrong
appreciation
of
evidence-
even
mandatory provisions of section 20
overlooked by both the Courts below-
finding regarding compliance of section
16(c) perverse- sufficient ground for
interference with concurrent finding of
facts.

Held: Para 27

The instances are innumerable where
despite
such
need
and
necessity
warranting such interference, second
appellate court mechanically declined to
interfere, the matter has been relegated
by this Court to the second appellate
court to objectively deal with the claims
of the parties keeping in view the
parameters
of
consideration
for
interference under Section 100 C.P.C. In
the instant appeal the courts below have
overlooked the mandatory provision of
Section 20 of the Act and at the same
time misapplied the statutory provisions
of the Ceiling Act. The findings on the
issue of compliance of the Section 16(c)
of the Act are also perverse. Therefore,
the second appellate court is competent
to interfere especially when the appeal
raises substantial questions of law.
Case law discussed:
JT 1995(5) 553
AIR 1987 SC 2328
JT 2002(5) SC 357
JT 1995(3) SC 614
2003 AWC2587
1982 AWC 709
AIR 1978 SC 537
AIR 1997 SC 1751

## Text

3 All] Indal Kumar Kushwaha and another V. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others
637
APPEALLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.09.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Second Appeal No. 20 of 1996

Indal Kumar Kushwaha and another

...Defendants/Appellants
Versus.
Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others

...Plaintiffs/Respondents

Counsel for the Appelants:
Sri. Sankata Rai
Sri. Arvind Srivastava
Sri. A.K. Singh
Sri R.P. Dubey
Sri. H.N. Singh
Sri. Manish Kumar Nigam
Sri. P.K. Srivastava
Sri. B.N. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri T.P. Singh
Sri S.P. Shukla
Sri Siddarth Singh

Code of Civil Procedure section 100-
second appeal- scope for interference-
concurrent
findings
of
fact-
wrong
appreciation
of
evidence-
even
mandatory provisions of section 20
overlooked by both the Courts below-
finding regarding compliance of section
16(c) perverse- sufficient ground for
interference with concurrent finding of
facts.

Held: Para 27

The instances are innumerable where
despite
such
need
and
necessity
warranting such interference, second
appellate court mechanically declined to
interfere, the matter has been relegated
by this Court to the second appellate
court to objectively deal with the claims
of the parties keeping in view the
parameters
of
consideration
for
interference under Section 100 C.P.C. In
the instant appeal the courts below have
overlooked the mandatory provision of
Section 20 of the Act and at the same
time misapplied the statutory provisions
of the Ceiling Act. The findings on the
issue of compliance of the Section 16(c)
of the Act are also perverse. Therefore,
the second appellate court is competent
to interfere especially when the appeal
raises substantial questions of law.
Case law discussed:
JT 1995(5) 553
AIR 1987 SC 2328
JT 2002(5) SC 357
JT 1995(3) SC 614
2003 AWC2587
1982 AWC 709
AIR 1978 SC 537
AIR 1997 SC 1751

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)

1. This second appeal has been
preferred by the defendants of Original
No. 210 of 1984 (Achchey Lal Gupta and
others Vs. Indra Kumar Kushwaha and
others)
after
the
suit
for
specific
performance of the agreement to sell had
been decreed against them by the two
Courts below.

2. The defendants Indra Kumar
Kushwaha and Raja Ram Kushwaha were
undisputedly
the
Bhoomidhars
with
transferable rights in possession of the
following plots of land situate in Tafsil
Jail Waka Mauja Banakteechak, Tappa
Kasba, Pargana Haweli, Tehsil Sadar,
District Gorakhpur :
Arazi No.

Rakba
15

-0-9-1/2
16

-12-1/2
17

-9-9-
18

-32-3-
19

-2-7-
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
20

-25-2-
25

-6-6-

------------------

Total 90 Desimal

-------------------

3. In the suit instituted by plaintiffs
it is said that the aforesaid two defendants
were in need of money and, therefore,
they executed an agreement to sell the
aforesaid land on 7.7.1973 in favour of
the Shiv Poojan and Achche Lal Gupta
for
a
total
sale
consideration
of
Rs.70,000/-, out of which Rs.10,000/- was
paid in advance and the balance of
Rs.60,000/- was payable at the time of the
execution of the sale deed. The sale deed
could not be executed as there was a ban
on the registration of the sale deeds in
U.P. at the relevant time and, therefore, it
was stipulated that the sale deed would be
executed within three months of the
lifting of the ban. The aforesaid Shiv
Poojan Gupta died sometime in July
1976. Thereafter, his successors and
Achche Lal Gupta by a registered notice
dated 13/14/2/1984 called upon the
defendants to execute the sale deed in
pursuance of the agreement. The said
notice
was
served
upon
the
two
defendants on 15.2.1984 and 17.2.1984
respectively. The plaintiffs-respondents
after the aforesaid notice approached the
defendants-appellants in the first week of
March 1984 along with the balance sale
consideration for the execution of the sale
deed but the defendants-appellants paid
no heed. The plaintiffs-respondents as
well as their predecessor in the interest
were always ready and willing to perform
their part of the contract but the
defendants-appellants failed to execute
the sale deed. Therefore, the suit for
specific performance.

4.

The
defendants-appellants
contested the suit by filing a joint written
statement accepting the execution of the
agreement to sell dated 7.7.1973 and
having received a sum of Rs.10,000/- as
earnest money but rest of the plaint
allegations were denied. In the additional
pleas it was stated as the Government was
contemplating to bring out a legislation
providing for the ceiling and regulation of
urban land, a ban on the registration of the
sale deeds was imposed. Therefore, on
account of the said ban it was agreed that
the sale deed would be got executed
within three months of the lifting of the
ban. The ban was only up to 31.12.1975
and it ceased to operate thereafter.
However, the plaintiffs-respondents or
their predecessor in interest never came
forward to perform their part of the
contract and to get the sale deed executed
as per the agreement. Accordingly, after
three months of the lifting of the ban from
31.12.1975 the agreement lapsed and the
defendants-appellants were set at liberty
to transfer the land in favour of third
party. There was no stipulation under the
agreement that the defendants-appellants
would have to take permission for the sale
from any Government department. The
suit for specific performance after expiry
of more than 11 years of the agreement is
not only barred by time but also
inequitable and as such no decree of
specific performance of the agreement is
liable to be passed.

5. The parties adduced evidence.
The suit was decreed vide judgment and
order dated 12.12.1989 and the appeal
was dismissed on 16.11.1995. Aggrieved
by the decree of the specific performance
so passed by the courts below, the
defendants-appellants have preferred this
second appeal.
3 All] Indal Kumar Kushwaha and another V. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others
639

6. At the admission stage, the
following substantial questions of law
were formulated:

1. Whether the suit was barred by
time?;
2.
Whether the suit was barred by
Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief
Act ?;
3. Whether the courts below erred in
granting
the
relief
of
specific
performance ignoring the provisions
of Section 20 of the Specific Relief
Act ?

7. During the pendency of this
appeal the defendant-appellant No. 1
Indra Kumar Kushwaha died and his heirs
and legal representatives were substituted
vide courts' order dated 18.6.2006.

8. I have heard Sri H.N. Singh,
assisted by Sri M.K. Nigam and Sri A.K.
Singh, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants and Sri T.P.
Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri
Siddharth Singh for the respondents.

9. A perusal of the agreement to sell
on record as paper No. 90-Ka makes it
clear that the defendants-appellants had
agreed to transfer the land on a total sale
consideration of Rs.70,000/-. On account
of the ban on the registration of the sale
deeds a sum of Rs. 10,000/- only was paid
in advance and the balance was agreed to
be
payable
at
the
time
of
the
execution/registration of the sale deed. It
was
specifically
stipulated
in
the
agreement that Shiv Poojan Gupta and
Achchey Lal Gupta would get the sale
deed executed within three months of the
lifting of the ban on the registration of the
sale deed otherwise the defendantsappellants would be at liberty to sell the
land to any other person and the earnest
money
would
stand
forfeited.
The
relevant part of the agreement containing
the above conditions is reproduced below:

"jftLVah [kqyus ds rhu ekg ds vUnj Jh f'ko iwtu xqIrk o
Jh vPNs yky xqIrk jftLVah djk ysxsaA vU;Fkk ge viuh
tehu fdlh vU; O;fDr ds gkFk cspus esa LorU= gksxsaA ,slh
gkyr esa :i;k c;kuk okilh ds ftEesnkjh ge eqfdjku ij
ugha gksxhA"

The agreement as such stipulated to
get the sale deed executed within three
months of the lifting of the ban. There
was
no
condition
for
taking
any
permission from any department before
the execution of the sale deed. Under the
agreement no responsibility was fixed
upon the defendants-appellants to take
initiative to get the sale executed, once the
ban
was
over.
The
intention
was
otherwise. The responsibility to act was
upon
the
plaintiffs-respondents
who
wanted the sale deed.

10. Learned counsel for the
appellant argued that the ban on the
registration of the sale deed expired on
31.12.1975. The plaintiffs-respondents or
their predecessor in interest took no steps
and showed no initiative to perform their
part of the contract so as to get the sale
deed executed after that. Accordingly, as
per the terms of the agreement the time
stipulated for getting the sale expired on
31.3.1976 whereupon no right survived in
favour of the plaintiff-respondents to get
the sale deed executed. The silence on the
part of the plaintiff respondents between
1.4.1976 till the date of notice i.e.
14.2.1984 itself establishes beyond any
doubt that they were never ready and
willing to perform their obligation under
the contract and to get the sale deed
executed.
The
courts
below
thus
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
committed manifest error of law in
decreeing
the
suit
for
specific
performance and at the same time failed
to exercise its discretion under Section 20
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He also
canvassed that the suit was patently
barred by time and could not have been
decreed.

11. In reply to the above argument
Sri
T.P.
Singh,
Senior
Advocate
submitted
that
the
matter
stands
concluded by findings of fact, which have
been concurrently recorded by the Courts
below and therefore, neither the High
Court has power to interfere in the second
appeal nor the appeal has any substance.

12. All the substantial questions of
law formulated at the time of admission
of the appeal are interlinked and are
dependent upon one another. Therefore,
all of them are being dealt together.

13. The provisions of Section 16 and
20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(hereinafter referred to as an Act) are very
relevant and material for adjudicating the
above controversy. Section 16 of the Act
in sub clause (c) provides that specific
performance of the contract cannot be
enforced in favour of the person who fails
to "aver and prove" that he has performed
or has 'always' been "ready and willing"
to perform the essential terms of the
contract which are to be performed by
him according to the true construction of
the agreement. At the same time Section
20 of the Act makes its discretionary upon
the Court to grant or not to grant a decree
for specific performance but the said
discretion is exercisable on sound and
reasonable judicial principles. Article 54
of the Limitation Act, 1963 which
governs the filing of the suit for specific
performance lays down the limitation for
instituting such a suit to be three years
from the date fixed for the performance or
if no such date is fixed three years from
the date when the performance of the
agreement is refused.

14. The legal position that emerges
from the above provisions is well settled.
First, there has to be an averment and
proof
of
continuous
readiness
and
willingness on part of the plaintiff to
perform his agreement. Secondly, the
Court is not bound to decree every suit for
specific performance even if there is an
agreement and it is lawful to do so and the
Court is vested with the power to exercise
its discretion on equitable consideration
for which conduct of the parties play an
important role. Thirdly, the limitation for
initiating a suit for specific performance is
three years from the date fixed for the
performance or where no such date is
fixed from the date the performance was
refused.

15. The Supreme Court in JT 1995
(5) SC 553 N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by
Lrs. Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao &
Ors. laid down that relief of specific
performance is discretionary in nature and
continuous readiness and willingness is a
condition precedent to grant such a relief.
In other words, continuous readiness and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff
must be proved from the date of the
agreement till the institution of the suit. In
AIR 1987 SC 2328 Parakunnan Veetill
Joseph's Son Mathew Vs. Nedumbara
Kuruvila's Son and others, the Supreme
Court has held that the Court is not bound
to grant the relief of specific performance
merely because it considers it lawful to do
so but has to meticulously consider all the
facts and circumstances and has to
3 All] Indal Kumar Kushwaha and another V. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others
641
exercise discretion while granting or
refusing the same. It is also the duty of the
Court to see that the litigation should not
be used as an instrument of oppression to
have an unfair advantage. The same view
has been expressed by the Supreme Court
in JT 2002 (5) SC 357 Veluyudhan
Sathyadas Vs. Govindan Dakshyani. It
has
been
laid
down
that
mere
establishment of the agreement to sell is
not sufficient to grant the relief for
specific performance and the Court
always has a discretion in this regard. In
another case JT 1995 (3) SC 614 S.V.R.
Mudaliar (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. Vs.
Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari (Dead) by Lrs.
& Ors., the Supreme Court ruled that in
exercising the discretionary power under
Section 20 of the Act, the conduct of the
parties
is
relevant
and
of
utmost
important.

16. It is an admitted position that
that land in dispute involved in the
present case is a Bhumidhari land. It has
been described by the plaintiff himself in
the plaint as Bhumidhari land. It has also
been recorded as Bhumidhari land which
means agricultural land. There are no
pleadings or material on record to show
that the said land or any part thereof has
been declared to be non agricultural in
nature under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A.
& L.R. Act. It is settled position that an
agricultural land would continue to an
agricultural in nature unless officially
notified to be non agricultural in nature
under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R.
Act. Therefore, even though part of it may
have been put to Abadi use, it shall
remain to be an agricultural land in the
absence of a notification under Section
143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act.

17. My aforesaid view finds support
from a decision of this Court reported in
2000(3) AWC 2587 Anirudha Kumar
and another Vs. Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority, U.P., Allahabad
and another wherein the Court held that
an agricultural land cannot be treated to
be a residential plot until there is a
declaration under Section 143 of the
UPZA & LR Act.

18. Section 26 of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(hereinafter referred to as Ceiling Act)
stipulates for giving notice to the
competent authority before transferring
any 'vacant land' within the ceiling limit
whereupon the competent authority would
have the first option to purchase the same
on behalf of the State Government. In
other words, this is the provision which
has been relied upon for obtaining
permission of the competent authority
before making any transfer of the 'vacant
land' on the enforcement of the Ceiling
Act. 'Vacant land' has been defined in
Section 2 (q) of the Ceiling Act, which
says 'vacant land' means land, not being
land mainly used for the purpose of
agriculture. Therefore, land used for
agricultural purpose cannot be a 'vacant
land'. In 1982 AWC 709 State of U.P.
Vs. Satyabir Singh and another, the
High Court has held that the land used for
the purpose of agriculture as per the
revenue entries cannot be said to be an
urban or vacant land and, therefore, no
application is required to be moved under
Section 26 before transferring the same.

19. In view of the above facts and
circumstances, the land in dispute being
Bhoomidhari land recorded as such would
remain to be an agricultural land on which
the provisions of Section 26 of the Ceiling
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
Act would not be applicable, even though
a small part of it may have been in use as
an
Abadi
land.
Accordingly,
the
conclusion is safe that after the expiry of
the ban on registration of the sale deeds
w.e.f. 31.12.1975 there remained no rider
or any clog upon the plaintiffs to get sale
deed executed in accordance with the
agreement to sell.

20. Undisputedly the ban on
registration of the sale deeds was only
upto 31.12.1975. Thereafter Urban Land
(Ceiling
and
Regulation)
Act
was
enforced w.e.f. 17.2.1976. The said Act
vide Section 26 provided for obtaining
permission from the competent authority
before executing any sale deed in respect
of 'vacant land' within the ceiling limit.
Thus, between 1.1.1976 to 16.2.1976,
there has neither any ban on the execution
and registration of the sale deeds nor there
was any statutory requirement for taking
the permission from any competent
authority for executing the sale deeds. It is
also evident from the oral evidence on
record that the plaintiff-respondents never
took initiative during the above period to
get the sale deed executed.

21. The evidence on record further
establishes that even on the cessation of
ban and on the enforcement of the Ceiling
Act w.e.f. 17.2.1976, the plaintiffsrespondents took no steps to get the sale
deed executed at least till 13/14.2.1984
when for the first time a notice in writing
was given calling upon the defendantsappellants to execute the sale deed. No
request was ever made by them during
this period for obtaining permission for
sale if necessary in view of Section 26 of
the Ceiling Act. Thus, they were totally
oblivious of the agreement to sell in their
favour and impliedly waived and gave up
their rights under the agreement by their
inaction and conduct.

22. Thus, the plaintiffs-respondents
neither come forwarded between 1.1.1976
to 16.2.1976 nor thereafter to get the sale
deed executed. It was for the first time on
13/14.2.1984 that a notice was given to
the defendants-appellants to execute the
sale
deed.
Accordingly,
there
was
complete inaction or silence on part of the
plaintiffs- respondents to perform their
part of the contract so as to get the sale
deed executed. Therefore, they cannot be
regarded
as
persons
who
were
continuously ready and willing to perform
their part of the obligation. Moreover,
inordinate delay in the institution of the
suit i.e. after 11 years of the agreement is
also sufficient in itself to disentitle them
to the discretionary relief of specific
performance.

23. The Supreme Court in AIR 1978
SC 537 Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Vs.
Smt. Sudha Rani Debi, observed that in
a suit for specific performance of contract
for sale of immovable property it is
incumbent
upon
the
plaintiff
to
affirmatively establish that all throughout
he/she was willing to perform his/her part
of the contract and where there is in
ordinate delay on part of the plaintiff to
perform his/her part of the contract, the
Courts would be perfectly justified in
refusing
the
decree
for
specific
performance. It means that even if the suit
is within time, the relief of specific
performance can be denied, if there is
unexplained delay on part of the plaintiff
in performing his part of the contract. In
1997 SC 1751 K. S. Vidyanadam and
others Vs. Vairavan, the Supreme Court
held that total inaction on part of the
purchaser
for
two
and
half
years
3 All] Indal Kumar Kushwaha and another V. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others
643
amounted to delay which was sufficient
enough to deny him the relief for specific
performance. In this case the purchaser
i.e. the plaintiff remained quiet from the
date of the agreement till the date of
issuing notice before instituting the suit
and had not taken any steps to perform his
part of the agreement. In the said
situation, the Supreme Court held that
even though time may not be the essence
of the contract it would be inequitable to
grant the relief of specific performance as
delay has brought about a situation where
it becomes inequitable to do so. In a
similar situation, the Supreme Court in
another case reported in AIR 1997 SC
2702 Tajram Vs. Patirambhan, refused
to grant specific performance of an
assessment in a suit instituted after a gap
of 3 years of the agreement though the
suit was brought within time on the last
day of the limitation. In this case the
plaintiff had remained passive for three
years and did nothing for the completion
of the contract.

24. The aforesaid authorities fully
supports the case of the defendantappellants. In the case at hand, the
plaintiffs-respondents
have
remained
dormant not only for two or three years
but for more than 10 years. They have
only
advanced
a
merge
sum
of
Rs.10,000/-
as
part
of
the
sale
consideration in the year 1973 and at least
till March 1984 never cared to tender the
balance amount of Rs.60,000/-. The
plaintiffs- respondents can not peg the
value of land in this way and hold the
defendants- respondents at ransom for the
whole of the life from dealing with their
land. Therefore, ex facie in the era of
rising demand for land and increase in
prices of immovable property it is highly
inequitable to grant a decree of specific
performance of the agreement of the year
1973 in a suit instituted in 1984.

25. Thus, in the light of the above
discussions, I find that in the present case
the plaintiffs-respondents have first of all
failed to prove their continuous readiness
and willingness to perform their part of
the contract. They admittedly never come
forward to get the sale deed executed
immediately after lifting of the ban on
1.1.1976 till 16.2.1976 when the Urban
Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976
was enforced. Subsequently, there was a
complete silence on their part to perform
as per the agreement even thereafter i.e.
from 17.2.1976
to
13/14.2.1984 as
admittedly notice to execute the sale deed
was
given
for
the
first
time
in
13/14.2.1984. During this period there
was no positive step on their part. The
plea that they waited for the defendants to
obtain permission under section 26 of the
Act and for the provision of permission
being deleted is also not tenable. They
had waited from February 1976 till
February
1984
for
the
defendantsappellants to take permission i.e. for 8
years. There is no reason or explanation
for such a long wait. The complete
inaction
on
part
of
the
plaintiffsrespondents to perform their part of the
agreement during the above period of
about 11 years alone is more than enough
for
refusing
the
relief
of
specific
performance.

26. In view of the above discussion,
the findings of the courts below on
compliance of Section 16 (c) of the Act
are not only perverse and one sided but
have been returned by applying incorrect
principles of law. They are accordingly
reversed. Both the Courts below while
granting decree of specific performance
644 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
have not adhered to the provisions of
Section 20 of the Act. No reasons have
been assigned for granting such a decree
in such a belated instituted suit.

27. The submission that concurrent
finding of fact cannot be disturbed in
second appeal is not tenable under the
facts and circumstances of the instant
case. In JT 2001 (6) SC 591 Shri
Hafazat Hussain Vs. Abdul Majeed, the
Apex Court observed that it has been
repeatedly pointed out by this Court that
concurrent findings recorded by the trial
court as well as the first appellate court on
proper appreciation of the materials on
record should not be disturbed by the
High Court while exercising jurisdiction
in second appeal, but at the same time, it
is not an absolute rule to be applied
universally and invariably since the
exceptions to the same also were often
indicated with equal importance by this
Court. The instances are innumerable
where despite such need and necessity
warranting such interference, second
appellate court mechanically declined to
interfere, the matter has been relegated by
this Court to the second appellate court to
objectively deal with the claims of the
parties keeping in view the parameters of
consideration
for
interference
under
Section 100 C.P.C. In the instant appeal
the courts below have overlooked the
mandatory provision of Section 20 of the
Act and at the same time misapplied the
statutory provisions of the Ceiling Act.
The findings on the issue of compliance
of the Section 16(c) of the Act are also
perverse. Therefore, the second appellate
court is competent to interfere especially
when
the
appeal
raises
substantial
questions of law.

28. Since the substantial questions
of law No. 2 and 3 as formulated at the
admission of the appeal are sufficient to
decide the appeal, I do not consider it
necessary to dwell on the first substantial
question of law with regard to suit being
barred by time.

29. Accordingly the appeal is
allowed. The judgment and orders passed
by the Courts below dated 16.11.1995
passed in Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1992
(Indal Kumar and another Vs. Achchey
Lal and others) and judgment and order
dated 12.12.1989 passed in Original Suit
No. 210 of 1984 (Achchey Lal Gupta and
others Vs. Indal Kumar Kushwaha and
others) and the consequential decree of
specific performance of the agreement are
set
aside.
The
suit
for
specific
performance is dismissed. No order as to
costs.

Appeal Allowed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.08.2007

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AMITAVA LALA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHISHIR KUMAR, J.

F.A.F.O. No. 47 of 2006

The New India Insurance Co. Ltd.

...Claimants
Versus
Smt. Sheela Devi and others

 ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri K.S. Amist
Sri V.C. Dixit

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri K.B. Dixit
Sri R.K. Porwal