# Iqrar Ahmad Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2021) 2 ILRA 508
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-02-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 144 of 2021
- **Bench:** Vivek Varma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/iqrar-ahmad-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-46840
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 401/397 -
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 - Section
138-cheque
dishonoured-convictionparties
arrived
at
a
compromiserevisionist does not take effective steps to
compound the offence at initial stagesHowever, compounding of offence under
N. I. Act is no more res integra and the
offences can be compounded on any stage
of proceedings-the court allowed the
revision subject to payment of Rs. 5000/-
as cost to opposite party.(Para 4,7,12)

B. The petitioner had already entered into a
compromise with a complainant and the
complainant had appeared and stated that the
entire money had been received by him and he
had no objection if the conviction already
recorded u/s 138 of the Act is set aside. Once a
person is allowed to compound a case u/s 147
of the N. I. Act, the conviction u/s 138 of the
Act, should also be set aside.(Para 8)

The revision is allowed. ( E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

508 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and others Vs. State of M.P. Decided,
(2011) 5 SCR 300 which have to be also
kept in mind.

24. We have relied on the decision of
Kushal Rao (supra) to come to the conclusion
that the dying declaration has been rightly
and properly made the basis of punishing the
accused. The judgment in Maheshwar Tigga
(supra) will not come to the aid of the
accused as the facts are quite different.

25. From the aforesaid discussion, three
things emerge that it was homicidal death; the
author of the said offences were the
appellants but the injuries and the motives
were not such that the accused wanted to do
away with the deceased; and the evidence on
record will permit us to listen punishment to
the lower decree namely under Section 304 to
Part -I for a period of ten years. The default
sentence is maintained. If the accused have
completed ten years of incarceration, they be
set free. If they have not paid the fine, the
default sentence shall begin after ten years.

26. The appeal is partly allowed. Both
the accused are held guilty of offences
punishable under Section 304 Part-I read with
34 of IPC.

27. Record and proceedings be sent
back to the Court below forthwith.
----------
(2021)02ILR A508
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK VARMA, J.

Criminal Revision No. 144 of 2021

Iqrar Ahmad ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Ishwar Chandra Tyagi, Sri Anmol Kumar
Dubey

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 401/397 -
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 - Section
138-cheque
dishonoured-convictionparties
arrived
at
a
compromiserevisionist does not take effective steps to
compound the offence at initial stagesHowever, compounding of offence under
N. I. Act is no more res integra and the
offences can be compounded on any stage
of proceedings-the court allowed the
revision subject to payment of Rs. 5000/-
as cost to opposite party.(Para 4,7,12)

B. The petitioner had already entered into a
compromise with a complainant and the
complainant had appeared and stated that the
entire money had been received by him and he
had no objection if the conviction already
recorded u/s 138 of the Act is set aside. Once a
person is allowed to compound a case u/s 147
of the N. I. Act, the conviction u/s 138 of the
Act, should also be set aside.(Para 8)

The revision is allowed. ( E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

1. K.M. Ibrahim Vs K.P. Mohammad & anr.
(2010) 1 SCC 798

2. Damodar S. Prabhu Vs Sayed Babalal
H.(2010) 5 SCC 663

3. Meters & Instruments Pvt. Ltd. & anr. Vs
Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Varma, J.)

1. This revision has been filed against
the judgment and order dated 9.12.2020
2 All. Iqrar Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
509
passed by Additional District and Sessions
Judge/
Special
Judge
(SC/ST
Act),
Amroha/ J.P. Nagar in Criminal Appeal
No. 18 of 2018 (Iqrar Ahmad vs. State of
U.P.), whereby the judgment and sentence
dated
6.7.2018
passed
by
Judicial
Magistrate, Hasanpur Amroha/ J.P. Nagar
has been confirmed.

2. The revisionist/applicant has been
convicted under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act and awarded sentence to
undergo simple imprisonment of three
months and also to pay a fine of
Rs.1,35,000/-, in default, to suffer further
simple imprisonment for three months.

3. In brief, the proceedings under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act were initiated against the revisionist
with the allegation that cheque no.77163
dated 10.1.2012 for a sum of Rs.1,35,000/-
issued by the revisionist was dishonoured
on account of insufficient funds. The
opposite party no.2 filed a complaint case
before the Judicial Magistrate, Hasanpur
Amroha/ J.P. Nagar, under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act. The
proceedings of the case, ultimately resulted
in order of conviction. Against the order of
conviction an appeal was preferred and the
appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the
revisionist and confirmed the judgment.

4. Learned counsel for the revisionist
submits that now the rival parties have
sorted out their dispute and have arrived at
a
compromise.
In
this
regard,
a
compromise deed dated 11.12.2020 has
been annexed as Annexure SA-1 to the
supplementary affidavit.

5. Learned counsel for the opposite
party no.2 has filed a short counter affidavit
and stated that he had received the entire
cheque amount of Rs.1,35,000/- and does
not
want
to
continue
the
criminal
proceedings and the matter may be decided
in terms of the compromise deed.

6. Heard Sri Ishwar Chandra Tyagi,
learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri
Anmol Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for
opposite party no.2, Sri Nikhil Chiturvedi,
learned AGA for the State and perused the
record.

7. The law regarding compounding of
offence under Negotiable Instruments Act
is no more res integra and the offences
under the said Act can be compounded on
any stage of the proceedings.

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of K. M. Ibrahim vs. K.P.
Mohammad and another reported in
(2010) 1 SCC 798 has held as under :

"7. Mr. Rohtagi submitted that
the said position had been accepted by this
Court in various decisions, such as in the
case of O.P. Dholakia vs. State of Haryana
& Anr. [(2000) 1 SCC 762], wherein it was
held that since the petitioner had already
entered into a compromise with the
complainant and the complainant had
appeared through counsel and stated that
the entire money had been received by him
and he had no objection if the conviction
already recorded under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act is set aside, the
Hon'ble Judges thought it appropriate to
grant permission, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, to compound the
offence. While doing so, this Court also
indicated that necessarily the conviction
and sentence under Section 138 of the Act
stoodannulled.

8. The said view has been
consistently followed in the case of (1) Anil
510 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Kumar Haritwal & Anr. vs. Alka Gupta &
Anr. [(2004) 4 SCC 366]; (2) B.C. Seshadri
vs. B.N. Suryanarayana Rao [2004 (11)
SCC 510] decided by a three Judge Bench;
(3) G. Sivarajan vs. Little Flower Kuries &
Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. [(2004 11 SCC
400];
(4)
Kishore
Kumar
vs.
J.K.
Corporation Ltd. [(2004 13 SCC 494]; (5)
Sailesh Shyam Parsekar vs. Baban [(2005
(4) SCC 162]; (6) K. Gyansagar vs.
Ganesh Gupta & Anr. [(2005) 7 SCC 54];
(7) K.J.B.L. Rama Reddy vs. Annapurna
Seeds & Anr. [(2005) 10 SCC 632]; (8)
Sayeed Ishaque Menon vs. Ansari Naseer
Ahmed [(2005) 12 SCC 140]; (9) Vinay
Devanna Nayak vs. Ryot Sewa Sahakari
Bank Ltd. [(2008) 2 SCC 305], wherein
some of the earlier decisions have been
noticed; and (10) Sudheer Kumar vs.
Manakkandi M.K. Kunhiraman & Anr.
[2008 (1) KLJ 203], which was a decision
of aDivision Bench of the Kerala High
Court, wherein also the issue has been
gone into in great detail.

9. The golden thread in all these
decisions is that once a person is allowed
to compound a case as provided for under
Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, the conviction under Section 138 of the
said Act should also be set aside. In the
case of Vinay Devanna Nayak (supra), the
issue was raised and after taking note of
the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C., this
Court held that since the matter had been
compromised between the parties and
payments had been made in full and final
settlement of the dues of the Bank, the
appeal deserved to be allowed and the
appellant
was
entitled
to
acquittal.
Consequently, the order of conviction and
sentence recorded by all the courts were set
aside and the appellant was acquitted of
the charge leveled against him.

10. The object of Section 320
Cr.P.C., which would not in the strict sense
of the term apply to a proceeding under the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, gives the
parties to the proceedings an opportunity
to compound offences mentioned in the
table contained in the said section, with or
without the leave of the court, and also
vests the court with jurisdiction to allow
such compromise. By virtue of Sub-Section
(8), the Legislature has taken one step
further in vesting jurisdiction in the Court
to also acquit the accused/convict of the
offence on the same being allowed to be
compounded.

11. Inasmuch as, it is with a
similar object in mind that Section 147 has
been
inserted
into
the
Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, by amendment, an
analogy may be drawn as to the intention
of the Legislature as expressed in Section
320(8) Cr.P.C., although, the same has not
been expressly mentioned in the amended
section to a proceeding under Section 147
of the aforesaid Act.

12. Apart from the above, this
Court is further empowered under Article
142 of the Constitution to pass appropriate
orders in line with Sub-Section (8) of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. in an application
under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act, in
order to do justice to the parties.

13. As far as the non-obstante
clause included in Section 147 of the 1881
Act is concerned, the 1881 Act being a
special statute, the provisions of Section
147 will have an overriding effect over the
provisions
of
the
Code
relating
to
compounding of offences. The various
decisions cited by Mr. Rohtagi on this issue
does not add to the above position.

14. It is true that the application
under Section 147 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act was made by the parties
after the proceedings had been concluded
before the Appellate Forum. However,
Section 147 of the aforesaid Act does not
2 All. Iqrar Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
511
bar the parties from compounding an
offence under Section 138 even at the
appellate
stage
of
the
proceedings.
Accordingly, we find no reason to reject the
application under Section 147 of the
aforesaid Act even in a proceeding under
Article 136 of the Constitution.

15. Since the parties have settled
their disputes, in keeping with the spirit of
Section 147 of the Act, we allow the parties
to compound the offence, set aside the
judgment of the courts below and acquit the
appellant of the charges against him.

16. The appeal is, accordingly,
allowed in the aforesaid terms."

9. In Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed
Babalal H. reported in (2010) 5 SCC 663 the
Hon'ble Supreme court has held as follows:

"6. Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati,
Solicitor General (now Attorney- General for
India) had appeared as amicus curiae in the
present matter and referred to the facts
herein as an illustration of how parties
involved in cheque bounce cases usually seek
the compounding of the offence at a very late
stage. The interests of justice would indeed be
better
served
if
parties
resorted
to
compounding as a method to resolve their
disputes at an early stage instead of engaging
in protracted litigation before several forums,
thereby causing undue delay, expenditure
and strain on part of the judicial system. This
is clearly a situation that is causing some
concern, since Section 147 of the Act does not
prescribe as to what stage is appropriate for
compounding the offence and whether the
same can be done at the instance of the
complainant or with the leave of the court.

7. The learned Attorney General
stressed on the importance of using
compounding as an expedient method to
hasten the disposal of cases. In this regard,
the learned Attorney General has proposed
that this Court should frame some guidelines
to disincentivise litigants from seeking the
compounding of the offence at an unduly late
stage of litigation. In other words, judicial
directions have been sought to nudge
litigants in cheque bounce cases to opt for
compounding during the early stages of
litigation, thereby bringing down the arrears.

8.
Before
examining
the
guidelines
proposed
by
the
learned
Attorney General, it would be useful to
clarify
the
position
relating
to
the
compounding
of
offences
under
the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Even
before the insertion of Section 147 in the
Act (by way of an amendment in 2002)
some High Courts had permitted the
compounding of the offence contemplated
by Section 138 during the later stages of
litigation. In fact in O.P. Dholakia v. State
of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 672, a division
bench of this Court had permitted the
compounding of the offence even though
the petitioner's conviction had been upheld
by all the three designated forums. After
noting that the petitioner had already
entered into a compromise with the
complainant, the bench had rejected the
State's argument that this Court need not
interfere with the conviction and sentence
since it was open to the parties to enter into
a compromise at an earlier stage and that
they had not done so. The bench had
observed:-

"3. ... taking into consideration
the nature of the offence in question and
the fact that the complainant and the
accused have already entered into a
compromise, we think it appropriate to
grant permission in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case, to
compound."

Similar reliefs were granted in
orders reported as Sivasankaran v. State of
Kerala & Anr., (2002) 8 SCC 164, Kishore
512 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Kumar v. J.K. Corporation Ltd., (2004) 12
SCC 494 and Sailesh Shyam Parsekar v.
Baban, (2005) 4 SCC 162, among other
cases.

9. As mentioned above, the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was
amended by the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment
and
Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 2002 which inserted a
specific provision, i.e. Section 147 to make
the offences under the Act compoundable'.
We can refer to the following extract from
the Statement of Objects and Reasons
attached to the 2002 amendment which is
self- explanatory."

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed
Babalal H. (Supra) has framed guidelines
with respect to granting permission for
compounding of offence at various stages.
The guidelines in the form of directions in
the aforesaid judgment reads as follows :

'THE GUIDELINES'

"(i) In the circumstances, it is
proposed as follows:

(a) That directions can be given
that the Writ of Summons be suitably
modified making it clear to the accused that
he
could
make
an
application
for
compounding of the offences at the first or
second hearing of the case and that if such
an application is made, compounding may
be allowed by the court without imposing
any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make
an
application
for
compounding
as
aforesaid, then if an application for
compounding
is
made
before
the
Magistrate
at
a
subsequent
stage,
compounding can be allowed subject to the
condition that the accused will be required
to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be
deposited as a condition for compounding
with the Legal Services Authority, or such
authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application
for compounding is made before the
Sessions Court or a High Court in revision
or appeal, such compounding may be
allowed on the condition that the accused
pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of
costs.

(d) Finally, if the application for
compounding is made before the Supreme
Court, the figure would increase to 20% of
the cheque amount."

11. Recently, in the case of Meters
and Instruments Private Limited and
another vs. Kanchan Mehta reported in
(2018) 1 SCC 560, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed as follows :

"18. From the above discussion
following aspects emerge:

18.1) Offence under Section 138
of the Act is primarily a civil wrong.
Burden of proof is on accused in view
presumption under Section 139 but the
standard of such proof is "preponderance
of probabilities". The same has to be
normally tried summarily as per provisions
of summary trial under the Cr.P.C. but with
such variation as may be appropriate to
proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Act.
Thus read, principle of Section 258 Cr.P.C.
will apply and the Court can close the
proceedings and discharge the accused on
satisfaction
that
the
cheque
amount
withassessed costs and interest is paid and
if there is no reason to proceed with the
punitive aspect.

18.2) The object of the provision
being primarily compensatory, punitive
element being mainly with the object of
enforcing
the
compensatory
element,
compounding at the initial stage has to be
encouraged but is not debarred at later
stage subject to appropriate compensation
2 All. Iqrar Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
513
as may be found acceptable to the parties
or the Court.

18.3)
Though
compounding
requires consent of both parties, even in
absence of such consent, the Court, in the
interests of justice, on being satisfied that
the
complainant
has
been
duly
compensated, can in its discretion close the
proceedings and discharge the accused.

18.4) Procedure for trial of cases
under Chapter XVII of the Act has normally
to be summary. The discretion of the
Magistrate under second proviso to Section
143, to hold that it was undesirable to try
the case summarily as sentence of more
than one year may have to be passed, is to
be exercised after considering the further
fact that apart from the sentence of
imprisonment, the Court has jurisdiction
under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award
suitable
compensation
with
default
sentence under Section 64 IPC and with
further powers of recovery under Section
431 Cr.P.C. With this approach, prison
sentence of more than one year may not be
required in all cases.

18.5) Since evidence of the
complaint can be given on affidavit, subject
to the Court summoning the person giving
affidavit and examining him and the bank's
slip being prima facie evidence of the
dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for
the Magistrate to record any further
preliminary
evidence.
Such
affidavit
evidence can be read as evidence at all
stages of trial or other proceedings. The
manner of examination of the person giving
affidavit can be as per Section 264 Cr.P.C.
The
scheme
is
to
follow
summary
procedure except where exercise of power
under second proviso to Section 143
becomes necessary, where sentence of one
year may have to be awarded and
compensation under Section 357(3) is
considered inadequate, having regard to
the amount of the cheque, the financial
capacity and the conduct of the accused or
any other circumstances.

19. In view of the above, we hold
that where the cheque amount with interest
and cost as assessed by the Court is paid by
a specified date, the Court is entitled to
close the proceedings in exercise of its
powers under Section 143 of the Act read
with Section 258 Cr.P.C. As already
observed, normal rule for trial of cases
under Chapter XVII of the Act is to follow
the summary procedure and summons trial
procedure can be followed where sentence
exceeding one year may be necessary
taking
into
account
the
fact
that
compensation under Section 357 (3)
Cr.P.C. with sentence of less than one year
will not be adequate, having regard to the
amount of cheque, conduct of the accused
and other circumstances."

12.

Following
the
aforesaid
propositions of law and taking into account
the fact that the parties have agreed to end
the proceedings by way of compromise and
the opposite party no.2 has already received
the amount of cheque and he does not want
to pursue the proceedings against the
revisionist, this Court deems it appropriate
to compound the offence on the basis of
compromise deed dated 11.12.2020 entered
into between the parties. However, in terms
of the guidelines framed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as the revisionist has not
appeared before the Court and has not
taken effective steps to compound the
offence at initial stages, in the backdrop of
peculiar facts and circumstance of the case,
this court deems it appropriate to permit the
compounding
of
offence
subject
to
payment of Rs.5000/- as cost/interest to the
opposite party no.2 to be paid by the
revisionist within a period of two weeks
from today.
514 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. Further, taking into account the
fact that the revisionist has caused undue
delay in making endevour for compounding
the offence in terms of guidelines framed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Damodar
S. Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H. (Supra),
the revisionist is directed to pay a cost of
15% of the cheque amount to the High
Court Legal Services Committee, High
Court, Allahabad within a period of three
weeks from today.

14. In case, the amount of Rs.5000/-
towards cost/interest is paid to the opposite
party no.2 and 15% of the cheque amount
is deposited by the revisionist to the High
Court Legal Services Committee, High
Court, Allahabad with the stipulated period,
the judgment and sentence dated 6.7.2018
passed by the trial Court duly confirmed by
the appellate Court vide judgment and
order dated 9.12.2020 is set aside.

15. The revision is allowed in the
above terms.
----------

(2021)02ILR A514
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAMIT GOPAL, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1156 of 2017

Mool Chandra ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Vikas Tripathi, Sri Dileep Kumar Pandey,
Sri Harish Yadav, Sri Jitendra Kumar

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.,
Sri
Achyutanand
Pandey,
Sri
Santosh Kumar Singh

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973-Sections 401/397 & 127determination
of
quantum
of
maintenance-Learned court below rightly
passed the order for enhancement of
maintenance
as
the
revisionist
is
employed and getting salary having two
school going daughter, also the cost of
living has been increased-the object of
section 125 Cr.P.C. was conceived to
ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial
suffering of a woman who left her
matrimonial
home
along
with
her
children-husband
can
not
take
subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit
of living with dignity.(Para 1 to 13)

Monetary relief granted to the aggrieved woman
and the children must be adequate, fair
,reasonable, and consistent with the standard of
living to which the aggrieved woman was
accustomed to in her matrimonial home.(Para 8
to 9)

The revision is dismissed.( E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Bhuwan Mohan Singh Vs Meena & ors. (2015)
6 SCC 353

2. Rajnesh Vs Neha & anr. : Crl. Appl. No. 730
of 2020 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) 9503 of 2018
)Nov. 4, 2020: 2020 SCC Online SC 903

(Delivered by Hon'ble Samit Gopal, J.)

1. Heard Sri Dileep Kumar Pandey,
learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri
Santosh Kumar Singh, learned Advocate
holding brief of Sri Achyutanand Pandey,
learned counsel for Opposite Party No.2
and Sri B.B. Upadhyay, learned A.G.A. for
the State and perused the record.

2. The present revision has been
preferred against the judgment and order