# Irshad Ahmad v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1956
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-31
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 9640 of 2023
- **Bench:** Rajesh Singh Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/irshad-ahmad-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51911
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 161, 164 & 439 - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections - 376, 354,
504 & 506 - The Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 -
Sections 3, 4, 7 & 8 - The Scheduled
Castes
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
Sectiosn - 1(w), 3(1), (Dha) & 3(2)(v) -
Information Technology Act, 2000
-
Section - 67 - Application for Bail - first Bial
Application - rejected - Second Bial Application
- on the ground that, applicant is languishing in
jail since long time - there is decisive
contradictions in the story alleged by the
prosecution - victim is a major lady but in the
FIR her age has been indicated as 17 years -
court finds that, - mere long detention in jail
does not entitle an accused for bail - prosecutrix
was aged about 17 years - if the entire St.ment
recorded u/s 164 Crpc is read, the fact would
emerge that she has levelled specific allegation
of rape against the present applicant - hence,
considering the facts and circumstances of the
case as well as the dictums of the Apex Court,
the bail application is rejected - direction issued
to trial court for conclude the trial within a period
of six months accordingly - however, liberty is
also given to the applicant to file another bail
application, if the trial is not concluded within
the stipulated time. (Para - 20, 21, 29, 30)

Bail Application Rejected. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1956 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(collectively speaking) that dismissal of
bails in POCSO Act offences irrespective
of the facts and circumstances of the case is
the only way to show one's integrity and a
fail safe way of discharging judicial
functions has to change. This can achieved
by regular training at the JTRI which is
consistently reinforced at the district
judgeships in the "Continuous Learning
Programmes" being run in the district
judgeships.
Needless
to
add,
the
observations made in this order shall not
operate adversely against the judicial
officers who had handed down the said
orders. The issue has to seen less as an
individual infirmity but more as an
institutional inadequacy.

52. There is an urgent need for the
Judicial Training & Research Institute,
Lucknow, Utrar Pradesh and all learned
District Judges to study the aforesaid
systemic faults in depth, and create
appropriate training programmes for the
learned POCSO judges and to sensitize
them for fair administration of justice in
bails arising out of POCSO Act offences.

53. The High Court too has a
responsibility
in
this
regard.
The
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India and also the appellate and revisional
jurisdictions possessed by this Court have
to be exercised with care and caution. By
virtue of Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court is the guardian court
of the district judgeships. When challenge
is laid to a judgment of a trial court before
the High Court, the correctness of the
impugned judgement is examined by this
Court. To correct an error in a judgment one
need not condemn the judge. For in the
latter case it is often not clear whether the
judgment is in appeal or the judge is on
trial. The High Court as a benign guardian
has to be a pillar of strength and not a
source of fear for the trial judiciary. A
solemn
obligation
is
cast
by
the
Constitution on the High Court to nurture
the autonomy of the trial judges to enable
them to act independently and to build the
capacity of the trial judges to judge fairly
and to foster the esteem of the trial judges
to fortify the citizens' faith in the judiciary.

54. Registry is directed to send this
order as well as the judgment of this Court
rendered in Aman (supra) to the learned
Government Advocate for communication
to the Director General of Police, Lucknow,
Uttar
Pradesh,
Director
General
(Prosecution), Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh and
other police authorities for necessary
action.

55. Registry is also directed to send a
copy of this order to the Director, Judicial
Training & Research Institute, Lucknow,
Utrar Pradesh and learned District Judges
for necessary action.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1956
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 31.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 9640 of 2023

Irshad Ahmad ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Vaibhav Kalia, Vidhu Bhushan Kalia

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.
5 All. Irshad Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1957
Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 161, 164 & 439 - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections - 376, 354,
504 & 506 - The Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 -
Sections 3, 4, 7 & 8 - The Scheduled
Castes
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
Sectiosn - 1(w), 3(1), (Dha) & 3(2)(v) -
Information Technology Act, 2000
-
Section - 67 - Application for Bail - first Bial
Application - rejected - Second Bial Application
- on the ground that, applicant is languishing in
jail since long time - there is decisive
contradictions in the story alleged by the
prosecution - victim is a major lady but in the
FIR her age has been indicated as 17 years -
court finds that, - mere long detention in jail
does not entitle an accused for bail - prosecutrix
was aged about 17 years - if the entire St.ment
recorded u/s 164 Crpc is read, the fact would
emerge that she has levelled specific allegation
of rape against the present applicant - hence,
considering the facts and circumstances of the
case as well as the dictums of the Apex Court,
the bail application is rejected - direction issued
to trial court for conclude the trial within a period
of six months accordingly - however, liberty is
also given to the applicant to file another bail
application, if the trial is not concluded within
the stipulated time. (Para - 20, 21, 29, 30)

Bail Application Rejected. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. P. Yuvaprakash Vs St. Rep. By Inspector of
Police reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 538,

2. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav Vs CBI through its
Director, (2007) 1 SCC 70,

3. St. of H.P. Vs Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766,

4. Ganesan Vs St. represented by its Inspector
of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573,

5. Vijay Vs St. of M.P. (2010) 8 SCC 191,

6. St. of Mah. Vs Chandraprakash Kewalchand
Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550,

7. St. of U.P. Vs Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594,
8. St. of Punj. Vs Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC
384,

9. St. of Orissa Vs Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC
86,

10. Phool Singh Vs St. of M. P., (2022) 2 SCC 74,

11. Sham Singh Vs St. of Har., (2018) 18 SCC 34,

12. Krishan Kumar Malik Vs St. of Har., (2011) 7
SCC 130.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vaibhav Kalia, learned
counsel for the applicant and Sri G.D.
Bhatt, learned Additional Government
Advocate for the State.

2. Despite the service of notice upon
opposite party No.2, no one has appeared
on behalf of opposite party No.2. As a
matter of fact, no one has appeared on
behalf of opposite party No.2 on any date.

3. This is the second bail application
as the first bail application bearing
Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.5158
of 2022; Irshad Ahmad vs. State of U.P. &
others; has been rejected vide order dated
30.11.2022 passed by Hon'ble Dinesh
Kumar
Singh,
J.
The
order
dated
30.11.2022 reads as under:-

"1. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant, Sri Ran Vijay Singh, learned
A.G.A. and perused the record.

2. The present application under
Section 439 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the
applicant Irshad Ahmad seeking bail in
FIR/ Case Crime No.-247 of 2021 under
section-376, 354, 504, 506 I.P.C. &
Section- (1)(w), 3(1)(Dha), 3(2)(v) SC/ST
Act and section 3/4 and section 7/8 POCSO
1958 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Act and section 67, I.T. Act, Police StationPachpedwa District- Balrampur.

3. The allegation against the
accused-applicant is of committing rape on
the prosecutrix, who is 17 years old girl and
a student of Class XI. It is further alleged
that the accused-applicant had made some
video-clips
and
clicked
indecent
photographs of the victim without clothes
and sent these indecent photographs on
Whatsapp to other persons. The accusedapplicant was not allowing the prosecutrix
to get married and blackmailing her on the
basis of alleged photographs and videoclips. The prosecutrix in her statements
recorded under sections 161 and 164,
Cr.P.C. has specifically alleged that the
accused-applicant raped her and clicked
the photo and video-slips and threatened
her that if she would tell anybody about the
incident, he shall make the video viral and
would not allow her to marry anyone else.
When the prosecutrix told the incident to
her parents, the parents went to the house
of the accused-applicant, however, the
brothers of the prosecutrix ran them away.

4. Considering the nature of
allegations against the accused-applicant
and the stand of the prosecutrix in her
statements recorded under section 161 and
164, Cr.P.C. this court does not deem it
appropriate to enlarge the accusedapplicant on bail at this stage and,
therefore, the bail application is rejected.

5. The accused-applicant may
revive the bail plea after the prosecutrix
gets examined in the court.

6. The trial court should make
endeavour to record the statements of the
prosecutrix and other witnesses of fact
expeditiously, preferably within a period of
six months.

7. Let a copy of this order be
transmitted to the learned trial court for
necessary compliance."

4. Learned counsel for the applicant
has stated that despite the specific direction
being issued by this Court on 30.11.2022
(supra) to record the evidence of the
prosecutrix and other witnesses of fact
within a period of six months but those
statements have not been recorded within
time so stipulated.

5. As per learned counsel for the
applicant, the present applicant ( Irshad
Ahmad) is languishing in jail since 28.12.2021
in Case Crime /F.I.R. No.247 of 2021, under
Sections 376, 354, 504 & 506 I.P.C. and
Section 3 (1) (w) (i), 3 (1) (Dha) & 3 (2) (v) of
S.C./S.T. Act and Section 3/4 and 7/8 of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act (in short POCSO Act) and Section 67 of
Information Technology Act, Police StationPachpedwa, District-Balrampur.

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
has stated that he shall not address those
grounds
which
have
already
been
considered by this Court while rejecting the
first bail application but shall address only
those grounds which have emerged after
recording
of
the
statement
of
the
prosecutrix and other witnesses.

7. Precisely, the fact of the present
case have been narrated in para-3 of order
dated 30.11.2022 (supra).

8. Attention has been drawn towards the
supplementary affidavit dated 02.05.2024
showing Annexure Nos.SA-1, SA-2, SA-3,
SA-4 & SA-5, which are the statements of
PW-1 (Arjun Kumar Valmiki), PW-2
(Prosecutrix), PW-3 (Seema Devi), PW-4
(Rajesh Kumar Singh, Principal) & PW-5
(Dr. Mahikriti Sishodia) .

9. Learned counsel for the applicant
has stated that if the aforesaid statements
5 All. Irshad Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1959
are perused, the fact would emerge that
there are relevant decisive contradictions in
the story alleged by the prosecution.

10. As per learned counsel for the
applicant, the victim is a major lady but in
the F.I.R., her age has been indicated as 17
years.

11. Sri Kalia has submitted that in the
F.I.R. and in her statement the prosecutrix
has stated that she is studying in Lokmanya
Tilak Inter College, Panchpedwa in ClassX whereas the Principal of the said
institution Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh has
been examined as PW-4 has stated that the
date of birth of the prosecutrix is
20.05.2004 and she was a regular student of
his institution till Class-X and got
admission in Class-XI but on account of
non-deposition of fee for Class-XI and for
being regular absent her name was struck
off from the roll of regular student on
19.10.2021, thereafter, she did not get
admission
again
in
the
institution.
Therefore, as per Sri Kalia, on the alleged
date of incident i.e. 20.12.2021 she was not
a bonafide/ legal student of the institution
in question.

12. Sri Kalia has also drawn attention
of this Court towards the evidence of Dr.
Mahikriti Sishodia, the Medical Officer,
District
Hospital,
Balrampur
(PW-5)
recorded on 17.10.2023 wherein she has
stated that she had internally examined the
prosecutrix on 27.12.2021 and as per
examination it was found that her hymen
was torn and the hymen may likely to torn
if any girl drives Cycle, plays some field
games or does the hard-work. As per her
examination, there was no evidence of rape.

13. Sri Kalia, learned Counsel for the
applicant has referred the order dated
16.04.2024 passed by this Court in
Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.2322
of 2024, wherein this Court has observed
that the age of the prosecutrix / child should
be determined by the Medical Board for the
reason that the medical report may prove to
be a reliable piece of evidence; the said
medical report will assist the process of law
and enable the courts to make a conclusive
finding on the victim's age after considering
all evidences in the record; the said medical
reports determining the victim's age at the
very outset will also help prevent misuse of
the POCSO Act and the said medical
reports are relatable to specific provisions
of law. In the aforesaid judgment, the
relevant provisions of Section 164-A
Cr.P.C. and Section 27 of the POCSO Act,
which provides the medical examination of
a child, have been considered.

14. Learned counsel for the applicant
has also submitted that if the prosecution
story is taken on its face value, it appears
that the impugned F.I.R. is anti-time
inasmuch as she allegedly narrated her
plight to her mother on 26.12.2021 but the
impugned F.I.R. has been lodged on
25.12.2021. He has further submitted that
there is no allegation of rape in the F.I.R.
and the story has been developed later on.

15. Learned counsel for the applicant
has also submitted that the story that the
present applicant had clicked some obscene
video and photographs of the prosecutrix is
false and concocted inasmuch there is no
material available with the prosecution to
that effect. He has also stated that another
story that the present applicant has sent
those video clips to the person with whom
the marriage of the prosecutrix was settled,
is incorrect. Further, almost all the fact
witnesses have been examined, threfore,
considering the period of incarceration of
1960 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the applicant in jail i.e. about two years and
six months, he may be enlarged on bail.

16. Per contra, learned Additional
Government Advocate has opposed the
aforesaid bail application by submitting
that the statement of the prosecutrix
recorded under Sections 161 & 164 Cr.P.C.
as well as her evidence recorded before the
learned trial court are intact wherein she has
levelled specific allegations of rape against
the present applicant. The age of the
prosecutrix/ child is below 18 years. In
terms of Section 29 of the POCSO Act,
burden is upon the applicant to establish
that he has not committed offence of rape
upon the prosecutrix.

17. Attention has been drawn towards
Annexure No.CA-9 of the counter affidavit,
which is the statement of one Sonu with
whom the marriage of the prosecutrix was
fixed, who has categorically stated that he
is a labourer and doing labour work at
Bangalore where he received one phone
call on his Mobile Number from one person
namely Irshad, who has informed him that
the girl with whom his marriage has been
fixed, is his lover and he loves her and he
has established physical relations with her
for couple of times. When the aforesaid
Cell Phone Number was verified by the
Investigating Agency, it was found that
such Cell Phone Number belongs to the
present applicant. The aforesaid C.D.R.
report has also annexed with the counter
affidavit which indicates that those Cell
Phone Numbers belong to the present
applicant. Therefore, learned Additional
Government Advocate has stated that the
present applicant has not only committed
rape with a minor girl, who is below 18
years, but also has informed this incident to
a person with whom marriage of the
prosecutrix was fixed, resultant thereof,
that marriage was broken before it could
take place.

18. Learned Additional Government
Advocate has also referred Section 94 of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015, wherein it has
categorically mandates that if any School
Certificate of the child/ prosecutrix is
available, the same would be given first
preference than others. Notably, in the
present case, the date of birth of the
prosecutrix as per the High School
Certificate is 20.05.2004, which means she
was aged about 17 years and 05 months,
therefore, the medical examination report,
if any, may not have overriding effect over
the age so indicted in the High School
Certificate.

19. Learned Additional Government
Advocate has relief upon the judgment of
Apex Court rendered in the case in re: P.
Yuvaprakash vs. State Rep. By Inspector
of Police reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC)
538, wherein the Apex Court in para-16
observed as under:-

"16. Speaking about provisions of
the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the
various options in Section 94 (2)) of the JJ
Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar
Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors. that:

Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places
the date of birth certificate from the school
and the matriculation or equivalent
certificate from the concerned examination
board in the same category (namely) (i)
above). In the absence thereof category (ii)
provides for obtaining the birth certificate
of the corporation, municipal authority or
panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i)
and (ii) that age determination by means of
medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)
5 All. Irshad Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1961
(a) (i) indicates a significant change over
the provisions which were contained in Rue
12 (3) (a) of the Rules of 2007 made under
the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12 (3) (a) (i) of
matriculation or equivalent certificate was
given precedence and it was only in the
event of the certificate not being available
that the date of birth certificate from the
school first attended, could be obtained. In
Section 94 (2) (i) both the date of birth
certificate from the school as well as the
matriculation or equivalent certificate are
placed in the same category."

20. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the material
available on record, at the very outset, I
would like to observe that the prosecutrix/
child, who was aged about 17 years on the
date of incident, recorded her statements
under Section 161 & 164 Cr.P.C. wherein
the specific allegation against the present
applicant of committing rape with her has
been levelled. Though there is some
variation in her statement recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. on some part but if the
entire statement recorded under Section
164 Cr.P.C. is read, the fact would emerge
that in such statement too, she has levelled
specific allegation of rape against the
present applicant.

21. To me, mere long detention in jail
does not entitle an accused for bail. Further,
it
all
depends
on
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case as there is no
straight jacket formula for granting bail.
Therefore, period of long incarceration may
be considered as one of the grounds for
granting bail, but it depends upon facts
and circumstances of the particular case.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in re; Rajesh
Ranjan Yadav v. CBI through its
Director, (2007) 1 SCC 70, has observed
as under:-

"...... None of the decisions cited
can be said to have laid down any absolute
and unconditional rule about when bail
should be granted by the Court and when it
should not. It all depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and it cannot be
said there is any absolute rule that the mere
fact that the accused has undergone a long
period of incarceration by itself would
entitle him to be enlarged on bail."

22. Section 29 of the POCSO Act
provides for presumption as to certain
offences. It provides that if a person is
prosecuted for violating any provision of
Sections 3, 5, 7 & 9 of the Act, the Special
Court shall presume that such person has
committed the offence, unless the contrary
is proved.

23. The Apex Court in re; State of
H.P. Vs. Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766,
has observed in para-5, which reads as
under:-

"5. We record our displeasure
and dismay, the way the High Court dealt
casually with an offence so grave, as in the
case at hand, overlooking the alarming and
shocking increase of sexual assault on
minor girls. The High Court was swayed by
the sheer insensitivity, totally oblivious of
the growing menace of sexual violence
against minors much less by the father. The
High Court also totally overlooked the
prosecution
evidence,
which
inspired
confidence and merited acceptance. It is
now a well-settled principle of law that
conviction can be founded on the testimony
of the prosecutrix alone unless there are
compelling
reasons
for
seeking
corroboration.
The
evidence
of
a
prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an
injured witness. The testimony of the victim
of sexual assault is vital, unless there are
1962 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
compelling reasons which necessitate
looking for corroboration of her statement,
the courts should find no difficulty in acting
on the testimony of a victim of sexual
assault alone to convict an accused where
her testimony inspires confidence and is
found to be reliable. It is also a well-settled
principle of law that corroboration as a
condition for judicial reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix is not a
requirement of law but a guidance of
prudence under the given circumstances.
The evidence of the prosecutrix is more
reliable than that of an injured witness.
Even minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix should not be a ground for
throwing
out
an
otherwise
reliable
prosecution case."

24. The Apex Court in re; Ganesan
Vs. State represented by its Inspector of
Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573 while
considering the judgments of Vijay v. State
of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191, State of
Maharashtra
v.
Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State
of U.P. Vs. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594, State
of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC
384, State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra,
(2002) 9 SCC 86 and Krishan Kumar
Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC
130 has observed that hold an accused
guilty for commission of an offence of rape,
the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is
sufficient, provided the same inspires
confidence and appears to be absolutely
trustworthy, unblemished and should be of
sterling quality.

25. In the case of Pappu (supra), the
Apex Court has held that even in a case
where it is shown that the girl is a girl of
easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual
intercourse, it may not be a ground to
absolve the accused from the charge of
rape. It has to be established that there was
consent by her for that particular occasion
and that consent should be free consent.

26. The Apex Court in re; Phool
Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022)
2 SCC 74, has considered the judgment of
Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2018)
18 SCC 34, wherein the Apex Court has
observed that the testimony of the victim is
vital and unless there are compelling
reasons which necessitate looking for
corroboration of her statement, the courts
should find no difficulty to act on the
testimony of the victim of sexual assault
alone to convict an accused where her
testimony inspires confidence and is found
to be reliable.

27. Therefore, considering the facts
and circumstances of the present case as
well as the dictums of the Apex Court, as
considered above, I am not inclined to grant
bail to the present applicant.

28. Accordingly, the bail application
is rejected.

29. Since the present applicant is in
jail since 28.12.20221 and the trial in
POCSO cases should be conducted and
concluded with expedition, preferably
within a period of one year in terms of
Section 35 (2) of the POCSO Act,
therefore, I hereby direct the learned Trial
Court to conclude the trial within a period
of six months from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order taking recourse of
Section 309 Cr.P.C. by fixing short dates, if
possible, fix dates on day-to-day basis to
ensure that the examination of all
prosecution witnesses and other witnesses
from both the sides, if any, be completed
expeditiously and if any of the witnesses
5 All. Pradum Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1963
does not cooperate in the trial proceedings
properly, the learned Trial Court may take
appropriate coercive steps against such
witness, which is permissible under the
law. Further, no unnecessary adjournment
shall be given to any of the parties so that
the trial in question could be concluded
within the time so stipulated.

30. However, liberty is given to the
applicant to file another bail application, if
the trial is not concluded within the
aforesaid stipulated time.

31. Let copy of this order be provided
to the learned Trial Court through District
& Sessions Judge, Balrampur by the
Registry of this Court within three working
days for its strict compliance.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1963
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN,
J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 9723 of 2022

Pradum Singh ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Alok Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Aslam Javed Siddiqui, Munna Singh

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Sections 161, 164, 309 & 439 -
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections - 506,
375 & 376-AB - The Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 -
Sections - 5, 6, 29 & 35(2) - Application for
Bail - FIR - allegation that applicant who is
neighbour of the informant has committed
offence of oral sex with her ten years old minor
girl - grounds of bail - present application is
languishing in jail since long time and St.ment of
prosecutrix recorded under pressure of her
family and he has been falsely implicated -
considering the totality of the facts, medical
examination report, St.ment of prosecutrix
recorded u/s 164 Cr.p.c. and provision of law,
court has not find any substance in the grounds
of bail and not inclined to grant bail to the
applicant - accordingly, bail Application rejected
- further, trial court directed to conclude the trial
within a period of nine months, direction issued
accordingly - however, applicant has a liberty to
file another bail application, if the trial is not
concluded within the stipulated time.
(Para - 17, 22, 24, 25)

Bail Application Rejected. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Sonu Kushwaha Vs St. of up (Criminal Appeal
no. 5415/2018 decided on 18.11.2021),

2. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav Vs CBI through its
Director, (2007) 1 SCC 70,

3. St. of H.P. Vs Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766,

4. Ganesan Vs St. represented by its Inspector
of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573,

5. Vijay Vs St. of M.P. (2010) 8 SCC 191,

6. St. of Mah. Vs Chandraprakash Kewalchand
Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550,

7. St. of U.P. Vs Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594,

8. St. of Punj. Vs Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC
384,

9. St. of Orissa Vs Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC
86,

10. Krishan Kumar Malik Vs St. of Har., (2011) 7
SCC 130.

11. Phool Singh Vs St. of M. P., (2022) 2 SCC
74,