# Irshad v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 2 ILRA 609
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-04-16
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21415 of 2014
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J. Dilip Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/irshad-v-state-of-u-p-ors-42847
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art.-226- Role of
police-where Civil suit pending before Civil
Court-private respondent failed to getexparte injunction order-with collusion of
private respondent police using extra
judicial
method
of
coercion-highly
depreciated-police can not discharge the
duty of Civil Court.

Held: Para-3
We have no manner of doubt that it is not
open to the police authorities to arrogate to
themselves powers which are not conferred
upon them by law. Any such coercive
methods would be violative of the rule of law.
The fourth respondent is entitled, in the
pending suit, to seek all possible reliefs which
are legitimately open. However, a police
officer would have no justification whatsoever
to exercise those powers which are to be
exercised by the civil court on an adjudication
of facts between litigating parties.

## Text

2 All] Irshad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
609
deed was executed and possession has been
handed over to the auction purchaser. Hence,
the District Magistrate, Siddharth Nagar has
stated that he had no jurisdiction to entertain
the representation.

4. In a matter as in the present, where
an immovable property has been sold in
execution of a decree passed by the Civil
Court, it would be most inappropriate for the
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere
when sufficient remedies are provided under
Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.

5. Order XXI Rule 90(1) stipulates
that where any immovable property has
been sold in execution of a decree, the
decree holder, or the purchaser, or "any
other person entitled to share in a rateable
distribution of assets, or whose interests
are affected by the sale", may apply to the
Court to set aside the sale on the ground
of a material irregularity or fraud in
publishing or conducting it.

6. Sub-rule (2) of Order XXI Rule 90
stipulates that no sale shall be set aside on the
ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing
or conducting it unless, upon the facts
proved, the Court is satisfied that the
applicant has sustained substantial injury.

7. Order XXI Rule 92(4) stipulates
that where a third party challenges the
judgment-debtor's title by filing a suit
against the auction-purchaser, the decreeholder and the judgment-debtor shall be
necessary parties to the suit.

8. Sufficient remedies are available
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
for applying to set aside an auction sale,
which has been conducted in execution of
a decree including at the behest of a third
party which claims an interest or share in
the property which is affected by the sale.

9. In this view of the matter, no recourse
can be had for exercise of writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
District Magistrate, Siddharth Nagar was
absolutely justified in declining to entertain
the representation filed by the petitioners. The
District Magistrate can exercise powers which
are specifically conferred upon him by law
and he had no jurisdiction to entertain a
representation in respect of a sale which had
taken place in pursuance of an execution of a
decree passed by the Civil Court in pursuance
of which a registered sale deed had been
executed and possession had been handed
over to the auction purchaser. Even otherwise,
the District Magistrate was not competent to
entertain such a request. The remedies of the
petitioner must, therefore, lie under the
provisions of Order XXI Rule 90 as observed
earlier. We leave it open to the petitioners to
do so.

10. The writ petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA
YESHWANT CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE DILIP GUPTA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21415 of 2014

Irshad ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Akhilanand Pandey, Sri Suresh Chandra
Varma
610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution of India, Art.-226- Role of
police-where Civil suit pending before Civil
Court-private respondent failed to getexparte injunction order-with collusion of
private respondent police using extra
judicial
method
of
coercion-highly
depreciated-police can not discharge the
duty of Civil Court.

Held: Para-3
We have no manner of doubt that it is not
open to the police authorities to arrogate to
themselves powers which are not conferred
upon them by law. Any such coercive
methods would be violative of the rule of law.
The fourth respondent is entitled, in the
pending suit, to seek all possible reliefs which
are legitimately open. However, a police
officer would have no justification whatsoever
to exercise those powers which are to be
exercised by the civil court on an adjudication
of facts between litigating parties.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya
Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J.)

1. The petitioner has moved this
proceeding stating that he is a co-sharer in
plots no. 177 and 178, situated in Mauja
Katauli
Buzurg,
Pargana
Devgaon,
Tehsil- Lalganj, District Azamgarh.

2. The fourth respondent filed a suit
before the Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Haveli, Azamgarh (Original Suit No. 381
of 2014) in which the petitioner and the
fifth respondents who are brothers have
been impleaded as the first and second
defendants, whereas respondents 6, 7 and
8 who are sons of the fourth respondentplaintiff
were
also
impleaded
as
defendants. The Civil Judge (Junior
Division) did not grant any interim
injunction but by an order dated 3 March
2014 issued notice and directed a spot
inspection by a Commissioner. The
petitioner has stated that on 9 March
2014,
while
he
was
carrying
out
construction on the portion of the land
which has fallen to his share, the third
respondent sought to raise an obstruction.

3. The grievance in these proceedings
is that the third respondent, who is the officer
Incharge of the Police Station, is now
coercing the petitioner not to carry out any
construction though the fourth respondent
has failed to obtain an injunction before the
Trial Court. At the outset, we make it clear
that the issue as to whether the construction
which is carried out by the petitioner is or is
not within his holding, as claimed, cannot be
determined by this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution in the present proceeding.
We are, however, entertaining the petition
only on the basis of the grievance that the
third respondent, who is the officer Incharge
of the Police Station, has taken the law in his
own hands and despite the fact that the fourth
respondent has failed to obtain an interim
injunction, is using extra judicial methods to
coerce the petitioner. We have no manner of
doubt that it is not open to the police
authorities to arrogate to themselves powers
which are not conferred upon them by law.
Any such coercive methods would be
violative of the rule of law. The fourth
respondent is entitled, in the pending suit, to
seek
all
possible
reliefs
which
are
legitimately open. However, a police officer
would have no justification whatsoever to
exercise those powers which are to be
exercised by the civil court on an
adjudication of facts between litigating
parties.

4. We, however, clarify that these
observations are only confined to deal
with the allegation against the third
respondent and shall not amount to any
2 All] Dr. Anil Kumar Vs. D.D.C. District G.B. Nagar & Ors.
611
expression of opinion by the Court on the
rights inter se as claimed by the petitioner
and the private respondents, which are left
to be decided in appropriate proceedings,
including those which are pending before
the Civil Court.

5. The petition is, accordingly,
disposed of. There shall be no order as to
costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.04.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.21572 of 2014

Dr. Anil Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C. District G.B. Nagar & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Saurabh Sachan,Sri A.K. Sachan
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act-Section
48-Sale deed by one co-shareholder to
other-prior to consolidation scheme-not
taken into consideration while determining
share-the C.O. Taken view as in pursuance
of sale deed name not mutated-and the sale
transaction hit by provision of section 168-A
of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act-SOC as well as D.D.C.-
rightly set-a-side the order passed by C.O.
In view of fact when sale deed executedvillage was not under consolidation-more
over sale transaction between one coshare
holder
to
other-neither
mutation
nor
provisions of 168-A of Z.A. Act attractedpetition dismissed.

Held: Para-11
Under the circumstances, there was no
question of the sale deed requiring
mutation in the revenue record. Mutation
could have been required only if the sale
deed was in favour of persons whose name
did not already exist in the record.
Moreover, sale deed is of a share in a joint
Khata and the same, therefore, is not hit by
provision 168-A of the Act as it existed in
the statute book on the date of sale deed.
This provision has been deleted from
statute book w.e.f. 23.8.2004 vide Act No.
27 of 2004. Sale of share by one co-tenure
holder in favour of another co-tenure holder
in a joint khata does not result in any
fragmentation.

Case Law discussed:
1971 RD 518.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar Mishra ,J.)

1. Heard Sri AK Sachan, learned
counsel for the petitioner.

2. This writ petition arises out of an
objection under section 9-A(2) filed by
Mushe and others,

3. The dispute in the writ petition
pertains to land of Khata No. 104 which
was recorded in the name of Smt.
Saremwati, w/o Sri Kashi Ram, Mushe,
son of Solu, and Horam, son of Kale in
the basic year. Three sets of objections
were filed under section 9-A (2). Of the
three objections, the writ petition pertains
to the objection filed by Mushe claiming
on the basis of the sale deed dated
11.12.1964 wherein Chandru had sold his
1/4th share in favour of Horam, son of
Kale and Mushe, son of Solu.

4. A counter objection was filed by
the petitioner's mother claiming the share
of Chandru on the basis of sale deed dated
17.4.1973 alleged to have been executed
in her favour by the said Chandru.