# Ishwar Chand & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 8 ILRA 869
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-07-26
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 15641 of 2021
- **Bench:** Manoj Misra, Jayant Banerji
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ishwar-chand-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47323
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Constitution of India - Art. 226 - writ
petition after 41 years to stake a claim for
compensation - Limitation for entertaining
writ petition - there is no limitation
provided for entertaining a writ petition
under Article 226 - where no limitation is
provided, the person must approach the
Court
within
a
reasonable
time
-
 Reasonable time - reasonable time is
dependent on the facts of a case -
Ordinarily, where a civil court remedy
would get barred by limitation, the prayer
should
not
be
entertained
in
writ
jurisdiction - period of limitation is to be
counted from the date when the original
cause of action arose - later examination
of dead and stale issue would not give a
fresh cause of action to revive a timebarred issue - Rejection of time barred
claim by authorities do not give new cause
of action for staking claim (Para 10, 13)
Petitioners ancestors. were owners of plot -
acquisition of said land made in the year 1980,
but no compensation was paid/ awarded to
them - petitioners continued to represent their
cause - representations/claims of the petitioners
rejected in the year 2021 upon finding that the
claim was highly belated - Held - cause of
action to institute suit for compensation first
arose when the land was utilised in the year
1980 or before - no documentary material on
record to indicate that either within three years
or even twelve years of such utilisation of the
land any promise was extended by the State or
its agencies to compensate the farmers - where
even the remedy to seek possession was barred
by limitation, that is on expiry of 12 years from
the date the possession of land was taken from
the farmers - writ petition, filed after 41 years,
to stake a claim for compensation is hopelessly
barred by laches - court rejected petitioner's
contention that the cause of action should be
taken as the date when the impugned order was
passed i.e. 12.02.2021 - rejection of the time
barred claim by the impugned order dated
12.02.2021 does gave the petitioners a new
cause of action for staking a claim for
compensation.
Dismissed. (E-4)
List of Cases cited:
1.Syed Maqbool Ali Vs St. of U.P. (2011) 15
SCC 383
870 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2.St.of M.P. Vs Bhailal Bhai & ors. AIR 1964 SC
1006

3.Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs Moti
Lal Agarwal & ors. 2011 (5) SCC 394

## Text

8 All. Ishwar Chand & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
869
assumed the management of the concerned
establishment concerned."

15. Thus, having considered the
argument as well as the pleadings of the
parties, I find that the order dated
26.02.2021 passed by respondent No.1 and
the recovery order issued by respondent
No. 2 on 02.3.2021 are totally against the
statutory provision 7-O of the Act of 1952
and thus they are hereby quashed. The
matter is remitted back to the Appellate
Tribunal respondent No.1 to hear and
decide
the
appeal
of
the
petitioner
expeditiously preferably within next three
months from the date of production of a
copy of this order downloaded from the
website of this Court.

16. Writ petition stands partly
allowed.
----------
(2021)08ILR A869
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.07.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE JAYANT BANERJI, J.

Writ C No. 15641 of 2021

Ishwar Chand & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Vishesh Rajvanshi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution of India - Art. 226 - writ
petition after 41 years to stake a claim for
compensation - Limitation for entertaining
writ petition - there is no limitation
provided for entertaining a writ petition
under Article 226 - where no limitation is
provided, the person must approach the
Court
within
a
reasonable
time
-
 Reasonable time - reasonable time is
dependent on the facts of a case -
Ordinarily, where a civil court remedy
would get barred by limitation, the prayer
should
not
be
entertained
in
writ
jurisdiction - period of limitation is to be
counted from the date when the original
cause of action arose - later examination
of dead and stale issue would not give a
fresh cause of action to revive a timebarred issue - Rejection of time barred
claim by authorities do not give new cause
of action for staking claim (Para 10, 13)
Petitioners ancestors. were owners of plot -
acquisition of said land made in the year 1980,
but no compensation was paid/ awarded to
them - petitioners continued to represent their
cause - representations/claims of the petitioners
rejected in the year 2021 upon finding that the
claim was highly belated - Held - cause of
action to institute suit for compensation first
arose when the land was utilised in the year
1980 or before - no documentary material on
record to indicate that either within three years
or even twelve years of such utilisation of the
land any promise was extended by the State or
its agencies to compensate the farmers - where
even the remedy to seek possession was barred
by limitation, that is on expiry of 12 years from
the date the possession of land was taken from
the farmers - writ petition, filed after 41 years,
to stake a claim for compensation is hopelessly
barred by laches - court rejected petitioner's
contention that the cause of action should be
taken as the date when the impugned order was
passed i.e. 12.02.2021 - rejection of the time
barred claim by the impugned order dated
12.02.2021 does gave the petitioners a new
cause of action for staking a claim for
compensation.
Dismissed. (E-4)
List of Cases cited:
1.Syed Maqbool Ali Vs St. of U.P. (2011) 15
SCC 383
870 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2.St.of M.P. Vs Bhailal Bhai & ors. AIR 1964 SC
1006

3.Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs Moti
Lal Agarwal & ors. 2011 (5) SCC 394

4. U.O.I. & anr. Vs V.M. Sarkar : 2010 (2) SCC
59

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Misra, J.
&
Hon'ble Jayant Banerji, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioners; the learned Standing Counsel
for the State-respondents; and perused the
record.

2. The case of the petitioners is that
their ancestors were owners of plot nos.
238, 239, 340, 242, 243, 245 and 246 at
village Saidbhar, Tehsil and District
Baghpat. For construction of road from
Sarai Mod (turn) of Baghpat road to
Binauli, having a length of 16.45 kms,
acquisition of land in favour of Public
Works Department (PWD) was made
sometime in the year 1980 with assurance
that fair compensation would be offered to
the land owners. The land of petitioners'
ancestors was utilised for the purpose but
no compensation was paid/ awarded to
them. However, on the representations of
the petitioners, on 19.01.2004, a Committee
was constituted to look into the issue but
the Committee took no action. As result,
the petitioners continued to represent their
cause. It is alleged that on 01.09.2010 in
respect of some other plots, an award was
passed in favour of one Smt. Angoori.
Therefore, again, representations were
made for payment of compensation but to
not avail. Later, a survey was conducted in
the year 2017 to ascertain whether the land
of petitioners' ancestors was utilised for the
road. The Survey report dated 20.06.2017
confirmed that the land was utilised.
Thereafter, on representations, the matter
was taken up again and, under the order of
District
Magistrate,
Baghpat
dated
25.06.2018, a five-member Committee was
constituted to submit a report. The
Committee submitted an ex parte report,
dated 10.02.2021, of which copy was not
provided. Acting on the report dated
10.02.2021, by the impugned order dated
12.02.2021, the representations/claims of
the petitioners were rejected by the third
respondent (Additional District Magistrate
(Finance & Revenue), Baghpat).

3. A perusal of the impugned order
dated 12.02.2021 would indicate that as per
the report dated 10.02.2021 the road,
namely, Binauli Baghpat Sarai Marg was
built in between 1972 and 1984. Its length
is 16.43 kms. The survey indicated that
2.13 hectare of land of the villagers of
village
Saidbhar
was
affected
by
construction of the road. It is stated in the
report that the ancestors of the petitioners,
keeping in mind the constraints of the
existing chak- road and the benefits of a
wider road, had voluntarily contributed
small portions of their land for construction
of the road and with their contribution and
participation, a 12 meter wide road could
be built which had been in existence for
last nearly 40 years. The report further
indicated that though the claimants claim
the width of the road as 80 feet i.e. 34.2
meter but, on spot, the road is 12 meter
wide. On the basis of this report, the third
respondent, by placing reliance on a
decision of the Apex Court in Syed
Maqbool Ali vs. State of U.P. : (2011) 15
SCC 383, upon finding that the claim was
highly belated; that the ancestors raised no
objection;
and
that
the
road
was
constructed for the benefits of the villagers
with
their
consent,
rejected
the
8 All. Ishwar Chand & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
871
representation of the petitioners as not
maintainable.

4. Aggrieved with the impugned
order, this petition has been filed by
claiming that the third respondent wrongly
placed reliance on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Syed Maqbool Ali's case
(supra) inasmuch as the petitioners had
been actively pursuing their cause and
since it is proved on record that their
bhumidhari land has been utilised for
construction of road, they are entitled to
compensation at the market rate.

5. Per contra, the learned Standing
Counsel submitted that it is admitted in the
petition that the road was completed
sometime in the year 1980 and as it has not
been demonstrated that any claim for
compensation was made prior to the year
2004, the claim of the petitioners is
hopelessly barred by laches and mere
subsequent examination of the claim, to
reject it later, will not make the laches
condonable. Hence, the third respondent
rightly rejected the claim by placing
reliance on the decision of the Apex Court
in Syed Maqbool Ali's case (supra).

6. We have given our thoughtful
consideration to the rival submissions and
have perused the record carefully.

7. The factual position that emerges
from the record is that a road was constructed
up to a length of 16.43 kms. in the year 1980
or before. In construction of the road, small
pieces of land belonging to different farmers
was used apart from the chak-road that
existed from before. The report of the
Committee is that the land of the farmers was
utilised with their consent and for their own
benefit and no force was used upon them.

8. No doubt, the case of the
petitioners is that their land was utilised
under a promise that they would be paid
compensation. But there is nothing on
record that any promise was extended by
the State or its agencies in respect of
payment of compensation either to the
petitioners or to their ancestors, though, it
is alleged by the petitioners that on their
representations, a Committee was set up in
the year 2004 to examine their claim.
Further, from our query to the learned
counsel for the petitioners, it transpires that
the petitioners are not those farmers whose
land was utilised but are successors in
interest of those farmers. Thus, in absence
of a specific stand in the petition that any of
the
petitioners
had
been
promised
compensation at the time when the land
was utilised for construction of road, it
would be any body's guess as to what
transpired at the time when the land was
utilised for constructing the road. Whether
the ancestors of the petitioners voluntarily
contributed their land or it was forcible
acquisition
would
be
a
matter
of
speculation. But what is clear on the record
is that there is no material put forth to
suggest that the ancestors of the petitioners
had claimed compensation. Whether the
ancestors of the petitioners had provided
their land voluntarily with a view to have a
road for the village and for their benefit or
they were forced to provide land for
construction of the road cannot be decided
by us, at this stage, particularly, because
those farmers, namely, ancestors of the
petitioners, are no longer alive.

9. In this context, it would be apposite
to notice the judgment of the Apex Court in
Syed Maqbool Ali's case (supra). In Syed
Maqbool Ali's case (supra), in paragraph
9, it was observed as follows:-
872 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"The remedy of a land holder
whose land is taken without acquisition is
either to file a civil suit for recovery of
possession and/or for compensation, or
approach the High Court by filing a writ
petition if the action can be shown to be
arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, biased,
mala fide or without the authority of law,
and seek a direction that the land should be
acquired in a manner known to law."

In paragraph 10 of the aforesaid
judgment, the apex court went on to observe
as follows:-

"But that does not mean that the
delay should be ignored or appellant should
be given relief. In such matters, the person
aggrieved should approach the High Court
diligently. If the writ petition is belated,
unless there is good and satisfactory
explanation for the delay, the petition will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches."

In paragraph 12 of the aforesaid
judgment, it was further observed as follows:-

"The High Courts should also be
cautious in entertaining writ petitions filed
decades after the dispossession, seeking
directions for acquisition and payment of
compensation. It is not uncommon for
villagers to offer/donate some part of their
lands voluntarily for a public purpose
which would benefit them or the community
- as for example, construction of an access
road to the village or their property, or
construction of a village tank or a bund to
prevent flooding/erosion. When they offer
their land for such public purpose, the land
would be of little or negligible value. But
decades later, when land values increase,
either on account of passage of time or on
account of developments or improvements
carried out by the State, the land holders
come up with belated claims alleging that
their lands were taken without acquisition
and without their consent. When such
claims are made after several decades, the
State would be at a disadvantage to contest
the claim, as it may not have the records to
show in what circumstances the lands were
given/donated and whether the land was
given voluntarily. Therefore, belated writ
petitions, without proper explanation for
the delay, are liable to be dismissed."

10. As a legal principle, there is no
limitation provided for entertaining a writ
petition
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India. But, ordinarily,
where no limitation is provided, the person
must
approach
the
Court
within
a
reasonable time. As to what is the
reasonable time is dependent on the facts of
a case. Ordinarily, where a civil court
remedy would get barred by limitation, the
prayer should not be entertained in writ
jurisdiction. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Bhailal Bhai and others : AIR 1964 SC
1006, a constitution bench of the Apex
Court, in paragraph 21 of the judgment,
observed as follows:

"Learned counsel is right in his
submission that the provisions of the
Limitation Act do not as such apply to the
granting of relief under Article 226. It
appears to us however that the maximum
period fixed by the legislature as the time
within which the relief by a suit in a Civil
Court must be brought may ordinarily be
taken to be a reasonable standard by which
delay in seeking remedy under Article 226
can be measured. The court may consider
the delay unreasonable even if it is less
than the period of limitation prescribed for
a civil action for the remedy but where the
delay is more than this period, it will
almost always be proper for the court to
hold that it is unreasonable."

Following the decision of the
Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Bhailal Bhai's case (supra), in Banda
8 All. Ishwar Chand & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
873
Development Authority, Banda v Moti Lal
Agarwal and others; 2011 (5) SCC 394,
the Apex Court, in paragraph 17 of its
judgment, observed as under :-

"It is true that no limitation has
been prescribed for filing a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution but one of
the several rules of self imposed restraint
evolved by the superior courts is that the
High Court will not entertain petitions filed
after long lapse of time because that may
adversely affect the settled/crystallized
rights of the parties. If the writ petition is
filed beyond the period of limitation
prescribed for filing a civil suit for similar
cause, the High Court will treat the delay
unreasonable and decline to entertain the
grievance of the petitioner on merits"

11. When we examine the facts of the
instant case in the light of the legal principle
noticed above, we find that the cause of
action to institute a suit for compensation first
arose when the land was utilised. Admittedly,
the land was utilised in the year 1980 or
before. There is no documentary material on
record to indicate that either within three
years or even twelve years of such utilisation
of the land any promise was extended by the
State or its agencies to compensate the
farmers. Under these circumstances, where
even the remedy to seek possession was
barred by limitation, that is on expiry of 12
years from the date the possession of land
was taken from the farmers, in our view, the
writ petition, filed after 41 years, to stake a
claim for compensation is hopelessly barred
by laches and is liable to be dismissed as
such.

12. At this stage, the learned counsel
for the petitioners submitted that the cause
of action for filing the writ petition should
be taken as the date when the impugned
order was passed i.e. 12.02.2021.

13. In our view, the aforesaid
contention is liable to be rejected for the
simple reason that the impugned order
rejects the claim of the petitioners on the
ground of limitation. Even otherwise, the
period of limitation is to be counted from
the date when the original cause of action
arose. A later examination of dead and stale
issue would not give a fresh cause of action
to revive a time-barred issue. In this
context, we may refer to the decision of the
Apex Court in Union of India and another
v. V.M. Sarkar : 2010 (2) SCC 59, wherein
the Apex Court, in paragraph 15 of the
judgement, observed as under:-

"When a belated representation in
regard to a `stale' or `dead' issue/dispute is
considered and decided, in compliance with
a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so,
the date of such decision can not be
considered as furnishing a fresh cause of
action for reviving the `dead' issue or timebarred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and laches should be considered with
reference to the original cause of action and
not with reference to the date on which an
order is passed in compliance with a court's
direction"

14. Though, in this case, it does not
appear
from
the
record
that
the
representation of the petitioners was
decided under court's direction but there is
nothing on record to demonstrate that the
claim of the petitioners was raised, or was
under consideration from, within the period
of limitation. As we have already noticed
above that there is nothing to indicate that
the claim was raised and was taken up for
consideration up to the year 2004, the
original cause of action, which arose
sometimes in the year 1980, became barred
by limitation. No doubt, the Staterespondents did examine the plea and,
874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ultimately, rejected the plea to be barred by
limitation but that would not provide fresh
limitation for a claim which had already
become barred by limitation. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the
rejection of the time barred claim by the
impugned order gave the petitioners a new
cause of action for staking a claim for
compensation.

15. For all the reasons noticed above,
we are of the considered view that the
claim of the petitioners raised in this
petition is hopelessly barred by laches and
the same cannot be entertained. The
petition is therefore dismissed as barred
by laches.
----------
(2021)08ILR A874
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

Writ C No. 17909 of 2021

Smt. Vimla Rani Agarwal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Sections 47A,
56(1-A) & 76-A - Delegation of appellate
power
-
power
of
Chief
Controlling
Revenue Authority u/s 45(1)(2), 56(1)
and 70(2) can be delegated to the
subordinate Revenue Authority in view of
Section
76-A -
Notification
dated
24.5.2017 issued u/s 76-A(b), delegating
power of entertaining appeal u/s 56(1-A)
to the subordinate revenue authorities -
As per notification dated 24.5.2017 in
matter up to Rupees Ten lakh, appeal is
cognizable
by
Additional
Divisional
Commissioner
/Deputy
Commissioner
Stamp of Division/circle concerned. (Para
9, 10, 13)
B. U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - Sections 143, S. 144 -
getting non agricultural land converted as
an agricultural land just for the purpose of
sale deed and evading the stamp duty -
Not approved by court
Original tenure holder sought declaration u/s
143 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - Sub-Divisional Magistrate
found the land not being used for agricultural
purpose & on 16.7.2005 declared said land as
non-agricultural land - On 07.09.2009, S.D.M.
recalled the earlier declaration & proceeded to
declare the said land as ''agricultural' u/s 144 of
the Act, 1950 - In years 2013 Petitioner
purchased said agricultural land vide registered
sale deed, stamp duty paid according to the
circle
rate
-
Revenue
Authorities
rightly
proceeded to hold deficiency of stamp duty on
the basis of the fact that once the declaration
was made in the year 2005 u/s 143 of Act,
1950, no occasion arose for getting the land
again converted as an agricultural land just for
the purpose of sale deed and evading the stamp
duty (Para 3, 17, 18)
Dismissed. (E-4)
List of Cases cited:
1. Yogesh Kumar & ors. Vs State of U.P. & ors.
 Writ-C No.33694 of 2013 dt 14.6.2013
2. Neetu Agarwal & anr. Vs Commissioner, Devi
Patan Mandal, Gonda & ors. W.P. No.6600 (MS)
of 2009 dt 17.12.2009
3. Ajay Kumar Srivastava Vs Commissioner,
Allahabad Division & ors. Writ-C No.42865 of
2011 dt 9.5.2013

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rohit Ranjan
Agarwal, J.)