# Ishwar Sharan @ Ishwar Sharan Das Revisionist v. Bharat Kumar & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 1 ILRA 1329
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-02
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 49 of 2022
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ishwar-sharan-ishwar-sharan-das-revisionist-v-bharat-kumar-ors-49594
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Sections 105 & 115 -Revision challenging
three orders - Revisionist contested rejection of
an application to bring a registered will on
record - the non-acceptance of a proposed
scheme of administration- the striking off of
execution
in
full
satisfaction-
Preliminary
objection on maintainability was raised - That
three
separate
revisions
should
be
file-
Revisionist argued challenging interlocutory
orders with the final order is permissible- The
court deeming the objection unsustainable.
Revision maintainable. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1 All. Ishwar Sharan @ Ishwar Sharan Das Vs. Bharat Kumar & Ors.
1329
cannot confer any further sanctity or
authority and validity which it is shown and
found to obviously and patently lack. It
would, therefore, be a myth to state that
Regulations made under Section 23 of the
Act have "constitutional" and legal status,
even unmindful of the fact that any one or
more of them are found to be not consistent
with specific provisions of the Act itself.
Thus, the Regulations in question, which
AICTE could not have made so as to bind
universities/UGC within the confines of the
powers conferred upon it, cannot be
enforced against or bind a university in the
matter of any necessity to seek prior
approval to commence a new department or
course
and
programme
in
technical
education in any university or any of its
departments and constituent institutions.

16. Since in this case, the issue is
about the vires of sub-rule (4) and Rule 3 of
the Rules framed by the State Government
in exercise of power of power Section 109
of the Act, this Court is of opinion that the
matter ought to be heard and determined by
a Division Bench.

17. List this matter before the
appropriate
Bench,
after
seeking
nomination from his Lordship the Hon'ble
The Chief Justice.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 1329
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Civil Revision No. 49 of 2022

Ishwar Sharan @ Ishwar Sharan Das
 ...Revisionist
Versus
Bharat Kumar & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Bhola Nath Yadav, Sri Prem Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Rahul Sahai, Sri Aman Sharma

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Sections 105 & 115 -Revision challenging
three orders - Revisionist contested rejection of
an application to bring a registered will on
record - the non-acceptance of a proposed
scheme of administration- the striking off of
execution
in
full
satisfaction-
Preliminary
objection on maintainability was raised - That
three
separate
revisions
should
be
file-
Revisionist argued challenging interlocutory
orders with the final order is permissible- The
court deeming the objection unsustainable.
Revision maintainable. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Rajendra Prasad Gupta Vs Prakash Chandra
Mishra & ors. (2011) 2 SCC 705

2. Achal Misra Vs Rama Shanker Singh & ors.
(2005) 5 SCC 531

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

This revision is directed against three
distinct orders passed by the Additional
District Judge, Court No. 9, Budaun in
Execution Case No. 1 of 2012, arising out
of the decree passed by the learned
Additional District Judge, Court No. 8,
Budaun in Original Suit No. 2 of 2001,
Bharat Kumar and others v. Ishwar Sharan,
a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 19081. The first order impugned
is one dated 24.01.2022, rejecting the
application, Paper No. 54ग made in the
execution by one Gaurav Das, claiming to
bring on record a registered will dated
21.12.2016 in his favour, executed by the
the
late
Ishwar
Sharan,
the
former
1330 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sarvarakar of the temple subject matter of
the decree passed in the suit under Section
92 of the Code. The second is an order
dated 03.03.2022, by which, the scheme of
administration submitted by the revisionist,
claiming to be the legal representative of
the
deceased
judgment-debtor,
Ishwar
Sharan Das has not been accepted, whereas
that submitted by the decree holder, Paper
No. 9ग has been accepted. The last is an
order dated 05.03.1992, by which the
execution proceedings have been ordered to
be struck off in full satisfaction.

2. Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel
appearing for respondent no. 1 has raised a
preliminary
objection
regarding
the
maintainability of this revision. He submits
that the three orders impugned have been
passed on three different applications, and,
may be, a case decided within the meaning
of Section 115 of the Code. But, each
would give rise to a distinct and separate
right to the revisionist to prefer a revision
to this Court. It is Mr. Sahai's submission is
that the revisionist cannot prefer a single
revision against the three orders impugned.

3. In answering the aforesaid
objection, Mr. Bhola Nath Yadav, learned
Counsel for the revisionist has placed
reliance upon a decision of the Supreme
Court in Rajendra Prasad Gupta v.
Prakash Chandra Mishra and others2.
He has drawn the attention of this Court to
Paragraphs Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the report in
Rajendra Prasad Gupta (supra) where it
has been held :

5. In Narsingh Das v. Mangal
Dubey [ILR (1883) 5 All 163], Mahmood,
J. the celebrated Judge of the Allahabad
High Court, observed:

"Courts are not to act upon the
principle that every procedure is to be taken
as prohibited unless it is expressly provided
for by the Code, but on the converse
principle that every procedure is to be
understood as permissible till it is shown to
be prohibited by the law. As a matter of
general principle prohibition cannot be
presumed."

6. The above view was followed
by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High
Court in Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen
[AIR 1966 All 84] and we agree with this
view. Accordingly, we are of the opinion
that the application praying for withdrawal
of
the
withdrawal
application
was
maintainable. We order accordingly.

7. In the result, the impugned
judgment of the High Court is set aside and
the appeal is allowed. No costs. The suit
shall proceed and to be decided on merits,
expeditiously.

4. He submits that the objection raised
is no more than a technicality or something
to do with rules or procedure. He has
emphasized that rules of procedure are
hand-maid of justice and so long as a
substantially wrong order is there on
record, this Court has ample jurisdiction to
correct those wrong orders, in exercise of
powers of revision, even if more than one
orders are challenged in a single revision.
Mr. Yadav has placed further reliance upon
the decision of the Supreme Court in Achal
Misra v. Rama Shanker Singh and
others3. Attention of the Court is drawn to
the holding in Paragraphs Nos. 12 and 13
of the report, that read :

13. This principle is recognised
by Section 105(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure and reaffirmed by Order 43 Rule
1-A of the Code. The two exceptions to this
rule are found in Section 97 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that
a preliminary decree passed in a suit could
1 All. Ishwar Sharan @ Ishwar Sharan Das Vs. Bharat Kumar & Ors.
1331
not be challenged in an appeal against the
final decree based on that preliminary
decree and Section 105(2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 which precludes a
challenge to an order of remand at a
subsequent stage while filing an appeal
against the decree passed subsequent to the
order of remand. All these aspects came to
be considered by this Court in Satyadhyan
Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [(1960) 3 SCR
590 : AIR 1960 SC 941. Ed. : See
also(1981) 2 SCC 103, (2004) 12 SCC 754
and (2005) 3 SCC 422] wherein, after
referring to the decisions of the Privy
Council, it was held that an interlocutory
order which had not been appealed from
either because no appeal lay or even though
an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can
be challenged in an appeal from a final
decree or order. It was further held that a
special provision was made in Section
105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as
regards orders of remand where the order
of remand itself was made appealable.
Since Section 105(2) did not apply to the
Privy Council and can have no application
to appeals to the Supreme Court, the Privy
Council and the Supreme Court could
examine even the correctness of an original
order of remand while considering the
correctness of the decree passed subsequent
to the order of remand. The same principle
was reiterated in Amar Chand Butail v.
Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1658] and in
other subsequent decisions.

14. It is thus clear that an order
notifying a vacancy which leads to the final
order of allotment can be challenged in a
proceeding taken to challenge the final
order, as being an order which is a
preliminary step in the process of decisionmaking in passing the final order. Hence, in
a revision against the final order of
allotment which is provided for by the Act,
the order notifying the vacancy could be
challenged. The decision in Ganpat Roy
case[(1985) 2 SCC 307] which has
disapproved the ratio of the decision in
Tirlok Singh and Co. [(1976) 3 SCC 726]
cannot be understood as laying down that
the failure to challenge the order notifying
the vacancy then and there, would result in
the loss of right to the aggrieved person of
challenging the notifying of vacancy itself,
in a revision against the final order of
allotment. It has only clarified that even the
order notifying the vacancy could be
immediately and independently challenged.
The High Court, in our view, has
misunderstood the effect of the decision of
this Court in Ganpat Roy case[(1985) 2
SCC 307] and has not kept in mind the
general principles of law governing such a
question as expounded by the Privy
Council and by this Court. It is nobody's
case that there is anything in the Act
corresponding either to Section 97 or to
Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 precluding a challenge in
respect of an order which ultimately leads
to the final order. We overrule the view
taken by the Allahabad High Court in the
present case and in Kunj Lata v.Xth
ADJ[(1991) 2 RCJ 658] that in a revision
against the final order, the order notifying
the vacancy could not be challenged and
that the failure to independently challenge
the order notifying the vacancy would
preclude a successful challenge to the
allotment order itself. In fact, the person
aggrieved by the order notifying the
vacancy can be said to have two options
available. Either to challenge the order
notifying the vacancy then and there by
way of a writ petition or to make the
statutory challenge after a final order of
allotment has been made and if he is
aggrieved even thereafter, to approach the
High Court. It would really be a case of
election of remedies.
1332 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. It is submitted that in the revision
filed from a final order in any proceedings,
it is open to question interlocutory orders or
consequential orders, all of which may be
challenged in the same revision on the
analogy of Section 105 of the Code. It is
further emphasized that all that is required
is that the main order should be challenged,
along with the consequential orders. In
support of this principle, the learned
Counsel for the revisionist has placed
reliance
upon
Bussa
Overseas
and
Properties Private Limited and another
v. Union of India and another4. Attention
of the Court has been drawn to Paragraphs
Nos. 6 and 26 of the report in Bussa
Overseas and Properties Private Limited
(supra) :

30. .....if the basic judgment is not
assailed and the challenge is only to the
order passed in review, this Court is obliged
not to entertain such special leave petition.
The
said
principle
has
gained
the
authoritative status and has been treated as
a precedential principle for more than two
decades and we are disposed to think that
there is hardly any necessity not to be
guided by the said precedent. .....

6. Reliance has also been placed upon
the decision in Bhagwanji and Kalyanji v.
Punjabhai Hajabhai Rathod5. Here, the
learned Counsel for the revisionist has
drawn the Court's attention to Paragraph
Nos. 7 and 8 of the report, which read :

7. So far as the first question is
concerned, I must immediately answer the
same in favour of the appellant. Section
105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that unless otherwise expressly
provided, no appeal shall lie from any order
made by a Court in exercise of its original
or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a
decree is appealed from, any error, defect
or irregularity in any order, affecting the
decision of the case, may be set forth as a
ground of objection in the memorandum of
appeal. As sub-section (2) is not relevant
for our purpose, I am not referring the
same. Section 105 in its clear terms
provides that against some particular order
if an appeal is not provided, then such an
order can be challenged in an appeal which
is filed against the final judgment and
decree. The reason behind Section 105 is
that a party is not required to rush to the
revisional Court every time and at the same
time does not allow the party to say that
though against the impugned order appeal
was provided but he did not file the appeal.

8
Undisputedly
an
order
accepting or rejecting a document would
not be an appealable order therefore,
correctness, validity and propriety of the
order can be challenged before the
appellate Court with the help and assistance
of Section 15 of Code of Civil Procedure.
The learned first appellate Court was
absolutely unjustified in holding that in
absence of a revision challenging the
correctness of the order passed by the trial
Court, it would not be open to the appellate
Court to examine the validity/correctness of
the order.

7. Relying on the said decision, Mr.
Bhola Nath Yadav submitted that an order
accepting or rejecting a document may be
challenged in a revision carried against the
final order. It is argued that here, the final
order is the one striking off the execution in
full satisfaction, without hearing the
revisionist as the deceased sarvarakar's
chela, appointed on the basis of the will. It
is next submitted by the learned Counsel
for the revisionist that the objection by Mr.
Sahai is founded on the decision of this
1 All. Ishwar Sharan @ Ishwar Sharan Das Vs. Bharat Kumar & Ors.
1333
Court
in
Khurjawala
Buckles
Manufacturing Company, Tatanpara v.
Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow
and another6 which has been overruled by
a Full Bench of this Court in the case of
Mall Singh and others v. Smt. Laksha
Kumar
Khaitan
and
others7.
The
following holding in Mall Singh has been
brought to this Court's notice :

69.
In
Khuriawala
Buckles
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner Sales
Tax, U.P. [A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 517.] it has,
however, been held by a Division Bench of
this Court that the provisions of Civil
Procedure
Code
do
not
govern
a
proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It is pointed out therein that
what is laid down in Sec. 141 of the Civil
Procedure Code is that the procedure laid
down in the Code in regard to suits is to be
followed, so far as it can be, in all
proceedings
is
any
court
of
Civil
jurisdiction. A High Court when exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226, according to
the view expressed by that Bench, cannot
be held to be a court of civil jurisdiction.
That
jurisdiction
is
not
ordinary
jurisdiction,
but
it
is
extraordinary
jurisdiction which means that it is neither
civil nor criminal.

70. This view, with respect, will
no longer hold good in view of the two
Supreme Court decisions referred to above.
The jurisdiction may be extraordinary
jurisdiction, but that does not mean that it is
not civil just as the ordinary jurisdiction of
the High Court may either be civil or
criminal, the extraordinary jurisdiction as
opposed to ordinary jurisdiction may also
either
be
civil
or
criminal.
The
classification
into
"ordinary"
and
"extraordinary" jurisdiction is different
from the classification between "civil and
criminal" jurisdiction for both the civil and
criminal jurisdiction may be ordinary or
extraordinary. The jurisdiction with respect
to a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution
may
be
extraordinary
jurisdiction, but if the impact of the
decision is on the civil rights of a party, it
would
be
exercised
under
its
civil
jurisdiction, if its impact is on criminal
rights it is exercised under its criminal
jurisdiction.

8. Mr. Sahai, on the other hand,
submits that the decisions relied upon by
the learned Counsel would not help him in
maintaining a single revision against the
three distinct orders impugned. He submits
that Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing
Company (supra) is still good law and
attention of the Court has been drawn to the
holding of the Division Bench, which reads
:

7. There are a number of
decisions laying down that one petition
impugning
sevaral
orders
is
not
maintainable; vide AIR 1980 All 366
(supra), Revenue Patwaris Union v. State
of Punjab, AIR 1982 Punj 55, Inder Singh
v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Raj 185
and AIR 1953 Mad 626 (supra). In Calcutta
Discount Co. Ltd. y. Income Tax Officer,
AIR 1961 SC 372, one petition was filed to
impugn three notices issued under S. 31 of
the Income-Tax Act in respect of three
years'
assessment
orders
and
was
entertained. It was granted by a single
Judge but rejected by a Bench. The
Supreme Court on appeal restored the order
of single Judge issuing prohibition but
without deciding that a single petition was
maintainable. It was not argued before it
that one petition was not maintainable and
so it did not decide this matter. The
Division Bench of the High Court had
dismissed the petition but not on the ground
1334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that it was not maintainable. It has not been
argued before it also that it was not. Hence
this decision of the Supreme Court does not
help the petitioner. In Chandra Bhan v.
State of Orissa, Civil Mis. Petn. No. 1398
of 1962 decided by the Supreme Court on
5-4-1963 (SC) the Supreme Court did not
decide whether one petition impugning two
or mote assessment orders could validity be
filed or not; all that it decided was that
when one petition was filed one appeal
arose out of the order and not two or more
appeals.

8. ...... In a petition under Art. 226
the opposite party generally is the State
Government
and
if
a
petitioner
or
petitioners were allowed tin benefit of
Order II Rule 3 all kinds of different orders
under different Acts having no connection
whatever with one another would be liable
to be joined in one petition causing
confusion and embarrassment and this
cannot be permitted. Then the principle that
one proceeding maybe instituted combining
a number of cases in which common
questions of law or fact arise is not of
universal application. Nobody yet has
thought of filing one appeal against several
orders or of filing one revision application
against several appellate orders, on the
ground that common questions of fact or
law arise. If there are two proceedings and,
therefore, two orders Courts have always
insisted upon two appeals and two revision
applications regardless of whether they are
by the same appellant or applicant or
against the same respondent or opposite
party or not. There is no reason why one
writ petition should be entertained simply
on the ground that common questions of
law or fact arise or that they are by or
against the same person.

9. It is pointed out that this decision
was overruled by the Full Bench in Mall
Singh (supra) on another point, but not that
a single petition or a single revision against
multiple orders can be maintained. In this
connection, he has drawn the attention of
the Court to the questions that were
referred to the Full Bench in Mall Singh,
which appear to be related to joinder of
more than one parties as petitioners in a
single petition and the applicability of
Order I Rule 1 of the Code to a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
questions that were precisely referred to the
Full Bench in Mall Singh are :

1. Whether an application under
Article 226 of the Constitution is a
proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction
and as such the provision of Or. 1, R. 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure would be
applicable to such a proceeding?

2. If the answer to the first
question is in the affirmative, then whether
persons more than one can join together in
a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution in the circumstances in which
persons more than one can join together as
plaintiffs in a suit in accordance with the
provisions of Or. 1, R. 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure?

10. These were answered by their
Lordships of the Full Bench thus :

Question No. 1--An application
under Article 226 of the Constitution
involving civil rights is a proceeding in a
Court of civil jurisdiction. So, the provision
of Or. 1. R. 1, C.P.C. is applicable to such a
proceeding.

Question No.--2 Even if we
assume that a writ petition is not a
proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction,
and Or. 1, R. 1, C.P.C. in terms does not
apply to such a proceeding, more persons
than one can join in a petition under Article
1 All. Ishwar Sharan @ Ishwar Sharan Das Vs. Bharat Kumar & Ors.
1335
226
of
the
Constitution
under
circumstances in which persons more than
one can join as plaintiffs in a suit in
accordance with the provisions of Or. 1, R.
1, C.P.C.

11. Mr. Sahai appears to be in right in
his submission that the decision in
Khurjawala
Buckles
Manufacturing
Company
on
the
point
about
the
impermissibility of challenge to multiple
orders was not the subject matter of
consideration in Mall Singh or overruled
there. At the same time, what cannot be
disputed
is
that
the
principle
in
Khurjawala
Buckles
Manufacturing
Company appears to be that distinct and
different orders in different proceedings,
may be against same party, cannot be
challenged in a single appeal or revision. In
fact,
in
Khurjawala
Buckles
Manufacturing Company the issue arose
in the context of two separate assessment
orders under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax
Act, 1948 passed against the petitioner, one
for the Assessment Year 1960-61 and the
other for the year 1961-62, both of which
were challenged in a single writ petition.
That was held impermissible.

12. Here, the issue is about the
maintainability of a single revision under
Section 115 of the Code from three
successive orders passed in the same
execution. The last order, that is to say, the
one dated 05.03.2022 strikes off the
execution in full satisfaction. The order
dated 24.01.2022 is an order that was
passed on an application filed by the
revisionist with a prayer that the former
Sarvarakar Ishwar Sharan is dead and the
revisionist, being his Chela, has been
nominated as the Sarvarakar by Ishwar
Sharan. The nomination has been done
through a registered Will dated 11.12.2016.
The prayer in the application was that the
Will
be
accepted
on
record.
This
application was rejected by the order dated
24.01.2022. Apparently, the application to
bring on record the Will left by the former
Sarvakar, the judgment debtor, was to
represent the Sarvarakar by the revisionist,
claiming to be his Chela. if the the Will
were accepted on record, the revisionist
would assert that he is entitled to represent
the interest of the deceased Sarvarakar on
behalf of the temple in further proceedings
for execution. This application being
rejected, prejudiced the revisionist's right.

13. The other application 45-Ga was
also made on behalf of the revisionist,
Bharat Kumar, saying that the scheme of
administration filed on behalf of the decree
holder may not be accepted by the Court,
and instead, the scheme of administration
proposed on behalf of the judgment debtor,
the deceased Sarvarakar, now represented
by Bharat Kumar, his Chela, be accepted.
This application has been rejected by
means of the impugned order dated
03.03.2022 and the proposed scheme of
administration filed on behalf of the decree
holder has been accepted. All this having
been done, by the order dated 05.03.2022,
also
impugned
in
the
revision,
the
execution has been struck off in full
satisfaction.

14. The question is, is it not in
keeping with the mandate of Section 105 of
the Code, applied mutatis mutandis to the
execution of a decree that erroneous or
defective orders, prejudicing a party, passed
in the course of proceedings be permitted to
be challenged against the final order made.
By virtue of Section 141 of the Code, the
procedure provided in regard to suits is
mandated to be followed, mutatis mutandis
in all proceedings in any Court of civil
1336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction. The proceedings for execution
of a decree are not excepted. The
provisions of Section 105(1) of the Code
would, therefore, apply, and, in any case,
would apply on principle, if not proprio
vigore.

15. The principle behind Section 105(1)
of the Code is to enable a party to challenge
interlocutory orders passed during the course
of a suit or other proceedings against the final
order or the decree, which the party against
whom these orders are made, thinks are
erroneous, defective or irregular and further
prejudices his interest. By enabling a party to
challenge such interlocutory orders while
challenging the final decree or order, the
inevitable delay that would be caused in
laying challenges to all kinds of prejudicial
orders, that are passed during the course of
proceedings, can be obviated. The purpose of
it all is to eschew delay and speed up
conclusion of the trial or other proceedings.
But, at the same time, orders passed during
the course of proceedings, that are prejudicial
to a party, are still left open to be challenged
in an appeal or revision from the final order,
if that also goes against the party suffering
interlocutory
reverses.
The
provision
balances the competing interest of an
expeditious conclusion of proceedings on the
one hand, with rectification of errors
committed during the course of it, on the
other.

16. In our opinion, therefore, looking to
the
nature
of
the
impugned
orders
24.01.2022, 03.03.2022 and 05.03.2022, a
single revision can be maintained by the
revisionist.

17. There is another pragmatic angle of
looking at the worth of the respondent's
objection. By the order dated 05.03.2022, the
execution has been struck off in full
satisfaction. If the revisionist were asked to
file separate revision from all the three
orders, any of these cannot be individually
heard or may even be maintainable unless all
the three orders are challenged through
separate revisions and all the revisions heard
together. The orders impugned are all but part
of one challenge by the revisionist, arising
out of the same execution.

18. In the considered opinion of this
Court, therefore, the objection regarding
maintainability raised by Mr. Sahai, cannot
be sustained. The revision is, accordingly,
held to be maintainable.

19. Considering the fact that the
revision has not been heard on merits, let it be
listed for admission on 06.01.2023 at 2:00
p.m. Liberty to mention is granted to the
revisionist.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 1336
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.01.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Civil Revision No. 48 of 2022
And
Civil Revision No. 66 of 2022

Radhey Shyam ...Revisionist
Versus
Nagina Devi & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Prakhar Saran Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Ankur Mehrotra

Motor Accident Claim-Orders from Motor
Accident Claims Tribunals - Not classified as
appealable awards - Revisions questions the