# Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 1 ILRA 217
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-01-11
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482/378/407 No. 1979 of 2020
- **Bench:** Rajeev Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ishwar-singhal-tinu-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48030
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 323, 354, 498A & 504 , Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 - Section 3/4 - after
lodging the FIR, which discloses the
commission
of
a
cognizable
offence,
statutory powers of Police, under Section
156
Cr.P.C.
to
investigate
the
case
registered on the basis of information - no
interference
is
permissible
in
the
investigation
in
the
exercise
of
its
inherent
powers,
under
Section
482
Cr.P.C. - this Court has no jurisdiction to
direct a police officer not to arrest the
accused
during
the
pendency
of
investigation of the case - but High Court
can always issue a writ of mandamus,
under Article 226 of the Constitution
restraining the police officer for misusing
his legal power in relation to arrest - Fir
can be quashed under section 482 Cr.P.C
.(Para - 9)

First Information lodged by opposite party No.4
- during the course of investigation - FIR and its
consequential proceedings challenged before
Court - matter referred to the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre of Court - on the first date it
was successfully concluded - opposite party
No.4 enjoying her matrimonial life and residing
with her husband and children .(Para - 18)

HELD:-Impugned FIR and its consequential
proceedings is liable to be quashed in terms of
settlement
agreement
of
parties
before
Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
First Information Report is hereby quashed.
(Para - 18,19)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

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1 All. Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
217
(2022)01ILR A217
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 11.01.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJEEV SINGH, J.

Application U/S 482/378/407 No. 1979 of 2020

Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Durgesh Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Vinod Kumar

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 323, 354, 498A & 504 , Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 - Section 3/4 - after
lodging the FIR, which discloses the
commission
of
a
cognizable
offence,
statutory powers of Police, under Section
156
Cr.P.C.
to
investigate
the
case
registered on the basis of information - no
interference
is
permissible
in
the
investigation
in
the
exercise
of
its
inherent
powers,
under
Section
482
Cr.P.C. - this Court has no jurisdiction to
direct a police officer not to arrest the
accused
during
the
pendency
of
investigation of the case - but High Court
can always issue a writ of mandamus,
under Article 226 of the Constitution
restraining the police officer for misusing
his legal power in relation to arrest - Fir
can be quashed under section 482 Cr.P.C
.(Para - 9)

First Information lodged by opposite party No.4
- during the course of investigation - FIR and its
consequential proceedings challenged before
Court - matter referred to the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre of Court - on the first date it
was successfully concluded - opposite party
No.4 enjoying her matrimonial life and residing
with her husband and children .(Para - 18)

HELD:-Impugned FIR and its consequential
proceedings is liable to be quashed in terms of
settlement
agreement
of
parties
before
Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.
First Information Report is hereby quashed.
(Para - 18,19)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Ram Lal Yadav & ors. Vs The St. of U.P. &
ors. , 1989 Cr. LJ 1013

2. Narinder Singh & ors. Vs St. of Punj. & anr. ,
(2014) 6 SCC 466

3. Jitendra Raghuvanshi & ors. Vs Babita
Raghuwanshi & anr. , (2013) 4 SCC 58

4. Parbatbhai Aahir & ors. Vs St. of Guj. & anr. ,
(2017) 9 SCC 641 B.S.

5. Joshi & ors. Vs St. of Har. & anr. , (2003) 4
SCC 675

6. Gian Singh Vs St. of Punj. & anr. , (2012) 10
SCC 303

7. Ramawatar Vs St. of M.P. , 2021 SCC Online
SC 966

8. St. of Har. & ors. Vs Bhajan Lal & ors. ,
(1992) Supp 1 SCC 335

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajeev Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Durgesh Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the applicant, Shri
Anirudh Singh, learned A.G.A. for the
State and Shri Vinod Kumar, learned
counsel for the opposite party No.4.

2. This application (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.)
has been filed with request that the matter
218 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
may be referred to the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre of this Court in relation
to FIR No.501 of 2019, under Sections 323,
354, 498A, 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Police
Station Mandion, District Lucknow and
also quashed the entire proceeding in
relation to FIR No.501 of 2019 (supra).

3. Learned A.G.A. raised preliminary
objection that in the present case, First
Information Report and its consequential
proceedings
are
challenged
as
the
investigation is still pending, therefore,
application (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.) is not
maintainable in terms of law laid down by
Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram
Lal Yadav and Others vs. The State of
U.P. and Others reported in 1989 Cr. LJ
1013, decided on 01.02.1989 and answered
that after lodging the FIR, no interference
is permissible by this Court in exercise of
its inherent powers, hence, no relief can be
granted despite the issue is already resolved
in the Mediation Centre.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants
has submitted that marriage of applicant
No.1 was solemnized with the opposite
party No.4 on 01.07.2009 and they were
enjoying their matrimonial life and out of
their wedlock, two children were born,
namely, Shourya and Tejal, but due to
some trivial issues, FIR in question was
lodged on 14.06.2019 by the opposite party
No.4. In the present case, investigation was
started and mediation was also initiated
before the court below, but the applicant
No.1 was not satisfied with the mediation
proceeding initiated before the court below,
hence, present application (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.)
was filed and with the consent of learned
counsel for the applicant as well as learned
counsel for the opposite party No.4, matter
was sent to the Mediation and Conciliation
Centre of this Court on 31.07.2020. The
order dated 31.07.2020 reads as under:-

"'Vakalatnama' filed by Shri
Vinod Kumar, Advocate on behalf of
opposite party No.4 is taken on record.

Heard learned counsel for the
applicants as well as learned A.G.A. for the
State and Shri Vinod Kumar, learned
counsel for opposite party No.4.

The
present
482
Cr.P.C.
application has been filed to quash the
entire proceedings arising out of F.I.R.
dated
14.06.2019
lodged
by
the
complainant (O.P. No.4) against the
applicants in Case Crime No. 501 of 2019,
under Sections 323, 354, 498-A, 504 of
I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961, Police Staton Madiaon, District
Lucknow and to refer this matter to the
Mediation and Conciliation Center, High
Court.

The instant dispute is the outcome
of strained matrimonial relations between
applicant No.1 and opposite party No.4. It
has been submitted by learned counsel for
the applicant that earlier the mediation
process was started to amicably settle the
dispute
between
applicant
No.1
and
opposite party No.4, however, due to some
wrong advice given by the Advocate of the
applicants they could not take part in the
mediation process and, therefore, one more
opportunity be provided to the parties to
settle their disputes amicably, if possible,
through the process of mediation.

Learned counsel for the opposite
party No.4 is not having any objection to
the request of learned counsel for the
applicants.

Having regard to the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the
applicants and learned counsel for opposite
party No.4, the matter is referred to the
Mediation Center of this Bench on deposit
1 All. Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
219
of Rs. 15,000/-, which shall be deposited by
the applicants within a week from today
with the Senior Registrar of this Bench.
When the Mediation Center will start
functioning, a communication will be sent
by the Mediation Center of this Bench to
the parties and on the first appearance of
opposite party No.4 before the Mediation
Centre Rs. 13,000/- out of Rs. 15,000/-,
which shall be deposited by the applicants
shall be paid to her to meet out her
expenses of travelling, etc.

Mediation Center will try its best
to persuade the parties to arrive at a
settlement and will submit a report to this
Court within two months from the start of
mediation.

List this case in the Ist week of
November, 2020.

Till then no coercive measure
shall be taken against the applicants in the
aforementioned case."

5. Learned counsel for the applicants
has
submitted
that
mediation
was
successfully concluded and opposite party
No.4 join her matrimonial home with her
husband and children on 07.07.2021 and
settlement agreement was singed at the
Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this
Court by the applicant No.1 (husband) and
opposite party No.4 (wife) along with their
respective counsels of the parties and they
also agreed to withdraw the proceeding of
Case, i.e. (i) Case Crime No.501 of 2019
(challenged in the present application) and
(ii) Case No.990 of 2019, pending before
the Principal Judge, Family Court, DistrictNorth West, Rohini Court, Delhi.

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
as well as learned counsel for the opposite
party
No.4
fairly
accepted
that
investigation is going on, but the
Investigating Officer has not taken into
consideration the settlement agreement for
dropping the investigation, therefore, it is
appropriate that First Information Report
and its consequential proceedings may be
quashed in terms of settlement agreement
dated
22.02.2021,
executed
in
the
Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this
Court.

7. Learned counsel for the applicants
has relied on the decisions of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the Case of Narinder
Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and
Another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466.
The relevant part of the judgment reads as
under:-

"29.7. While deciding whether to
exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after
the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High
Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement
to
quash
the
criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of
the
reason
that
at
this
stage
the
investigation is still on and even the
charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise,
those cases where the charge is framed but
the evidence is yet to start or the evidence
is still at infancy stage, the High Court can
show benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably,
but
after
prima
facie
assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where
the
prosecution
evidence
is
almost
complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of
argument, normally the High Court should
220 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
refrain from exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases
the trial court would be in a position to
decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the
offence
under
Section
307
IPC
is
committed or not. Similarly, in those cases
where the conviction is already recorded
by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court,
mere compromise between the parties
would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who
has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section
307 IPC and conviction is already
recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore,
there is no question of sparing a convict
found guilty of such a crime."

Jitendra
Raghuvanshi
And
Others vs. Babita Raghuwanshi and
another reported in (2013) 4 SCC 58. The
relevant part of the judgment reads as
under:-

8. It is not in dispute that
matrimonial
disputes
have
been
on
considerable increase in recent times
resulting in filing of complaints under
Sections 498-A and 406 IPC not only
against the husband but also against the
relatives of the husband. The question is
when such matters are resolved either by
the wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial
home or by mutual settlement of other
pending disputes for which both the sides
approached the High Court and jointly
prayed for quashing of the criminal
proceedings or the FIR or complaint by the
wife under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC,
whether the prayer can be declined on the
sole ground that since the offences are noncompoundable under Section 320 of the
Code, it would be impermissible for the
Court to quash the criminal proceedings or
FIR or complaint.

9. It is not in dispute that in the
case on hand subsequent to the filing of the
criminal complaint under Sections 498-A
and 406 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, with the help
and intervention of family members, friends
and well-wishers, the parties concerned
have amicably settled their differences and
executed
a
compromise/settlement.
Pursuant thereto, the appellants filed the
said compromise before the trial court with
a request to place the same on record and
to drop the criminal proceedings against
the appellants herein. It is also not in
dispute that in addition to the mutual
settlement arrived at by the parties, the
respondent wife has also filed an affidavit
stating that she did not wish to pursue the
criminal
proceedings
against
the
appellants and fully supported the contents
of the settlement deed. It is the grievance of
the appellants that not only the trial court
rejected such prayer of the parties but also
the High Court failed to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
only on the ground that the criminal
proceedings
relate
to
the
offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 406
IPC which are non-compoundable in
nature.

12. After considering the law laid
down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426] and explaining the decisions rendered
in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra
[(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] ,
Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa
[(1999) 5 SCC 238 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 998]
and
Pepsi
Foods
Ltd.
v.
Judicial
Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC
(Cri) 1400] this Court held: (B.S. Joshi
case [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
848] , SCC p. 680, para 8)

"8. ... We are, therefore, of the
view that if for the purpose of securing the
1 All. Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
221
ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes
necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar
to the exercise of power of quashing. It is,
however, a different matter depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case
whether to exercise or not such a power."

Considering matrimonial matters,
this Court also held: (B.S. Joshi case
[(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] ,
SCC p. 682, para 12)

"12. The special features in such
matrimonial
matters
are
evident.
It
becomes the duty of the court to encourage
genuine
settlements
of
matrimonial
disputes."

17. In the light of the above
discussion, we hold that the High Court in
exercise of its inherent powers can quash
the criminal proceedings or FIR or
complaint in appropriate cases in order to
meet the ends of justice and Section 320 of
the Code does not limit or affect the powers
of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code.

Parbatbhai Aahir and Others
vs. State of Gujrat and Another reported
in (2017) 9 SCC 641. The relevant part of
the judgment reads as under :-

"16. The broad principles which
emerge from the precedents on the subject,
may be summarised in the following
propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the
inherent powers of the High Court to prevent
an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does
not confer new powers. It only recognises and
preserves powers which inhere in the High
Court.

16.2.
The
invocation
of
the
jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first
information report or a criminal proceeding
on the ground that a settlement has been
arrived at between the offender and the victim
is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding
an offence. While compounding an offence, the
power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to
quash under Section 482 is attracted even if
the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether
a criminal proceeding or complaint should be
quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate
whether the ends of justice would justify the
exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of
the High Court has a wide ambit and
plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure
the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse
of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a
complaint or first information report should be
quashed on the ground that the offender and
victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power
under Section 482 and while dealing with a
plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the
trial in such cases is founded on the
overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7.
As
distinguished
from
serious offences, there may be criminal
222 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cases which have an overwhelming or
predominant element of a civil dispute.
They stand on a distinct footing insofar as
the exercise of the inherent power to quash
is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving
offences which arise from commercial,
financial,
mercantile,
partnership
or
similar transactions with an essentially
civil flavour may in appropriate situations
fall for quashing where parties have settled
the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High
Court may quash the criminal proceeding if
in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is
remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception
to the principle set out in propositions 16.8.
and
16.9. above.
Economic offences
involving the financial and economic wellbeing of the State have implications which
lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court
would be justified in declining to quash
where the offender is involved in an activity
akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the
act complained of upon the financial or
economic
system
will
weigh
in
the
balance."

B.S. Joshi And Others vs. State
of Haryana And Another reported in
(2003) 4 SCC 675. The relevant part of the
judgment reads as under :-

8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu
Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 10] does not lay down any
general proposition limiting power of
quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR
or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the
Code or extraordinary power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. We are,
therefore, of the view that if for the purpose
of securing the ends of justice, quashing of
FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would
not be a bar to the exercise of power of
quashing. It is, however, a different matter
depending
upon
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case whether to
exercise or not such a power. Considering
matrimonial matters, this Court also held:

12. The special features in such
matrimonial
matters
are
evident.
It
becomes the duty of the court to encourage
genuine
settlements
of
matrimonial
disputes.

15.
In
view
of
the
above
discussion, we hold that the High Court in
exercise of its inherent powers can quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint
and Section 320 of the Code does not limit
or affect the powers under Section 482 of
the Code.

Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
and Another reported in (2012) 10 SCC
303. The relevant part of the judgment
reads as under:-

"61. the power of the High Court
in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR
or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from
the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it
has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i)
to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court.
In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be
exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the
1 All. Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
223
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
victim or victim's family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are
not private in nature and have a serious
impact
on
society.
Similarly,
any
compromise between the victim and the
offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis
for
quashing
criminal
proceedings
involving such offences. But the criminal
cases
having
overwhelmingly
and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a
different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute.
In this category of cases, the High Court
may quash the criminal proceedings if in its
view, because of the compromise between
the offender and the victim, the possibility
of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would put
the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement
and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to
the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding would tantamount to
abuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the
ends of justice, it is appropriate that the
criminal case is put to an end and if the
answer to the above question(s) is in the
affirmative, the High Court shall be well
within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding."

8. Learned counsel for the applicants
has also relied on the recent judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 966. The
relevant part of the judgment reads as
under:-

"19.
Having
considered
the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case in light of the afore-stated
principles, as well as having meditated on
the application for compromise, we are
inclined to invoke the powers under Article
142 and quash the instant Criminal
proceedings with the sole objective of
doing complete justice between the parties
before us. We say so for the reasons that:

Firstly, the very purpose behind
Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter
caste-based insults and intimidations when
they are used with the intention of
demeaning a victim on account of he/she
belonging
to
the
Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. In the
present case, the record manifests that
there was an undeniable pre-existing civil
dispute between the parties. The case of the
Appellant, from the very beginning, has
been that the alleged abuses were uttered
solely on account of frustration and anger
over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis
of the deprecated incident was the aforestated civil/property dispute. Considering
224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this aspect, we are of the opinion that it
would not be incorrect to categorise the
occurrence as one being overarchingly
private in nature, having only subtle
undertones of criminality, even though the
provisions of a special statute have been
attracted in the present case.

Secondly, the offence in question,
for which the Appellant has been convicted,
does not appear to exhibit his mental
depravity. The aim of the SC/ST Act is to
protect members of the downtrodden
classes from atrocious acts of the upper
strata of the society. It appears to us that
although the Appellant may not belong to
the same caste as the Complainant, he too
belongs to the relatively weaker/backward
section of the society and is certainly not in
any better economic or social position
when compared to the victim. Despite the
rampant prevalence of segregation in
Indian villages whereby members of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
community are forced to restrict their
quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that
in the present case, the Appellant and the
Complainant lived in adjoining houses.
Therefore, keeping in mind the socioeconomic status of the Appellant, we are of
the opinion that the overriding objective of
the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if
the present proceedings are quashed.

Thirdly, the incident occurred
way back in the year 1994. Nothing on
record indicates that either before or after
the purported compromise, any untoward
incident
had
transpired
between
the
parties. The State Counsel has also not
brought to our attention any other
occurrence that would lead us to believe
that the Appellant is either a repeat
offender or is unremorseful about what
transpired.

Fourthly, the Complainant has,
on her own free will, without any
compulsion, entered into a compromise and
wishes to drop the present criminal
proceedings against the accused.

Fifthly, given the nature of the
offence, it is immaterial that the trial
against the Appellant had been concluded.

Sixthly, the Appellant and the
Complainant parties are residents of the
same village and live in very close
proximity to each other. We have no reason
to doubt that the parties themselves have
voluntarily
settled
their
differences.
Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of
healed wounds, and to advance peace and
harmony, it will be prudent to effectuate the
present settlement."

9. Learned counsel for the applicants
has submitted that in the law laid down by
the Full Bench of this Court in the case of
Ram Lal Yadav (supra) relied by learned
A.G.A. is wrongly interpreted as in the
aforesaid judgment, it is held that after
lodging the FIR, which discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence,
statutory powers of Police, under Section
156 Cr.P.C. to investigate the case
registered on the basis of information, no
interference
is
permissible
in
the
investigation in the exercise of its inherent
powers, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and this
Court has no jurisdiction to direct a police
officer not to arrest the accused during the
pendency of investigation of the case, but
High Court can always issue a writ of
mandamus, under Article 226 of the
Constitution restraining the police officer
for misusing his legal power in relation to
arrest.

10. Learned counsel for the applicants
has
submitted
that
provisions
of
anticipatory bail, under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
was omitted in the State of U.P., vide U.P.
Act No.16 of 1976 w.e.f. 28.11.1975, the
1 All. Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
225
protection of pre arrest was not available,
therefore, application (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.) was
being filed restraining the police from
arrest during investigation and in the case
of Ram Lal Yadav (supra), this controversy
was decided that under Section 482
Cr.P.C., Police Officer cannot be restrained
from arresting the accused persons during
the course of investigation, but by way of
writ of mandamus, this power can be used.
This question is already settled in the case
of State of Haryana and Others vs.
Bhajan Lal and Others reported in (1992)
Supp 1 SCC 335, that First Information
Report can be quashed either under Section
482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The relevant part of the
judgment reads as under:-

"102. In the backdrop of the
interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by
this Court in a series of decisions relating
to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we
have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be
exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in
the first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.(2) Where the
allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or complaint and
the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused

(6) Where there is an express legal
bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in
the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge."

11. Learned counsel for the applicants
has
submitted
that
in
the
case
of
226 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ramawatar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that even at the stage of
appeal against the conviction order, power
of inherent jurisdiction can be invoked to
do the complete justice, therefore, in the
present case, First Information Report and
its consequential proceedings may be
quashed in terms of settlement agreement
executed
before
the
Mediation
and
Conciliation Centre of this Court.

12. Learned A.G.A. as well as learned
counsel for the opposite party No.4 fairly
conceded this fact that matter was sent to
the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of
this Court on 31.07.2020 and it was
successfully
concluded
and
presently,
opposite party No.4 is residing with her
husband (applicant No.1) and children.

13. Considering the arguments of
learned counsel for the applicants, learned
counsel for the opposite party No.4 as well
as learned A.G.A. and going through the
record, it is evident that FIR was lodged by
the opposite party No.4 (wife of applicant
No.1) due to some trivial issues and during
the
course
of
investigation,
First
Information Report and its consequential
proceedings were challenged before this
Court, and thereafter, matter was referred
to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of
this Court with the consent of counsel for
the opposite party No.4 on the first date and
it
was
successfully
concluded
and
settlement
agreement
was
executed
between the parties and opposite party No.4
join her matrimonial home on 07.03.2021
and enjoying her life with her husband
(applicant No.1) and children.

14. As in the case of Ram Lal Yadav
(supra) there is no bar from interference in
the FIR in application (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.) as
this question was already decided in the
case of Bhajan Lal (supra) that inherent
powers can be invoked in seven conditions,
which reads as under:-

(1) Where the allegations made in
the
first
information
report
or
the
complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the
first
information
report
and
other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence
but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused

(6) Where there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned
Act,
providing
efficacious
1 All. Ishwar Singhal @ Tinu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
227
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge."

15. As in Criminal Procedure Code
1898, there was no such provision in
relating to inherent jurisdiction of High
Court, but the legislature added Section
561-A by inserting in 1923 Act No.XVII of
1923. Section 561-A of the Criminal
Procedure Code 1898, which reads as
under:-

"Saving of inherent power of
High Court-Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent power
of the High Court to make such orders as
ma be necessary to give effect to any order
under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice"

16. The Law Commission in its 40th
report observed that the statutory power
under Section 561 A Cr.P.C. is extended only
the inherent power of High Court. One may
compare it with the recognition of the
inherent powers of all civil courts by Section
151 Cr.P.C. Later on, Law Commission in its
41st reports recommended that inherent
power of Section 561-A Cr.P.C. be extended
to all Criminal Courts to prevent abuse of
process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, but the legislature did not
accept the recommendation of commission to
extend the inherent power as mentioned in
Section 561-A of Criminal Procedure Code,
1898. Para 46.23 of 41st report of Law
Commission is reproduced as under:-

"Section 561 A recognises the
inherent powers of the Section 561 A, High
Court to do real and substantial justice
between parties. Assuming its existence, the
Section provides that nothing in the Code
shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent power of the High Court to give
effect to any order under the Code (whether
made by itself or by a subordinate Court)
or to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court (including subordinate Courts) or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Fourteenth Report. Vol. II, page
829, the Law Commission observed:-

"This
statutory
recognition,
however, extends only to the inherent
powers of the High Court. One may
compare it with the recognition of the
inherent powers of all civil courts by
Section 151, Criminal Procedure Code.

In a number of decisions before
and after the enactment of Section 561A,
various High Courts have also recognised
the existence of such power in subordinate
Courts. We would, therefore, recommend a
statutory recognition of such inherent
power which has been recognized as
vesting in all subordinate criminal courts.

However, the general principle of
law is that the inherent power of a court
can be exercised only to give effect to
orders made by it or to prevent abuse of its
own processes.

We agree with this recommendation.
We do not, however consider it necessary or
desirable to go further and recognise and
inherent power in Courts of Session and other
Courts of Appeal to pass appropriate orders to
prevent the abuse of the process of any
subordinate Court.
228 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

We propose that the Section may be
expanded as follows:-

"561 A. Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or saving of

inherent powers of Criminal Courts,
affect the inherent power-

(a) of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice, or (b) of any Criminal Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to
prevent abuse of its process or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice."

17. In the case of Ram Lal Yadav (supra)
the provision of anticipatory bail, under Section
438 Cr.P.C. was not existing, therefore, there
was a delima to get the remedy of pre arrest
during investigation, then it was clarified by this
Court that High Court has no inherent powers,
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interfere with the
arrest of accused persons during the course of
investigation, but it was clarified that High Court
can always issue a writ of mandamus, under
Article 226 of the Constitution restraining the
police officer for misusing his legal power in
relation to arrest and FIR can be quashed, under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., which is covered under the
principle laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the Case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and the
present case law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the cases as discussed above.

18. In the present case, First Information
Report No. 501 of 2019, under Sections 323,
354, 498A, 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961, Police Station Mandion,
District Lucknow was lodged on 14.06.2019 by
the opposite party No.4 and during the course of
investigation,
FIR
and
its
consequential
proceedings were challenged before this Court,
and thereafter, matter was referred to the
Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court
with the consent of counsel for the opposite party
No.4 on the first date and it was successfully
concluded and presently opposite party No.4 is
enjoying her matrimonial life and residing with
her husband and children. As in the case of Ram
Lal Yadav (supra), this Court held that
Investigating Officer can not be restrained from
arresting the accused of a cognizable offence.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bhajan Lal (supra) and Ramawatar (supra)
already held that FIR and its consequential
proceedings can be quashed (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.),
therefore, this Court is of the view that impugned
FIR and its consequential proceedings is liable to
be quashed in terms of settlement agreement of
parties before Mediation and Conciliation Centre
of this Court.

19.