# Jagadamba Singh v. D.D.C., Ayodhya & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 1135
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-16
- **Case number:** Writ-B No. 295 of 2023
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jagadamba-singh-v-d-d-c-ayodhya-ors-50152
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Consolidation Law - UP Consolidation
of Holding Act, 1953 - Section 48 - Power
of Revision - Scope - About 43 age of
litigation - Relevance - Deputy Director of
Consolidation, while deciding the revision,
remanded the matter - Validity challenged
- No evidence was required to be adduced
in the matter - Effect - Held, taking note
of the power of DDC and the age of
litigation between the parties, the High
Court set aside the remand order and
directed the DDC to consider and decide
all the issues including the issue(s) related
to applicability of Section 11-A and 49 of
the Act of 1953. (Para 17, 18 and 19)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Jagdamba Singh Vs. D.D.C., Ayodhya & Ors.
1135
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, there
is power of placing an employee under
suspension, and I am of the view that the
power has been exercised correctly for
valid and cogent reasons for placing the
petitioner under suspension.

22. In view thereof, I find no merit
and substance in the present petition, which
is hereby dismissed. It is, however,
provided that the Department should
proceed with the departmental inquiry
expeditiously and conclude the same,
preferably within a period of four months,
subject to full cooperation by the petitioner.
Any observation, made herein above,
would not influence the inquiry officer,
who
should
conduct
the
inquiry
independently and record his finding based
on the evidence.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1135
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Writ-B No. 295 of 2023

Jagadamba Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
D.D.C., Ayodhya & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Prabhakar Vardhan Chaudhary, Mohammad
Aslam Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ankit Pande, Rakesh Kumar Srivastava

A. Consolidation Law - UP Consolidation
of Holding Act, 1953 - Section 48 - Power
of Revision - Scope - About 43 age of
litigation - Relevance - Deputy Director of
Consolidation, while deciding the revision,
remanded the matter - Validity challenged
- No evidence was required to be adduced
in the matter - Effect - Held, taking note
of the power of DDC and the age of
litigation between the parties, the High
Court set aside the remand order and
directed the DDC to consider and decide
all the issues including the issue(s) related
to applicability of Section 11-A and 49 of
the Act of 1953. (Para 17, 18 and 19)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. WRIT B No. 108 of 2023; Angad Pratap Singh
& ors. Vs Deputy Director Consolidation & ors.
decided on 10.02.2023

2. Prabhu Dayal Vs D.D.C. & anr.; 2018 (140)
RD 460 (All.)

3. Musuttu Vs D.D.C. & ors.; 2018(140) RD 505 (All.)

4. Dhooram Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Bagpat; 2006 (100) RD 505 (H.C.)

5. Smt.Anju Rajpal & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.;
2023 (41) LCD 626

6. Bechan Pandey & ors. Vs Dulhin Janki Devi;
AIR 1976 SC 866

7. Arvind Kumar Jaiswal (Dead) through L.R. Vs
Devendra Prasad Jaiswal; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 146,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard Mohammad Arif Khan,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Prabhakar
Vardhan
Chaudhary
and
Mohammad Aslam Khan, learned counsel
for the petitioner, Sri Hemant Kumar
Pandey, learned State counsel appearing for
the respondent No. 1 and Sri R.S. Pandey,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel
appearing for the caveator.

2. The order impugned in this petition
dated 23.03.2023 passed by the respondent
1136 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
No. 1/Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Ayodhya
in
Revision
No.
1864/2020530423000014 (Bajrang Pratap
Singh and others vs. Jagdamba Singh) is an
order of remand, whereby, the respondent
No. 1 after interfering in the order dated
22.06.2019 passed by the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation as also the orders
dated 29.06.2016 and 11.07.2016 passed by
the Consolidation Officer remanded the
matter back to the Court of Consolidation
Officer, Sadar, Ayodhya for deciding the
matter afresh. The relevant portion of the
order impugned dated 23.03.2023 on
reproduction reads as under:-

"जविािोपिांत मैं इस मत का ह ं जक िकबन्दी अजधकािी
द्वािा जनजमशत वाद जबन्दुओं की जबन्दुवाि स्पष्ट जववेिना नहीं की
गयी है एवं अपीलीय न्यायालय द्वािा भी सिसिी रूप से अवि
न्यायालय के आदेश की पुजष्ट कि दी गयी है। इस प्रकिण में
मुख्य जविािणीय जबन्दु यहीं िहा है जक प्रथम िक्र िकबन्दी में
उप संिालक िकबन्दी स्ति तक पारित आदेश के जवरुद्ध
माननीय उच्ि न्यायालय में मु० लखिाजी द्वािा याजिका प्रस्तुत
की गयी औि मु० लखिाजी के मृत्यु के उपिान्त उक्त याजिका
की पैिवी जवजधक वारिस द्वािा न जकये जाने के कािण जनगिानी
न्यायालय द्वािा पारित आदेश जदनांक 09.08.1958 अजन्तम
हो िुका है तो जद्वतीय िक्र िकबन्दी में उक्त प्रकिण से
सम्बजन्धत वाद धािा-11क व धािा-49 जोत िकबन्दी
अजधजनयम से बाजधत है अथवा नहीं एवं जनगिानी स्ति तक
पारित आदेश प्रांग न्याय का प्रभाव िखते है अथवा नहीं तथा
िकबन्दी प्राजधकारियों को प्रस्तुत आपजियों पि सुनवाई का
क्षेत्राजधकाि प्राप्त है अथवा नहीं। पिीक्षण न्यायालय को सवशप्रथम
इन्हीं जबन्दुओं पि सुनवाई किकें इन जबन्दुओं का जनस्तािण किना
िाजहए। इस जबन्दुओ के जनस्तािण के उपिान्त ही अन्य जबन्दुओं
पि गुणदोर् पि जविाि जकया जा सकता है। तदनुसाि जनगिानी
स्वीकाि जकये जाने योग्य है।

आदेश

उपिोक्त जववेिन के आधाि पि यह जनगिानी स्वीकाि
की जाती है। बन्दोबस्त अजधकािी िकबन्दी द्वािा पारित आदेश
जदनांक 22.06.2019 एवं िकबन्दी अजधकािी द्वािा पारित
आदेश जदनांक 29.06.2016 व 11.07.2016 जनिस्त
जकया जाता है। प्रकिण ऊपि की गयी जववेिना के अनुसाि
पुनः जनस्तािण हेतु िकबन्दी अजधकािी सदि अयोध्या के
न्यायालय पि प्रजत प्रेजर्त जकया जाता है। वाद के जनस्तािण
तक आधाि वर्श का इन्राज यथावत िहेगा। पक्ष िकबन्दी
अजधकािी सदि के न्यायालय पि अग्रेति कायशवाही हेतु जदनांक
18.04.2023 को उपजस्थत हो। पत्रावली वाद अग्रेति
कायशवाही िाजस्व अजभलेखागाि में संग्रहीत हो।"

3. A perusal of relevant observation,
quoted above, as also the recitals of the
order impugned dated 23.03.2023, this
Court finds that the parties to the litigation
after remand were not required to adduce
evidence in support of their case. Despite
this, the respondent No. 1 vide order
impugned dated 23.03.2023 remanded the
mater back to Consolidation Officer for
decision afresh on merits.

4. Sri Khan, learned Senior Advocate
while assailing the order impugned dated
23.03.2023 stated that the respondent No. 1
in the given facts and circumstances of the
case ought not to have remanded the matter
back to the Consolidation Officer for
deciding the case afresh on merits as he
himself is empowered to decide it on merits
in view of settled legal proposition. In
support of his submission, Sri Khan has
placed reliance on the judgment dated
10.02.2023 passed by this Court in WRIT-
B No. 108 of 2023 (Angad Pratap Singh
And
Others
vs.
Deputy
Director
Consolidation/ Addl. District Magistrate
(F/R), Lakhimpur Kheri And Others).

5. He further submitted that the
Revisional Court/Authority under the Act
of 1953 is having wide powers. Power
under this section of the Act of 1953
includes power to examine any finding
whether it is of fact or law. D.D.C. while
hearing revision under this section is fully
empowered to reassess the evidence and
record its own findings of fact by virtue of
Section 48 Explanation 3. Under this
5 All. Jagdamba Singh Vs. D.D.C., Ayodhya & Ors.
1137
section of the Act of 1953, the D.D.C. has
power
to
reassess
the
findings
of
subordinate
consolidation
Authorities.
Reference has also been made to the
judgment of this Court Prabhu Dayal v.
D.D.C./Additional District Magistrate
(Administration) Manipuri and Another,
2018 (140) RD 460 (All.); Musuttu vs.
D.D.C. and others, 2018 (140) RD 505
(All.); Dhooram vs. Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Bagpat, 2006 (100) RD
505 (H.C.).

6. Sri Khan further submitted that in
the dispute between the parties, the
Consolidation Officer passed the order on
10.10.1957.
Thereafter,
an
order
on
18.02.1958 was passed by the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation and thereafter the
Deputy Director of Consolidation passed
the order on 09.08.1958. Being aggrieved,
a Writ Petition No. 3389 of 1958 was filed
by Smt. Lekhraji, which was dismissed as
abated. The dispute between the parties
regarding rights over the land, in issue,
could not be settled. To adjudicate the issue
involved, a suit for declaration was filed
under Section 229-B/209 of U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in
short "Act of 1950"), which was registered
as Case No. 1168. Another suit was also
filed in the same provisions, which was
registered as Case No. 1099/75-519/1102.
During pendency of the said suits, second
operation of consolidation was started on
15.11.1980 and since then, the dispute
between the parties has not been decided.
The matter has again been remanded back
to the Consolidation Officer concerned for
decision afresh. This remand order has
been passed after lapse of about 43 years
from initiation of second consolidation
proceedings. He says that in view of settled
principle of law, the respondent No. 1
ought to have decided the issues involved
in the case including the issue of
maintainability after taking note of Section
11-A and 49 of U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953 (in short "Act of
1953"). Thus, interference of this Court is
required in the matter. The prayer is to
allow this petition and remand the matter
back to respondent No. 1 to consider and
decide the issues involved in the case after
giving proper opportunity of hearings to the
parties to the litigation.

7. Sri R.S. Pandey, learned Senior
Advocate has opposed the present petition.
He stated that in view of the facts of the
case, the order of remand impugned in this
petition dated 23.03.2023 is reasonable and
justifiable and the same is not liable to be
interfered with by this Court, as several
issues,
which
were
framed
by
the
Consolidation Officer, ought to have been
decided, however, the said issues were not
dealt with as required under the law.

8. He submitted that in the similar
facts
and
circumstances,
this
Court
declined to interfere in the order of remand.
In support of his submissions, Sri Pandey
has placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court dated 22.12.2022 passed in the case
of Smt. Anju Rajpal and others vs. State of
U.P. and others reported in [2023 (41) LCD
626]. However, on being asked, Sri Pandey
could not dispute the power of Deputy
Director of Consolidation, as observed in
various judgments of this Court and that of
Hon'ble Apex Court.

9. Considered the submission of
learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.

10. This Court is not entering into the
factual aspect of the case, as it is dealing
with the order of remand in the light of
1138 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
submissions advanced by the learned
Counsel for the respective parties.

11. From the facts, in brief, indicated
above, as also on record, it is apparent that
second consolidation proceedings, in which
the order impugned dated 23.03.2023 has
been passed, were initiated on 15.11.1980
and the Consolidation Officer has decided
the case on 29.06.2016. Thereafter, the
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation/Appellate
Authority
has
decided
the
appeal
No.
1031/2016540423000069 (Ram Prakash
Singh vs. Jagdamba Singh) filed under
Section 11(1) of the Act of 1953 on
22.06.2019 and the order impugned has
been passed by the respondent No. 1 on
23.03.2023. From these facts, it is apparent
that this order of remand has been passed
after lapse of about 43 years.

12. It is undisputed that the
respondent No. 1 under the Act of 1953
particularly in view of language couched
under Section 48 of the Act of 1953 is
having wide power, as observed in the
judgment(s), referred above.

13. From the judgment relied upon by
Sri Pandey passed in the case of Smt. Anju
Rajpal (supra), itreflects that this Court
after considering the facts of the case and
taking note of the provisions of Indian
Partnership Act, 1932, in para 41 and 46,
observed as under:-

"41. In order to arrive at a correct
conclusion, the provisions contained in the
Partnership Act i.e. Sections 5, 6, 14, 37, 42
to 49 have to be taken note in context with
the evidence relating to the different
partnership firms constituted from time to
time and their respective dissolution. Since
none
of
the
two
authorities
i.e.
Consolidation Officer and the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation had taken a look
at the problem with the correct lens of the
legal provisions and this aspect has
attracted the attention of the DDC who
after noticing the same found that the
matter required a re-look and for the said
purpose it has remanded the matter.

46. It may be true that the DDC is the
final Court of fact and law in but in the
present
case
where
the
matter
has
proceeded upon a tangent and ignoring the
principles as attracted to the dispute in
question de-hors the provisions of the
Partnership Act and the parties have also
not brought on record the requisite
evidence
which
could
support
the
respective contentions, hence, this Court is
of the clear view that it cannot be said that
the order of remand is bad in the given
circumstance."

14. From the above quoted paragraphs
of the judgment passed in the case of Smt.
Anju Rajpal (supra), it is apparent that on
the ground of requirement of evidence for
deciding the dispute between the parties,
the remand order was not interfered. Thus,
the judgment relied upon by Sri Pandey is
distinguishable on facts and would not
apply in the instant case.

15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Bechan Pandey and others vs.
Dulhin Janki Devi reported in AIR 1976
SC 866, on the plea of remand of case,
after considering Rule 23 of Order 41 CPC
as also the age of litigation between the
parties, in paragraph 9, made some
observation, which on reproduction reads
as under:-

"9.Prayer has also been made by Mr
Sarjoo Prasad for the remand of the case to
the trial court as the plaintiff-appellants
5 All. Jagdamba Singh Vs. D.D.C., Ayodhya & Ors.
1139
were labouring under the impression that
the defendant-respondents had not disputed
that the land in dispute was the same as had
been purchased by Maina Kuer. It is urged
that because of that impression, material
which could have clearly proved that the
land in dispute was the same as had been
purchased by Maina Kuer could not be
brought on the record. We find it difficult to
accede to this prayer. As already pointed
out above, the contesting defendants clearly
stated in their written statements that Maina
Kuer was not the auction purchaser of the
land in dispute. In view of that unequivocal
averment, there was no valid basis for the
assumption or the impression under which
plaintiff-appellants are stated to have
laboured. Apart from that, we find that the
suit out of which the present appeal has
arisen was filed as long ago as January
1950. From the title of the appeal we find
that many of the original plaintiffs and
defendants have during this period of more
than a quarter of century departed and are
no more in the land of the living, having
bowed as it were to the inexorable law of
nature. They are now represented by their
legal representatives. To remand the suit to
the trial court would necessarily have the
effect of keeping alive the strife between
the parties and prolonging this longdrawn
litigation by another round of legal battle in
the trial court and thereafter in appeal. It is
time, in our opinion, that we draw the final
curtain and put an end to this long
meandering course of litigation between the
parties. If the passage of time and the laws
of nature bring to an end the lives of men
and women, it would perhaps be the
demand of reason and dictate of prudence
not to keep alive after so many years the
strife and conflict started by the dead. To
do so would in effect be defying the laws of
nature and offering a futile resistance to the
ravage of time. If human life has a short
span, it would be irrational to entertain a
taller claim for disputes and conflicts which
are a manifestation of human frailty. The
courts should be loth to entertain a plea in a
case like the present which would have the
effect
of
condemning
succeeding
generation of families to spend major part
of their lives in protracted litigation. It may
be appropriate in the above context to
reproduce what was said in the case ofSant
Naroin
Mathurv.Rama
Krishna
Mission[(1974) 2 SCC 730] : (p. 737, para
15)

"It is time, in our opinion, that we
draw the final curtain on this long drawn
litigation and not allow its embers to
smoulder for a further length of time, more
so when the principal contestants have all
departed bowing as it were to the
inexorable law of nature. One is tempted in
this context to refer to the observations of
Chief Justice Crewe in a case concerning
peerage claim made after the death without
issue of the Earl of Oxford. Said the
learned Chief Justice:

'Time hath its revolutions; there must
be a period and an end to all temporal
things - an end of names, and dignities
and whatsoever is terrne, and why not of
De Vere? For where is Bohun? Where is
Mowbray? Where is Mortimer? Why,
which is more and most of all, where is
Plantagenet? They are all entombed in the
urns and sepulchres of mortality. What was
said about the inevitable end of all mortal
beings, however eminent they may be, is
equally true of the affairs of mortal beings,
their disputes and conflicts, their ventures
in the field of love and sport, their
achievements and failures for essentially
they all have a stamp of mortality on them.'

One feels tempted to add that if life
like a dome of many-coloured glass stains
the white radiance of eternity, so do the
1140 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
doings and conflicts of mortal beings till
death tramples them down."

16. In the case of Arvind Kumar
Jaiswal
(Dead)
through
L.R.
vs.
Devendra Prasad Jaiswal reported in
2023
SCC
OnLine
SC
146,
after
considering the relevant provisions of order
41 CPC viz. Rule 23, 23A, 24 and 25, on
the issue of remand of a case, observed as
under:-

"3.An order of remand prolongs and
delays the litigation and hence, should not
be passed unless the appellate court finds
that a re-trial is required, or the evidence on
record is not sufficient to dispose of the
matter for reasons like lack of adequate
opportunity of leading evidence to a party,
where there had been no real trial of the
dispute or there is no complete or effectual
adjudication of the proceedings, and the
party complaining has suffered material
prejudice
on
that
account.
(See:Shivakumarv.Sharanabasappa, (2021)
11 SCC 277; andBachahan Deviv.Nagar
Nigam,
Gorakhpur,(2008)
12
SCC
372)Where evidence has already been
adduced and a decision can be rendered on
appreciation of such evidence, an order of
remand should not be passed remitting the
matter to the lower court, even if the lower
court has omitted to frame issue(s) and/or
has failed to determine any question of fact,
which, in the opinion of the appellate court,
is essential. The first appellate court, if
required, can also direct the trial court to
record evidence and finding on a particular
aspect/issue in terms of Rule 25 to Order
XLI, which then can be taken on record for
deciding the case by the appellate court.

4.In the present case, the High Court,
as the first appellate court, which is also a
court of fact and law, has passed an order of
remand observing that the judgment of the
trial court was, in its opinion, not written as
per the mandate of Section 33 and Rule
4(2) and 5 of Order XX of the Code, as the
discussion and reasoning on certain aspects
was not detailed and elaborate."

17. Considering the power of DDC
under Section 48 of the Act of 1953, this
Court is of the view that the observations
made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgments passed in the case of Bechan
Pandey (supra) and Arvind Kumar
Jaiswal (supra) are liable to be taken note
of.

18. In the instant case regarding the
dispute between the parties, the first order
was passed by the Consolidation Officer on
10.10.1957 and dispute continued between
them and on 15.11.1980, the second
consolidation proceedings were started and
the order dated 23.03.2023, an order of
remand, has been passed by DDC after
about 43 years from initiation of second
consolidation proceedings. Moreover, the
parties to the litigation in the instant case
are not required to adduce evidence, as
appears from the impugned order. The
DDC has not observed that the evidence on
record is not sufficient to dispose of the
matter or re-trial is required.

19. Taking note of the aforesaid
including the power of DDC and the age of
litigation between the parties, this Court is
of the view that interference in the
impugned order dated 23.03.2023 is
required. Accordingly, the order impugned
dated 23.03.2023 is hereby set-aside. The
matter is remanded back to the Deputy
Director of Consolidation to consider and
decide all the issues including the issue(s)
related to applicability of Section 11-A and
49 of the Act of 1953, after affording
proper opportunity of hearing to the parties
5 All. Brahmanand Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1141
to the litigation preferably within a period
of six months from the date of production
of certified copy of this order, if there is no
other legal impediment in this regard.
While conducting the proceedings, the
Authority concerned is directed to avoid
unnecessary adjournments to either party.

20. The writ petition is allowed in
above terms.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1141
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.04.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ-C No. 143 of 2021

Brahmanand Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Brahmanand Pandey (In Person)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anand Prakash Srivastava

A. Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Writ
-
Maintainability
-
Mutation
proceeding - Scope of interference - Held,
orders of mutation are passed on the basis
of possession and since no substantive
rights of the parties are decided, ordinarily
a writ petition would not be entertainable
against such orders unless the same are
found to be wholly without jurisdiction or
have the effect of rendering findings
which are contrary to title already decided
by a competent court. (Para 35)

B. Revenue Law - UP Land Revenue Act,
1901 - Sections 33, 39 & 225 - Mutation -
Nature and Scope - Held, mutation
proceedings is summary in nature - It
does not have the effect of creating or
extinguishing
the
title
nor
has
any
presumptive value on title and it only
enables the person concerned to pay land
revenue - Mutation orders would not
debar institution of any suit by any person
having right in the holding in a competent
court. (Para 36, 41 and 46)

C. Interpretation of Statute - General Clauses
Act, 1897 - Section 2(42) - Word 'Person' -
Whether St. include in it or not - Held, The
definition of "person" is not exclusive but
inclusive and considering the language used in
the Statute with reference to the proceedings
giving rise to the present case, in the opinion
of the Court, the 'St.' would fall in the
definition of 'person'. (Para 46 and 47)

D. Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226 -
Writ - Locus standi - Main party to be
aggrieved by the impugned orders or by the
nature of relief claimed in the original
proceedings u/s 33/39 of the Act, 1901 is
the 'St. of U.P' - However, the challenge
was made by a stranger (petitioner) -
Permissibility - Held, the petitioner have no
locus in the matter. (Para 47, 48 and 49)

Writ petition dismissed of. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs Kallyani
Sulochana & ors.; (1993) 1 SCC 499

2. Hiya Associates & ors. Vs Nakshatra
Properties Pvt. Ltd.; (2018) 18 SCC 358

3. Jaipal Vs Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad &
ors.; AIR 1957 All 205

4. Sri Lal Bachan Vs Board of Revenue, U.P.,
Lucknow & ors.; 2002 (93) RD 6

5. Bindeshwari Vs Board of Revenue & ors.;
2002 (1) AWC 498

6. Vinod Kumar Rajbhar Vs St. of U.P. & ors.;
2021 (1) ADJ 792.

7. Buddh Pal Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2012
(5) ADJ 266,