# Jagat Narayan v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 4 ILRA 1327
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-27
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 10247 of 2018
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jagat-narayan-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50039
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

C.S.C.,
Sri
Girijesh
Kumar
Tripathi,
Standing Counsel

A. Service Law- order of compulsory
retirement from service under challengeunder rule 56(c) of the U.P. financial
Handbook,
Volume
II
(Part
II-IV)-
arbitrariness- without sufficient material.

B. Non-adherence to the procedure of
consideration
by
the
Screening
Committee-procedure
duly
followed-
Absence of material to form opinion-held
to
be
incorrect-sufficient
material
available-principle of audi alteram partem
not applicable in cases of compulsory
retirement-scope of judicial review is
limited-impugned
order
legally
sustainable-no
arbitrariness
in
the
impugned order-complete service records
can
be
looked-to
form
subjective
satisfaction-plea
of
mala
fides
not
available-concerned officers not made
parties eo nomine-petition lacks meritimpugned
order
upheld-petition
dismissed. (Paras 17, 20 to 23, 25, 27, 29,
33, 35 and 42)
HELD:
Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties
and perusing not only the record annexed to the
counter affidavit, but also the petitioner's
service-book, produced in original before the
Court, this Court finds that it is incorrect to say
that there is no material against the petitioner,
on the basis of which the Screening Committee,
or for that matter the Appointing Authority,
could not form their subjective satisfaction
under Fundamental Rule 56(c). (Para 20)

The sufficiency of material and the subjective
satisfaction of the Screening Committee or the
Appointing Authority, based on existing material,
cannot be interfered with by the Court, if there
is relevant material on record. It is for the
Screening
Committee
and
the
Appointing
Authority, invested with the power under
Fundamental Rule 56(c) to exercise it, based on
their subjective satisfaction. It can, of course,
still be interfered with, if shown to be the result
of mala fides or the product of arbitrariness.
(Para 21)

The ground here urged was total absence of
adverse
material
against
the
petitioner,
inasmuch as that is one ground on which an
order of compulsory retirement may be judicially
reviewed. But, the record here shows that
material adverse to the petitioner and very
tangible is available on record. Therefore, there
is no force in the petitioner's submission on this
count. (Para 27)

The submission of the learned Counsel for the
petitioner, therefore, that the impugned order is
vitiated, because no notice was issued to the
petitioner or opportunity afforded to submit his
reply before the impugned order was passed, is
misconceived and, accordingly, rejected. (Para
30)

Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties,
this Court may say that arbitrariness for all that
it would mean in the context of exercise of
power of compulsory retirement is perversity of
opinion. If the Screening Committee or the
Appointing Authority or the Government, in
reaching their conclusion to retire an employee
compulsorily under Fundamental Rule 56(c),
take a view of the material on record, which no
reasonable person would subscribe to on the
basis of that material, the order would be
arbitrary. This was precisely the import of the
word 'arbitrary' as enunciated in Baikuntha Nath
1328 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Das. The principles there were endorsed in
Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
and others, (2013) 3 SCC 514. (Para 33)

It is to be remarked here that given the conduct
of the petitioner, where he has exhibited
indiscipline and misbehaviour on duty while
drunk on numerous occasions is a serious
matter. The petitioner is a member of a
disciplined force, where discipline and rectitude
are not only the hallmark of a member of such
force but a sine qua non for the efficient
discharge of their functions. For the said reason,
in particular, the opinion of the Screening
Committee, given the material on record, cannot
be held to be arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides
or an instance of a colourable exercise of power
in any manner. (Para 42)

Petition dismissed. (E-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,908 of 55,322. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39908 for what follows._

4 All. Jagat Narayan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1327
(2023) 4 ILRA 1327
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ-A No. 10247 of 2018

Jagat Narayan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Nand Kishor Mishra, Sri Vijay Gautam,
Sri Akhilesh Kumar, Sri L.P. Mishra, Sri
Ashok Kumar Rai, Ms. Shilpa Ahuja

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.,
Sri
Girijesh
Kumar
Tripathi,
Standing Counsel

A. Service Law- order of compulsory
retirement from service under challengeunder rule 56(c) of the U.P. financial
Handbook,
Volume
II
(Part
II-IV)-
arbitrariness- without sufficient material.

B. Non-adherence to the procedure of
consideration
by
the
Screening
Committee-procedure
duly
followed-
Absence of material to form opinion-held
to
be
incorrect-sufficient
material
available-principle of audi alteram partem
not applicable in cases of compulsory
retirement-scope of judicial review is
limited-impugned
order
legally
sustainable-no
arbitrariness
in
the
impugned order-complete service records
can
be
looked-to
form
subjective
satisfaction-plea
of
mala
fides
not
available-concerned officers not made
parties eo nomine-petition lacks meritimpugned
order
upheld-petition
dismissed. (Paras 17, 20 to 23, 25, 27, 29,
33, 35 and 42)
HELD:
Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties
and perusing not only the record annexed to the
counter affidavit, but also the petitioner's
service-book, produced in original before the
Court, this Court finds that it is incorrect to say
that there is no material against the petitioner,
on the basis of which the Screening Committee,
or for that matter the Appointing Authority,
could not form their subjective satisfaction
under Fundamental Rule 56(c). (Para 20)

The sufficiency of material and the subjective
satisfaction of the Screening Committee or the
Appointing Authority, based on existing material,
cannot be interfered with by the Court, if there
is relevant material on record. It is for the
Screening
Committee
and
the
Appointing
Authority, invested with the power under
Fundamental Rule 56(c) to exercise it, based on
their subjective satisfaction. It can, of course,
still be interfered with, if shown to be the result
of mala fides or the product of arbitrariness.
(Para 21)

The ground here urged was total absence of
adverse
material
against
the
petitioner,
inasmuch as that is one ground on which an
order of compulsory retirement may be judicially
reviewed. But, the record here shows that
material adverse to the petitioner and very
tangible is available on record. Therefore, there
is no force in the petitioner's submission on this
count. (Para 27)

The submission of the learned Counsel for the
petitioner, therefore, that the impugned order is
vitiated, because no notice was issued to the
petitioner or opportunity afforded to submit his
reply before the impugned order was passed, is
misconceived and, accordingly, rejected. (Para
30)

Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties,
this Court may say that arbitrariness for all that
it would mean in the context of exercise of
power of compulsory retirement is perversity of
opinion. If the Screening Committee or the
Appointing Authority or the Government, in
reaching their conclusion to retire an employee
compulsorily under Fundamental Rule 56(c),
take a view of the material on record, which no
reasonable person would subscribe to on the
basis of that material, the order would be
arbitrary. This was precisely the import of the
word 'arbitrary' as enunciated in Baikuntha Nath
1328 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Das. The principles there were endorsed in
Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
and others, (2013) 3 SCC 514. (Para 33)

It is to be remarked here that given the conduct
of the petitioner, where he has exhibited
indiscipline and misbehaviour on duty while
drunk on numerous occasions is a serious
matter. The petitioner is a member of a
disciplined force, where discipline and rectitude
are not only the hallmark of a member of such
force but a sine qua non for the efficient
discharge of their functions. For the said reason,
in particular, the opinion of the Screening
Committee, given the material on record, cannot
be held to be arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides
or an instance of a colourable exercise of power
in any manner. (Para 42)

Petition dismissed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1.Baikuntha Nath Das & anr. Vs Chief District
Medical Officer, Baripada & anr., (1992) 2 SCC
299

2. St. of Guj. Vs Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001) 3
SCC 314

3. M.S. Bindra Vs U.O.I. & ors., (1998) 7 SCC
310

4. Pritam Singh Vs U.O.I. & ors., (2005) 9 SCC
748

5. Posts and Telegraphs Board & ors. Vs C.S.N.
Murthy, (1992) 2 SCC 317

6. Central Industrial Security Force Vs HC (GD)
Om Prakash, (2022) 5 SCC 100

7. Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
& ors., (2013) 3 SCC 514

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This writ petition is directed
against an order of compulsory retirement
from service passed by the Superintendent
of Police, Mahoba against the petitioner, a
Police Constable, in exercise of powers
under Rule 56(c) of the U.P. Financial
Handbook, Volume II (Part II-IV). The
order
impugned
says
that
the
Superintendent of Police is the Appointing
Authority for the post held by the petitioner
and that in public interest, he directs that
the petitioner stands retired from service
with effect from the date of the impugned
order in the forenoon. The impugned order
further says that the petitioner would be
entitled to receive a sum equivalent to three
months of his salary together with all
allowances due, computed on the basis of
his emoluments that he was receiving
immediately before the date of retirement.
The petitioner has come up challenging the
aforesaid order of compulsory retirement
dated 28th March, 2018, which shall
hereinafter be referred to as 'the impugned
order'.

2. It is the petitioner's case that his
date of birth is 01.05.1963 and he is aged
55 years. He is physically and medically fit
to perform his duties. The petitioner has
been
performing
his
duties
with
extraordinary devotion and integrity. His
service
record
is
unblemished
and
exemplary. The petitioner is an honest and
diligent
policeman.
He
has
always
discharged
his
duties
with
utmost
responsibility and worked to the full
satisfaction of his superiors. The petitioner
was appointed as a constable on 20.02.1984
in the Uttar Pradesh Police, and after
completing
his
training,
has
been
discharging his duties regularly, until the
date of the impugned order.

3. Pending admission, parties have
exchanged affidavits in compliance with
the orders of this Court dated 19.04.2018 -
a counter on behalf of respondent Nos.3, 4
4 All. Jagat Narayan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1329
and 5 and a rejoinder to it. A personal
affidavit of the Superintendent of Police,
Mahoba was also required to be filed on an
ancillary issue. That affidavit was filed and
the matter dealt with. By an order dated
10.06.2022, the petition was admitted to
hearing, which proceeded on that day.

4. On 16.07.2022, when the matter
came up, this Court vide order of that date
also summoned the petitioner's servicebook and all other records, on the basis of
which the impugned order has been passed.
The petitioner's service-book was produced
by the learned Standing Counsel on
21.07.2022. The service-book and the
entries therein were perused by the Court.
Thereafter, the records were directed to be
placed in a sealed cover with the Registrar
General.

5. The matter was adjourned on
04.08.2022
to
01.09.2022
without
a
hearing.
The
service-book
that
was
forwarded to the Court in sealed cover by
the Registrar General was not opened for
the said reason on the dates that the matter
was not heard. On 12.09.2022, a rejoinder
affidavit was filed on behalf of the
petitioner to a counter affidavit dated 3rd
August, 2022 on behalf of respondent No.5.
The service-book received in sealed cover
from the Registrar General was opened for
the purpose of perusal and duly perused.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner and the
learned Standing Counsel were heard and
judgment reserved.

6. Heard Mr. Nand Kishore Mishra,
learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr.
Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Standing
Counsel appearing on behalf of the State.

7. It is argued by Mr. Nand Kishore
Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner
that
no
Screening
Committee
was
constituted
in
accordance
with
the
Government Orders dated 26.10.1985,
06.07.2017
and
08.09.2017,
and
the
impugned order was passed by the
Appointing
Authority
without
the
Screening Committee's appraisal. It is
further argued that the impugned order has
been passed by the Superintendent of
Police in colourable exercise of powers
under Fundamental Rule 56(c), ordering
the petitioner's compulsory retirement. It is
also argued that the respondents have done
a pick and choose while passing the
impugned order and acted arbitrarily in
invoking their powers under Fundamental
Rule 56(c).

8. It is also argued that the petitioner
has been compulsorily retired by the
respondents abusing their powers under the
law and in violation of the principles of
natural justice. It is urged that the
impugned order has been passed mala fide
and vitiated by arbitrariness and perversity
in decision making. It is the submission of
the learned Counsel for the petitioner that
an order of compulsory retirement if bad on
any of the three grounds of mala fides,
arbitrariness and perversity, is open to
judicial review in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das
and another v. Chief District Medical
Officer, Baripada and another, (1992) 2
SCC 299. It is also argued that in this case,
the petitioner has been retired compulsorily
as a measure of punishment, which is not
permissible. In support of this proposition,
the learned Counsel for the petitioner has
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court
in State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M.
Patel, (2001) 3 SCC 314.

9. It is argued further that the
impugned order is based on no evidence as
1330 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
there is no material with the respondents to
form an opinion that the petitioner ought to
be compulsorily retired under Fundamental
Rule 56(c). The absence of any material to
proceed under the Rule vitiates the order.
In this regard, reliance has been placed by
the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon
the guidance of the Supreme Court in M.S.
Bindra v. Union of India and others,
(1998) 7 SCC 310. Reliance has also been
placed upon the authority in Pritam Singh
v. Union of India and others, (2005) 9
SCC 748.

10. In the counter affidavit dated
13.08.2018 filed on behalf of respondent
Nos.3, 4 and 5 jointly, it has been averred
in Paragraph No.8 that a Screening
Committee was constituted in terms of the
Government Orders dated 26.10.1985,
06.02.1989,
21.05.1998,
23.09.2000,
25.01.2007 and 28.03.2018. It is not an
uninformed decision of the 5th respondent,
the Appointing Authority, without scrutiny
by the Screening Committee. It is pleaded
that the Screening Committee in this case
had
the
Appointing
Authority,
the
Superintendent of Police, Mahoha as its
Chairman, the Additional Superintendent of
Police, Mahoba and the Circle Officer,
Sadar, Mahoba as Members. In addition,
the Reserve Inspector was also associated
with the proceedings before the Screening
Committee. It is pleaded that the impugned
order has been passed on the basis of
material in the petitioner's service-book,
which shows him to be a drunkard, who
was found on more than one occasion
inebriated while on duty. The petitioner has
attained the age of 50 years and the
Screening Committee acted within their
right, for the purpose of maintaining
discipline in the police force and in the
interest of public safety, to compulsorily
retire the petitioner. It is incorrect to say
that there is no material, on the basis of
which the Screening Committee and the
Appointing Authority have formed an
opinion and passed the impugned order.

11. A perusal of Paragraph No.11 of
the rejoinder affidavit shows a somersault
by the petitioner, where he has given up the
stand that no Screening Committee was
constituted, a plea very emphatically raised
in Paragraph Nos.13 and 27 to 31 of the
writ
petition.
The
petitioner
has
acknowledged the fact in the rejoinder
affidavit that there was a Screening
Committee, but says that there was no
material before them to find the petitioner
unfit to be retained in service. In the
rejoinder affidavit, another point that has
been raised is that the petitioner was not
afforded any opportunity or given a notice
to show cause before the impugned order
was passed. Denial of opportunity has been
pleaded with much emphasis, as a fact,
vitiating the exercise of jurisdiction under
Fundamental Rule 56(c).

12. A further counter affidavit dated
4th August, 2022, that was filed on behalf
of the fifth respondent with leave of the
Court, has referred to the material that was
taken into consideration by the Screening
Committee, headed by the Appointing
Authority. It is specifically pleaded in
Paragraph No.9 that the Reserve Inspector
was directed to produce the petitioner
before
the
Screening
Committee
on
28.03.2018. There is a reference generally
to the effect that there are consistent
instances of the petitioner turning up for
duty drunk and emphasizing that he was a
habitual drunkard. There is a reference to
an FIR lodged against the petitioner giving
rise to Crime No.286 of 2017, under
Section 354-A, Police Station Kotwali,
District Mahoba, where he had misbehaved
4 All. Jagat Narayan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1331
with a woman, who had come to the police
station. In addition, there is also reference
to a case against the petitioner under
Section 34 of the Police Act, Police Station
Kotwali, District Jhansi, wherein the
petitioner earned a technical acquittal,
because the proceedings were abated in
consequence of a notification issued by this
Court dated 6th January, 2017 under The
Uttar Pradesh Criminal Law (Composition
of Offences and Abatement of Trails)
(Amendment) Act, 1979 (for short, 'the Act
of 1979'). The case under Section 34 of the
Police Act was said to be registered
because the petitioner had indulged in
rioting with people in a public place while
drunk. The Annual Confidential Roll of the
petitioner too has been referred to in
Paragraph No.14 of the counter affidavit
under reference, where it is mentioned that
he was punished with a censure entry vide
order dated 28.01.2011.

13. There is then a reference to a
suspension order passed against the
petitioner on 04.09.2013, where he had
misbehaved while drunk at Chowki New
Basti, P.S. Kotwali, District Jhansi,
hurling furniture at others. This had led to
the case under Section 34 of the Police
Act, that was later on abated. There is
also a reference to an order dated
25.01.2014, awarding a severe censure
entry to the petitioner. There is still again
a reference to an order dated 31.07.2017,
where the petitioner was given a censure
yet again. The last is a reference to an
order
dated
27.04.2018,
where
the
petitioner was punished with the penalty
of deduction of his pay equivalent to 30
days under Rule 14(2) of the Uttar
Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1991. All the orders carrying these entries
have been annexed as Annexure No.6 to
the counter affidavit. There is also a
reference to four petty punishments that
were awarded to the petitioner.

14. The stand of the respondents is
that the petitioner's service record was
scrutinized as a whole and he was found
unfit to be retained in a disciplined force
like the police. The petitioner has attained
the age of 50 years. He fell into the age
zone where he could be considered for
compulsory retirement and the Screening
Committee, on the basis of very tangible
material, decided to retire him in public
interest.

15. In the rejoinder affidavit, it has
been averred in answer to the last
mentioned counter affidavit that in the case
registered with the Police at Jhansi, the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi vide order
dated
19.03.2018
has
ordered
the
proceedings to abate. So far as Crime
No.286 of 2017, under Section 354-A IPC,
Police Station Kotwali, District Jhansi is
concerned, it is asserted in Paragraph No.5
that after investigation, the Police did not
find
any
material
to
support
the
prosecution. A final report has been put in
on 18.09.2017. A copy of the Magistrate's
order dated 19.03.2018 and the final report
put in by the Police dated 18.09.2017 have
been annexed as Annexure Nos. RA-1 and
RA-2, respectively. It is pleaded in
Paragraph No. 13 of the rejoinder affidavit
that the petitioner's character roll carries
excellent entries continuously from 2007 to
2016. It is just that in a deliberate and mala
fide buildup to tarnish the petitioner's
otherwise good record, he has been
awarded a few adverse entries. This has
been done by the respondents mala fide in
order to engineer the impugned order. The
action of the respondents, therefore, is mala
fide as asserted in the writ petition. Since
1332 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
mala fide is a ground for judicial review, it
is urged that the impugned order is vitiated.

16. It is appropriate to dispose of the
various contentions urged on behalf of the
petitioner in challenge to the impugned
order under definitive heads as indicated
hereinafter:

(i)
Non-adherence
to
the
procedure
of
consideration
by
the
Screening Committee

17. Though urged as one of the
principal grounds of challenge to the
impugned order by the learned Counsel for
the petitioner in the opening of his case, a
short way into the hearing, the learned
Counsel for the petitioner could not
substantiate at all the fact that no Screening
Committee, as required in terms of the
Government Orders dated 26.10.1985 and
06.07.2017 was constituted in this case.
Here, apparently, a Screening Committee
was
constituted,
comprising
the
Superintendent of Police, Mahoba, as
Chairman, the Additional Superintendent of
Police, Mahoba and the Circle Officer,
Sadar, Mahoba as its Members, who have
scrutinized and screened the petitioner's
case
for
compulsory
retirement
in
accordance with the Government Orders
under reference. It is in accordance with the
resolve of the Screening Committee that
the Appointing Authority has considered
and passed the order impugned. An
assertion to this effect has been made in
Paragraph No.13 of the counter dated 9th
August, 2018 filed on behalf of respondent
Nos.3,
4
and
5,
already
noticed
hereinbefore, which has not been denied in
the rejoinder affidavit. Rather, the position
that a Screening Committee was constituted
has been acknowledged by the petitioner in
Paragraph No.11 of the relative rejoinder, a
fact also noticed earlier. Therefore, this
submission of the petitioner's that the
genesis of the impugned order is flawed,
because the mandatory procedure of
scrutiny by a Screening Committee has not
been adhered to, is without substance.

(ii) Absence of material before
the
Screening
Committee
to
form
opinion against the petitioner under
Fundamental Rule 56(c)

18. The substance of the contention
urged on behalf of the petitioner on this
count is that there is absolutely no material
on record on the basis of which the
Appointing Authority, or for that matter the
Screening
Committee,
could
form
a
subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is
unfit to be retained in service.

19.

Learned
Standing
Counsel
appearing on behalf of the State has invited
the attention of the Court to the material on
record, which according to him is enough
for the Screening Committee to form their
subjective satisfaction about the petitioner
to be considered for compulsory retirement.

20. Upon hearing learned Counsel for
the parties and perusing not only the record
annexed to the counter affidavit, but also
the petitioner's service-book, produced in
original before the Court, this Court finds
that it is incorrect to say that there is no
material against the petitioner, on the basis
of which the Screening Committee, or for
that matter the Appointing Authority, could
not form their subjective satisfaction under
Fundamental Rule 56(c). The fundamental
principles, on the basis of which an order of
compulsory retirement can be passed by the
Government and the limited grounds on
which it can be judicially reviewed, have
been laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das
4 All. Jagat Narayan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1333
(supra) by the Supreme Court, where it has
been held:

"34. The following principles
emerge from the above discussion:

(i) An order of compulsory
retirement is not a punishment. It implies
no
stigma
nor
any
suggestion
of
misbehaviour.

(ii) The order has to be passed by
the government on forming the opinion that
it is in the public interest to retire a
government servant compulsorily. The
order
is
passed
on
the
subjective
satisfaction of the government.

(iii) Principles of natural justice
have no place in the context of an order of
compulsory retirement. This does not mean
that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether.
While the High Court or this Court would
not examine the matter as an appellate
court, they may interfere if they are
satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala
fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or
(c) that it is arbitrary -- in the sense that no
reasonable person would form the requisite
opinion on the given material; in short, if it
is found to be a perverse order.

(iv) The government (or the
Review Committee, as the case may be)
shall have to consider the entire record of
service before taking a decision in the
matter
--
of
course
attaching
more
importance to record of and performance
during the later years. The record to be so
considered would naturally include the
entries in the confidential records/character
rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a
government servant is promoted to a higher
post notwithstanding the adverse remarks,
such remarks lose their sting, more so, if
the promotion is based upon merit
(selection) and not upon seniority.

(v) An order of compulsory
retirement is not liable to be quashed by a
Court merely on the showing that while
passing
it
uncommunicated
adverse
remarks were also taken into consideration.
That circumstance by itself cannot be a
basis for interference.
Interference is permissible only on the
grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This
aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32
above."

21. The sufficiency of material and
the subjective satisfaction of the Screening
Committee or the Appointing Authority,
based on existing material, cannot be
interfered with by the Court, if there is
relevant material on record. It is for the
Screening Committee and the Appointing
Authority, invested with the power under
Fundamental Rule 56(c) to exercise it,
based on their subjective satisfaction. It
can, of course, still be interfered with, if
shown to be the result of mala fides or the
product of arbitrariness.

22. The scope of interference with the
decision of the Screening Committee or the
Appointing Authority or the Government in
exercise of powers under Fundamental
Rule
56(c),
rather
a
provision
corresponding to it, fell for consideration of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Posts
and
Telegraphs Board and others v. C.S.N.
Murthy, (1992) 2 SCC 317, where it was
held:

"5. It will be clear from the
extracts referred to above, that though the
respondent's conduct was quite satisfactory
till March 1970, his standard of work had
declined in the last two years under review.
In both these years, it was found that he
was not taking adequate interest in his work
and was responsible for delays of various
kinds. As has already been pointed out, an
order of compulsory retirement is not an
1334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order of punishment. F.R. 56(j) authorises
the Government to review the working of
its employees at the end of their period of
service referred to therein and to require the
servant to retire from service if, in its
opinion, public interest calls for such an
order.
Whether
the
conduct
of
the
employee is such as to justify such a
conclusion is primarily for the departmental
authorities to decide. The nature of the
delinquency and whether it is of such a
degree as to require the compulsory
retirement of the employee are primarily
for the Government to decide upon. The
courts will not interfere with the exercise of
this power, if arrived at bona fide and on
the basis of material available on the
record. No mala fides have been urged in
the present case. The only suggestion of the
High Court is that the record discloses no
material which would justify the action
taken against the respondent. We are
unable to agree. In our opinion, there was
material which showed that the efficiency
of the petitioner was slackening in the last
two years of the period under review and it
is, therefore, not possible for us to fault the
conclusion of the department as being mala
fide, perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable.
The Division Bench seems to have thought
that, since the adverse remarks mentioned
in the earlier letter of April 29, 1971 were
not repeated in the subsequent letter, it
should be taken that they had been given up
subsequently or that the respondent had
improved in the subsequent year. We do
not think that this is a legitimate inference,
for the report for 1971-72 only shows that
the respondents' propensity to delay matters
persisted despite the warning of the
previous year. But, even if one assumes
that the High Court was correct on this, the
adverse
remarks
made
against
the
respondent in relation to the period 197172, standing by themselves, can constitute
sufficient material for the department to
come to a conclusion in the matter. It is
true that the earlier record of the respondent
was good but if the record showed that the
standard of work of the respondent had
declined and was not satisfactory, that was
certainly material enabling the department
to come to a conclusion under F.R. 56(j).
We are of opinion that the High Court erred
in setting aside the order of compulsory
retirement on the basis that there was no
material at all on record justifying the
action against the respondent."

23. There is also valuable guidance in
this regard to be found in a recent decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Central
Industrial Security Force v. HC (GD)
Om Prakash, (2022) 5 SCC 100. There
were some wider issues involved there
about the effect of adverse entries awarded
to the constable in that case, who had
subsequently earned a promotion to the
post of head constable with the objection
being that old entries prior to promotion
stood washed out. But, one of the
fundamental issues that was considered was
about the scope of the power of the
Government in passing an order of
compulsory retirement. It was observed in
HC (GD) Om Prakash (supra):

"7. A three-Judge Bench of this
Court reported as Union of India v. Dulal
Dutt [Union of India v. Dulal Dutt, (1993)
2 SCC 179 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 406]
examined
the
order
of
compulsory
retirement of a Controller of Stores in
Indian Railways. It was held that an order
of compulsory retirement is not an order of
punishment. It is a prerogative of the
Government but it should be based on
material and has to be passed on the
subjective satisfaction of the Government
and that it is not required to be a speaking
4 All. Jagat Narayan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1335
order. This Court held as under : (SCC pp.
184-85, para 18)

"18. It will be noticed that the
Tribunal completely erred in assuming, in
the circumstances of the case, that there
ought to have been a speaking order for
compulsory retirement. This Court, has
been repeatedly emphasising right from
R.L. Butail v. Union of India [R.L. Butail v.
Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 876] and
Union of India v. J.N. Sinha [Union of
India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458] that
an order of a compulsory retirement is not
an order of punishment. It is actually a
prerogative of the Government but it
should be based on material and has to be
passed on the subjective satisfaction of the
Government. Very often, on enquiry by the
Court the Government may disclose the
material but it is very much different from
the saying that the order should be a
speaking order. No order of compulsory
retirement is required to be a speaking
order. From the very order of the Tribunal
it is clear that the Government had, before
it, the report of the Review Committee yet
it thought it fit of compulsorily retiring the
respondent. The order cannot be called
either mala fide or arbitrary in law."

24. Here, this Court finds that though
there are good entries earned by the
petitioner for the years 1986, 1987, 1988,
1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 199596, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002/2003, 2004,
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and also a record
of good service, besides awards earned by
the petitioner in the years 1985, 1986,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1995 and 1999, yet there
are definite adverse entries awarded to the
petitioner on 28.01.2011, 25.01.2014 and
31.07.2017, all of which are censure
entries. The entry dated 25.01.2014 is a
severe censure. There is then an order of
minor penalty dated 27.04.2018, ordering
deduction of a sum of money equivalent to
30 days' pay passed against the petitioner.
There are four petty punishments also
awarded in the years 1985, 1986, 2000 and
2003.

25. There is suspension order passed
against the petitioner on 04.09.2013,
entered in the service-book in connection
with the offence under Section 34 of the
Police Act. There is also an FIR brought to
the Court's notice regarding an offence
under Section 354-A committed by the
petitioner. About that the petitioner has
indicated that a final report has been put in
by the Police finding no substance. Since
there is no case that the final report was not
accepted, it can be safely assumed that the
final report would have been accepted in
due course. The registration of the FIR
would, therefore, not count as adverse
material. But, so far as the case of rioting
with the public in the Police Chowki and
inviting registration of a case under Section
34 of the Police Act is concerned, the
petitioner's exoneration was one under a
special statute for abatement of trials in
certain matters under the Act of 1979. It
does not cease to be material of which
cognizance cannot be taken by the
Screening Committee.

26. Quite apart, there are three
adverse entries and one minor punishment
order
dated
28.01.2011,
25.01.2014,
31.07.2017 and 25.01.2014, respectively.
This Court thinks that these must be set out
in order to understand the nature of the
material
that
was
there
before
the
Screening Committee. These are:

"ME
2010
1336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"िर्ि 2005 में जब यि आरिी थाना कोतिाली जनपद
झांसी में आरिी के पद पर र्नयुक्त था, तो पुर्लस मिार्नरीिक इला0 जोन
इलािाबाद के माध्यम से प्राप्त शुि र्चंतक र्ििार्ीय कमिचारी (र्ुमनाम)
र्शकायती प्राथिना पि में अंर्कत थाना कोतिाली के कर्मियों द्वारा जनता को
लूट कर अिैि तरीको से िन कमाने की जांच आदेश संख्या SSP23(IG)05 र्दनांक 14.06.05 द्वारा कराये जाने पर झांसी नर्र में इस
आरिी द्वारा अपना मकान बनिाया। इस मकान से सबबंर्ित िूखण्ड िर्ि
1993-94 में इसकी पत्नी श्रीमती मीरा देिी के नाम से मोिलला पठौररया
थाना कोतिाली झांसी में र्लया र्या था, र्जसके र्िर्य में अर्ग्रम सूचना
र्ििार् को निीं र्दया और ििन र्नमािर् की अनुमर्त प्राप्त निीं िुआ पाया
र्या जो उ0प्र0 सरकारी कमि0 आचरर् र्नयमािली के प्राििानों का
उललंघन िै, र्जसके र्लए इसको दो (फटा) जो इसका इसका अपने कतिव्य
के प्रर्त घोर लापरिािी, अनुशासनिीनता, आदेशों की अििेलना,
अकमिण्यता एिं प्रमाद को प्रदर्शित करता िै। इसके इसके इस कृत्य की
पररर्नन्दा की जाती िै।

पिांक द-663/10
(अर्मत चन्रा)

Jans, 10

SSP

HOB-74

JSI

Dt. 28.1.11"

"2013

जब कान्स0 िर्ि-2013 में जी0आर0पी0 अनुिार्,
झांसी के कंट्रोल रूम में र्नयुक्त थे, तो र्दनांक 2.9.2013 को शराब के
नशे में चौकी नईबस्ती थाना कोतिाली जनपद झांसी में जाकर कमिचारी/
अर्िकारीर्र् से अिरता की तथा चौकी की कुरर्सया फेंक दी एिं अिर
िार्ा का प्रयोर् र्कया। कांस्ट0 के र्िरुद्ध मु0अ0सं0 र्नल/2013 िारा
34 पुर्लस अर्िर्नयम के तित रपट नं0 50 समय 21:15 पीएम पर
थाना कोत0 जनपद झांसी में पंजीकृत र्कया र्या। डॉक्टरी परीिर् कराए
जाने पर अलकोिल का सेिन र्कए जाने की पुर्ष्ट िुई। इस प्रकरर् में
प्रारंर्िक जााँच पुर्लस उपािीिक, रेलिे, झांसी श्री सुरेंर र्संि तेिर्तया
कराये जाने पर जााँच से कांस्टे0 द्वारा र्कए र्ए उक्त की पुर्ष्ट िुई िै। कांस्टे0
का कृत्य लापरिािी, अकमिण्यता एिं अनुशासनिीनता का द्योतक िै
र्जसकी घोर पररर्नंदा की जाती िै।

पि सं0-26/2013

(Sd.)

र्दनांक-25.1.2014

पुर्लस अिीिक, रेलिे

HOBn-157

झांसी

12.2.14
प्रमार्र्त
ि0 अ0
पुर्लस अिीिक
बांदा"
"पररर्नन्दा प्रर्िर्ष्ट

िर्ि-2017-प्रिारी र्नरीिक कोतिाली मिोबा की
आख्या र्दनांर्कत 16.5.17 के अनुिम में र्दनांक 16.5.17 को जररए
सीयूजी मोबाइल िेिार्िकारी नर्र द्वारा सूचना प्राप्त िुई र्क लाकप ड्यूटी में
कां0 जर्त नारायर् आरिी शराब के नशे में ड्यूटी में आया िै जो ड्यूटी
पर आने के बाद से काफी समय से अनुपर्स्थत िै इस सूचना पर मैं प्रिारी
र्नरीिक कोतिाली मय िमरािी फोसि के न्यायालय पररसर मिोबा आया
एिं उक्त आरिी पुर्लस की तलाश करिाई, जो काफी देर बाद नशे के
िालत में स़िक र्कनारे दुकान पर बैठा र्मला र्जससे िाताि की र्यी तो
उसके मुंि से शराब की दुर्ांि आ रिी थी तथा आंखें लाल थी र्जसका
डॉक्टरी परीिर् र्जला अस्पताल मिोबा में कराया र्या र्जसमें एलकोिल
लेने की पुर्ष्ट की र्यी इनका यि कृत्य कतिव्य के प्रर्त घोर
अनुशासनिीनता, स्िेच्िाचाररता, उदासीनता को प्रदर्शित करता िै, र्जसकी
पररर्नन्दा की जाती िै।

प0सं0 द-27/2017
प्रमार्र्त

SP

र्दनांक-31.7.2017
ि0 अ0

MBA

SP MBA"

"अथिदण्ड

िर्ि 2017

जब आप िर्ि 2018 में पुर्लस लाइन जनपद मिोबा में
र्नयुक्त थे, तब र्दनांक 26.3.18 को पुर्लस लाइन मिोबा से आपकी
ड्यूटी मेर्डकल झांसी बन्दी सुरिा िर प्रसाद पुि खरजुिा के सुरिा र्ाडि में
शस्त्र इन्सास नं0 18630887 मय 02 मैर्जीन ि 40 अदद कारतूस
बजाय आरिी र्शिम कुमार के लर्ायी र्यी थी, र्कंतु आप द्वारा ड्यूटी िेतु
मेर्डकल कॉलेज झांसी के र्लए रिाना र्कए जाने के उपरांत सुरिार्ाडि
ड्यूटी पर न जाकर तथा अपने कतिव्यों के प्रर्त सचेत न रिकर नशे की
िालत में असलिा इन्सास आर्द से बेपरिाि राठ रोड र्तरािे की पुर्लया के
पास नाले में प़िे िुए पाए र्ए, र्जससे आम जन-मानस में पुर्लस की िर्ि
िूर्मल िुई। आपका यि कृत्य अपने पदीय कतिव्य के प्रर्त घोर लापरिािी,
अकमिण्यता, अनुशासनिीनता, स्िेच्िाचाररता का द्योतक िै।

अतः पुर्लस अर्िकाररयो की (दण्ड एिं अपील)
र्नयमािली 1991 के र्नयम 14(2) के अन्तर्ित प्रस्तार्ित 01 माि
(30 र्दिस) के िेतन के बराबर अथिदण्ड से दर्ण्डत र्कए जाने का आदेश
पाररत र्कया जाता िै।

प0सं0 द-19/2018
प्रमार्र्त

SP

Date-27.4.2018

ि0 अ0

MBA SP

MBA"

27. The principles in Baikuntha
Nath Das and the subsequent authorities
make the entire service record relevant for
the
purpose
of
a
decision
by
the
4 All. Jagat Narayan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1337
Government to compulsorily retire in
public interest. In considering the entire
record, according to the principles in
Baikuntha Nath Das, more weight has to
be attached to the performance of the
employee during the later years. Here is a
case, where the petitioner might have
consistently earned good entries and
rewards during the earlier period of his
service, but from 2010-2017, his record has
been marred by adverse entries, minor
penalty and the commission of an offence
under Section 34 of the Police Act. The
older record of good entries or the rewards
earned and the adverse material available
against the petitioner between the years
2010-17, cannot give rise to an inference
that it is a case where there is no material
whatsoever on record for the Screening
Committee or the Appointing Authority to
act under Fundamental Rule 56(c). The
sufficiency of material is not a matter for
the consideration of the Court. The ground
here urged was total absence of adverse
material against the petitioner, inasmuch as
that is one ground on which an order of
compulsory retirement may be judicially
reviewed. But, the record here shows that
material adverse to the petitioner and very
tangible is available on record. Therefore,
there is no force in the petitioner's
submission on this count.

(iii) Violation of principles of
natural justice

28. It is argued by the learned
Counsel for the petitioner, which is also
the case pleaded in the writ petition that
the impugned order is bad, because no
notice was issued to the petitioner or
opportunity afforded to submit a reply. It
is argued that the impugned order being
one which visits the petitioner with
adverse civil consequences could not
have
been
made
without
affording
opportunity.

29. Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi,
learned Standing Counsel appearing on
behalf of the State refuted the said
submission and says that principles of
nature justice have no application in a
case of compulsory retirement under
Fundamental Rule 56(c). The principles
laid down in Baikuntha Nath Das,
extracted hereinabove, make it evident
that adherence to the requirement of
natural justice has no place in the context
of compulsory retirement. An order of
compulsory
retirement
is
neither
stigmatic nor a punishment. Most of the
remarks regarding exclusion of the
principles of natural justice in Baikuntha
Nath Das, considering older authority,
have
come
in
the
context
of
uncommunicated adverse entries that
have been later on taken into account by
the
Screening
Committee
or
the
Government
to
pass
an
order
of
compulsory retirement. It does not seem
to have been suggested in the said
authority, as done in the present case by
the petitioner, that before passing an
order
of
compulsory
retirement,
opportunity should be afforded in the
form of a show cause. In Baikuntha
Nath Das, there are some pertinent
remarks, which form the basis of
principles culled out in Paragraph No.34
of the report extracted hereinabove. The
aforesaid observations in Baikuntha
Nath Das read:

"30. On the above premises, it
follows, in our respectful opinion that the
view taken in J.N. Sinha [(1970) 2 SCC
458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791] is the correct one
viz., principles of natural justice are not
attracted in a case of compulsory retirement
1338 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
under F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to
it. In this context, we may point out a
practical
difficulty
arising
from
the
simultaneous
operation
of
two
rules
enunciated in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra
[Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of
Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 188 : (1987) 3 ATC
496] . On one hand, it is stated that only the
entries of last ten years should be seen and
on the other hand, it is stated that if there
are any adverse remarks therein, they must
not only be
communicated
but
the
representations made against them should
be considered and disposed of before they
can be taken into consideration. Where do
we draw the line in the matter of disposal
of representation? Does it mean, disposal
by the appropriate authority alone or does it
include appeal as well? Even if the appeal
is dismissed, the government servant may
file a revision or make a representation to a
still higher authority. He may also approach
a court or tribunal for expunging those
remarks. Should the government wait until
all these stages are over? All that would
naturally take a long time by which time,
these reports would also have become stale.
A government servant so minded can adopt
one or the other proceeding to keep the
matter alive. This is an additional reason
for holding that the principle of M.E. Reddy
[Union of India v. M.E.