# Jagat Pal v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2010) 3 ILRA 1147
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2010-09-24
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26617 of 2010
- **Bench:** Ran Vijai Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jagat-pal-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-41734
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

C.S.C.

U.P.
Recruitment
of
Dependents
of
Government Servant Dying in Harness
Rules
1974-
Rule-2(c)-Compassionate
appointment-claim
by
adopted
sonrejected
on
ground
of
not
within
definition of family under the Rule-heldillegal-adopted son has same status as of
natural son-necessary direction issued.

Held Para 27

After observing so, this Court has held
that adopted son is as good as real son.
In this view of the matter, I am of the
definite opinion that the adopted son has
got the same status under law as the
1148 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
natural son has and there can be no
difference in between the two (adopted
or
natural)
either
for
mythological
purpose
or
for
secular
purpose
to
perpetuate the line of family. The view
taken by me also finds support from
several decisions of this Court rendered
in Sunil Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and
others, 1994 (68) FLR 283; Singhasan
Gupta Vs. State of U.P. and another,
(1996) 1 UPLBEC 4 and Ravindra Kumar
Dubey Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2005
(4) ESC 2706 (All). Thus, the impugned
notice/order
dated
17.4.2010
sent/passed by respondent no. 3 is
unsustainable in the eye of law and
deserves to be quashed.
Case law discussed:
2009 (3) ESC 1869 (All), 1994 (68) FLR 283,
(1996) 1 UPLBEC 4; 2005 (4) ESC 2706. (All)

## Text

3 All] Jagat Pal V. State of U.P. and others
1147

13. It is, thus, well settled that if any
of the offences referred to in section 195
(1)(b) (ii) of the Code is committed in
respect of a document before the document
is produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any court, the provisions of
section 195 would not be attracted. In that
eventuality, it will not be necessary to hold
an inquiry under section 340 of the Code for
filing the court complaint. But the position
is different if such offence is committed
after production of the document in
evidence in the court. In that situation the
court complaint as required by section 195
of the Code would be necessary for taking
cognizance and it would also be necessary
to hold the inquiry under section 340 of the
Code before filing the complaint.

14. In the present case, the alleged
forgery
in
the
revenue
record
was
committed outside the Court much prior to
the initiation of the proceeding in the
Additional Commissioner's Court and it is
nowhere stated that any forgery was
committed in or in relation to the judicial
proceeding pending in the Court of learned
Additional Commissioner or in respect of a
document
filed
in
that
proceeding.
Therefore, the provisions of section 340 of
the Code. are not attracted in this case and
as such no inquiry was required under
section 340 of the Code before filing the
complaint.

15. The complaint filed by learned
Additional Commissioner, in view of the
aforesaid reasons, is nothing except an
ordinary complaint under section 190(1)(a)
of the Code. Therefore, the learned
Magistrate was legally required to observe
the procedures laid down in Chapter XV of
the Code. But in this case no such procedure
has been adopted and summoning order has
been passed treating the complaint under
section 343 of the Code. Therefore, the
summoning order cannot be upheld.

16. The petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 04.06.2010 and all
consequential
proceedings
done
in
pursuance of the impugned order are
quashed.

17. The learned Magistrate is directed
to proceed with the complaint in accordance
with Chapter XV of the Code and pass an
appropriate order in accordance with law.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.09.2010

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26617 of 2010

Jagat Pal

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri C.B. Dubey

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C.

U.P.
Recruitment
of
Dependents
of
Government Servant Dying in Harness
Rules
1974-
Rule-2(c)-Compassionate
appointment-claim
by
adopted
sonrejected
on
ground
of
not
within
definition of family under the Rule-heldillegal-adopted son has same status as of
natural son-necessary direction issued.

Held Para 27

After observing so, this Court has held
that adopted son is as good as real son.
In this view of the matter, I am of the
definite opinion that the adopted son has
got the same status under law as the
1148 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
natural son has and there can be no
difference in between the two (adopted
or
natural)
either
for
mythological
purpose
or
for
secular
purpose
to
perpetuate the line of family. The view
taken by me also finds support from
several decisions of this Court rendered
in Sunil Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and
others, 1994 (68) FLR 283; Singhasan
Gupta Vs. State of U.P. and another,
(1996) 1 UPLBEC 4 and Ravindra Kumar
Dubey Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2005
(4) ESC 2706 (All). Thus, the impugned
notice/order
dated
17.4.2010
sent/passed by respondent no. 3 is
unsustainable in the eye of law and
deserves to be quashed.
Case law discussed:
2009 (3) ESC 1869 (All), 1994 (68) FLR 283,
(1996) 1 UPLBEC 4; 2005 (4) ESC 2706. (All)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.)

1. By means of this writ petition, the
petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of
certiorari
quashing
the
impugned
reply/order dated 17.4.2010 sent/passed by
respondent no. 3 with the further prayer to
direct
the
respondents
to
provide
appointment to the petitioner under the
U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of
Government Servants Dying in Harness
Rules 1974 (herein after referred to as
Rules of 1974), within specific period.

2. The facts giving rise to this case
are that the father of the petitioner late
Radhey Shyam was confirmed Class IV
Employee with the respondents and he
expired in harness on 21.11.2007. Initially
the father of the petitioner was issue less
therefore through registered adoption deed
he adopted the petitioner on 25.2.2004,
copy of adoption deed has been brought on
record as Annexure No. 2 to the writ
petition. After the death of father, the
petitioner has applied for appointment on
compassionate ground on 3.12.2007 under
the Rules of 1974 but nothing was done.
The petitioner has sent thereafter number
of reminders on 15.2.2008, 28.2.2008 and
16.7.2008, copy of the application as well
as reminders have been brought on record
as Annexure No.4 to the writ petition.

3. It is stated in paragraph no. 7 of
the writ petition that the petitioner has
obtained
succession
certificate
on
14.2.2008, copy of which has been brought
on record as Annexure no. 3 to the writ
petition.

4. It is stated in paragraph 9 of the
writ petition, that after the death of his
father, the petitioner has received all the
service benefits as a legal heir of his father
late Radhey Shyam.

5. It appears that the respondent no. 3
through letter dated 3.3.2008 has inquired
from the higher authorities whether an
adopted son of a deceased employee is
entitled to get an appointment under the
Rules of 1974? copy of this letter has been
brought on record as Annexure 5 to the
writ petition. When nothing was done, the
petitioner has sent a legal notice on
10.4.2010. In pursuance thereof, impugned
information dated 17.4.2010 has been
given to the petitioner which has been
brought on record as Annexure no. 1 to the
writ petition.

6. From the perusal of the impugned
reply/order dated 17.4.2010 sent by
Regional Director Social Forestry Region
Bareilly it transpires that Regional Director
Social Forestry Region has taken the view
that adopted son do not fall in the ambit of
son and dependent as defined under Rule 2
(c) of the Rules of 1974.
3 All] Jagat Pal V. State of U.P. and others
1149

7. While assailing the impugned
notice Sri C.B. Dubey, learned counsel for
the petitioner has submitted that it has not
been denied by the respondents that the
son of a deceased employee falls in the
ambit of definition of family as defined
under the Rules of 1974 and what has been
denied is that the adopted son do not fall in
the ambit of son. In his submissions, the
respondents could not differentiate in
between son and adopted son as the
adopted son is as good as natural son under
the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance
Act,
1956
(hereinafter
referred to as Act of 1956). In his
submissions, the impugned reply/order
dated 17.4.2010 is illegal and deserves to
be quashed.

8. Refuting the submissions of
learned counsel for the petitioner learned
standing counsel has tried to defend the
notice/order dated 17.4.2010 passed by
Regional Director Social Forestry Region
Bareilly by saying that the order dated
17.4.2010 is perfectly legal as there is no
word like 'adopted son' mentioned in the
definition of family of the dependents of
deceased under the Rules of 1974. In his
submissions no infirmity can be attached
with the impugned order.

9. I have heard learned counsel for
the petitioner and learned standing counsel
and considered their submissions. With the
consent of learned counsel for the parties
the writ petition is taken up for final
disposal on the admitted facts of the case.

The dispute involved in this case
revolves towards the word 'adopted son'.

10. To appreciate the controversy the
mythological and the legal aspect of 'son' is
required to be looked into. In Vadic age
and even thereafter prior to India got its
independence, the insistence was given for
a Hindu to have a male child and the desire
for male offspring (in particular) was very
natural in all early societies. Male issue
was prized both for the continuance of the
family as well as for the performance of
funeral rites and offerings. The Veda
declares: "Endiess are the worlds of those
who have sons; there is no place for the
man who is destitute of male offspring'.
"May
our
enemies
be
destitute
of
offspring". " O Agni, may I obtain
immortality by offspring. Rig Veda, I, 21, 5
cited in Vas., XVII, 2-4; Vishnu, XV, 45;
Manu, VI,36, 37; IX, 45.

11. Not only in Vadic age but later on
Manu
also
emphasized
the
Vadic
injunction regarding the necessity for a son
thus : "Through a son, he conquers the
world; through a son's son, he obtains
immortality but through his son's grandson, he gains the world of the Sun. Because
a son delivers his father from the hell
called PUT, he was therefore called PUTTRA. Manu, IX, 137, 138; Vishnu, XV, 44,
46.Medhatithi explains that the hell called
'put' isonly ' the name given to the four
kinds of elemental life on the earth' and
that all that is meant is that by the birth of
a son, the father is "born next in a divine
life". Jha., Manu Bhashya, Vol. V, 123.

So also Yajnavalkya : "Because
continuity of the family in this world and
the attainment of heaven in the next are
through sons, son's sons and sons'
grandsons, therefore women should be
loved and protected."

For the above reasons, in the old age
twelve or thirteen kinds of sons were
recognized and mentioned by the earlier
writers : (1) The legitimate son (Aurasa) is
1150 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
one begotten by a man upon his lawfully
wedded wife. (2) The son of an appointed
daughter (Putrikaputra). (3) The son of the
wife (Kshetraja) is one begotten upon a
man's appointed wife or widow by his
brother or near kinsman. (4) The son
secretly born (Gudhaja or Gudhotpanna)
is the son born in a man's house to his wife
when it is not certain who the father is. (5)
The maiden's son (Kanina) is the son born
to an unmarried girl in her father's house
before her marriage. (6) The son of the
pregnant bride (Sahadha or Sahodhaja) is
the son born to a woman whom one, while
she is pregnant, knowingly or unknowingly
marries. (7) The son of a twice married
woman (Paunarbhava). (8) The son given
(Dattaka) is the son whom his father or
mother gives in adoption. (9) The son
made (Kritrima) is the son whom a man
himself makes his son with the adoptee's
consent only. (10) the son bought (Krita) is
one sold by his father and mother or either.
(11) The deserted son (Apaviddha) is one
who, having been discarded by his father
and mother, is taken in adoption. (12) The
son self-given (Svayamdatta) is one, who
bereft of father and mother or abandoned
by them presents himself saying ' Let me
become thy son', and (13) The Nishada or
Parasava is the son of a Brahmin by a
Sudra wife. A person by appointing
another as heir to his property cannot
confer on him the status of a son; the latter
cannot claim as heir of another on the
footing that he is the son of the farmer.
Gaut. XXVIII, 32,33; Baudh II, 2, 3, 14-30;
Apas, II, 6, 13, 1-11; Vas., XVII, 9-22;
Vishnu, XV, 1-27; Manu, 1, 127-140, 158184;Yajn II, 127-132; Nar.,XII, 17-20; 4547; Mitakshara, I, xi.

Gurudit Singh v. Surjit Singh 1950 Pepsu
56: 2 Pepsu LR 431.

12. Under the old Hindu law the
insistence was not only given for having a
son and perpetuate the family line but
simultaneously a pious duty was also
imposed to maintain the dependents like
wife, aged parents and a minor son as a
matter of personal obligation arising from
the very existence of the relationship and
quite independent of the possession of any
property, ancestral or self acquired. A text
of Manu cited in the Mitakshara and the
Parasaramadhaviya says "It is declared
by Manu that the aged mother and father,
the chaste wife and an infant child must be
maintained even by doing a hundred
misdeeds". The text is not found in Dr.
Buhler's edition (SBE Vol XXV) but is cited
in Mit. on Yajn II, 175 (Setlur, 819). The
last clause is only an arthavada to show
the importance of the duty. Ghose HL, I,
322; see Manu, VIII, 389 with Medhatithi's
comment on it; Savitribai vs. Luximibai
(1878) 2 Bom 573; Commr of Income-tax
v. Lakshmipathi Saheba (1935) 14 Pat 313,
316; Bhoopathi Nath Vs. Basanta Kumari
(1936) 63 Cal 1098, 1110. So the
Mitakshara lays down that " where there
may be no property but what has been selfacquired,
the
only
person
whose
maintenance out of such property is
imperative are aged parents, wife and
minor children."

13. The importance and extent of the
right of maintenance necessarily arisen
from the theory of an undivided family.
The head of such a family is bound to
maintain its members, their wives and their
children, to perform their ceremonies and
to defray the expenses of their marriages,
in other words, those who would be
entitled to share in the bulk of the property
are entitled to have all their necessary
expenses paid out of its income. The right
of maintenance includes persons who by
3 All] Jagat Pal V. State of U.P. and others
1151
reason of personal disqualification are not
allowed to inherit, such as the idiot, the
madman and the rest. The right of
maintenance was also extended with
respect to illegitimate son, Concubine etc.
(some portion of the citation has been
borrowed from Mayn's Hindu Law.

14. After India's independence the
Parliament realising the present need of the
society, has enacted The Act of 1956. The
object and reason of the Act as has been
mentioned in introductory part of the Act is
reproduced below :-

With the passing of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, which treats sons
and daughters equally in the matter of
succession, it has now become possible to
simplify the law of adoption among
Hindus. The Bill provides for the adoption
of boys as well as girls. There is no longer
any justification for allowing a husband to
prevent his wife from taking a child in
adoption after his death. The adoption
made by a widow will hereafter be in her
own right. No person need be divested of
any property, which has vested in him, by
reason only of the fact that subsequent to
such vesting an adoption has been made.
This rule of divesting has been the cause of
many a ruinous litigation.

15. It would appear from the perusal
of the Act that after enactment of the Act
of 1956 now a male or female both can
adopt a child either it is male or female.

16. In the Ancient Hindu Law five
kinds of adopted sons were recognized as
there was no concept to adopt a female
child. However the Modern Hindu Law
recognizes only two namely, the dattaka
(adopted ) and the Kritrima. The dattaka
form is in use all over India. The Kritrima
form is prevalent in Mithila and the
adjoining districts.

17. The object and purpose of the
adoption are two fold. The first is religious,
to secure benefit to the adopter and his
ancestors by having a son for the purpose
of offering funeral cakes and libations of
waters to the soul of the adopter and his
ancestors. The second is secular, to secure
an heir and perpetuate the adopter's name.

18. However after the enactment of
the Act of 1956 the mythological purpose
has disappeared but so far as the modern
purpose is concerned, the Act provides for
adoption of a child and once a child has
been adopted either by adoptive father or
mother it has a definite effect which has
been provided under Rule 12 of the Act of
1956.

For better appreciation Section 12 of
the aforesaid Act is quoted below.

12. Effects of adoption :- An adopted
child shall be deemed to be the child of his
or her adoptive father or mother for all
purposes with effect from the date of the
adoption and from such date all the ties of
the child in the family of his or her birth
shall be deemed to be severed and
replaced by those created by the adoption
in the adoptive family :

Provided that-

(a) The child cannot marry any
person whom he or she could not have
married if he or she had continued in the
family of his or her birth;

(b) Any property which vested in the
adopted child before the adoption shall
continue to vest in such person subject to
1152 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
the obligations, if any, attaching to the
ownership of such property, including the
obligation to maintain relatives in the
family of his or her birth;

(c) The adopted child shall not divest
any person of any estate which vested in
him or her before the adoption.

19. From the perusal of above
section, it is clear that an adopted child
shall be deemed to be the child of his or
her adoptive father or mother for all
purposes with effect from the date of the
adoption and from such date all the ties of
the child in the family of his or her birth
shall be deemed to be severed and replaced
by those created by the adoption in the
adoptive family.

20. It appears recognizing the duty to
maintain the dependents in the service law
also, proper care has been taken of by the
framer of the Rules of 1974 by making a
provision for saving out the dependents of
a deceased employee who have fallen
under financial crunch after the death of an
employee
while
working
with
the
department. There also almost on the same
line the family has been defined and
dependents have been identified.

21. In so far as the lis involved in this
case with regard to equivalence of adopted
son with natural son (aurasa) under the
Rules of 1974 is concerned, it has tobe
looked into in the context of the word
'family' as defined under Rule 2 (c) of the
Rules of 1974 which runs as under.

(i) Wife or husband

(ii) Sons

iii)
Unmarried
and
widowed
daughters.

(iv) If the deceased was unmarried
government servant, brother unmarried
sister and widowed mother dependent on
the deceased government servant.

22. From the perusal of Rule 2 (c) (ii)
and 2 (c) (iii) of the Rules of 1974 it
transpires that the word 'sons' and
'unmarried and widowed daughters' have
been mentioned whereas in Clause (iv) the
word 'brother' and 'unmarried sister' has
been mentioned. Here, in Sub-Rule 2 (c)
(ii) and 2 (c) (iii) plurality is attached with
the word 'son' and 'daughter' whereas with
respect to Sub-Rule 2 (c) (iv) it is in
singular form by mentioning (brother and
sister) and not 'brothers' and 'sisters'.

23. The problem which is wriggling
in my mind is that why the framer of the
Rules of 1974, in Rule 2 (c) (ii) and (iii)
has attached plurality with the word 'son'
and 'daughter' as 'sons' and 'daughters' and
why singularity is attached with the word
'brother' and 'sister' in Rule 2 (c) (iv),
whereas either it is son, daughter, brother
or sister they constitute one class and in
each category their number may be more
than one, therefore, in view of Rule 5
which provides that only one member of
the family is entitled to be considered for
appointment, attaching plurality with the
word 'son' and 'daughter', the framer of the
rule has intended to mean something more
behind the attachment of plurality with the
word 'son' and 'daughter' and that looking
into the object of the rule in recent
perspective is to attach plurality means not
to infer number of the 'son' and 'daughter'
but the kind of the 'son' and 'daughter' who
are legally recognized under law, as after
the enactment of the Act of 1956 the kind
3 All] Jagat Pal V. State of U.P. and others
1153
of 'son' and 'daughter' has become more
than one i.e. natural/real/son/daughter and
adopted son/ daughter. It may be noticed
that according to the Act of 1956 right of
adoption has been given to a male and
female both to adopt either a male or
female child. The effect of such adoption is
that by virtue of adoption a male or female
child becomes a 'son' or 'daughter' as the
case may be of the adopter and this
constitute a separate category i.e. adopted
son/daughter and that is why plurality is
not attached with the words 'brother' and
'sister' under Rule 2 (c) (iv) as the kind of
'brother' and 'sister' for the purposes of this
rule or other rules is not more than one.

24. Otherwise also the Act of 1956
has been enacted by the Parliament and the
provisions contained in this Act, unless
something otherwise is provided under this
Act, will prevail over any Act of the State
legislation or Rules framed under Article
309 of the Constitution of India. In the
present case, the Rule which is under
consideration has been framed under
Article 309 of the Constitution of India,
therefore, also the effect of adoption
providing same status to adopted child as
of a natural child will prevail over the rule
in question and both the adopted child as
well as the natural child will be treated at
par, without there being any difference
amongst two.

25. For the above reason, I am of the
view that the Rules of 1974 itself provide
that the adopted son/daughter is also
included in the definition of family as
defined under Rule 2 (c) (ii) and (iii) of the
Rules.

26. Otherwise also the definition of
family as defined under the Rules of 1974
begins as, 'family shall include' and this
aspect of the matter has been considered
by this Court in the case of Shiv Prasad
Vs. State of U.P. and others 2009 (3) ESC
1869 (All) where this Court has observed
as under :-

It appears that in Rule-2 of Dying in
Harness Rules which defines various
words or expressions mentioned in the
definition
clause,
these
words
and
expressions are preceded by the words
'unless the context otherwise requires'. It
means that the definitions given in the
definition clause should be normally
applied and given effect to but this normal
rule may however be departed from if
there be something in context to show that
definition should not be applied. In view of
legal position stated by Hon'ble Apex
Court referred hereinbefore, the definition
of expression 'family' given in the
definition clause appears to be an inclusive
definition as the definition clause used the
word 'include' in the definition of family.
Such definition is known as expansive
definition and is used to enlarge the
meaning of the words or phrases occurring
in the body of statute and when it is so
used, the words or phrases should be
construed as comprehending not only such
thing which they signify according to their
natural import, but also those things which
the interpretation clause declares that they
shall include. Where the definition is an
inclusive definition, the word not only
bears its ordinary, popular and natural
sense whenever that would be applicable
but it also bears its extended statutory
meaning. Contrary to it, where in a
definition clause of a statute a word is
defined to mean certain thing whenever
that word is used in that statute, it shall
mean what is stated in the definition
'unless the context otherwise requires'.
Such definition is known as restrictive
1154 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2010
definition and used to restrict the meaning
of expression defined in the definition
clause and whenever such word or
expression is used in the body of the
statute, it shall be restricted to meaning
assigned in the definition clause and
popular or natural meaning of such word
or expression shall not be applied.

27. After observing so, this Court has
held that adopted son is as good as real
son. In this view of the matter, I am of the
definite opinion that the adopted son has
got the same status under law as the natural
son has and there can be no difference in
between the two (adopted or natural) either
for mythological purpose or for secular
purpose to perpetuate the line of family.
The view taken by me also finds support
from several decisions of this Court
rendered in Sunil Saxena Vs. State of U.P.
and
others,
1994
(68)
FLR
283;
Singhasan Gupta Vs. State of U.P. and
another, (1996) 1 UPLBEC 4 and
Ravindra Kumar Dubey Vs. State of U.P.
and others, 2005 (4) ESC 2706 (All).
Thus, the impugned notice/order dated
17.4.2010 sent/passed by respondent no. 3
is unsustainable in the eye of law and
deserves to be quashed.

28. In the result, the writ petition
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned
reply/order dated 17.4.2010 passed by
respondent no. 3 (Regional Director Social
Forestry, Region Bareilly) is hereby
quashed.

29. Keeping the purpose and object
of the Rules of 1974 i.e. to save out the
family from financial crunch after the
death of an employee, the concerned
respondent is directed to reconsider the
petitioner's
matter
in
view
of
the
observation made hereinabove within a
period of six weeks from the date a
certified copy of this order is produced
before him, by passing a reasoned
speaking order.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.08.2010

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE A.P.SAHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26836 of 2004

Dinesh Kumar

 ...Petitioner
Versus
The Dy. Inspector General of Police and
another

 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Mithilesh Kumar Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri K.C.Sinha

Constitution of India Article 342-Caste of
Kol-whether
included
in
schedules
tribes?-held-'No' unless-promulgated by
President of India-even in constitution
scheduled tribes U.P. order 1967-not
included the caste of Kol as scheduled
tribes can not be treated as S.T.

Held: Para 5

Without entering into the other merits of
the procedure for dispensing with the
services of the petitioner it would be
appropriate
to
mention
that
the
Constitution
Scheduled
Tribes
Order
1950 promulgated by the President of
India under Article 342 does not contain
the caste of the petitioner namely 'Kol'
as a scheduled tribe. The Constitution
Scheduled Tribe Uttar Pradesh Order
1967 published on 24th June, 1967
includes only five castes as scheduled
tribes namely (1) Bhotia (2) Buksa (3)
Jannsari (4) Raji and (5) Tharu. The