# Jagdamba Singh v. State of U.P. &Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 654
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-12
- **Case number:** Misc. Single No. 3971 of 2008
- **Bench:** Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/jagdamba-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44534
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Act, 1978- Section 6 (3) - Whether
power for reviewing the earlier order
given to the Joint Director under the said
Act? (Paras 6 to 10)- Power to revoke an
order passed under Section 6 (3) of the
said Act has been specifically granted to
the Education Officer, which can be
exercised by him on sufficient cause
being shown by the elected Committee
of
Management
-
Writ
Petition
Dismissed. (E-8)

## Text

654 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
those
which
victim
has
actually
incurred and which are capable of
being calculated in terms of money.
Pecuniary damages may include: (i)
medical
attendance;
(ii)
loss
of
earning profit upto the date of trial;
(iii) other material loss.

43. Non-pecuniary damages
are such which are incapable of being
assessed by arithmetical calculation.
They may include; (i) damages for
mental
and
physical
shock,
pain
suffering, already suffered or likely to
be suffered in future; (ii) damages to
compensate for the loss of amenities
of life which may include a variety of
matters, i.e., on account of injury the
claimant may not be able to walk, run
or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of
expectation of life, i.e., on account of
injury the normal longevity of the
person concerned is shortened; (iv)
inconvenience, hardship, discomfort,
disappointment, frustration and mental
stress in life.

and
in
the
following
decisions reliance can be placed as
they relate to additional amount being
paid for future loss of income even in
the case of injured claimant:-

(I) Sanjay Kumar Vs. Ashok
Kumar and another, (2014) 5 SCC
330;

(II) Syed. Sadiq and others
Vs. Divisional Manager, United India
Insurance Company Limited, (2014) 2
SCC 735;

(III)
V.
Mekala
Vs.
M.
Malathi and another, (2014) 11 SCC
178; and

(IV) Uttar Pradesh Motor
Vehicles
(Eleventh
Amendment)
Rules, 2011.

18. Additional amount of Rs.1 Lac
for his future loss of income requires
to be granted looking to the fact that
he has been totally crippled and he
will not be able to do the work of
conductor. He is entitled to a sum of
Rs.50,000/- for each limb for getting
artificial limb or crutches. The amount
awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced
by
Rs.4
Lac.
The
amount
not
deposited yet be deposited within 12
weeks.

19. The interest at the rate of
9% from the date of filing of the
claim petition till award and 6%
thereafter from the date of filing of
cross
objection.
The
Insurance
companies first shall deposit their
share of the amount namely 50%
each and then recover the said
amount
from
the
owner.
The
appellant
would
be
entitled
to
recover
the
amount
deposited
pursuant to the interim order from
the driver - owner as per the
procedure prescribed.

20. Record and proceedings be
sent back to the Tribunal. Appeal and
cross-objection
both
are
partly
allowed.

21. This Court is thankful to both
the counsels to see that this very old
matter is disposed of.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.09.2019

BEFORE
1 All. Jagdamba Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
655
THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.

Misc. Single No. 3971 of 2008

Jagdamba Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. &Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Janardan Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. U.P Junior High School (Payment of
Salary to Teachers and other Employees)
Act, 1978- Section 6 (3) - Whether
power for reviewing the earlier order
given to the Joint Director under the said
Act? (Paras 6 to 10)- Power to revoke an
order passed under Section 6 (3) of the
said Act has been specifically granted to
the Education Officer, which can be
exercised by him on sufficient cause
being shown by the elected Committee
of
Management
-
Writ
Petition
Dismissed. (E-8)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta
Chandra, J.)
 (ORAL)

(1) Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

(2) This petition has been filed
challenging the order dated 27.02.2008
passed by the opposite party no.2-Joint
Director
Education,
Faizabad,
as
contained in Annexure No.1 to the
petition.

(3) It has been submitted by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, who is
the Adhyaksh, Ayodhya Prasad Bachchoo
Lal Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya,
Bangaon,
Tehsil
Tarabganj,
District
Gonda, which runs the School that such
order could not have been passed. It is
wholly without jurisdiction as there is no
such power for reviewing the earlier order
given to the Joint Director, under U.P.
Junior High School regarding (Payment
of
Salary
to
Teachers
and
other
Employees) Act, 1978.

(4) The facts of the case as argued
by the learned counsel for the petitioner
are that Ayodhya Prasad Bachchoo Lal
Uchchatar
Madhyamik
Vidyalaya,
Bangaon,
Tehsil
Tarabganj,
District
Gonda,
is
an
Institution
imparting
education upto Intermediate and the
petitioner is the Adhyaksh of the
Institution, and the opposite party no.5
namely Jagdish Prasad, is the Manager of
the Committee of Management. Since the
Institution in question is under Grant-inAid upto Class VIIIth, the provisions of
U.P. Junior High School (Payment of
Salary to Teachers and Other Employees),
Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred as Act of
1978) are applicable to the Institution. A
recommendation was made by the District
Basic Shiksha Adhikari on 17.10.2007 to
the Joint Director, the opposite party no.2
regarding several problems is making
payment of salary to the Teachers and
other employees of the Institution and
requested for appointment of Authorized
Controller. The Joint Director, Education,
Devi Patan Mandal, Faizabad, passed the
order on 19.01.2008 appointing Finance
Accounts Officer, in the office of the
BSA, Gonda, as Authorized Controller for
the Institution. The Authorized Controller
was functioning in accordance with the
directions issued by the High Court from
time to time in several writ petitions and
had complied with such orders. All of a
sudden, the opposite party no.2 has passed
an order on 27.02.2008 revoking his
earlier order passed under Section 6 (3) of
656 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Act of 1978 and reinstated the
Management.

(5) It has been argued by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that there is no
provision of review of order by the
Education
Authorities
in
the
Basic
Education Manual and, therefore the
opposite party no.2 could have passed the
order reviewing his earlier order.

(6) This Court has perused the
Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1978 which
has been referred to in the impugned
order and also in the earlier order dated
19.01.2008.
It
is
being
quoted
hereinbelow:-

"6. Enforcement of provision and
directions. -(1) Where on the basis of an
inspection of an institution or its records
or otherwise, the Education Officer is
satisfied
that
the
management
has
committed default in complying with any
direction given under Section 4 or with
the provisions of Section 3 or Section 5,
he may through the Inspector, recommend
to
the
Regional
Deputy
Director,
Education, that action be taken against
the institution under sub-section (2).

(2) On receipt of a recommendation
under sub-section (1), the Regional
Deputy Director, Education, may call
upon the management to comply with the
said direction or provision or to show
cause within a week why the management
should not be superseded.

(3) Where the management fails to
comply as aforesaid or to show cause, or
the Regional Deputy Director, Education,
considers
the
cause
shown
to
be
insufficient he may by order supersede the
management,
for
such
period
not
exceeding one year as may be specified in
the order, and authorise any person
(hereinafter referred to as the Authorised
Controller), to take over the management
of the institution for the said period:

Provided that the Regional Deputy
Director, Education, may where he
considers it necessary or expedient so to
do -

(i) extend the said period from time
to time, so however, that the period so
extended does not exceed five years in the
aggregate; or
(ii) revoke the order at any time :

Provided further that nothing in
clause (ii) of the preceding provision shall
bar the passing of a fresh order under this
section."

(7) It is apparent from a perusal of the
Section itself that under the First Proviso Sub
Clause (ii), the Authority who has passed the
order can also revoke his order at any time.
But after revoking, the Second Proviso further
provides that nothing in Clause (ii) of the
preceding Proviso shall bar the passing of a
fresh order under the Section.

(8) It is apparent that on cause being
shown
to
be
sufficient
by
the
Management that it has complied with a
directions issued by the Education Officer
earlier and with the provisions of the Act,
the officer has been conferred the power
of revoking his earlier order. Therefore,
the arguments raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, cannot be said
to be appropriate.

(9) Learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgment rendered by a Co-ordinate
Bench in the case of Janta Shiksha
Prasar Samiti and Another Vs. State of
U.P. and Others reported in [2008 (26)
LCD 433]. The facts in the aforecited case
were that an Authorized Controller had
been appointed in the Institution and
1 All. Santoshi Vs. VIth Addl. Dist. Judge Sultanpur & Ors.
657
elections were conducted by him on
24.01.1997. The elections were granted
approval by the Sub Divisional Officer by
order dated 09.08.2001 while exercising
the power under Section 25 (1) of the
Societies Registration Act. Later on, the
SDM passed another order on 03.04.2002,
recalling
his
earlier
order
dated
09.08.2001. The contention before the
Court was that Sub Divisional Officer
while exercising his jurisdiction under
Section 25 (1) of the Act of the Societies
Registration Act could not have recalled
his earlier order which would amount to
exercising the power of review which he
was inherently lacking.

(10) This Court referred to several
judgments rendered by this Court in
similar matters, and then observed in
Paragraph no.8 as follows:-

"From the aforesaid decision cited
by learned counsel for the petitioner, it
appears that the inherent power which an
authority can possess is with relation to
either a specific provision for the same or
application of the principles as are
available under Section 151 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. In the absence of such
a provision an order could be recalled by
the authority only upon a proved ground
of fraud or misrepresentation. It cannot
be disputed that in case an order has been
obtained by fraud or misrepresentation,
the authority concerned would be within
its power to recall such order. However,
in case no such ground exists an order
cannot be recalled by reviewing it by the
authority in the absence of a specific
power under a statute. Admittedly, the
Societies Registration Act does not
provide for any such inherent power in
the
Sub-Divisional
Officer
while
exercising his jurisdiction under Section
25 (1) of the Act. Such inherent power has
not been given by any express provision
either in the Act or in the Rules.
Therefore, in the absence of any provision
under the statute permitting exercise of
inherent power it cannot be assumed by
the Sub-Divisional Officer."

(11) It is apparent from a perusal of
Section 6 (3) of the Act, 1978, that the
power to revoke an order passed under
Section 6 (3) of the Act has been
specifically granted to the Education
Officer, which can be exercised by him on
sufficient cause being shown by the
elected Committee of Management. The
aforecited case is hence not applicable.

(12) Accordingly, the writ petition is
dismissed. No order as to costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.04.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Misc. Single No. 2247 of 1991
connected with
Misc. Single No. 2248 of 1991 and Misc. Single
No. 2249 of 1991

Santoshi ...Petitioner
Versus
VIth Addl. Dist. Judge Sultanpur &Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
V.P. Nagaur, Manju Nagaur

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., R.K. Saxena, Shailesh Pathak

A. The Court Fees Act, 1870 - Section 7
(xi) (cc) - whether order passed by the
trial court as well as by the revisional
court on the issue of payment of Court